EDUCATION AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF CULTURE: A CRITICAL STUDY OF TWENTIETH CENTURY ENGLISH AND AMERICAN THEORIES

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ABSTRACT

The reconstructionist position may be expressed as an ideology which treats schools and teachers as major instrumentalities of directed cultural change. Other conceptions of education and culture emphasize the social force of cultural heritage, whereas reconstructionism treats the heritage as a resource for future social and individual growth.

Reconstructionist thinking is conspicuous in those modern nation-building enterprises which seek to direct schooling by broad social policy objectives. Throughout the twentieth century, in England and America, many educational thinkers have diagnosed a contemporary cultural crisis and proposed large-scale remedial treatment. These proposals have come most notably from Fabian socialists, scientific rationalists like Wells and Russell, Dewey and other American experimentalists, and Mannheim. Their diverse proposals for cultural renewal may be organized under such headings as crisis, planned change, holism, and a quest for unity and order. Thus, reconstructionists seek to manage the change processes whose destructive impact on culture they have analysed.

Reconstructionism embraces a range of educational positions, from the cultural autonomy of education to the assimilation of educational to other social and political processes. Despite the ambitious synthetic accounts given of these and other relationships, various tensions remain, including those between common core curricula and specialization, mass and minority institutions, and social adjustment and independence of mind. Reconstructionism, by broadening the teacher's role, poses particular problems for teacher education. As a theory of planned cultural change, its focus is not so much the school as the institutions of teacher education, which are conceived as potentially culturally critical and innovative.

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INTRODUCTION

1. Purpose and Structure of the Study

The subject of this study is a movement in twentieth-century English and American thought which conceives education as a process capable, under certain conditions, of profoundly changing the social and cultural order. It is a movement of thought whose parts are loosely and variously connected by different writers, rather than a tight and coherent theory. From their different standpoints, the reconstructionist theorists have developed a wide range of ideas on the possibilities education might provide for social and cultural reform. Thus, reconstructionism is both a theory of education and a theory of directed social and cultural change.

There is no best single source or set of sources for reconstructionist thinking. There have been historical expositions and occasional appraisals of particular aspects of the movement, mainly of its American exponents (1). But, so far as I am aware, the writers I classify as reconstructionists have never been related and appraised as members of a single movement of thought. Inevitably, my study falls far short of a comprehensive account of the numerous strands of reconstructionist thinking in education. My intention is not, however, to give a detailed exposition of a tradition or the history of a set of ideas, but to build a perspective and to achieve a unity of understandings, based on exposition, interpretation and appraisal of reconstructionist discussions of certain key themes and ideas. I have also attempted to suggest ways in which reconstructionist thinking on some of these themes and ideas might be modified and developed. These suggestions are not made in the form of a systematic theory,

which is a major undertaking in its own right; rather, they occur in the context of criticism of the selected key ideas, and as part of the two overview chapters, Nine and Fifteen.

For the purposes of this study I have selected and grouped English and American reconstructionists as follows:

1. Piecemeal social and political reformers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century in England: Sidney and Beatrice Webb.

2. Utopian and scientific rationalists of the same period: Wells and Russell.

3. American experimentalists of the nineteen-twenties and thirties: Dewey, Kilpatrick, Rugg, Counts and Childs.

4. Advocates of large-scale, central social planning in Britain in the nineteen-forties: Mannheim and Clarke.

5. Later experimentalists, recent American reconstructionists: Frank, Brameld, Raup and Stanley.

Many of these, for example Russell, Dewey and Wells, have discussed a wide range of subjects and educational topics other than the idea that education can and should function as a participant in directed social and cultural change. I have not attempted to give a comprehensive account of their thinking, but have concentrated on those aspects which appear most relevant to the basic reconstructionist objective. In addition to the writers I have mentioned, many other twentieth century thinkers have touched upon or examined the reconstructionist viewpoint. I discuss some of this wider group of writers briefly, and refer to others. However, I have restricted detailed appraisal to the more limited group who are, I believe, the more significant of the English and American reconstructionist thinkers.

My study is divided into two parts. In the first part, taking

the thinkers in the order listed above, I discuss and appraise their more general ideas on society and culture. My principal objective is to outline and assess the distinctive strategies of culture analysis adopted by the different writers. Each thinker or group of thinkers is examined in the light of three central ideas: methodology of culture analysis; assessment of the contemporary cultural situation; recommendations for substantial changes.

In the second part, I adopt a different system of classification. This is based not on the distinctiveness of reconstructionist culture analysis, but on a set of commonly recognized educational themes. These themes have to do with the concept of education, curriculum, teaching and learning, the role of the school and of the teacher, and teacher education. Having identified, in Part I, the distinctiveness of the different reconstructionist perspectives on culture, I aim in Part II to bring out the overall unity of reconstructionism as an educational movement, and to assess it within a framework familiar to educational theorists.

In the first chapter, I give a general outline of reconstructionism, and in Chapters Nine and Fifteen I look back on reconstructionist thinking about culture and education. These chapters together provide what is, I hope, a comprehensive overview of my interpretation of reconstructionist thinking. But, since reconstructionism is a term which is not in common usage, it may be helpful to give a very brief indication of some of the major issues and ideas lying behind its use.

2. Education and Cultural Reconstruction

At first sight, reconstructionism might be thought to refer to a process of retrieving and perhaps remaking something valuable from

the past, like the restoration of an ancient monument or a Greek vase. However, reconstructionism is not a golden age theory directed primarily towards a restoration of the past, although its exponents are certainly interested in retaining and restoring certain ideals, values and processes which they feel are threatened in a rapidly changing society. These elements from the past are treated as a valuable heritage which can only survive and be utilized by deliberate effort, usually collective effort in the form of social planning. The ideals are variously described as the democratic heritage, community-mindedness, rational and reflective inquiry, cultural unity and order, the methods of consensus and shared decision-taking, equality of consideration, and personal growth.

The reconstruction of culture consists in establishing these and other ideals and forms of experience in individuals and in society at large through the processes of education. In Chapter Three, I try to show how this normative use of the concept of culture may be related to other normative uses and to the more technical uses in social science. These ideals represent the aspirations of individuals and groups within society, but have been only very incompletely achieved in any historical society. If educational institutions and teachers were able to universalize them and to create in children the appropriate dispositions, habits, attitudes and skills, then, it is claimed, by degrees, a very profound transformation of society and of the totality of cultural experience would occur. For such a transformation to take place, schools and teachers must learn in various ways to co-operate with and to work through other social institutions and agencies. Furthermore,

education, conceived in these very broad terms, becomes no longer simply a matter of schooling, but an enterprise to which many other institutions in society might and should contribute. The basic reconstructionist aim is to ensure that society becomes educative in outlook, and hence that the rapid social changes of our time are as far as possible brought under control and directed to educational ends.

It is clear, then, that the reconstructionist view of education is not restricted to schooling but takes account of many other cultural processes upon which it depends and which it is hoped to influence and direct. Educationists are encouraged to develop an awareness of a very wide range of cultural phenomena and to understand how education might become part of a directed process of social change. These considerations, which many educational theorists have ignored, or denied, point to a view of education which arouses many misgivings. Schooling appears as a political instrument, or a social reform movement, and the teacher it appears is being asked to assume an active political and social reform role (2). I discuss these issues at some length in different parts of this study and point out some of the possibilities as well as the difficulties to which they give rise.

The emphasis in the reconstructionist theory upon a wider context of social and political thought, and upon the idea of culture as an order of social and individual experience which can be substantially modified, gives rise to questions about its standing as an educational theory. It is because of this wider context of social and political thought, and because reconstructionism is a theory which prescribes or recommends various forms of social and political action, in addition to more particular processes of school-

based teaching and learning, that I have adopted a different frame of reference from that normally used in discussing educational theory. The frame of reference I propose to adopt is that of ideology.

3. Reconstructionism as Ideology

3.1 The analysis of educational theory

Reconstructionism does not readily fall within any of the categories into which the study of education has been conventionally divided. It raises problems and questions which are of interest to philosophers, sociologists and psychologists without being primarily a philosophical or a sociological or a psychological theory. Because many reconstructionists are determined to build up a complete structure of ideas for the guidance of educational policy, in the widest sense, their writings include discussion of the curriculum, institutional provision, the role of the teacher, and a wide range of factors affecting educational change. Reconstructionists aim to influence the total system and to bring about substantial changes in the direction of policy.

The attempt to analyse the theory as a totality requires a frame of reference different in several respects from those analysed in the well-known studies of the logic of educational theory by Hardie, Hirst, O'Connor and others (3). In these studies, educational theory is analysed into discrete elements: empirical, evaluative and metaphysical, but little is said about the way in which theories relate and organize these elements into coherent programmes of action. Reconstructionism is essentially a prescriptive theory, designed to stimulate and encourage action across a broad educational front. It seems to me more akin to a socio-political reform movement than to the more limited or more

precisely defined theories of education that Hardie and the others had in mind. The concept which seems to me most appropriate to such a wide ranging, action-orientated reform movement is ideology. But, in arguing for the ideological frame of reference, I am conscious of two dangers which I shall try to avoid. The first is the Marxist-Freudian propensity for unmasking and disposing of ideologies by disclosing the interests, whether social or personal, that they serve. The second danger is that of overlooking or minimizing the significance of the irrational elements in ideological thinking. There are ways of using the concept of ideology, for purposes of critical analysis, which avoid at least the more extreme forms of these two dangers.

My wish to make use of the concept of ideology in examining reconstructionism arises in part from a sense of dissatisfaction with the influential studies in the logic of educational theory which I mentioned above. These studies emphasize the logical discreteness of elements within theories. While they indicate very clearly the nature of the analytic and critical tasks which philosophers, psychologists and others need to undertake in relation to a lot of loose talk and writing about education, they neglect aspects of educational theorizing which seem to me no less important than conceptual clarity and factual correctness. These other aspects, for which there is, unfortunately, no clear framework corresponding to that developed by Hardie and the others, refer, first, to the structure or total organization of educational theories, and, second, to their function as interpretations of and guides to action. In examining the reconstructionist theories we need to keep in mind that they were written and presented as wholes, as comprehensive, coherent systems of thought.

It is not only reconstructionist thinking which deserves to be examined with an eye to the interrelationships of the various elements. In the romantic view of education from Rousseau through Pestalozzi, Froebel and the modern progressives it is of some importance that characterizations of the "nature of the child" are linked with various prescriptions for treatment. To criticize the arguments used, or more often not used, for links that are made is a vital task, but it does not exhaust the problem of understanding how those links came to be made, to persist, to develop and shift. Such criticism does not of itself bring out the particular flavour or style of the formulation; nor does it disclose the logical complexity of acts of application and interpretation. Finally, it tells us little about the processes involved in revising these theories to produce more satisfactory statements, should we wish to do so.

As theories of practice, educational theories attempt to make a difference to how people live, think and feel. At the personal level, Oakeshott brings out the relationship of practice to <u>desires</u> for improvements:

> "In practical activity, then, every image is the reflection of a desiring self engaged in constructing its world and in continuing to reconstruct it in such a manner as to afford it pleasure. The world here consists of what is good to eat and what is poisonous, what is friendly and what is hostile, what is amenable to control and what resists it. And each image is recognized as something to be made use of or exploited."(4)

In a social context where desires for improvement are shared and communicated in language this attempt to "improve experience" gives rise to the idea of expressive style. This is a function which is intrinsic to theory conceived as theory of practice. It is not something external

to it. Thus we need to consider style as itself a persuasive device in the formulation and presentation of a particular theory. The selection of metaphorical names for processes (e.g. "growth", "initiation") is itself evocative of other things, and educational theorists commonly strengthen arguments not only by the chosen structural devices but also by the selection of evocative and emotionally charged metaphors. Except in the processes of "de-mythologizing", "stripping down" and "exposing", these stylistic features of educational theory have been largely overlooked in the recent preoccupation with analysis into "elements".(5)

These metaphors, this language, have a significance which is contextually conditioned. That is to say, in the analysis of ideas, movements are detectable in which the symbols and modes of expression of one field of discourse may be seen to draw upon, to echo, and to interrelate with those of other fields and with various forms of action (6). This is not quite Mannheim's thesis of the sociology of knowledge, which seeks to identify the social interests served by and the underlying social assumptions of theories in the human sciences. Nor is it the Marxist argument that, at any rate in the human sciences, all theory is ideological superstructure to the underlying realities of productive relationship. My claim is a more modest one, that an adequate analysis of practical theories depends in part on apprehending their total structure and understanding. both how they are intended to be interpreted and applied, and something of the cultural context of which they are an aspect. Just what this "some-thing" is and just how far this wider understanding is "required", are much more difficult problems; inquiries must terminate if they are to be intelligible. However, emphasis on the discrete elements of educationa

theories and sustained and systematic criticism of these elements from pre-defined standpoints, while fundamental, does not exhaust the possibilities.

Amongst recent writers, Reid seems to have been almost alone in drawing attention to two of the features, noted above, that do not fall within the conventional empirical-normative-metaphysical categorization - namely, the question of interpreting theories of practice, and the "synthetic", "global" quality of educational theory (7). All theorizing, according to Reid, is talk about or reflection upon some aspect of the practical processes of education. He draws a rough distinction between talking or thinking about something and taking action to sustain or change that thing - a distinction that overlooks the point that persuasive <u>talk</u> about education may be a highly effective way of sustaining or changing the thing in question. However, the difference is in emphasis, and it may be brought out by conceiving levels, or points in a continuum (talk ... action), and allowing that in certain circumstances the levels or points may move about.

The philosopher, on Reid's analysis, is he who attempts to develop a general, a global theory of education. Dewey cast the philosopher into a similar role (8). One problem to which this gives rise is that of attributing to the philosopher skills, interests and knowledge he may not possess or may actually, as philosopher, wish to dissociate himself from. As Reid argues, the building of a global theory may not be so much a matter of developing new knowledge as of building up fresh perspectives of relationships, and fresh understandings of interconnections. However, the analytical philosopher commonly eschews this part of his traditional role, to the extent that it involves

"enunciating basic values and formulating intermediate objectives for educational institutions" (9).

The argument about whether the philosopher is best equipped to develop global educational theories is for my purpose of less significance than the fact that Reid has identified as important in educational theory features which are not brought out in the logical categories identified by Hardie, Hirst and O'Connor. For example, "deep, sensitive participation, actual and imaginiative, in the concrete situations out of which the judgments arise"; and the development of perspectives, judgments, or "passionate concern" (10). These considerations suggest that the structure of educational theory needs to be categorized as it were vertically as well as horizontally: vertical categories of logical structure, and horizontal categories, much more difficult to define, of style, organization and interpretation; loosely, categories of function and use.

3.2 The concept of ideology

The analysis of educational theories into discrete empirical - evaluative - metaphysical elements has clarified the task of criticism and directed students and theorists to relevant fields of knowledge, e.g., philosophy and psychology. However, I have argued that there are important features of the more holistic educational theories, including reconstructionism, which are easily neglected when attention is centred exclusively on the separate elements. The concept of ideology, used with caution, is an appropriate tool for the analysis of educational theories like reconstructionism, which seek to define and recommend large-scale, coherent action programmes. For other reasons, too, the concept of ideology is apposite

in a discussion of reconstructionism, as we shall see from a brief review of its emergence in the French enlightenment.

Although, in general, it might be argued that to study the history of a term is to make only a limited contribution to elucidating the concept (11), there is a peculiarly close relationship between the earlier uses of the term ideology, and reconstructionism. This relationship is of such a degree of intimacy that it is not misleading to say that the reconstructionist theory is itself a modern version of the eighteenth and early nineteenth century theory of ideology.

According to Lichtheim, the term ideology is a French revolutionary heritage, to be found first in the writings of the enlightenment savant, Antoine Destutt de Tracy (12). Destutt was one of the managers of the newly founded Institut de France, which supported Napoleon's rise to power. The ideologists of the Institut were liberals, espousing the cause of rationalism, and forerunners of positivism: the Institut became a centre of "experimental studies" in literature, art, religion and psychology. By thus making rationalism a cause, the ideologists identified certain forms of inquiry, or an interest in <u>ideas</u>, with particular <u>ideals</u>. Destutt conceived ideology both as a "natural history of ideas" - and, echoing Locke and Condillac, as a critique of the notion of absolute norms. But, by attaching himself so enthusiastically to the belief that through experimental inquiry he and his colleagues could establish "the general laws of sociability", this critical <u>philosophe</u> erected a particular normative system. The ideologists of the Institut created a faith, which blended: (1) Baconian criticism of <u>idola</u> as a starting point for the reformation of consciousness; (2) Cartesian rationalism as a

model for inquiry and for the structural arrangement of ideas; and (3) the enlightenment onslaught on prejudice, via reason and education, as represented in the works of Condillac, Holbach, Helvetius and others.

When Destutt and his associates thought of themselves as ideologists, they had in mind ideas which it may not be too misleading to outline as a programme:

1. certain values and norms of conduct to which they subscribed not dogmatically but in a spirit of tentativeness and continuing self-criticism;

2. a set of ideas which united them, providing a social bond or even perhaps a myth, creating a community of inquirers out of otherwise disparate intellectuals, and providing a sense of identity;

3. a perspective of a historical or a wider social kind - a world view or a set of matrices which constituted a very general frame of reference, or a tradition of thought and action, within which systematic inquiry could take place, and which gave to the inquiry a certain flavour, or coherent style;

4. a mode of conjoint activity which constituted a <u>praxis</u>, a set of links between thought and action, such that thought was seen to relate to practice as a form of inspiration and guidance as well as a mode of analysis and of criticism;

5. a concern for orderly, planned social change, inspired by the general ideals of liberal democracy, as they emerged in thought in the early post-Revolutionary period.

This is an idealization or a more systematic post hoc realization of what was undoubtedly in practice a less developed point of view. Nevertheless, the early thought and activities of the Institut ideologists pointed in these directions as well as in the directions of Hegelianism, Marxism and Freudianism.

3.3 <u>Criticisms of ideological thinking</u>

It is not necessary to trace the later vicissitudes of the concept

of ideology in the possession in turn of Hegelians, Marxists, Comteians, romantics, psychoanalysts, and, more recently, of the exponents of sociology of knowledge (13), to appreciate that what it generally identifies are sets of principles governing practical conduct. Unfortunately, pejorative usages have tended to drive out all others, so that, amongst contemporary political writers, it is not uncommon to find Marxist or Freudian "therapies" being advocated; i.e. the "unmasking" of ideological thinking. On the one hand, according to Marxist pejorative use, a theory is "ideological" if it elevates contemplation and isolates thought from the physical and material processes of production; if it emerges within a socially stratified situation (the rigid separation of classes); if it exalts contemplation over action; if it appears to separate the products of human activity from the labour that produces them, and converts these products into self-sustaining realities - the reified abstractions of religion, the law, bourgeois politics, etc. Here ideology is the "disease" of "false consciousness", and those entertaining ideologies are held to be suffering from an affliction and in need of a cure. On the other hand, according to Freudian pejorative uses, a theory is held to be ideological to the extent that it throws the cloak of apparent order and coherence and objectivity over the emotional maze of self-interest, self-assertion, free association and fantasy, which provide some of the underlying dynamics of personality. Ideology as rationalization is, as with Marxists, a form of false consciousness, a fiction which must be penetrated if truth is to be unveiled. Again, those entertaining ideologies are victims of delusions from which they can be freed by suitable therapy (14).

Beyond these two major critical onslaughts on ideology, the sociologists of knowledge, following Weber and Mannheim, have emphasized the social and contextual "determining" of knowledge, or, more properly, of awareness and beliefs. Weber characterized ideology as the intellectual reflex of determinate social processes. Ideas come to be treated as weapons which particular interest groups in society wield in defence of their special interests. In Mannheim's confusing usage (influenced by Pareto), the weapons are "ideological" to the extent that they represent the intellectual efforts of conservative groups to retain power and resist change detrimental to their interests; they are "utopian" to the extent that they represent the intellectual struggles of reformers to overthrow the conservatives and to rule in their stead (15). In either case, the idea systems take the form of complex creeds designed to distort rather than disclose the truth, and to enlist support for causes rather than for the notion of inquiry. It is one major task of the sociology of knowledge to unmask the "situational" motives of the protagonists of ideology and utopia and to disclose the social consequences of their credo convictions.

The characterization of ruthless political movements as ideological has, again, brought the term into disrepute in liberal western democracies in the twentieth century. Chief amongst the "ideological movements" have been fascism and communism, perceived as totalitarian, doctrinaire, authoritarian, fanatical and violent. These are the movements that use ideology as a culture binding and bonding procedure, building up bonds of affect, social commitment, and unifying the particular community, nation or movement by providing it with a historical and mythical perspective and a vision of a triumphant future. Thus individuals are provided with an identity, even if it is only an identity

of stereotypes, and culture is supplied with solidifying meanings, symbols and institutions (16). In view of the form and content of these ideologies and the expansionist politics of which they have been a part, many critics have attempted to build up a distinction in action theory between ideology and science, criticizing the former for making universalistic, non-contextual, non-testable claims (17); for presenting value judgments in the guise of facts (18); for projecting doctrines instead of developing structures of inquiry, and so forth (19). Ideology as a form of distortion or a battleground of interest groups is characterized as irrational, while science and conceptual analysis, by contrast, are rational procedures by which we may gain objective knowledge and clear understanding (20).

As Corbett makes clear in his systematic critique of the ideologies of American democracy, Marxism, and Catholicism, the anti-rational elements in ideological thinking are, however, susceptible to the corrective treatment of self-awareness and criticism (21). The non-rational elements (if subscription to certain values can be so described) cannot be fully dispensed with as they are an ingredient of any form of action.

3.4 Resuscitation of ideological thinking

The hostile usages made of the term ideology, arising from the later nineteenth century and twentieth century developments in thought and practice which I have reviewed, may be contrasted with the definitions of two contemporary philosophers, both interested in reviving the enlightenment understanding of ideology as a socio-political mode of constructive theorizing.

In his paper "Democracy and ideology", Williams argued that ideologies need not be "explicit", "noisy", "openly inculcated" and

"totalitarian". By ideology he meant, broadly, "a system of political and social beliefs" that (a) "embodies some set of values or ideals, and, consequently, some principles of action" and (b) "connects with its values and principles of action some set of very general theoretical beliefs which give the values and principles some sort of backing or justification". Furthermore, these general beliefs must be "about man, society and the state, and not merely about some aspect of man in society" (22). Thus there can be ideologies of liberalism, as well as totalitarianism, of democracy as well as absolutism. Somewhat in the fashion of the early nineteenth century ideologues, Williams proceeded in his paper to sketch out the principles of a liberal, democratic ideology.

More sustained in criticism and constructive theorizing is Corbett's treatment of ideology. He defined the term thus:

> "a set of beliefs about the conduct of life and the organisation of society; a set of beliefs about man's nature and the world in which he lives; a claim that the two sets are interdependent; and a demand that those beliefs should be professed, and that claim conceded, by anyone who is to be considered a full member of a certain social group."(23)

Accordingly, Catholicism, American democracy, Leninism, the myths of English Public Schools, or Amazonian Tribes (but not, he claimed, the theory of relativity) count as ideologies. Corbett went further, maintaining that:

1. the word will carry no implication that what it notes is good, bad, or indifferent, and no implication as to the rationality of the beliefs referred to;

2. there will be no restriction on the content of beliefs that make up the ideology: it may be moral, political, religious, etc., in character;

3. the beliefs referred to will have implications for conduct: to accept an ideology is to be committed to a way of life;

4. some of the beliefs referred to concern the general nature of man and society;

5. the beliefs constitute a system, they support one another;

6. the term will imply associating the system of beliefs with some institution in such a way that holding these beliefs is a condition of membership.

By excluding relativity, Corbett has accepted the common distinction between scientific rationality and the biases and distortions of cultural belief and action systems.

It is true that, from a purely logical point of view, the theory of relativity, the quantum theory, Galileo's and Newton's mechanics, Darwin's evolutionary theory and so forth are non-ideological, as Corbett defines the term. However, the wider cultural consequences that have followed on the formulation, the testing, the development and the modification of these and other scientific theories are by no means non-ideological. Conspicuous amongst examples of the rapid assimilation of scientific theories into social ideologies are the religious and philosophical impact of Newtonianism in the eighteenth century, of Darwinism in the nineteenth century and the persistence of Baconianism since the seventeenth century (24). Nor are the conditions - personal and social - which give rise to these theories in the narrowest sense free of some ideological features. "The scientific creator", in Russell's words, "like every other, is apt to be inspired by passions to which he gives an intellectualistic expression amounting to an undemonstrated faith, without which he would probably achieve little" (25). Russell adds that without this "faith" scientific work of a creative kind - theorizing - will itself cease.

Similarly, as Kuhn has shown, replacing one scientific theory by another involves the substitution of one complex frame of reference, or

world view, for another (26).

These are considerations usually described as psychological and sociological. They are commonly claimed to have no bearing on the problems of validating and testing theories, except insofar as they facilitate or hinder these processes. Yet when, as it appears, the very creation and the human consequences of theories are so intimately bound up with matters of faith and feeling and complex action, it is difficult to avoid concluding that purely logical analysis, for all its importance, is only a part of the story. We can be clear that certain types of theory are non-ideological only by severely abstracting them from a context of germination, development and use. Provided this is how we understand theory in a scientific sense, it is correct to describe it as non-ideological, but,as Polanyi has argued, it is by no means the case that this form of understanding is the only one proper even to scientific theories in the strictest and narrowest sense (27).

There is a further point to notice about Corbett's definition. His contention that the normative and empirical constituents of the system are "interdependent" echoes Destutt's enlightenment confidence in the mutuality and interpenetration of accretive experimental science and social-moral progress. It is just this claim that gives ideologies their distinctive character, as thought systems, and their appeal as reform programmes. Yet this claim also gives rise to the most serious problems in criticizing and validating them.

This latter point will be taken up later, when the reconstructionist theory is under critical scrutiny. Meanwhile, it is sufficient to emphasize the importance of open-mindedness, tolerance and scepticism in developing, interpreting and examining ideologies. These are

qualities which the "noisier" ideological theories themselves overlook or deliberately omit. It is appropriate to heed Montaigne's admonition. Like Hume after him he "warned men to beware of those who bore a sanctified appearance and imposed a burden of austerities": these are zealots, partisans to causes (28).

From the general outline of some of the major features and claims of reconstructionist theory that follows in the next chapter it will become apparent why the ideological frame of reference is considered more appropriate to a full understanding than the other schematization of educational theory which we have considered.

4. Chapter Synopses

Chapter I: General Outline of the Reconstructionist Theory

I raise the issue of the cultural bearings of reconstructionism and classify theories of culture into value spare and value laden, a distinction which emphasizes that even the descriptive and explanatory theories of culture science embody value preferences. Reconstructionism is a value laden theory, which I contrast with two significant theories of education which have also used the concept of culture in a normative way. These are the theories of classical humanism and child interest. I briefly discuss the distinctive contribution of the reconstructionists to problems of transmitting and transforming culture through teachers and schools and note some of the perfectibilist assumptions of reconstructionism.

Chapter II: A Case Study: the Report of the Indian Education Commision, 1966: Ch. 1. Education and National Objectives

I justify the choice of this document as a recent example of reconstructionist thinking in a developing society. I summarize the main arguments of the commission insofar as they project a culturally

reconstructive role for education. The arguments hinge on the concept of crisis. Education is treated by the commission as the chief instrumental means of culture re-making. I examine their claim that there is a crisis and consider the arguments for subserving education to the pre-defined ends of national development. My conclusion is that in several important respects the commission fails to make an adequate case. But their study is a valuable reconstructionist document, since it raises many of the issues and problems relevant to a discussion of the wider movement of reconstructionism.

Chapter III: Theories of Culture and Culture Reconstruction

I distinguish two broad types of culture theory - descriptive and prescriptive. I further divide the descriptive theories of certain anthropologists into those which emphasize culture determinism and those which emphasize individual creativity. I contrast the emphasis on individual creativity with those theories which emphasize mammalian inheritance, and those which emphasize social facts and education as a process of culture transmission (Durkheim). I define reconstructionism as a prescriptive culture theory which seeks to combine culture determinism and individual creativity.

Chapter IV: Fabian Socialism: the Webbs

I discuss the contribution of the Webbs to the methodology of social research and raise the problem of relating their interventionism to historicist strands in their thought. I examine the Webb diagnosis of the failings of English society and distinguish their sharp and detailed criticism from the more holistic crisis theories. In assessing their contribution, I emphasize the operational utility, for reformers, of piecemeal, empirical inquiries. I argue that their diagnosis of

cultural malaise is directed by an intention to engage in systematic reform. Piecemeal and holistic aspects of their reform proposals are contrasted and I suggest that their reform programme may be considered as a series of unresolved tensions: centralized and decentralized institutions; individual freedom and collectivization; a managerial democracy; gradualism and revolutionary communism; parochialism and internationalism.

Chapter V: Utopian and Scientific Rationalism: Wells and Russell

I argue that Wells and Russell share many beliefs, as scientific rationalists. I characterize Wells' diagnosis of culture as bourgeois man and society in a period of crisis. The elements of this crisis are numerous, but what is most conspicuous is Wells' dislike of disunity and his belief that failure to apply science in society is chiefly responsible for the chaos he detects. I consider and assess his prescriptions for culture development, emphasizing his views on: scientific utopianism, collectivization and interpersonal relations, elitism and democracy, creativity and the pursuit of beauty, and the concept of the new man. I argue that, despite historicist tendencies, Wells is not a historical determinist but an imaginative prophet and prescriptivist. I conclude the chapter with a brief discussion of Russell's criticisms of contemporary civilization, his theory of human nature, and his recommendations for implementing a modern liberal ideology.

Chapter VI: American Experimentalists

I briefly discuss the polarization of society and individual in educational theory and try to reach an understanding of the experimentalist definition of a person. I appraise the experimentalist contribution to a cultural understanding of education. The problem of culture breakdown in experimentalist theory is related both to its

metaphysical doctrines and to its emphasis on the impact of science and technology on western culture. The crisis, according to the experimentalists, is peculiarly a crisis in American democracy. I consider this claim and examine a variety of experimentalist assessments of their cultural dilemma in the 1930s. I examine the more holistic proposals for reconstruction made by Rugg, and Dewey's more cautious adoption of a method of reform instead of a grand design. Dewey's views on democracy, however, go beyond method, a point which may be appreciated by contrasting his theories with Max Weber's. I conclude the chapter with an assessment of the relationship between social trends and interventionist planning.

Chapter VII: Culture Crisis: Mannheim

Mannheim's most significant contribution is to the methodology of culture analysis. I discuss his theory in terms of the distinctiveness of culture science, and of levels of meaning, holism, perspectivism, relational truth, and realms of experience beyond history. His theory is, in sum, inadequate and has been rightly criticized. Nevertheless he has made many valuable suggestions for culture study. I examine his views about the relationship of man and culture, emphasizing the problems raised by his aspiration to remake man. Then I criticize the ideological features of his diagnosis of culture crisis. Mannheim ambitiously projected a total planning framework for western democracies. I discuss his justification of planning and in greater detail examine his theory of elites and point out some of its shortcomings. I conclude by considering Mannheim's alleged historicism, in the light of Popper's critique, and argue that Mannheim is not a historicist, on Popper's definition.

Chapter VIII: Later Experimentalists

I consider very briefly post-war developments of reconstructionism and explain my limited choice of sources. These sources are Brameld, an exponent of holistic, crisis diagnosis and of planning; Frank, who has emphasized psychological aspects of culture renewal; and the social foundations movement represented by Stanley, Smith, Raup and others. I criticize Brameld's failure to establish his claim that there is a culture crisis and suggest that Frank has made a significant, if partial, contribution by emphasizing a neglected aspect of reconstructionism, namely personality. However, Frank proposes an impossibly large and complex method of culture study. The social foundations movement is examined mainly in terms of the quest for consensus and cultural unity. I criticize the arguments the later experimentalists advance but suggest that the proposed method of "practical judgment" has many uses even if these are more limited than those intimated by its authors. I discuss Stanley's careful, detailed analysis of cultural disintegration and suggest that his attempt to rescue the democratic heritage raises as many problems as it is intended to solve. I show how in the social foundations movement the school curriculum is turned into an emergent culture synthesis and point to some of the difficulties raised by this proposal. Finally, I assess the quest for cultural order and integration in Frank, Brameld and Stanley.

Chapter IX: Overview and Critique of Part I

A summary of the major themes introduced throughout Part One: I examine these critically, and contrast the reconstructionist approach to culture change with selected aspects of Durkheim, Marx and recent technological change theories.

Chapter X: Education: Concepts, Objectives and Processes

From a very wide range of material I select four topics for more detailed discussion. First, I examine the concepts of growth and experience and the good life in Dewey and Kilpatrick, which provide the basis for later reconstructionist thinking about the processes of education. Second, I criticize the tendency of several reconstructionists, notably Brameld, to assimilate education to enculturation. Third, I consider the problem of elitism,which is a necessary but not always adequately acknowledged feature of reconstructionist thinking. Fourth, I argue that, despite occasional pronouncements - e.g. by Counts, Mannheim and Clarke - reconstructionism does not subscribe to indoctrination. I follow the discussion of these four topics by a brief review of reconstructionist proposals for reconstruction through education, treating theorists in the order I followed in Chapters Four to Eight. I conclude with an assessment of the reconstructionist quest for culture order through education.

Chapter XI: Curriculum Design I: the Webbs, Wells, Dewey and Kilpatri

I divide the substantial but nevertheless uneven contributions of the reconstructionists to curriculum theory into two, making Chapters Eleven and Twelve two parts of a single extended discussion. After briefly reviewing selected contemporary ideas on the subject of a general design for the curriculum, I consider the utilitarian-studies proposal of the Webbs, and Wells' curriculum design for a new society. In view of Dewey's and Kilpatrick's significance as leaders of twentieth century educational thinking, I examine at some length their views on problem solving, project work and their emphasis on scientific culture.

Chapter XII: Curriculum Design II: Rugg, Mannheim, Brameld and later Experimentalists

I discuss Rugg's conception of the curriculum as a design for future social living, prepared through a nation-wide effort of adult education. Rugg's ideas of a curriculum core of contemporary and future-directed social experience is given different treatment by Mannheim, Brameld and the later experimentalists, but the quest for some common, unifying body of ideas and values is similar. In considering Mannheim's views I draw a contrast between his perspectivism and Dewey's problem solving. I conclude by assessing reconstructionist curriculum thinking in the light of a number of central themes: the curriculum as a model of future culture trends; the problem of a common core; the role of the teacher as curriculum designer; and the problem of a clash between school values and those of other social institutions.

Chapter XIII: Schools: Institutional Structures for Reconstruction

Following a brief discussion of the reconstructionist advocacy of a wide-ranging educational programme, I conclude that in their writing they gave far more attention to schools and similar institutions than to less orthodox educational instrumentalities. I discuss each of the major reconstructionist theories according to a distinct theme, rather than by attempting to comprehend the full range of their institutional prpposals. For the Webbs, the theme is building up an administrative infrastructure; for Wells, it is the design of experimental institutions, in particular the "world brain", an encyclopaedic information storage and retrieval system; for the experimentalists of the Dewey era, the theme is the democratization of public educational institutions; for Mannheim and Clarke, it is the school as a transitional society, in terms of past and future, primary and secondary groups; and for the later experimentalists it is the effort to achieve social

consensus in and through school education. I conclude by discussing the general issue of the school as an institutional agency of change, together with the argument for a greater democratization of the school.

Chapter XIV: The Teacher as Agent of Reconstruction

I examine three topics: the qualities sought in teachers, the task of teaching, and teacher education. I argue that the reconstructionists are typically optimistic and expansive in their treatment of these subjects. The ultimate source of directed change, it emerges, is the teacher education programme. This raises the question of who educates the teachers. Following a review of selected outlines of teacher education programmes, I conclude that the reconstructionists, despite the weaknesses of their specific proposals, were right to identify teacher education as a critical area. Future developments of reconstructionist thinking should pay particular attention to the problems of developing and strengthening the teacher's perception of himself as a change agent, and to the determination of appropriate initial and inservice programmes of teacher education.

Chapter XV: Overview and Critique of Part II

A summary of the major themes discussed in Part Two: I make an assessment of the major reconstructionist arguments on education as a force for cultural change, and suggest some possible lines of development if the theory is to maintain its vitality.

PART ONE

CHAPTER I

GENERAL OUTLINE OF THE RECONSTRUCTIONIST THEORY

Reconstructionist thinkers are concerned with the broad policy objectives of education and with those major strategies which seem most suitable for achieving or operationalizing these objectives. Their conceptions of the directions which cultural and social development should follow vary considerably; reconstructionism nevertheless may be distinguished from other educational theories through an analysis of the different uses educationists make of the concept of culture. I shall attempt in this chapter to bring out the distinctiveness of the reconstructionist position by contrasting it with two other educational theories, which I shall designate classical humanism and romantic communitarianism.

For this purpose, I shall start by distinguishing uses of the concept of culture into "value spare" and "value laden", a distinction which I develop in Chapter Three. By value spare, I mean those forms of inquiry and theorizing which endeavour to eliminate or to make very sparing and explicit use of value preferences; the so-called pursuit of objectivity in research and scholarship. I do not use the more familiar expression "value neutral" because, as I argue in Chapter Three, the situation or standpoint of observers, their choice of topics to investigate and their use of concepts and of instruments all presuppose value preferences, even if these are to some extent public and shared by other inquirers. By value laden, I mean the preferences, ideals and values which are an integral part of action theories, such as educational theories, where what is at

stake is the determination and justification of policies for modifying and guiding very wide areas of human experience. Thus, the determination, through education, to achieve an enlargement of the scope of rationality in human experience, or the extension of a sense of common community interests and aspirations, indicates the value laden character of these theories.

1. Culture

1.1 Value spare uses

The meanings, experiences, symbolic systems, patterns of organization of thought and behavior, and the instruments which constitute culture order and culture processes may be analysed through the use of descriptive, classificatory and functional categories. An anthropologist, a sociologist, an archaeologist, or some other social scientist, wishes so to describe a way of life as to present it as intelligible and meaningful to a third party. For this purpose he needs certain techniques of inquiry, certain instruments, certain tests for the validity of his insights: in short, methods for observing and for selecting amongst, organizing and validating his findings. In this sense, he "judges" his material and he may be said to exhibit preferences towards it - for example, in his choice of key concepts. But these are judgments and preferences usually of a wide sub-cultural circle and efforts are made to relate such valuations as are introduced to the norms of this sub-cultural circle. Furthermore, these judgments are directed by criteria of objectivity, descriptiveness, truth as an ideal, repeatability and replication of observations and experiments, and by reference to explanatory theories and concepts - e.g., those concerning processes like "diffusion", "man-environment interaction", "ritual", "persistence

of belief", "social solidarity", etc. The primary purpose of inquiries directed by this concept of culture may be said to be understanding and explanation: the advancement of knowledge.

The concept of culture in this scientific use is a general ordering category both for experiencing and for exploring relationships amongst human actions. The cultural sciences are those studies which intend to define the nature of these relationships through the use of pragmatically relevant structures of thought and instrumentalities of inquiry (1). Categories of thought in cultural science are designated and developed as a conceptual system whose purpose it is to elucidate and to understand the phenomena, as expressed in the "public images" of fields of human action. Just how these conceptual systems should be split off from and related to each other, and what the most useful of the valid ordering concepts are, is as much a matter of dispute in the culture sciences as in educational theory, and many different approaches have been explored (2).

1.2 Value laden uses

The concept of culture has, traditionally, and in education, also been defined in other ways, for different purposes. These purposes direct the definition, and they have to do with the selection of experiences, patterns of thought and action to transmit to the young, in the effort to structure their growth and to give certain directions or emphases to future movements of the cultural system. Traditionally, this concept of culture has been designated "high" or "elite" culture, but this is misleading, for different kinds of cultural patterns have been selected for different groups, at different times, and so-called "high" culture is only one of these. We might just as well

speak of scientific, or humanist, or pop or traditional culture. However, the notion of high culture points up a basic feature of the value laden use of the term - namely, selecting particular meanings and ways of ordering experience, and attaching a definite value to them.

Only those educational theories which aim to explain how and why a particular society sets out to educate its young in particular ways restrict themselves to culture in the value spare sense. Indeed, such writings depend in part on the efforts of culture scientists to devise appropriate explanatory systems. Even so, they are subject to value choices in the selection of instruments and ordering concepts, the relationship of inquirer to his subject matter, and so forth. All educational theories which intend to recommend certain practices and to discourage others make implicit or explicit use of the concept of culture in the value laden sense. That is, they select certain elements or forms of experience (e.g., free inquiry) and reject others (e.g., indoctrination). The attempt by recent theorists - e.g. Peters - to infer a theory of practice from a particular concept of education (education conceived as a cognitively and critically ordered process) and thus to eliminate all rivals as non-education theories, is itself an example of the value laden approach (3). Values operate to govern the choice of items for the definition. Other theorists have thought differently, perhaps on the whole more loosely, about the concept of education; for example, giving greater stress to non-rational factors, and refusing to assimilate them to rational processes; or, very loosely, identifying education with efficient processes of enculturation. Education is variously defined

as "growth", "experience", "cultural assimilation" and cognitively orientated "initiation".

Thus, educational theories with a prescriptive intent express various cultural commitments, but they all fall within the range of value laden uses of the term culture, and it is of particular interest to identify the implicit and explicit cultural preferences they display and their deployment of strategies intended to advance one particular concept of culture or another (4).

2. Threefold Division of Educational Theories

As was stated above, broadly speaking, prescriptive educational theories may be divided into three groups, in relation to their use of the organizing concept of culture. We have seen that these theories will make greater use of value laden than of value spare descriptions of culture. I designated the threefold division as follows:

1. classical humanism;
2. romantic communitarianism;
3. reconstructionism.

We may better appreciate the character of the third by contrasting it with the first two.

2.1 Classical humanism

Classical humanism is a refinement, or a succession of refinements within the western tradition of an extremely pristine view; namely, that culture is a heritage, in the safekeeping of a class of guardians, into which each generation is to be initiated by the guardians. In Plato's hands this became a static concept, in that it was assumed that the quest for knowledge could, in principle, ultimately yield

truths of a transcending, permanent character which the elites of guardians were charged to sustain and to transmit unchanged. Admittedly, this must be qualified in several ways. It was never expected in practice that truth would be finally realised; hence there would be a continuing quest for understanding and knowledge. Again "transmit" is misleading in view of the maieutic method of Socrates and Plato's theory of ideas. Ideas were not so much transmitted as re-discovered, a very important distinction for education. Nevertheless, in The Republic and in The Laws, Plato outlined with unparalleled vigor and detail the institutional framework within which a heritage was to be communicated to the masses, only a tiny elite, in Jesuitical fashion, being granted freedom to pursue inquiry untrammelled.

However, the classical humanist concept of cultural transmission is not necessarily static; it has in fact changed both in content (e.g., the various meanings the Greeks attached to "paideia", and the transformation of curriculum content at the Renaissance and in the nineteenth century) and in procedures (transmission being variously conceived as a process involving passive acceptance, development, and critical reconstruction) (5). Yet, the emphasis in this theory, as in all traditional doctrines, is on past achievements, on the continuity of experience, on established understandings and awareness, on predefined views about the nature of action and standards of performance. Education may be active, but is primarily an assimilative process: induction ihto institutions; adoption of norms; initiation into modes of thought and action (6).

2.2 Romantic communitarianism

The second theory, designated "romantic communitarianism", is not

in all senses the opposite of classical humanism, but its exponents have emphasized other and different educational processes. There may well have been, in the ancient world, those who wished to educate children not according to the requirements of pre-existing cultural systems but in accordance with the romantic conceptions of children's unfolding nature, their interests and their developmental needs. But Marrou, the most authoritative of the historians of the totality of education in antiquity, records none in the period prior to the Hellenistic period when Greek thought spread and diversified itself in the Alexandrian empire (7). This would be as is to be expected, according to Hegel's contention that romanticism is a post-Hellenic development.

The child-centrism of this theory is frequently traced back to Rousseau. But, despite his claim to be writing only about his own ideas on education, he drew extensively on earlier writers in developing his own views (8). Even so, the emergence of the romantic movement in eighteenth century Germany, England and France was clearly a decisive factor in the popularization of the view that, in education, transmitting a cultural heritage must be made subservient to "discovering" and "following" the developing impulses of the individual child (9). Rousseau's is the most striking example of the iconoclastic attitude towards traditional cultural categories and the social institutions in which the traditional culture expressed itself; for example, his youthful contention that the progress of the arts and sciences has been bought too expensively, at the price of moral and political degeneration (10). Again, his iconoclasm is apparent in his determination in the Emile to structure the mind of the pupil Emile through direct experiences. This process of mind making was to be performed without benefit - until

late adolescence - of the forms of organized understanding represented by literature, philosophy, history, Euclidean geometry, etc., and of the modes of political experience represented by the urban and national institutions of his time.

Rousseau neglected the communitarian elements which have become predominant in more recent formulations of this position. The cultural choices made for and by Emile were made in the deliberately restricted setting of a very intimate primary group, and they were basically those of the tutor, an individualist and a revolutionary at odds with the world of his time. Converted, by Pestalozzi and Froebel, into a wider setting and influenced by nineteenth century communitarian socialism and by Idealistic philosophy, the theory has come to take note of the interactions of the individual with the group, and of the relationship of the school to society. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, romantic communitarianism split into two broad streams: first, the kindergarten and child development and activity movements in the national school systems of the old and new world; and, second, the hundred-year old ttradition of progressive education in a small body of independent schools (11).

It is in the latter group of schools that the communitarian ideal has been most fully developed, in a way that parallels the classical ideal of community running through Plato, Vittorino and into the English Public Schools. The communitarian ideal takes the form of a conviction that the collection of children and teachers that comprise the school can constitute an integrated community, more or less insulated from wider cultural forces and institutions, self-articulating and self-directing through norms of conduct, social customs, and school rules which are developed within and for the community, tried out by it,

and modified according to its experience and preferences. The relatively autonomous way of life that emerges is a complex whole, a blend of academic, social and emotional elements. Major tasks of the school are to nourish the sub-culture, to induct newcomers, to sustain the uniqueness and individuality of the sub-culture, and to organize, from time to time, criticisms of the larger society (12). Hence, it is not merely appropriate but of considerable functional importance that both the academic programme, which normally embodies culture in the classical humanist sense, and the system of social rules, should be highly idiosyncratic and represented as indigenous to the institution. Those schools which attempt to combine a vital or a more traditional academic programme with the specifically communitarian features, quoted above are hybrids (as indeed most schools are, with respect to these three major theoretical orientations). The more "pure" form is represented best by Summerhill, and by the writings of Neill and of Goodman (13). In both the hybrid and the pure forms of romantic communitarianism we find the Owenite belief that experimental communities can play an important part in changing culture (14). This belief was shared by the reconstructionists, to whom school was to become in varying degrees a trial ground for experiments in future social living.

2.3 Reconstructionism

I have already suggested that some of the distinctive features of reconstructionist thinking first became prominent during the enlightenment. Further examination reveals a complex network of roots. It would be a major study to trace all of these. However, a more limited inquiry may yield some worthwhile results.

As an ideological theory, reconstructionism is prescriptive and

reformist. Institutions, practices and ideas about education are treated as means - for some reconstructionists, ultimately, the most decisive means for bringing about wholesale changes in culture (15). The claims commonly made by reconstructionist writers go well beyond the now commonplace beliefs that education organized on a sufficiently large scale has ascertainable effects on society - e.g., selecting elites, socializing, facilitating occupational mobility, enhancing the division of labour, modifying speech patterns, etiquette and interpersonal relationships, strengthening national solidarity, etc. (16). What is distinctive about reconstructionism in relation to these and similar changes is:

1. The extent of the claims made for possible and desirable spheres of influence for education.

2. The patterns and coherences imposed upon cultural changes, and the directionality given to social trends. Isolated and haphazard phenomena are thus converted from "piece-meal" to "holistic" elements, as part of a programme to achieve a unity or synthesis, a new core of principles and procedures.

3. The claim to be moving culture in worthwhile directions in opposition to various forces allegedly misdirecting culture, especially disintegrative forces; hence the re-creation of a missing or lost community.

4. The aspiration to make a new man, or at least to direct the experiences of children in new and different directions.

5. A detailed apparatus of methodologies, procedures and institutional arrangements designed to effect these changes, and centering on the school curriculum.

6. The apotheosis of the teacher or of an elite of educators as agents of cultural renewal.

7. The relative neglect of difficulties and of countervailing forces - a characteristic feature of utopian thinking.

Before we look at these points, it should be noted that reconstructionism adopts as a rationale not only the traditional reformer's wish to better conditions as he finds them, but also what at times appears

as a chiliastic sense of crisis and impending social chaos (17).

The systematic structuring of the totality of educational processes and institutions to achieve stipulated cultural ends owes its impetus in Western thought to Plato. Likewise, the sense of impending social chaos - the diagnosis of a cultural crisis - may be traced to Plato. Popper has shown that one of the boldest moves of the utopian social reformer is to assert a condition of crisis which only the most far-reaching measures can alleviate (18).

New factors have been introduced by modern reconstructionists, especially in the writings of Wells, Russell, Mannheim and Dewey. These writers stressed the impetus towards basic cultural change provided by science, technology, industrialism and democratization. Except for the latter these are factors which played no part in Plato's formulation. Furthermore, the reconstructionists reversed Plato's assessment of democracy and treated it as the chief moral and political inspiration for the new order they advocated. Nevertheless, the reconstructionists are Platonic to the extent that they project a total and not just a partial cultural crisis, and also, although less uniformly, to the extent that they give a historical, law-like character to the trends they pick out as the foci of change (19).

The ends of the restructuring process are different in Plato and modern writers. In the former, the basic objective is to achieve cultural stability, a condition dependent upon the discovery of and systematic reverence for truth. Perfectibility is implicit in Plato but only in respect of the total social system and the elite of leaders. Perfectibility as a meaningful goal for the common man is ruled out as being against his "nature". Contemporary and recent reconstructionists, however, under the influence of enlightenment

doctrines and those of nineteenth century democratic theory, envisage the progressive improvement of humanity as a whole. At least, this is projected as a policy objective: "perfectibility" as a process of human amelioration whether, as in Russell, this takes the form of the wide diffusion of rationality and of the "constructive" impulses in human nature, or, as in Dewey, the emergence of a world-wide community of kindly utilitarians.

The extent to which reconstructionists are perfectibilists in the numerous senses in which that term has been used in the long history of progress and developmental theory will become clearer in subsequent chapters. With the exception of Clarke and, possibly, Mannheim they rejected one traditional belief which seems to set firm limits to universal progress - namely, original sin. Their perfectibility was not built on enlightenment confidence in inevitable progress through the limitless application of science to human affairs, but rather on the belief that a steady and indefinite amelioration could be achieved through the systematic attempt to plan and organize individual and social experience according to agreed ends. Hence, it was man's capacity for social and moral improvement through the deliberate cultivation of rationality that the reconstructionists emphasized (20).

Although environmentalist explanations of human development are not necessarily entailed by belief in perfectibility - except insofar as adverse environment prevents full realization of "potential" - the reconstructionists are, on the whole, environmental determinists, unlike Plato, who believed in the ultimate power of heredity as a determining factor in human nature. They are not wholly committed to the crude notions of Godwin and especially Owen, who adopted the optimistic

environmentalism which traces to ignorance all human and social problems, and who saw in the diffusion of understanding a quick and sure remedy to all problems (21). Reconstructionists, as large-scale reformers, have generally argued that the changes they have in mind are possible (but not therefore inevitable) for two reasons. First, the "plasticity", the "malleability", the "potentiality" of human nature. Second, the fluidity of institutions, traditions, customs which make it possible for human intelligence to devise institutions and practices to its own advantage. Their views of human nature and culture are open to criticism on empirical grounds, although they can never be refuted because the range of possible environments in which talents might reveal themselves is infinite and, no matter how resistant culture has been to modification, there is always the possibility of finding new ways of changing it.

The empirical criticisms and objections have been ignored by most reconstructionists, but they have been acutely conscious of two other important and related issues. First, the supposed malleability of human nature,and the potential power of redesigned institutions and organized ideas to influence it, give rise to the frightening possibilities of misdirection, or the capture of the vital ground of education by miseducative forces - e.g., commercialism, or totalitarianism, or fascism (22). Second, a problem not so clearly recognized as such by many of the reconstructionists themselves but raised frequently by their critics - that of indoctrination by those claiming to be educators. Thus, the wish of the reconstructionists to achieve a world culture, the rule of rationality, or even to ensure a "victory" for "democracy" over "totalitarianism" has led several of them, mainly Counts, Brameld, Clarke and Mannheim, at times to advocate propagandist

and even doctrinal methods, despite warnings, for example by Dewey, that such advocacy is self-defeating in a theory which claims to be grounded in rationality (23).

The reconstructionists have an overriding desire to achieve, through education, major cultural changes and to achieve them as a matter of urgency in what is felt to be a period of cultural crisis. It is argued that the attempt to transmit established knowledge and understanding loses both feasibility and credibility when the world which gave rise to those forms of establishment is itself changing rapidly, so that the traditional categories of understanding and action require redefinition. The school cannot simply reflect the whole of culture, in the sense of mirroring all that is there. This is because culture is an unimaginably complex entity, and in any case reflection is an undiscriminating process, governed by the nature of the instrument, not by norms and standards, which are the concern of education. Nor, the reconstructionists argue, should the school attempt to reflect or embody selected past achievements, since, however defensible these may be in their historical setting; they have lost their stability and coherence. New selections and definitions are required; new instruments, and, for many of the reconstructionists, a new core of socially unifying values is needed. New patterns of culture will emerge in rapidly changing industrialized societies, and the question asked by the reconstructionists is whether these patterns will have a determinate, educative quality, as a result of the creative involvement by schoolmen in culture analysis; or whether they will be the educationally indifferent expressions of other social interests.

The reconstructionists have all embarked upon the re-creative culture analysis which they claim it is a major task for the school

and for other educational agencies to practise and to teach. As a consequence, a variety of models - both "content" and "process" - of the emerging, educationally-determined culture of the future have been constructed. These will be discussed in greater detail in the chapters that follow. In this general review they may be characterized as totalistic and heavily moralistic in tone: visions or images of various ideal conditions of universal hedonism; universal rationality; the achievement of working world government and the elimination of national wars; abandonment of class barriers and the dissolution of prejudices; active, mass involvement in processes of government and community management; the elimination of superstition; the enthronement of various forms of scientific humanism; the development of a new kind of scientific-democratic personality; and the institutionalizing and universalizing of modes of self and social renewal: a form of cultural immortality in which continuous change is the only assurance of the durability of culture in either its individual or its social aspects. Not all the reconstructionists subscribed to all these ideals, but they point the direction in which most of them moved.

Schools and teachers are conceived, not merely as agents of universal diffusion, spreading and establishing throughout society ideas and practices generated, as in the classical humanist theory, by elites and in highly specialized institutions. Reconstructionism is not primarily a diffusion but an innovatory theory of culture renewal (24). As a result of their commitment to various forms of democracy, the reconstructionists generally impose severe burdens of creativity and construction on all,or at least very many, members of the systems they describe. That this is not uniformly so is shown by the recurrence,

in this movement, of the classical humanist concept of a guiding elite. In some writers, notably the Webbs, Wells and Mannheim, the problem of reconciling the respective areas of authority and responsibility of masses and elites is never resolved. Despite tendencies towards elitism, by contrast with classical humanism and romantic communitarianism, reconstructionism challenges the ordinary teacher to act as culture analyst, critic, and, almost, prophet, although he is in fact well supplied with prophetic utterances by the spokesmen for the theory. Just how the teacher is expected to perform these roles and the manner of educating him for others is discussed in Chapter Fourteen.

Curriculum content and strategies for teaching and learning are a detailed complex of centrally important strategies for the reconstructionists. By contrast with classical humanists, much emphasis is given to a supposed need to re-define and to re-integrate traditional organizations of subject matter. Science, and particularly social science material, is given a predominant place, and various schemes of organization are proposed - most significantly the so-called social core curriculum, familiar as a more or less totally integrated programme of study which is organized around themes and issues of current social relevance and concern and grounded in a new set of social-moral values (25). This aspect of reconstructionist theorizing degenerated - to a considerable extent because of Kilpatrick's mis-handling of certain ideas - into the life adjustment programmes of the 1940s in the U.S.A. (which are echoed in the curriculum sections of the Newsom Report), whose chief purpose seems to have been to procure acceptance by pupils of the prevailing social and political ideologies. This is the opposite of what reconstructionism, in the hands

of Russell and Dewey, intended, but it illustrates, as does Counts' treatment of the indoctrination question, how the reconstructionist position may veer into irrationalism and subservience to interest groups.

By contrast, and very much in the tradition of Socrates and Rousseau, teaching and learning strategies advocated and examined by reconstructionists are those conventionally known as "problem-solving", "reflective thinking", "discovery", or, in Dewey's language, "reconstruction of experience". It is to Dewey that this whole school of thought is most indebted for its theories of educational procedure and, while much might be made of a detailed study in contrasts of the various ideas on "method" advanced by different reconstructionists, particular attention is paid in Chapter Eleven to Dewey's treatment of this subject.

It is in the examination of methodology that we shall see most clearly the peculiar blend of normative and empirical principles, classically expressed in Dewey's volume How we Think, from a perusal of which it is never quite certain whether what he is describing is how thinking does, in fact, occur, or how we should think if we are to be good experimentalists. From a review of a wider selection of writings, by Dewey and others, it is clear that central importance is attached by reconstructionists to the definition of learning processes. At any rate, this is true of the professional educationists, Wells, for example, is much more explicit on the overall policy objectives of a reformed educational programme than he is on the development of appropriate modes of thinking in children.

The claims made by reconstructionists for the efficacy of education as a force for cultural renewal and growth distinguishes them, not only

from the other two major educational theories already discussed, but also from a much wider range of culture-change theorists. A full discussion of these theorists would be an enormous undertaking, as they include all the major systematic social theorists of the nineteenth century - e.g., Comte, Spencer, Mosca, Pareto, Durkheim, and others. It is remarkable how little attention these writers, and many of their more empirically-minded successors - the development and organizational theorists of the present day - give to the question of education as a culture change process.

This may be more the result of lack of awareness of the ways in which educational thinkers have approached the problems arising out of the great cultural transitions of the past century. I do not wish to suggest that the reconstructionists have successfully grappled with these problems. However, by showing what difficulties are created for formal education by these transitions, and by suggesting broad lines of response, they have laid the foundation for more systematic appraisals of the intricate network of relationships binding education to other dimensions and agencies of culture.

CHAPTER II

A CASE STUDY: THE 1966 REPORT OF THE INDIAN EDUCATION COMMISSION. CH.1. EDUCATION AND NATIONAL OBJECTIVES

The first chapter of the Report, "Education and National Objectives", will be treated as a specific example of reconstructionist theorizing. Similarities to and differences from a variety of reconstructionist writings will be noted, and several difficulties and weaknesses identified. A full appraisal of this report of the Indian Education Commission would require a more detailed discussion than is possible of problems facing India's education, in the light of wider cultural trends and the availability of resources needed for the achievement of the targets set (1).

1. Culture Crisis and National Objectives

The Kothari Report was prepared by a distinguished international committee of educationists, economists, political scientists, planners and development theorists under the chairmanship of Dr. Kothari, chairman of the Indian University Grants Commission. The brief given the committee was to prepare a policy for the development of the total educational system. Both in the nature of membership and the scope of inquiry, the Kothari Report differs significantly from twentieth century British reports, which have all dealt with specific aspects of the system and have been prepared by committees containing only a sprinkling of social science specialists. These differences are typically those that separate reconstructionist from other types of educational theorizing - first, the emphasis on social science expertise in policy-formation, an expertise which has in recent years created an international community of thought; second, the attempt to inter-relate the totality

of educational ideas and practices at all institutional levels; and, third, the attempt to treat education as the most powerful agency of planned culture change (2). As we shall see, the preference for social science expertise at the stage of policy formation, as distinct from implementation, posed a severe problem for reconstructionists like Rugg and Brameld, who also subscribed to the democratic belief in maximum involvement of community interests in policy formation.

The first chapter of the Kothari committee report intimated the wide scope of the inquiry, conveyed a sense of the seriousness and the urgency of the task in social development confronting Indian educators, and sought to inspire national confidence in the capacity of the society to rehabilitate itself through education. A picture of mounting crisis was drawn, a crisis not only in economic and political affairs but in national consciousness, which is threatened by continuing linguistic, religious and caste differentiation and by various other forms of communal tension. These factors, the committee argued, combined with the almost universally unsettling effects of science and technology, and the legitimate "explosion of expectations" amongst the masses, have produced a critical phase in the development of Indian culture, to which a redesigned educational system should direct its interests and energies. In this crisis situation, the committee thought, the educational system has a decisive role to play. Of all cultural forces, it has the greatest opportunity and the greatest potential power to effect a fundamental transformation of the material, emotional, spiritual and intellectual conditions of Indian life.

By thus underlining the forces making for instability, change and

- if not directed - for national disorder and chaos, the committee aligned itself with the long tradition of educational thinking which takes the sense of crisis as its point of departure. As we have seen, the crisis mentality is not confined to reconstructionist theorists. Of the many similarities between the classical humanism dating from Plato's Republic and reconstructionism, that which is most striking is the feeling of deep unease over contemporary cultural conditions and fear of total breakdown unless there is massive intervention to produce order and stability out of impending chaos. In this, Plato and Matthew Arnold of the classical humanists, and Mannheim, Wells, Rugg and Brameld of the reconstructionists, are in broad agreement.(3). Further, these writers are united in the belief that, of all social systems, a reformed schooling can be the most effective in introducing and consolidating interventionist policies leading to culture unity and stability. This seems, however, a misplaced confidence. Schooling is admitted to have a significant effect upon culture only in the long term. But the crisis as diagnosed is too critical and urgent to be treated by long term measures. Also, the extent of the postulated crisis and the inclusiveness of the proposed remedies raise the problems of indoctrination and possibly miseducative use of educational institutions, and the limited equipment teachers have as prospective culture change agents. These are problems whose significance and difficulty the Kothari committee, like most reconstructionist thinkers, did not adequately appraise (4).

The committee moved from defining the extensive cultural crisis in India,and from their expression of faith in the capacity of a redesigned school system to resolve the crisis, to formulating educational and cultural objectives. These objectives were derived, in the first

instance, not from an analysis of the concept of education in the context of contemporary Indian culture, nor from a consideration of the processes of individual development, but from "imperatives" and "targets" of the society. Most reconstructionists take it upon themselves to define these targets, whereas the Kothari committee adopted the modernization objectives already prepared in the political, economic and social spheres (5). The need for rapid and massive development of industry, agriculture, urban life, village communities, democratic institutions, administrative infrastructure - these provide the "modern" contexts within which the new educational system is expected to work out its teaching and learning programmes. But "modernization" as the capitalist and communist development theorists have defined it was not the only major policy objective adopted by the committee. The claims of the traditional culture are, in part at least, accepted as valid, not simply as a necessary conditioner of any change but as expressing values which should be preserved. The committee itself wisely avoided attempting to outline in detail a new cultural synthesis which takes the "best" of modern and traditional cultures, avoiding destructive clashes and disunities. However, with surprisingly little consideration for the difficulties this raised, it proposed the creation of cultural synthesis as another task facing the school system, or education in the widest sense. Just such a proposal has been made by other reconstructionists, notably Rugg and Brameld (6). The chapter ends with a stirring call for this new cultural synthesis, whose outlines emerge while the human and social problems of definition, selection, adaptation and adjustment raised by such synthetic solutions are kept out of sight. Two forms of knowledge and experience, those of modern science and of Hindu ideals, awareness and self-knowledge, are to

be harmonized:

> "Atom and Ahimsa [non-violence], or, to put it differently, man's knowledge and mastery of outer space and the space within his skull, are out of balance. It is this imbalance which mankind must seek to redress. Man now faces himself. He faces the choice of rolling down a nuclear abyss to ruin and annihilation or of raising himself to new heights of glory and fulfilment yet unimagined. India has made many glorious contributions to world culture, and perhaps the grandest of them all is the concept and ideal of non-violence and compassion sought, expounded and lived by Buddha and Mahavira; Nanak and Kabir; Vivekananada, Ramana Maharishi and Gandhi in our own times and which millions have striven to follow after them.
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> "The greatest contribution of Europe doubtlessly is the scientific revolution. If science and ahimsa join together in creative synthesis of belief and action, mankind will attain to a new level of purposefulness, prosperity and spiritual insight. Can India do something in adding a new dimension to the scientific achievement of the West? This poses a great challenge and also offers a unique opportunity to the men and women of India, and especially to the young people who are the makers of the future."(7)

The committee made no attempt to provide a systematic rationale for their multi-faceted concept of development. But they did provide some of the groundwork needed for such a rationale. They discussed not only a general crisis of cultural disintegration whose main features are open to argument, but also more fundamental human survival needs about whose reasonableness there could hardly be any controversy. These needs include the provision of adequate food supplies to satisfy minimal nutritional targets, the achievement of a basic minimum of accommodation and material goods, the establishment of levels of literacy and awareness appropriate to the barest mechanics of democratic participation, and the realization of other United Nations-type human rights. No doubt questions of justification arise in relation to need statements that refer to these elemental standards of community life. But the committee was undoubtedly right to avoid the sophisticated and sometimes sophistical arguments built

upon these questions of justification. It is unimaginable that disputes would arise over such a minimal list of social survival "needs", even granting the deep ideological differences which separate Indian sub-cultures.

On the other hand, the operationalizing of these need statements and the efforts required to implement them in the continental complexity and diversity of contemporary India would without question give rise to clashes of value commitment and institutional interests, for example, between the claims of social and national integration on the one hand, and political participation by diverse sub-cultural groups on the other. The reconciliation of "nation" and "sections" has been one of the basic, enduring problems of modern Indian life, a problem which, as Gandhi rightly foresaw, independence and Congress government would not of themselves solve (8).

No less difficult to imagine is reconciliation of the inherently unstable and dynamic values of science-based technology and the associated commerce of mass consumption, on the one hand, and the traditional, quiescent, anti-materialist values of orthodox Hinduism on the other hand. The Brahmanical culture should not be expected to shift very readily when, in the words of Panditji, the head of a traditional Kumaoni family in Lizelle Raymond's <u>My Life with a Brahmin Family</u>:

> "On the vital plane we Hindus are like forest trees of different sizes and at different stages of development. Just as the trees are rooted to the ground, so are we fixed in certain essentials of our lives. We have no choice. It has been like this for thousands of years ... We are apt to repeat the experiences of past generations, since occupations, opinions, food, education, ritual and mantras, are all laid down by a tradition that allows no room for free choice. Our traditions bind Man to Nature as closely as the earth is bound to the universe" (9).

Reconciliation of ancient and modern could take no form other than an ongoing, shifting pattern of adjustments. This, as the committee rightly saw, could not be defined in advance. However, a "culture centre" comprising both a core of ideas and a group or class unified in its commitment to those ideas could be indicated. Furthermore, qualitative criteria to guide the development of practical instruments of change could have been specified. While the committee gave due consideration to some of the relevant quantitative elements (e.g., the structure of the educational system and directions of resource allocation) they had little to offer towards an enhanced understanding of qualitative criteria. One perhaps unintended consequence of this is that, given the basic strategy proposals of modernization and development, the synthesis of old and new cultures that emerges has far more obviously the qualities of the modern than of the traditional culture. In the proposed blending of cultures, the modernist has far less accommodating to do than the traditionalist. This is always so when a new cultural synthesis, itself a modernist concept, is proposed. But the Kothari committee went further than this. The implicit criteria governing their proposed new synthesis are those of functional rationality and efficiency of means-ends relations embedded in the forces making for massive, sustained change, not those expressive of the far less self-conscious and inarticulate traditional culture (10).

In this, the Kothari report may be likened to the more utopian and holistic aspects of the reconstructionist writings of Wells, Rugg and Brameld. The initial move of redefining the desired cultural synthesis, so far from facilitating the achievement of a balanced intermixture, pre-judges the issue. This is because the concepts and

strategies of cultural redefinition are themselves central features of reconstructionism. The very thought of redefining, and the act of consciously creating culture,are anathema to those who rejoice in the largely unconscious and undirected processes of cultural transmission.(11). The over-simplification, the deliberation and the systematization required by the effort to analyse "cultural wholes" or total patterns characterize the thinking of rational-empirical change agents. These calculated approaches stand in marked contrast to the undeliberate, unselfconscious evolution of traditional modes of experience. I do not pretend to have an answer to the problem of avoiding an unbalanced synthesis when policies have to be evolved, plans made, instrumentalities designed, and resources allocated. All of these are, after all, part of the modern mentality and they inevitably shape the outcome of any inquiry. However, it would represent a substantial gain in understanding if these difficulties were acknowledged instead of reduced to the level of technical problems and "barriers to change".

How far the organization of educational forces in the contemporary Indian context can reasonably be expected to achieve a new cultural unity is a problem which is not analysed in the Kothari report. Conscious that a claim of this kind might be rejected as exaggerated, the committee introduced the report with these words:

> "The destiny of India is now being shaped in her class-room. This, we believe, is no mere rhetoric. In a world based on science and technology, it is education that determines the level of prosperity, welfare and security of the people."

Despite this disclaimer, it is in fact a long-established rhetorical device to smuggle in an ambiguity between some and all. That education can make <u>some</u> contribution to determining prosperity, etc.,

is not in dispute; that it and it alone determines this prosperity is manifestly false. What is at issue is how far might (and should) education be thus mobilized, and the kinds of relationships which need to be developed with other social forces, if the ends sought are to be realized.

Just as most of the classical theories of social change have neglected or minimized the potential contribution of education to changing society, so the reconstructionist educational theorists tend to overlook or minimize the impact of the wider context of institutions upon educational reform and, in Durkheim's phrase, the resistance of "social facts" to deliberate intervention. The Kothari committee certainly admitted that "education cannot be considered in isolation or planned in a vacuum" but, instead of itself undertaking to consider education in this way, it proceeded to assimilate educational processes to predefined national development goals.

There seem to be three main lines of approach to this problem: first, the elevation of education into a socially transcending reform agency; second, the enlistment of education as an agency of state policy; third, the recognition that education is a socio-cultural process, a party to state policy, but nevertheless in certain fundamental respects autonomous. The first approach is that adopted by many of the romantic communitarians, to whom I referred in the preceding chapter. The second approach is that adopted by totalitarian societies and, increasingly, by developing societies which seek to effect rapid changes. The third approach is that of the principal exponents of reconstructionism who wrestled with the manifold problems created by the effort to be vitally engaged in directed

cultural change, to use the public school system for this purpose, and yet to avoid subserving educational ends and processes to those already determined within the polity.

Admittedly, the task of drawing up a national, integrated plan of cultural development is a formidable one beset not only with technical problems but also with profound intellectual and ethical difficulties. It is hardly surprising that the history of reconstructionist theories is littered with lifeless failures. The nearest approach in political practice is the five year plans in the Soviet Union, but,so far from shaping the future of culture, education in these plans is reduced to an instrumentality of pre-determined political and social policy (12).

2. Tasks of Culture Reconstruction

Within the broad framework of a new cultural synthesis, the Kothari committee proposed a set of culturally reconstructive tasks which educational institutions were expected to take up. These tasks are:

2.1 Contributing to the modernization of agriculture and of industry

Modernization is not precisely defined, but it may be taken to mean the diffusion of scientific and technical concepts, skills and attitudes at all levels, including that of the politician, research scientist and manual operative. Modernization also means the widespread diffusion and adoption of efficiency and management-science criteria in public and private administration. All of this entails the thorough institutionalizing of the ideology of the industrial society. Raymond Aron's analysis of the industrial society points to factors to which the committee at least implicitly subscribed:

1. In work organization, there is technical mastery, rational organization, productivity consciousness and high per capita output.

2. In family life the nuclear family replaces the extended family.

3. In state organisation there is increased bureaucracy (in the Weberian fashion - pervasive, rational administration).

4. Processes and products of the mass media dominate culture.

5. In social organization, urbanization replaces the peasantry, and there is increased equity in wealth distribution.

6. In industry, a management rather than an ownership pattern prevails.

In all, basic to the concept of the modern, industrialized society is the attempt to apply rational and empirical thought to production and all forms of social organization. Thus the principle of innovation is itself institutionalized and universalized (13).

2.2 Human resource development

This concept derives from development theory, and more remotely from the humanist's elevation of the unique value and worth of individuals. These two separate sources of this idea underline important differences which are not so easily reconciled.

The 1963 report of the Robbins Committee, on higher education in Britain, brings out this contrast. Without rejecting the relevance of national need arguments to provision, the Robbins Committee rejected the argument that it is an obligation of the universities, in selecting students for its different faculties, to follow a predetermined scheme of manpower needs for the different professions. Rejection reflected not only the technical problem of manpower forecasting but, more significantly, a positive view of the right of

the qualified individual to access to a place in the higher education system in general and the university in particular (14). In practice this right of course is heavily qualified by faculty and departmental constraints; by re-drawing the qualification requirements, it is possible very severely to modify the notion of individual right. Nevertheless, there are significant differences between (a) the approach to human resource development, which uses projections of manpower needs in different professions as a major criterion for admitting individuals to institutions, and, (b) that approach which concedes to the individual the right to develop his potentialities and aptitudes, even if the result is a surfeit of lawyers or arts graduates. Further exploration of these two approaches, the "Kothari" and the "Robbins", could bring out other problems. For example, developing an individual's aptitudes regardless of the capacity of the economy to provide employment opportunities relevant to the kind of training he has had is an absurdity with which Indian educationists and those in many other developing countries are all too familiar.

What is required is that a working reconciliation of the two viewpoints should be devised and tested through models and in actual situations. Neither the Kothari nor the Robbins committee went as far as this, and this may be an illustration of the difficulty economists and educationists encounter in trying to understand each other's viewpoint, or to work closely together, as Beeby has claimed (15). The earlier literature of reconstructionism barely got beyond the level of global aspiration and platitude on this topic, and there appear to be no examples in this earlier literature even of the recognition of a problem. Beeby may again be right in arguing that the conditions governing awareness and understanding of these

problems have been so drastically altered by the emergence of the "third world" in the period following the second world war that many earlier discussions have been largely superseded (16).

2.3 The school as a universal institution

Of all social agencies only the schools have the capacity of reaching all the people. This is an argument made familiar by the American reconstructionists who related the emergence of the common, universal school to the supposed diminution in influence of family, church, work groups and other agencies. It is an argument which is made to carry a heavy weight: the universal or common school is, it is alleged, the best single instrument for directed social change.

Several questions need to be raised about this view of the school, since to accept it is to move from the more traditional unique function characterization of schooling to one which sees the school as a residual agency. The unique function view ascribes to the school distinctively educational roles: the task of the school is to "educate"; usually in a precise meaning of that term; other social agencies exist or can be created for other purposes to do with children, which are not centrally and directly educational. For example, a unique function theorist might object to the school being used as a distributing agency for free milk, on the grounds that this is a distraction from the specific educational tasks it alone can accomplish. The residual theorist might defend the practice on the grounds that free milk is beneficial, is indirectly contributory to better education, and is more conveniently distributed through the universal agency of the school than by other means. Reconstructionist

writers cannot be neatly classified through the use of this distinction, as some, like Kilpatrick, are avowedly residualists,while others, like Dewey, prefer to characterize schooling as an enterprise which has a determinate, educational character which should not be lost to view because of the supposed defaulting of other social institutions (17).

In arguing for the school's reconstructive potential by virtue of its universality, the Kothari committee failed to consider several relevant questions. First, is it true that of all the formative and influential social institutions the common school is the most powerful? To ask this question is to bring out the difficulty of wide generalization: formative for whom? formative of what? Relating these questions to the objectives of national development that have been specified, we may see that very extensive transformations of personal, inter-personal and impersonal behavior are projected. If we consider the formation of dispositions as vital to the adoption of the change-mindedness proposed by the committee, empirical evidence on the formation of dispositions suggests that a much earlier start than school entry age is required (18). This, in turn, calls for extensive adult education programmes directed at child-rearing practices. Reconstructionists,more than most theorists, have emphasized the need for these programmes, and the Webbs in their appraisal of Soviet education in the nineteen-twenties were particularly impressed by the attention given to child care. The Kothari committee neither examined the question of whether educational processes and institutions are the most effective,or even the proper ways of bringing about the desired changes, nor did they give to adult education related to child-rearing the emphasis that might

be expected.

The question of effectiveness of educational institutions cannot be answered simply by reference to existing practices. It is just because these practices, and the institutions in which they occur, were thought to be so deficient in respect of a national policy of development that the committee was set up. To argue, therefore, that the existing system of education appears to lack the ideological homogeneity and the technical proficiency to carry the burdens being imposed upon it would be to argue in a circle. Yet it is reasonable to ask whether evidence from other national school systems attempting in the manner proposed to create a "new man" is encouraging. The committee, despite its ardor in promulgating the scientific approach, cited no empirical evidence in support of the role it proposed for the school. Such evidence as there is on this point is not encouraging and it suggests that, if schools are to undertake the kinds of major national development tasks recommended by the Kothari committee, very different approaches to those already adopted will be required (19).

It would be misleading to suggest that the Kothari committee offered no new or unusual proposals. The past orientation of Indian education, geared to the administrative and vocational needs of the imperial administrators in a semi-feudal society was contrasted with future requirements. The old system had been strongly influenced by the English boarding school. The imperial tie had been broken, but, the committee claimed, the imperial educational mentality had, in certain decisive respects, lingered on.

2.4 Tasks for education

To initiate a socio-cultural revolution, parallel to and extending

the earlier political revolution, a new kind of education is required. This educational programme, according to the committee, should be carried forward on three fronts:

1. a transformation to "relevance";
2. the achievement and maintenance of certain standards;
3. expansion of the base, both to satisfy national manpower needs and to achieve an equalization of educational opportunity.

I shall discuss just the first of these.

"Relevance", since the report of the Newsom committee, Half our Future, has become a familiar educational slogan in Britain (20). Its popularity, likewise, in the United States,has prompted the philosopher, Scheffler, to attempt to explode its pretensions (21). "Relevance" in the understanding of the Kothari committee had little to do with the conflicting personal aspirations and perplexities of the self-conscious adolescent, which in wealthier societies are subjected to detailed, even anguished explorations. For the committee, "relevance" is primarily a curriculum objective leading to the search for ways of relating the content, modes and institutions of education to pre-defined national needs. These needs, however, must not be thought external to personal expectations of reasonable life conditions and other popular aspirations. "Life", as we have seen, was treated by the committee as a mixture of traditional and modern qualities, a new synthesis for personal and social existence, with a strong bias towards the qualities of "development". Thus, "life" is equated with national development, and national development is comprised of:

1. modernized agriculture;
2. a productivity-conscious economy;

3. social and national "integration";

4. socialist-democratic institutions.

Thus, individual aspirations were systematically reorganized or articulated into a national needs policy, and this policy set the targets to which educational institutions were to relate. "Relevance" equates with functional adaptation of education to pre-defined social ends, with this important qualification that one of the national needs was to define a new cultural synthesis, and the schools were given this task. Nothing was said about the problem that could arise if the emerging cultural synthesis repudiated the other projected national needs. This would be a real possibility, since the concept of education incorporates rational-critical processes, and a new cultural synthesis grounded in educational criteria would be socially critical.

The form of education designed by the committee to achieve the transformation to relevance - that is, to operationalize the concept of a new cultural synthesis - hardly rises in boldness and originality to the visionary level of the proposed new society. This may be because, unlike most of the earlier reconstructionists, who were able to project social systems of their own devising, the committee accepted a predefined framework for national development. This makes their proposals more amenable to implementation - though sceptics would point to the enormous gulf between the existing system and the proposals to change it. However, the cost to be paid for this degree of practicality is, in reconstructionist terms, a high one. The more utopian reconstructionists, like Wells, Rugg and Mannheim, saw the school not as the designer of working cultural models within existing frameworks, but as the inventor and creator of new frameworks as well

as models. The Kothari committee, briefed to produce a policy for education within predefined national objectives, both accepted its brief and yet saw further, if only vaguely delineated, possibilities for the schools, eventually, or for education in a broader sense, to transcend these objectives by designing new syntheses.

There are four major components of the programme of education which the committee proposed. In condensed form these are:

1. Literacy, including,by considerably stretching the term, a grounding in humanities and social sciences.

2. Numeracy, including a grounding in natural science.

3. Work experience.

4. Social service.

The very strong emphasis on sciences in the first two of these four platforms, and on active pupil learning instead of the still common Indian practice of recitation from textbooks, is characteristic of reconstructionist thinking. Virtually every major contribution to the theory has stressed the importance of a content of scientific subject matter, a teaching mode purportedly based on scientific inquiry, and a school atmosphere congenial to the scientific temperament. In the more extreme forms, notably Dewey's experimentalism, this enthusiasm for science has taken a distinct reductionist direction: all modes of thought, inquiry and experience being reducible to a common scientific methodology. More recent examinations of the structures of experience and of knowledge have drawn attention to matters which have been, on the whole, seriously neglected or confused in many reconstructionist writings. These should be set against the Kothari and other reconstructionist proposals to

universalize scientific thinking through education (22).

Points 3 and 4 of the Kothari curriculum proposal reflect in part the Soviet and British representation on the committee. Social service has become a familiar method of seeking "relevance" in the post-Newsom era. Work experience has had a limited impact on British thought but has been a recurring theme of Soviet education, under the guise of "polytechnical education". It has also been a distinctive feature of reconstructionist thinking since the time of Kerschensteiner and Dewey's earlier writings (23). The chequered history of attempts to adopt "polytechnization" in Russian schools illustrates two problems to which the Kothari committee gave insufficient attention - first, the intellectual problem, in teaching, of adjusting the logical structure of the physical sciences to the distinctly ideological requirements of a quasi-mystical element in Marxism (namely, the understanding of socio-political processes yielded by manual labour and the bond which units workers, manual and intellectual): second, the practical problems of making specialist subject teachers into multi-disciplinary ideologists of a special kind, and of adjusting the teaching requirements of specialists to the constraints of factories designed primarily for productive adult work.

Beyond these four major components of schooling, the committee envisaged a common school on the lines of universal comprehensive education. The social cohesion which this institutional homogeneity is intended to create was to be further strengthened by a language policy whose details are highly specific to the frightening linguistic complexities of the sub-continent. But, behind the functional rationale of arguments for a coherent language policy, lies an

intriguing set of general propositions about language, culture and education. These stem from a European intellectual tradition which has had a profound, if indirect, impact on reconstructionism. This is the Idealistic tradition. Its chief exponents - apart from Kant, whose position was more moderate than those of his successors - are Fichte, Nietzche and Gentile.

These thinkers are united in a fervent conviction that the basis of developed national consciousness is the national language. Hence, any programme which seeks to unify culture at the deeper levels must adopt a language policy which attempts to bind together members of a community in a common set of linguistic devices and in the metaphors, symbols, myths and works of literature of that language (24).

But, for this purpose of binding together a nation into something approximating to a common set of imaginative experiences, a language policy is not, of itself, enough. Just as the Idealists proposed a superstructure of socially-binding nationalistic literature, and the reconstructionists of the nineteen-twenties and thirties a comparable superstructure of moral norms blending scientific knowledge and democratic values, so the Kothari committee developed a peculiar blend of religion and citizenship. This hybrid is avowedly moralistic and doctrinaire in character. The intention of the committee was that, through this new and common element in the curriculum, children should be directly imbued with the distinctive mix of traditional and modern values, beliefs and orientations that have already been described. It should provide a vehicle for the emerging synthetic culture, as literature provided a vehicle for European national cultures in the minds of the Idealists.

Such hybrids are very common in education and have appeared

variously as "character training", "core curricula", "interdisciplinary studies", and so forth. Theorists of almost all persuasions have advocated them, including the classical humanists who ascribed to Greek studies not only linguistic achievements but many different intermingled forms of cognitive awareness, ethical insight and practical skill. They have been particularly noticeable, however, in reconstructionist writings where, as we shall see in Chapters Eleven and Twelve below, it is difficult to locate any curricula proposal as simple as a prescription to teach, say, history or French.

All such proposals are open to at least two objections: first, the inadequacy of the intellectual rationale for the proposed intermingling; and, second, the tendency to substitute propagation of supposed insights and understandings for realistic inquiry into the nature of these understandings.

The second objection is particularly apposite to the Kothari committee's proposal for, whereas they offered reasons for wishing to achieve a cultural synthesis, and looked forward to long term culturally creative efforts within schools, in the short term they intended that a newly-compounded social-moral course of studies should be imposed upon the schools and inculcated into teachers and children. This affirmation of what appears to be an intention to indoctrinate is a consequence of the committee's initial acceptance of a prior set of objectives within which educational processes should be structured. It is the major ethical difficulty which confronts school systems that are brought under the control or into the service of a uniform, centrally directed state policy.

What alternative had the committee? One alternative would

be to discuss the socio-cultural changes needed to support and implement a concept of education. This reverses the usual process of fitting in education as one of the service or support systems for state policy. It is usually dismissed as a piece of academic quaintness. It appears that only in the speculations of philosophic utopians, like Plato, is this approach possible, for it seems to elevate the educator into the role of king as well as philosopher. Nevertheless, it is a concept of educational and political relations which has fascinated many reconstructionists, as we shall see in the following chapters.

The committee might reply to such a speculation in the language of Lenin, that omelettes are not made without breaking eggs: the achievement of any major change requires some sacrifice. The sacrifice of a degree of intellectual freedom at a certain stage of national development might be likened to the processes in the individual of habit-formation or disposition-shaping in the early education of children. Such an argument would have its dangers. An intensive renewal phase of an ancient civilization, which is what the committee is calling for, is not analogous to individual infancy. In cultural renewal, growth is more complex and uneven; those taking part are mostly adult or near-adult; and many of the participants in the renewal process, including teachers and students, are quite capable of sustaining a continuing debate about the nature of the proposed synthesis.

What is required is a parallel development of a more subtle mode of procedure where solutions (e.g., commitments to policy objectives) are adopted tentatively and critically and where the imposing authority of the educationist with answers to give is conditioned by a sense of

the growing capacity of the learner to criticize the answers. Striking a balance between free inquiry which implies some postponement of action, and commitment to what is widely admitted to be an urgent, if not a desperate, task of reform and renewal is extremely difficult. The leisurely pursuit of consensus through discussion, research, speculation, critical, reflective thought: these are all part of the reconstructionist theory as it has developed in England and the U.S.A. Much more immediate and practical survival tasks face India, and for these a much less sophisticated programme of literacy, national unity, and morale strengthening is needed. The committee was undoubtedly right to stress these, yet, if its more ambitious long-term objectives are ever to be realized, there must be some in the community who are encouraged to go on inquiring into the very possibility of "solutions" and "cultural synthesis".

3. Problems for Education

The Kothari committee, even in the single chapter selected for discussion, raised many more issues than those already examined. Five of these are particularly relevant to a wider discussion of the reconstructionist theory, and I shall conclude my discussion by treating them as five problems which typify reconstructionist thinking about education.

First, is the problem of drawing lines of relationship, theoretical and practical, between the proposed new synthesis and the traditions represented in living form by existing regional and local cultures. In a wider form this is the problem of showing how the transition from the present reality to the desired future condition is to be achieved.

It is only part of an answer to describe process solutions to be implemented in schools. The other part of the answer consists of a demonstration of how all that is proposed to be changed would be taken, step by step, forward into the proposed new culture. Revolutionaries settle this problem by positing discontinuities in the form of violent attack, confiscation, liquidation, etc. The reconstructionists uniformly and properly as educational thinkers repudiate violence. They are left with the difficulty of gaining conviction for the view that schools and other educational institutions can undertake the great tasks set them. The reforms proposed for educational institutions seldom match the loftier aspirations of those reconstructionists who wish to introduce a new order and unity of culture.

A <u>second</u> problem is more widely recognized, and that is the danger of producing a technocratic elite, isolated from the masses with whom it is intended to be integrated emotionally, socially and politically. This was a danger which the Kothari committee acknowledged and sought ways of avoiding. Elite theorists, in particular Pareto, argue that it is a delusion to suppose that societies can be made to function without such a separation occurring (25). Evidence concerning the operations of elites suggests that any proposal, like the Kothari committee's, to integrate elites and masses must be worked out in full consciousness of the difficulty. Asserting a need for a common school system and a common core curriculum is insufficient when it is on the higher levels of education that elites separate from masses.

<u>Third</u>, to transform culture in the manner proposed by the Kothari committee imposes the most severe demands upon teachers. These demands are sufficiently strenuous in highly literate, technologically

advanced societies which are able to sustain a high level of teacher education. Yet, as we shall see in Chapter Fourteen, the evidence on teachers as agents of cultural change is not encouraging. Beeby has argued that a national teaching force cannot be transformed quickly, in the manner required for implementation of the Kothari report. The four stages Beeby argues schools and teachers need to pass through are a crude first attempt to analyse this kind of change. It is no criticism of the committee that it did not adopt his model. But it is a criticism that the inspirational aspects of its plea for a transformation were not matched by a cautious appraisal of the potentiality of the existing teaching force to perform the tasks assigned them (26). This is the more surprising in view of criticisms made of the American reconstructionists of the nineteen-thirties, who issued a similar challenge to the teachers but neglected to consider some of the relevant facts - e.g., the political attitudes of teachers, the social forces operating on them, their own perception of their role, and their levels of political and social awareness (27).

Fourth, just as the Kothari committee underestimated the possible difficulties arising from teacher attitudes, attainment and status, so they underestimated the wider context of cultural forces which might militate against the changes they proposed. They appreciated that an unreformed school can become a hindrance to social change, but schools are not perhaps the major hindrance (28). The educative society envisaged by Clarke and other reconstructionists has not been attained. If it had, there might be no need of further reconstructionist theorizing. That such a condition has not been achieved indicates that non-educative, and possibly anti-educative, forces are actively at work in society. There is no need to demonstrate the latter point. Thus,

proposals for co-operative efforts between schools and other social agencies, while they rescue the school from its traditional isolation, are in danger of overlooking the actual resistances some of these other agencies might display to the idea of working with schools and educationists. The Kothari committee did not explore these issues and so overlooked some of the necessary conditions for the success of its own proposals. Even in a hypothetical monolithic society, it could not be assumed that major countervailing forces might not develop: hence the cries of "revisionism", "reaction" and "counter revolution" still to be heard in those contemporary societies which have most nearly achieved monolithic status. It has been until recent years a characteristic reconstructionist weakness to suppose that the inspirational, persuasive features of its proposed new cultural synthesis will not be met by vigorous resistance. If this is accepted, then there is indeed a distinctly rhetorical flavour to the claim that the destiny of a country is being shaped in her classrooms.

Fifth, the overall significance of this document is the orientation it gives to education in the wider processes of national development. I have argued that severe difficulties arise in the attempt to establish this orientation and that the committee did not fully succeed in dealing with some of these. Nevertheless, it is of crucial importance for education, in the situation described, to develop a fresh cultural perspective and for teachers to come to grips with the problems of actively relating school programmes to some of the major tasks and problems of the society. The achievement of the report is to offer a profound challenge and to show possible directions for schools to follow in sensitizing youth to some

of the great issues facing their society.

CHAPTER III

THEORIES OF CULTURE AND CULTURE RECONSTRUCTION

In Chapter I, I contrasted the value spare uses of the concept of culture to be found in the theories of social scientists with the value laden uses which characterize educational theories. This discussion left uhtouched several questions which need to be examined if we are to understand what formal properties of culture the reconstructionists had in mind in their proposals to use education as the means of culture regeneration and renewal. This subject opens up far more issues than it is possible to examine here, so I shall select those which seem most relevant to the major culture strategies of the reconstructionists. Then I shall discuss, in the framework of a set of oppositions: descriptive contrasted with prescriptive theories; and individual creativity contrasted with biological and social inheritance. Finally, I shall characterize reconstructionism as a prescriptive theory of culture which encompasses a variety of positions, from the creativity of individuals in shaping their own experience to the impress upon them of the so-called superorganic system of values, customs, ideals and behavior patterns.

1. Descriptive and Prescriptive Culture Theories

Theories of culture may be reduced to two basic types: first, the description, categorization and explanation of ideas, values, behavior, etc., to be found in the writings of anthropologists; second, the highly selective, value laden proposals of moralists, educationists and others interested in some ideal of thought and action. These selective, value laden proposals cover a very wide range. This

extends from the "high culture" ideals,which are expressed in the equation with the arts or the pursuit of some precisely defined standard, to the attempt to find value in many of the interests and activities of everyday life (1).

Descriptive cultural theorists attempt to explain how social patterns of thought, articulated feeling and behavior are produced, how they inter-relate, change, are taught, learned, and otherwise disseminated. For example:

> "We think culture is a product, is historical; includes ideas, patterns, and values; is selctive; is learned; is based upon symbols; and is an abstraction from behavior and the products of behavior."(2)

This definition draws attention to the common use,by theorists, of culture as a methodological concept, hence "patterns of culture", "culture diffusion", etc. Other anthropologists, critical of a tendency towards social moulding, or superorganic determinism, which they detect in this kind of definition, emphasize man's creative and individual role in producing culture. For them, culture is the individual's organization of his experience in and out of society. It is not only a product but a process, and it is personally experienced:

> "Culture is primarily a mode of human behaviorr acquired by man in the course of his experience of nature to promote his survival as an individual and as a member of society. Culture is acquired through the individual's own efforts and creativity as well as through communication with his fellow men in society who have already acquired some degree of cultural experience. Culture as an existential attribute of actual man in society is not to be confused with the conceptual abstractions of the anthropologist in describing the characteristic qualities of impersonal cultural products, such as traditions. Culture is a process as well as a product of tradition, and as a process it is inseparable from human behaviorr taken individually and collectively."(3)

Elsewhere in the book from which this passage is taken, Bidney also used "culture" in the sense of "the conceptual abstractions of the anthropologist",

thus giving the term both a methodological and an experiential reference. To emphasize the individual's own efforts in acquiring culture is to attempt to counteract the weight often given to two factors which have played a very large part in the sociological and scientific discussions of culture. The first of these is that of mammalian inheritance, and the second is the idea of social forces.

2. Mammalian Inheritance and Body-liberation

In a review of recent research by physiologists and ethologists, Court emphasized the first factor, that of mammalian inheritance:

> "It is already possible to present a very reasonable case for the supposition that man, with all his capacity for self-conditioning, has not escaped from an innate vertebrate biogram."(4)

Defining biogram as "characteristic way of living", he went on to suggest that the distinctive ways in which men act and react by translating environmental energies into stimuli, are dominated by hereditary organic mechanisms. This is a view which is supported by Jensen's more recent examination of the empirical literature on the relative effect of heredity and environment on intelligence (5).

There are, of course, disagreements about the meaning and significance of the empirical data on inherited factors (6). Apart from these differences of opinion, quite different interpretations have been offered of the main outlines of species evolution and, hence, of the significance in human culture of traits with an ancient animal origin. The neo-Darwinian school is the most powerful. Its interpretations emphasize functionalist explanations of behavior and the

continuity of at least the primate species. One of the clearest and most concisely argued of recent alternative interpretations is that of Alsberg, who developed the argument that human cultural evolution is fundamentally different from animal evolution just because man is a product of culture (7). In the spirit of neo-Kantianism, Alsberg proposed the idea of "body liberation" which he used to criticize orthodox neo-Darwinists. The details of this idea may be passed over, but what is important is the way in which he argued that in the early period of hominid development man gradually lost his original, bodily-orientated adaptive outfit, and took to using tools. Alsberg showed how the extra-bodily dimension into which man then moved ultimately widened out into language and other forms of symbolization. Through symbol use, man both freed himself from adaptational specialization and achieved a vital human-cultural dependence on the scientific, moral, aesthetic, and other mental domains. Thus body-liberation merges into culture-assimilation. It is through culture that man is defined as a distinct organism in evolutionary terms (8).

This account gives as much weight to inherited factors as do those of the ethologists, physiologists, psychologists and geneticists. However, Alsberg's "inheritance" is the metaphorical one of transmitted ideas, concepts, meanings, systems of thought and so on, which, if they are to be significantly assimilated (i.e., made the foundation of organized behavior) must be learnt and taught. The preservation of the human line of evolution becomes a matter of conscious, complex decision-taking, provision and organization. These are not primarily acts of individual creativity so much as critical tasks for the larger community. Hence, the cultural inheritance and its continuous modification and development in human experience is the means of determining

and sustaining human acts of creativity. This, as we shall see in the following chapters, is a point of view widely held by reconstructionist writers, especially those influenced by the Dewey-Mead tradition of social interaction.

3. Social Facts and Forces: Education as Culture Transmission

Another school of thought emphasizes the shaping force of culture on individuals. This school of thought, which has influenced a great deal of contemporary sociological theorizing, derives from Durkheim's concepts of representation and social facts. However, it gives far more emphasis to transmission and to the role of education as a transmitting process than to the reconstructionist idea of education as itself a culturally recreative force.

A thorough examination of these concepts, including the modifications of them Durkheim himself made, would be a very large undertaking indeed (9). For our purposes it is sufficient to appreciate that Durkheim and his successors have attempted severely to delimit the scope of individual behavior and ideas by arguing that social facts are not susceptible to modification through the efforts of individuals or groups. In The Rules of Sociological Method, Durkheim defined social facts as those fulfilments of obligations as brother, husband, citizen, those executions of contracts "which are defined, externally to myself and my acts, in law and custom ... I did not create them; I merely inherited them through my education". Similarly, the beliefs and practices of religious life; all these items "present the noteworthy property of existing outside the individual consciousness". Furthermore,

they are "endowed with coercive power" (10). Durkheim was intent on establishing the independence of sociology from psychology, and on criticizing the individualistic tenets of utilitarianism. In terms of culture theory, it is important to appreciate that social facts, on his definition, constitute an element in culture to which man has to reconcile himself and find ways of adjusting. Education becomes, in part, a process whereby individuals learn their limitations and discover the intractibility of some of the social situations which confront them.

Like Marx, Durkheim objected to that kind of "psychologism" which reduces complex social forces and institutions to individual ideas. But, despite the conservatism of the social facts doctrine, he admitted a more substantial role for ideas in processes of social change than at any rate the older Marx seems to have done (11). Also, in his theory of representations, Durkheim gave more emphasis than Marx did to the role of consciousness and to modes of perception as factors of change. Indeed, it is the mode of perception that he defined as the "essence" of culture.

Durkheim's theory of representations states that what we gain through perception are representations, that is, communicable images in a mind, or communicable categories into which a mind classifies data, or communicable expectations of behavior. Thus, representations are a reflection of culture; they are culture as perceived. The representations are social or collective to the extent that they are characteristic of many persons. Culture is there to be perceived, or it is a mode of perception to be acquired, it is not an individual, imaginative invention. As they are collective, representations transcend individuals, or are superordinate to individual minds.

Durkheim defined the mass of collective representations put together in a certain idiomatic way, or style, as the "conscience collective". Regarded as a coherent set of group perceptions and expectations, these are the conventional understandings, or, in Parsons's language, common societal values (12).

While this brief account of the formation of the "conscience collective" omits many important details, it does underline the capacity of pre-existing group expectation and understandings to shape individual experience. Indeed, such is this shaping power, in Durkheim's account, that it is difficult to see how a new idea could occur or a change take place in a system. The criticism made of Freud's conversion into universal laws of his interpretations of the psychic disorder of middle class Viennese in the 1890s may apply to Durkheim. What is proffered as a universal account of culture is a reification, perhaps, of a particular static situation, or the expression of a wish to stabilize social change at an early period of French industrialization (13). Nonetheless, Durkheim did have a theory of cultural change. Insofar as this theory of change was a description, it was a non-ideational theory. Population pressures break down organic solidarity, or institutionalized norms and roles, and lead to changes in the division of labor. However, Durkheim was anxious to see solidarity re-established, so that this description of processes of change was by no means free of his preferences for order. Insofar as his theory of change was ideational it rested on assumptions about individual action and spontaneity which are difficult to reconcile with his remarks on the "conscience collective" (14).

We can appreciate the problem of reconciling stability and ideational change in Durkheim's theory by contrasting his remarks on the

role of the innovating or critical individual, on the one hand, with the coercive power he attributed to "social facts", and the power to control individuals with which he invested norms and values; on the other hand, Durkheim allowed that in some circumstances these "facts" may be overcome - they may be "violated successfully" ... but "I am always compelled to struggle with them" (15). However, the capacity of the individual to affect these "facts" is extremely limited:

> "A social fact is to be recognized by the power of external coercion which it exercises or is capable of exercising over individuals, and the presence of this power may be recognised in its turn by the existence of some specific sanction or by the resistance offered against every individual effort that tends to violate it" (16).

Various explanations are offered for this limited individual capacity to influence social facts. In some places, Durkheim seemed to suggest that it is because the facts have a social reality independent of any particular individual or group within society; elsewhere it is because they represent the context of assumptions and expectations on which consciousness itself has been nourished through upbringing and education (17). In other places, it is because the "social facts" are the expectations and sanctions uppermost in the social milieu (18).

Not surprisingly, Durkheim was led into confusion when considering problems of truth, freedom, moral discretion and, indeed, education, whose aim he reduced to "the socialization of the human being" (19). In his essay, "Individualism and the Intellectuals", he asserted that "the individual derives from society even the moral beliefs which deify him" (20). Yet he also exalted the autonomy of reason, and freedom of discussion. In the style of Kant, he spoke of self-realization

being achieved through actions performed out of a sense of duty in the community setting of republican democracy. But are there any occasions on which this sense of duty might lead the individual into rebellion? In view of the coercive, moulding power of "social facts" and of institutionalized norms, it is difficult to see how on Durkheim's account a rebellious idea could occur to an individual. Yet in "Individualism and the Intellectuals" he did allow the right to rebellion when any of three conditions are present:

1. When the individual comprehends the reality of his society better than most of its members (i.e., its "best interests").

2. When the moral ideas we know are "out of date".

3. When society as a whole loses sight of the sacred quality of individual rights (21).

However, in each set of conditions, the test seems to be purely historical: that morality is right which coincides with the direction in which the society is moving. This is true of the first set of conditions if we assume, as Durkheim seems to intend us to do, that "best interest" means "emerging character". Even if it means some divination of ultimate good, Durkheim offered no way of analysing or evaluating goods of this kind, except the unsatisfactory principle of a free competition of "goods". In order to avoid possible despotism, Durkheim proposed a clash of competing societies, and especially competing corporations. This would presumably include the clash of competing institutions and societies on the international plane. Thus, despotism is avoided at the cost of what it may not be unfair to describe as the ruthless competitiveness of large corporations and the imperial wars which Marx predicted and which events since Durkheim's time have partly borne out.

Durkheim's theory of culture, ostensibly a description of the processes whereby individuals learn the customs and morality of the group, and hence a sample of the first or descriptive type of theory, in fact is a programme of social action intended to stabilize change by imposing a complex of understandings and values on the rising generation. It is appropriate that in this theory educational institutions are conceived as conserving and transmitting agencies acting for more powerful social forces.

Neither the conscious, historical individual,nor a hypothesized physico-psychological inheritance, plays a determinate role in this theory. Instead, culture is the sphere within which operate the interlocking forces of social history, traditions, group outlooks and behaviors, and a network of institutions. The individual is a product of these forces. He has a legacy of moral values which, through the operation of an implanted moral will and in the spirit of democratic republicanism, he should apply critically to his cultural milieu. But, despite this gesture towards individual autonomy, Durkheim's theory, taken as a whole, raises little confidence in the individual's capacity to make any impression on this milieu.

The impact of Durkheim's normative assumptions on sociology and education is a vast but neglected topic. Transmission theories of education have absorbed,uncritically, the model of the powerful society shaping its rising generations through its educational institutions (22). As a single example of the persistence of the Durkheimian normative model in sociological theory, one may note the work of the most influential of modern French sociologists, Aron, whose description of cultural assimilation and change, and his nostalgic references to the loss of authority, are reminiscent of his distinguished predecessor

at the Sorbonne:

> "The present culture of European nations is the result of a kind of historical sedimentation. The layers of culture, each belonging to a more or less recent century, are fused rather than superimposed in the unconscious of a limited group or an entire nation. The different groups have not all rejected, assimilated, or transformed the heritage of every bygone age in the same way. Here, too, fortunately, integration is incomplete. Creative dissatisfaction springs from the contradictions in values.
>
> "No society in history has lent itself to a complete assimilation of all its members. But modern societies increase the causes of anomy, if one may define anomy in the most general sense as the absence of a system of values or behaviour patterns which would at once impose itself with self-evident authority." (23)

The grip of historical culture upon the imaginative life of the individual and nostalgia for authoritarian values are very apparent in this passage. Yet Aron recognizes a greater diversity of social forces and sources of authority than did Durkheim. Furthermore, he avoids defining consciousness and behavior merely in terms of the assimilation of group experiences. Thus he was not faced with the difficulty which Durkheim encountered in trying to explain social diversity and the ideational sources of change. Aron's is a conservative theory no less than Durkheim's, but a significant difference is that Aron acknowledges a preference for achieving stability in and through social institutions, whereas Durkheim often seemed to suggest that this stability was not a matter of preference but of recognizing the "facts" or "realities" of society, a technique skilfully employed by his American contemporary, Sumner (24). Despite very considerable differences of approach, it should be noticed that Durkheimian conservatism and modern reconstructionism have in common the conviction that socialization and education are processes which deeply color, indeed transform, the lives of the young. The ideals of moral autonomy,

self-mastery, and rationality which lie behind Durkheim's apparently inexorable system of social coercions are recognizably reconstructionist, even though the uses made of these ideals are very different in the two theories (25).

Despite wide differences between them, the "culture product" school of thought does not neglect processes of acquisition, dissemination and change, nor does the "culture process" school neglect products in the form of acquired ideas, values, symbol system, forms of behavior and so forth. In the work of Durkheim, "process" and "product" are brought together in the idea of assimilation of a heritage, which he unobtrusively reconstructed by inserting selected ideals and values. What has united social science theorists since the days of E.B. Tylor is an interest in <u>understanding</u> the phenomena of culture, however these may be defined. Tylor, however, was by no means successful in keeping to descriptive uses of the term culture and at times fell into normative uses (26).

I have argued that Durkheim's objective approach to social theory did not prevent him for coloring his explanations of cultural phenomena with his own preferences for a certain kind of society. This modern attempt to develop a "value free" descriptive and explanatory science has come increasingly under attack, partly on the grounds that the role of participant observer in a sharply divided world is not a value free role at all, nor, it is argued, can his observations and explanations be conceptually separated from his evaluations. Thus, much contemporary anthropology is said to represent an implicit and sometimes an explicit commitment, for example to the interests of the international strategy of one or other of the major powers (27).

4. Prescriptive Culture Theories

Criticism of the methodological biases and the influence of personal preferences in the works of anthropologists raises issues about the objective or inter-subjective quality of social science knowledge which are matters for controversy amcngst specialists. Nevertheless, the pursuit of objectivity, neutrality, or inter-subjectivity in the interest of a scientific understanding of how and why people live as they do remains an aim of the first type of theory. Even if it could be shown to be a delusion, this quest distinguishes the first from the second major type of culture theory, at least as a matter of emphasis. The second type of theory by contrast explicitly commits itself normatively both to ends and means. This is the traditional usage of the concept of culture, exemplified in all its diversity in the classical and post-classical Greek concepts of "paideia" (28). According to the prescriptivists, culture is a process of cultivation, a deliberate, sustained pursuit of some kind of excellence, a moral quest, a vision, an ideal of perfection, a valued way of life. Its exponents include a long line of moralists and educationists within the Western tradition stretching from Plato to Matthew Arnold and it includes such varied twentieth-century writers as Dewey, Huizinga, Y Gassett, Shaw, Eliot, Leavis, Cassirer, and Whitehead (29). However, as I pointed out above, the difference between the descriptive and the prescriptive theories of culture may be more a matter of emphasis and of aspiration than of logical distinctiveness. The descriptive theory, despite the endeavours of its exponents to remain morally detached, is unable to restrict itself entirely to explanation and description, and by implication at least commits itself to a view on what is worthwhile in

culture conceived as product. Thus, Durkheim in fact recommended what he purported to describe in his discussion of the shaping force of culture on individuals. Does such recommendation inevitably follow from the fact that, as it has been more generally defined, "culture" is a valued attribute of human society? This question raises the problem of the objectivity of social science knowledge. I do not intend to enter into an analysis of this question, but simply to point to the difficulty of selecting and using a conceptual apparatus and a language for this topic which avoids a high degree of personal preference. Thus the term culture itself refers to something which is thought to be good. This may be an objective usage in that it expresses the preferance of a wide community of social scientists. But we could certainly not infer from this an objectivity in the use of the term culture by social scientists comparable to the objectivity of use of the concepts of physics by physicists. The physicist does not have any views about the desirability of the concept of force, but even dispassionate observers cannot free themselves from the values which it seems are inextricably bound into the concept of culture. This may be seen in the writings of two recent exponents of the "anthropological school":

> "The great novelty, then, in the behavioural evolution of the primates was not simply the development of a cultural mode of adaptation as such. It was, rather, the psychological restructuralization that not only made this new mode of existence possible but provided the potentiality for cultural re-adjustment and change. The psychological basis of culture lies not only in a capacity for highly complex forms of learning but in a capacity for transcending what is learned; a potentiality for innovation, creativity, reorganization and change." (30)

> "Culture, then, represents a biological adaptation, based on genetic changes, but transmitted non-genetically, that is, through the socially interactive process of learning. Culture is man's social heredity. Within the limits

set by the genes every human act of organism is learned, acquired, through the action of the culture upon him. Though based on genetic factors which make it possible, culture is itself an extragenetic, a superorganic system which functions in the service of man just as any tool does, to enlarge and extend the satisfaction of his needs" (31).

Admittedly the concept of culture is treated in a very general fashion by these writers. In particular field observational and theoretical studies, a general commendatory usage is replaced by a patient filling in of detail through the use of some overarching framework (32). Yet even these writers are unable to escape entirely the ancient tradition of treating culture as a valued attribute of human life - in their own terms, the defining quality of human evolution.

However, despite these qualifications concerning the use of the term culture, it is still true that the second, or prescriptive type of culture theory intermingles, much more obviously than the first, empirical generalization and normative judgments. This is partly achieved by frankly normative and commendatory definitions:

> "A community is in the state of culture when the domination of nature in the material, moral and spiritual realms permits a state of existence which is higher and better than the given natural conditions; and when this state of existence is furthermore characterized by a harmonious balance of material and spiritual values and is guided by an ideal (in principle homogeneously derived) toward which the different activities of the community are directed." (33)

Jaeger, in his masterly description and assessment of Greek contributions to the understanding of culture as an ideal of human life, made the second type of theory a standard against which the first type should be judged:

> "The 'ideal of culture' (in Greek arete and paideia) is a specific creation of the Greek mind. The anthropological concept of culture is a modern extension of

> this original concept; but it has made out of a concept of value a mere descriptive category which can be applied to any nation, even to 'the culture of the primitive' because it has entirely lost its true obligatory sense" (34).

These definitions stipulate "essential" meanings which denote not so much a methodological crassness as a vital commitment to norms and ideals of civilized living. The terminological issue might be resolved by using different words, although the cost would be high in view of the long traditions of literature, inquiry and discussion relating to both the first and the second theories of culture (35). However, settling the terminological issue would still leave unsettled the substantive issues of what ought to be valued; and decisions about the criteria governing the processes of "cultivating" young and established members of given communities would remain to be settled.

Nor is there much likelihood of the two types of theory being brought into harmonious relationship with each other through the use of a common analytic framework. The categories of the descriptive type of theory are based on some notion of fundamental life activities of man in society, indicated by sets of terms like (1) economic relations, kinship patterns, taboos, mores, technology and tools, patterns of child rearing; or (2) some hierarchy of elements of perception, consciousness, action and ideology; or (3) some more or less mentalistic taxonomy of scientific ideas, religious beliefs, aesthetic judgments and so on.

The categories of the second, or prescriptive, type of theory overlap with those of the first, but invariably they are centred on some norm of central and peripheral activity, or some key concept or set of key concepts, which yield criteria for judging any and all cultural activities. One of the clearest examples of this

is Jaeger's account of the various forms of paideia amongst the Greeks. Every form of paideia was grounded in a coherent set of values against which all other claims were judged - e.g., the rhetorician Isocrates criticized the paideia of the philosophers for its supposed neglect of the practical wisdom of compromise and accommodation.

5. Reconstructionism and Culture

Insofar as we can maintain a clear distinction, the reconstructionists, on the whole, belong to the second, not to the first, group of culture theorists. This does not mean they have not been profoundly influenced by social science theory. Their primary stated purpose in describing and analysing cultural phenomena is to lay the groundwork for a programme of change and reform and for criticizing alternative proposals. The most obvious general character for such groundwork to assume is to claim that there is something seriously amiss with the world - with culture in the widest sense of "way of life", involving both process and product, to return to the distinction made at the beginning of this chapter. If it can be shown that the whole way of life of a people is somehow in an unsatisfactory condition, although the particular proposals for reforming it may not be accepted, then the basic strategic victory of establishing a need for action will have been achieved. That this victory was sought is obvious from the extremities of decline, degeneration and chaos to which the reconstructionists attempted to reduce the culture of their own time.

These extremities generally took the form of a "crisis in culture", most conspicuously in the writings of Wells, Mannheim,

Rugg and Brameld. Less vivid, emotional and totalistic, but no less searching in their critical implications,were the studies of the condition of culture instituted by the Webbs and other Fabians. Separation of descriptive and prescriptive elements in reconstrucfionist examinations of culture is extremely difficult. As we have seen, even in the work of descriptive scientists this separation is not easily accomplished. True to their ideological origins and interests, the reconstructionists fused facts and values, both through definition of terms and, more confusingly, through an intermingling of different forms of discourse. Sometimes this intermingling led them into historical predictions of social trends, and advice to adapt reform to the "forces of history" - to "get on the side of history".

Like the ancient exponents of paideia, they all entertained an ideal of a central structure, or a normative core of universally agreed principles, or a methodology towards which culture reconstruction would be directed. These structures, cores and methodologies provided both ends and means. This is because all of the reconstructionists, by rejecting violence, historical inevitability, and the belief that man is shaped by forces beyond his control, put their ends into service as instrumentalities for attaining the new order: a synthetic core curriculum becomes the means of cultivating awareness of the skills and knowledge needed to make the future consensus, the larger synthesis of the whole of culture; and scientific method, in the form of reflective thinking, becomes a general method of education which anticipates the universalization of scientific thinking throughout society.

In general, the reconstructionists accepted the idea of an external

cultural reality in and through which individual experience is shaped. But the relationship of experience to an external culture reality was seen as reciprocal. Although individual development is a function of cultural participation, the subsequent impact of individuals and social groups on culture is, in reconstructionism, vital for cultural growth. Dewey's theory of growth as the reconstruction of experience, which involved a continuing interaction with environment, expresses the ideal of the reciprocal development of individual and culture. Education, in this context, reflects aspects of the wider culture, since it is a process and a set of institutions designed to further the interests of various cultural sub-groups - e.g., the economy. However, the processes of individual and group education can be so conducted as themselves to become major instrumentalities of future cultural development. It is this latter aspect of the relationship of education to culture, together with the kind of education proposed, that gives to the reconstructionist theory its particular claim to interest and attention as a theory of culture change.

CHAPTER IV

FABIAN SOCIALISM: THE WEBBS

Fabian socialism is a complex political and social reform movement comprising not a single doctrinal orthodoxy but a variety of ideas. It embraces such diverse matters as criticism of specific social economic and political institutions and proposals for their piecemeal reform; an attempt to reformulate the Ricardian theory of rent as a means of condemning capitalism; and projects for total transformation of the culture. When contrasted with other socialist movements (e.g., Marxism, or Guild Socialism), Fabianism does have some distinctive features; for example, the willingness to build upon and only gradually replace existing institutions, the repudiation of violence, a persistent meliorism, and the mistrust of producer control in industry and of the working class in general. But, even so, doctrinal uniformity can be overdrawn. Taken as a movement of ideas and practical action from the mid 1880s to the present day, Fabianism has provided a rostrum not only for gradualist piecemealers but for reformers who, impatient with gradualism, have advocated more peremptory, ruthless and authoritarian measures (1).

An appraisal of the whole Fabian movement, or even of the contributions of its early leaders, who included William Clarke, Hubert Bland, G.B. Shaw, Edward Pearse, Sydney Olivier, Graham Wallas, Sidney and Beatrice Webb, and, for a time, Annie Besant and H.G. Wells, is beyond the scope of this study. Instead, we shall concentrate on two of its leading figures, the two who are, by general consent, the chief architects of the Fabian ideology. These two are Sidney and Beatrice Webb.

In view of their joint researches into the history of local government,

trade unionism and political democracy, their close co-operation in numerous reform projects (e.g., Poor Law reform), and their mental harmony, to which Beatrice's autobiographies amply testify, it is appropriate to treat the Webbs not separately but as a partnership. Differences there certainly were, for example of temperament and background, but for our purposes these are unimportant.

1. Culture Diagnosis

The Webb diagnosis of late nineteenth and early twentieth century British culture may be considered under three headings:

1. Methodology of social research.
2. Historicism and interventionism.
3. Specific failures of capitalist civilization.

The distinctive features of the Webb culture diagnosis derive primarily from their use of empirical methods for investigating selected social institutions and movements, and from the tactics of social infiltration and gradualist reform. I shall give rather more attention to these, therefore, than to the specific failures of capitalism that they identified.

1.1 Methodology of social research

Beatrice Webb has been related, as a somewhat degenerate offshoot, to the tradition of scepticism and empiricism running from Locke through Hume and Bentham to John Stuart Mill: degenerate because of the bureaucratic, impersonal and authoritarian solutions she is supposed to have offered to the problems she diagnosed (2). Yet there is an important element in the empirical tradition which she and Sidney sustained and made positive contributions to: systematic inquiry into the living conditions of her fellow citizens, according to the methods of laborious,

painstaking collection, classification, interpretation and assessment of public documents and institutional practices. In Simey's words, the Webbs were "scientists of the truly empirical type" (3). Thus, the first point to note about the Webb analysis of culture is that it is empirical, piecemeal, and part of an established tradition of historical inquiry. That topics were selected which the Webbs had a political interest in - e.g., trade union reform, reorganization of local government, and consumer co-operatives - does not affect their distinction as leading exponents of the empirical method.

Similarly, the Fabian Society, from its inception in 1884, laid particular emphasis on the collection, discussion and dissemination of information and ideas about contemporary living conditions: socialists, as campaigners for reform, had to be supplied with facts. Appended to the forty-first of the Fabian Tracts is this summary statement of the work of the Society:

> "1. Meetings for the discussion of questions connected with Socialism.
>
> 2. The further investigation of economic problems, and the collection of facts contributing to their elucidation.
>
> 3. The issue of publications containing information on social questions, and arguments relating to Socialism.
>
> 4. The promotion of Socialist lectures and debates in other societies and clubs.
>
> 5. The representation of the Society on public conferences and discussions on social questions." (4)

In pursuit of these objectives, the Fabians, following the Webb example, undertook various tasks. Thus, they assiduously gathered and collated facts on economic, social, political, educational and welfare questions, and published these as Fabian tracts, an unrivalled source of material on the developing Fabian mentality which inextricably

bound together a reformer's zeal with a fact-finder's passion for information (5). A sample of the topics and possibilities for reform investigated between 1884 and 1930 indicates both the range of their diagnosis and their preference for internal, administrative and institutional reform: poverty under capitalism; concentration of ownership; hours of work; communal responsibilities of parish and district councils; co-operative movements; wages; conditions of employment; housing; workers' compensation; municipal slaughterhouses; rural depopulation; public health; population trends; child labor; school nurseries; taxation; industrial reconstruction; school boards; and municipal pawnshops!

Sidney Webb adopted a simple form of hedonistic utilitarianism in determining the basic directions of social policy. This meant that the wants of the populace were to be ascertained, and satisfied, with this important qualification: that only those wants would be satisfied which were consistent with or taken to be an expression of the basic tenets of socialism. I shall discuss these in later sections of this chapter. For the moment, I want to emphasize the importance the Webbs gave to detailed, concrete, historical studies of social phenomena, not only as a means of ascertaining wants and the barriers that frustrated want satisfaction, but also as a way of discovering the principles of socialism:

> "Socialism, to Socialists, is not a utopia which they have invented but a principle of social organization which they assert to have been discovered by the patient investigations into sociology whose labours have distinguished the present century." (6)

The inquiry methods adopted by the Webbs were on the face of it a naive inductionism, facts gathered by questionnaires, interviews, and from documentary sources, and arranged into "natural" categories, from

which certain regularities were inferred. But Beatrice herself criticized the spurious inductionism of Herbert Spencer, whereby social "laws" were "proved" by the accumulation of appropriately supportive evidence. She claimed to have freed herself from this "dogmatic creed", without losing regard for "the relevance of facts" (7), and she noted that the decision to search for certain kinds of facts, and to arrange them in a certain way, meant an end to simple inductionism (8). She saw that inquiry into the life and labor of the common people was, in late Victorian England, partly motivated by a fear of the newly enfranchised democracy, and this fear was part of what she was interested to understand:

> "What impelled me to concentrate on the condition of the people as the immediate question for investigation [this was before she met Sidney] was the state of mind in the most vital centres of business enterprise, of political agitation and of academic reasoning." (9)

Later, she pointed to another, more obvious consideration in the Webb approach to social research, the genetic method, out of which was to arise, in Sidney's mind, the foundations of a historical argument for socialism:

> "'The Webb speciality' has been a study, at once historical and analytic, of the life-history of particular forms of social organizations within the United Kingdom, such as the Trade Union and Co-operative movements, and English local government from the seventeenth to the end of the nineteenth century." (10)

This analytic-evolutionary method is to be distinguished on the one hand from abstract, theoretical economic analysis (although the Webbs for many years continued to express satisfaction in their development of a theory of rent designed to supplant Ricardian and Marxist value theories); on the other hand, Beatrice distinguished their genetic approach from the "static" accounts given by Booth

and the social surveyors.

It is important to appreciate the nature of the facts to whose discovery and interpretation the Webbs devoted their researches. The facts disclosed by the Webbs are of the kind we might designate social and public, having to do with institutional life and with topics like conditions of employment, provision of welfare services, and so forth. Despite Beatrice's early profession of interest in the personal mental and emotional lives of individuals, and her occasional diary references to the superiority of the artist's insight, the Webbs never investigated the personal dimensions of experience under capitalism. Furthermore, they had very little to say about the quality of personal life and of culture in the sense of felt experience which socialism might be expected to facilitate and enhance. Writers like Matthew Arnold, Jaeger and Cassirer intended by the concept of culture a very different set of qualities in individual and social life. We may see how wide is the gap between the two approaches by referring to Cassirer's discussion of Rousseau's and Simmel's criticisms of the pursuit of the arts and the sciences. According to these critics, the arts and the sciences encourage their exponents to exalt abstractions, and they bring about a divorce between the personal world of the individual and the processes and creations of the arts and sciences. These criticisms have become more familiar in recent years in the Marxist version of the concepts of "reification" and "alienation". But for Cassirer, such criticisms miss the importance of the symbolic realms for personal awareness. He argued that the consolidation which life undergoes in the symbolic realms of the arts and sciences is not the antithesis of what the "I" requires but "the <u>condition</u> by virtue of which it discovers and comes to know its

own being" (11).

Allowing for the quite different traditions of expression within which the Fabians and Cassirer wrote, there is still an enormous gulf between this culture of personal experience and the ways in which it can be articulated in public, symbolic forms, and the Fabian ordering of patterns of social and political organization to bring about the communal concept of a national minimum of material well-being. Yet the gulf was recognized by Beatrice, who struggled to bridge it, in her diaries, if not in her analytical and polemical works (12).

The contribution of the Webbs to culture analysis was not restricted to the sustained application of empirical techniques to a selected range of contemporary social problems in their historical setting. As Fabians, they were no less interested in influencing others than in conducting their own inquiries. For this purpose, the Fabian Society itself as an instrument of social inquiry and criticism was felt to be insufficient. Both the London School of Economics and the New Statesman were founded as a consequence of the Webbs' determination to consolidate and institutionalize the methods of inquiry and reform which they advocated.

True to his instinct for establishing institutions, and in this more immediately successful than Karl Marx, his socialist forebear in the empirical tradition (13), Webb, when left £10,000 by a Fabian sympathizer, Henry Hutchinson, decided to found an institution for social science research. According to Graham Wallas, the Webbs together decided "to found a school in London on the lines of the Ecole Libre des Sciences Politiques in Paris". The remaining trustees were persuaded to support this plan for a school of social and

economic research, which was founded in 1895. It was to be:

> "a centre not only of lectures on special subjects, but an association of students who would be directed and supported in doing original work ... Above all we want the ordinary citizen to feel that reforming society is no light matter, and must be undertaken by experts specially trained for the purpose." (14)

Reference to the experts brings out an implication of the Webbs' empirical approach never far beneath the surface: the twin tasks of documenting social conditions and proposing reforms require, and indeed call forth, an elite of experts, of whom the active Fabian Society membership constituted something of an example. Elitism is a feature of reconstructionist thinking, but most reconstructionists attempted to combine elite leadership with mass education directed at democratic citizenship. These attempts were not always very successful. Just how ineffective were the proposals made by the Webbs for uniting expert leadership and mass participation under the single banner of democracy we shall see in the second part of this chapter. For the present, something more needs to be said about their views on educating the experts and disseminating the findings of social research.

Lord Beveridge specified four distinct purposes in the idea that the London School should be founded as an instrument for inquiry (and, by extension, reform):

1. "The general idea of increasing, out of all proportion to anything attempted hitherto, the resources devoted to scientific study of society."
2. That specialists should live together in one institution.
3. The special aim of the School was to study and investigate "the concrete facts of industrial life and the actual working of economic and political institutions".
4. The School was to be properly placed in the University

> of London, so giving London the distinction of being first among the British Universities to have a Faculty for the Social Sciences, of which the London School of Economics and Political Science was recognized as a school (15).

The last purpose may be thought to be inconsistent with a reform movement which gave the attention which Fabianism did to the achievement of a national minimum. There appears to be no evidence that the Webbs saw the School as the forerunner of similar institutions throughout the country (16). However, the empirical purpose of the School indicates the remarkable unity, in the Webbs' mind, of free inquiry and social reform. There was nothing partial or tendentious in the constitution of L.S.E., which was incorporated as a Company in whose articles Webb had included the fundamental principle of free expression, or holding of opinions "on any subject whatsoever" (17). That this principle was implemented is confirmed both by the appointment of the political conservative, Hewins, as the first director, and in a retrospective view by Hewins himself (18).

Yet there was considerably more to the Fabian method of institutionalizing inquiry than the disinterested establishment of an institution of higher learning. By 1900, Beatrice had found much to be thankful for in the workings of the School - and not all of it the fruits of the method of research whose contours she so clearly outlined. The quotation is lengthy but it brings out the special flavour of the "Webb method":

> "Our little schemes with regard to the new University of London prosper. We have got the School recognised as a Faculty of Economics, we have secured a site and a building, free of cost, and an income of £2,500 devoted to economics and commercial science. Sidney will be a member of the Faculty and will probably represent the County Council on the Senate. Best of all he has persuaded the Royal Commission to recognise economics as a science and not merely as a subject in the Arts Faculty. The preliminary

studies for the economics degree will, therefore, be mathematics and biology. This divorce of economics from metaphysics and shoddy history is a great gain. We have always claimed that the study of the structure and function of society was as much a science as the study of any other form of life, and ought to be pursued by the scientific methods used in other organic sciences. Hypothesis ought to be used,not as the unquestioned premise from which to deduce an unquestioned conclusion but as an order of thought to be verified by observation and experiment. Such history as will be taught at the School will be the history of social institutions discovered from documents, statistics and the observation of the actual structure and working of living organisations. This attainment of our aim - the starting of the School as a department of science - is the result of a chapter of fortunate accidents. There was the windfall of the Hutchinson Trust, then the selection of Hewins as director, the grant from the T.E.B. [Technical Education Board of the London County Council] towards commercial education, the coming of Creighton to London as Bishop, and the successful packing of the University of London Commission. Then again we are humble folk whom nobody suspects of power; and Sidney's opinions on educational matters are considered moderate and sound as neither anti- nor pro-ecclesiastic. And we have had two very good friends helping us - Haldane and the Bishop of London, both of them trusting us completely in our own range of subjects. Of course, the School is at present extremely imperfect: its reputation is better than its performance. But we have no illusions, and we see clearly what we intend the School to become and we are convinced that the science will emerge" (19).

It is clear from their own researches, from the emphasis they placed on free ranging inquiry and research in the founding of the L.S.E., and from the intimate relationship in their own mind between inquiry and reform, that the Webbs entertained another model of culture reform in addition to that I have already referred to as a national minimum of material well-being. This other model is part of what might be termed rationalistic naturalism, the sustaining belief of the enlightenment philosophy and of the ideologues of the nineteenth century. It is a model of and for the expert elite, just as the material or environmental national minimum is a culture model for the masses, in whose well-being the expert elite has invested very powerful, if sublimated, feelings, together with a considerable

portion of its intellectual capital. There is an echo here of Disraeli's two nations paternalism.

According to the Webb culture model, theories of social reconstruction arise "naturally" out of dispassionate, critical studies of the existing social order (20). Furthermore, the model, echoing the French ideologues and Marxism, requires the enlargement and improvement of facilities for others to conduct such inquiries so that the desired, reconstructed society might be brought more quickly into existence (21). Hence the Webbs' confidence in proposing the endowment of free inquiry as a means to social amelioration as they understood the concept in the eighteen-nineties. At that time, this endowment was the mental counterpart, in the Fabian scheme, to the amelioration of material conditions, an extension of the "national minimum" of tolerable conditions of life in a civilized society. Forty years later, discouraged by slow reform in Britain and stimulated by the drastic upheavals in Soviet society, the Webbs were seriously to entertain as a cultural model Soviet communism, whose implementation depended in part on a falsification of the facts in which they placed so much confidence.

1.2 Historicism and interventionism

The Webbs were evolutionary socialists, who believed in the inevitable transformation of Britain from a capitalist into a socialist society. How far, then, is the culture to whose study and reform they addressed themselves the outcome of inevitable laws or of trends beyond the power of individuals or groups to control? The association in Plato, Marx and others of inevitability doctrines with a holistic approach to social change has been demonstrated by Popper (22). At first it might appear that the active commitment

of the Fabians to highly specific forms of interventionism rules out both the deterministic aspects of Marx's laws of social movement and Platonic holistic utopianism. But there is clear, if limited, evidence, particularly in Sidney Webb's writings, of a belief in historical inevitability and in the need for total social reform, combined with his more obvious enthusiasm for piecemeal social reformism.

First, however, I want to examine the Webb theory and practice of interventionism. It is apparent, both from their writings and from their life-long involvement in political, administrative and educational reform, that the Webbs believed it both possible and useful in achieving socialism for individuals and groups to intervene in the historical processes whose main features they had tried to identify in their genetic studies of institutions like the co-operative movement. The famous policy slogan of permeation expresses this interventionist belief. That this was a conscious technique is indicated by Beatrice Webb, who described permeation both in respect of specific legislative possibilities and as the means whereby young public officials and social researchers would inevitably encounter the Webb-Fabian ideology:

> "Sidney much enjoyed colloquy with Sir John Gorst, Michael Sadler, Llewellyn Smith and others [responsible politicians and civil servants] about Education Bill [1902 Act]. On the whole he is favourable to the central idea of the Bill: that is replacing <u>ad hoc</u> bodies by one set of representatives chosen to manage all the business of the locality (but doubtful whether the Bill, as it stands, will effect this); also, not against helping voluntary or denominational schools in return for a measure of control, which is bound to grow. Other clauses, enabling public authorities to subsidise private venture schools, he looks upon as radically bad. He, however, recognises that it is no good <u>for him</u> to oppose the Bill - far better to appreciate the good in it and by appreciating it, get some influence in amending

it in our direction. And he is fortunately placed for this purpose. As originator and chairman of the most successful educational authority in London [Beatrice was referring to the Technical Education Board of the London County Council] as a friendly acquaintance of Gorst's - as a friend of Llewellyn Smith and Sadler, and acquainted with all the educationalists in London, he is able to be constantly suggesting amendments which are favourably considered by those in authority.

"This work, and pushing the London School and the Political Science Library [the London School of Economics and Political Science], combine to force us more into political society on both sides. On Monday, for instance, we dined at the House with Haldane and Asquith and other Liberals; on Tuesday, with Sir John Gorst and Lord George Hamilton, two Conservative Ministers. Becoming, too, every day more connected with the superior rank of civil servants, such as, Sir Alfred Milner, Sir George Kekewich, Henry Cunynghame and others (Sidney's old connection with the Civil Service stands him in good stead - he knows the ropes of almost every office)." (23)

"We can now feel assured that with the School [London School of Economics] as a teaching body, the Fabian Society as a propagandist organization, the L.C.C. Progressives as an object lesson in electoral success, our books as the only elaborate and original work in economic fact and theory, [sic] no young man or woman who is anxious to study or to work in public affairs can fail to come under our influence." (24)

As we have seen, Sidney Webb's influence on the 1902 Education Act has been amongst commentators a matter of some controversy. However, the procedures he adopted clearly rested on the beliefs that there was nothing inevitable even about the ultimate very broad shape or effect of the legislation, that adults, in positions of influence and whatever their party political affiliations, could be persuaded by rational means to adopt certain types of policy in preference to others, and that it was part of the duty of Fabians to "permeate" the circles of power and influence of their own time. Interventionism could make a decisive difference, but it had to be an informed, technically adroit permeation, based on a careful knowledge and understanding of political and economic

considerations. The Webbs never assumed that the complex infrastructure of social organizations could be remade simply through criticism and the vague recommendation of socialist ideals. Few, if any other, reconstructionists showed the same awareness of the need in proposing changes to think out the problem of changing a network of intimately related institutional structures and roles. The Webbs appreciated that society has achieved a determinate character, over time; it is organic to the extent that past affects present and changes in one part are affected by changes in other parts. Webb accepted Marx's view that a crisis of capitalism is inevitable, but this crisis can be attributed to a variety of inter-connected, historically evolving factors, including the social critiques of the nineteenth century reformers of whom Marx was so contemptuous. Webb gave to none of these factors ultimate motive power. McBriar has criticized the Webb theory of change, on the grounds that multi-causality is inadequate for predictive purposes. But,since single-cause theories gain predictive power by discounting freedom, plurality of action and other significant areas of experience, and since there are now technical ways of analysing multi-causation change, this is not a serious criticism. Furthermore, by adopting multi-causation, the Webbs were able to harmonize their theoretical assumptions with their multi-faceted programme of social criticism and reform.

The permeation period extended for some twenty years, from the middle of the 1880s. After the first decade of the twentieth century, it tailed off as Sidney turned from permeation of the Liberals and Conservatives to policy-making for the Labour Party (25). Thus it might reasonably be argued that the permeation form of intervention was a device intended for a particular transient set of political circumstances. It

was a means whereby a tiny group of activists could hope to exert an influence on the larger society by identifying key figures and promoting key legislation. In these and other ways they could hope, through rational persuasion, to influence events towards such socialist objectives as a national minimum of material conditions, increased opportunity for education, democratization of industrial relations, municipal enterprise, and nationalization or regulation of major industries.

It is obvious also from the Fabian Tracts, from the first one in 1884 up to the present day, that individuals and groups are expected to intervene to effect small and large scale reforms. A few examples will demonstrate this:

> "Teach, preach and pray to all eternity in your schools and churches: it will aid you nothing until you have swept away this blind idol of Competition, this misuse of Capital in the hands of individuals." (26)

"Socialism is a plan for securing equal rights and opportunities for all." (27)

"The aim of the modern Socialist movement, I take it, is not to enable this or that comparatively free person to lead an ideal life, but to loosen the fetters of the millions who toil in our factories and mines, and who cannot possibly be moved to Freeland or Topolobampo." (28)

The Fabian Society "aimed simply at the reduction of Socialism to a constitutional political policy which, like Free Trade or Imperial Federation or any other accepted parliamentary movement, could be adopted either as a whole or by instalments by any ordinary respectable citizen without committing himself to any revolutionary association or detaching himself in any way from the normal course of English life." (29)

The Fabian Society "seeks to promote [its policy of reform] by the general dissemination of knowledge as to the relation between the individual and Society in its economic, ethical, and political aspects." (30)

The Fabian Society "works for the extinction of private property in land, with equitable consideration of established expectations, and due provision as to the tenure of the home

and the homestead; for the transfer to the community, by constitutional methods, of all such industries as can be conducted socially; and for the establishment, as the governing consideration in the regulation of production, distribution and service, of the common good instead of to provide profit" (31).

Knowledge, in the form of organized collections of data on selected aspects of social and political life, played a centrally important role in Fabian thinking. Knowledge, in the hands of experts, was to be the chief instrument of social change. The best example of expert use of knowledge is Sidney Webb's chairmanship of the London Technical Education Board, a focal point for the practical development of educational policy in the 1890s. A number of reports, including those of Sidney and Beatrice themselves, testify to the importance the Webbs attached to this platform as a means of shaping and directing not merely London education, but influencing national educational trends as well (32). In this work, Webb seems to have achieved very nearly a fusion of theory and practice and he was able to operationalize such Fabian concepts as the creation of a ladder of educational opportunity through scholarships and a more equitable distribution of school facilities, and the support of practical and scientific studies in opposition to the linguistic and literary leanings of the traditional curriculum (33). The educational ideas of the Fabians are discussed in Chapters XI, XII and XIII. Sidney's work of the London Technical Education Board was a good illustration of his conviction that, within a capitalist society, it is possible through education to promote class-consciousness and other forms of economic and political awareness which will subsequently serve to advance the movement towards socialism.

Parallel to this achievement was the implementation over a twenty-year period of the Minority Report of the Poor Law Commission (1909).

This report, adopted by the Labour Party, was one of the policy foundations of the welfare state in Britain and ancestral to parts of the Beveridge Report of 1942. It was directed against charitable provision in favour of state provision and organization of facilities, and it incorporated the characteristic Fabian concept of a minimum standard of employment relief, together with a detailed reorganization of national and local administration (34).

As with Sidney's work for the London Technical Education Board, his campaigning on behalf of the 1902 Act, and his practice of the tactics of permeation, the political adoption and eventual implementation of the Minority Report exemplified belief in gradual, piecemeal reform achieved through rational persuasion. The evidence thus seems overwhelmingly to suggest that the Webbs were, in Popper's terms, piecemeal reformers, adapting the methods of the physical sciences to the study of social phenomena, yet recognising their historical individuality, proposing specific changes in the existing socio-political order, trying them out and being prepared to modify and adjust ideas in accordance with the experiences of such trials. The Fabian Society avoided firm doctrinal commitment and embraced people of many different ethical, religious and political persuasions. Above all, the Webbs themselves appear to have been moderate, open to argument, free of doctrinaire absolutism and fanaticism.

Yet their reputation also suggests another character to their ideas, work and personality: regimenters, anti-democratic, humorless, narrow, and so forth (35). For the moment, we are not concerned with a wider appraisal but just to ascertain whether the Webbs, in particular, held a view of culture which is deterministic and historicist.

Popper has proposed that a historicist, believing in inevitable

historical trends and processes, may nevertheless conceive an activist, interventionist role for reformers or change agents. Marx himself has shown how, within a single, developing theory of inevitable social change, the revolutionary may help to speed up the "inevitable" processes. There are many examples of this combining of determinate law and individual activism in the tradition of Christian activism stretching from St. Augustine to Calvin and his followers (36).

Although there is no evidence of either Marxian or Augustinean subtlety of juxtaposition in his writings, it is clear that Sidney Webb, too, shared some of these ancient beliefs combining historical inevitability with political activism. The activism is implicit in his naturalistic confidence that appropriate empirical knowledge commits an individual to a programme of action intended to secure certain changes in the situation that knowledge discloses. The gathering of knowledge itself is an active process (as was Marx's amassing of data on the workings of capitalism in Victorian England) whose results include an awareness without which - naturalistic beliefs aside - appropriate reform programmes could not be formulated.

Beyond this, in not much more than an occasional turn of phrase, Webb disclosed a belief in the inevitability of socialism. In what way inevitable?

> "Socialism, to Socialists, is not a Utopia which they have <u>invented</u>, but a principle of social organization which they assert to have been <u>discovered</u> by the patient investigators into sociology whose labours have distinguished the present century." (37)

This kind of "discovery" perhaps has more in common with Michaelangelo's claim to have discovered the form of David in the marble block than Christopher Columbus's setting foot in the new world. Just what is

it that the patient Fabian investigators have "discovered"? This Webb never made very explicit but the discovery appears to have been comprised of the various problems, crises, and inequities of industrial capitalism, and the fateful emergence of trends towards co-operation, common action, etc.:

> "In all directions, and throughout the whole civilized world, we may distinguish, as the dominant characteristic of the social movements of the past three-quarters of a century, an ever growing elaboration of organised common action." (38)

This elaboration of organized common action, it is further hypothesized, springs from a desire for popular self-government.

Now this is just the kind of discovery which might well be disputed by other historians and commentators. At least, they would add to it such a diverse mass of additional discoveries as to make meaningless the claims to be basing proposals for future action on emerging trends. This problem is apparent even within the limited context of socialist extrapolations of supposed trends, in the contrast between what the Marxists and the Fabians discovered as "trends". Thus, to the Webbs, it appeared that not only is socialism inevitable but that a particular form of socialism is inevitable: Fabianism. For Marx, however, utopianism and meliorism of the Fabian type were destined to be extinguished with the demise of bourgeois civilization. In the 1890s, Sidney Webb referred to the inevitability of Socialism in terms of the events of the previous century:

> "Socialism is, indeed, nothing but the extension of democratic self-government from the political to the industrial world, and it is hard to resist the conclusion that it is an inevitable outcome of the joint effects of the economic and political revolutions of the past century." (39)

By the 1920s the emphasis shifted, in a manner that seems to have escaped notice, from the inevitability of socialism to, in the well-known phrase,

"the inevitability of gradualness" - i.e., change will and should be orderly, constitutional, and slow (40). By the 1930s, a greater shift of emphasis had occurred, this time to a more thorough-going and ruthless transformation of the total culture than the Webbs had previously envisaged even in their utopian scheme for a socialist commonwealth of Great Britain.

This shift was reflected in the Webbs' growing enthusiasm for social planning in the Soviet Union. Enthusiasm for Soviet communism meant the adoption of the other partner in the alliance that Popper argued historicism frequently enters into, namely holism. Thus, although they did develop and operationalize a model of social study and social change, which assumed active scientific-type intervention at the level of particular changes, the Webbs also displayed some of the features of historicist thinking. Does this invalidate their thinking? Popper's criticisms of historicism, directed primarily against Mannheim and not so much as mentioning the Webbs, are by no means convincing in every respect (see Chapter VI, section 5). Popper notwithstanding, historical writing is not confined to the description and explanation of particular events; it also includes the identification of movements and trends (e.g., industrialism, urbanization, colonization) and a description of their persistence over time and their influence (e.g., as imaginative ideas) on individuals and societies. On the face of it, socialism of the kind described by the Webbs might be just such a trend whose future can be in part imaginatively anticipated, even though, as Popper rightly insists, the outcome of future knowledge cannot be predicted, so formal and exact prediction of future social trends is ruled out.

The Webbs encountered no great difficulty in relating interventionism

to the broad historical movement of socialism, as they perceived it. But when they stated or implied that Fabianism is inevitable or that gradualism is inevitable (instead of merely desirable and likely) then they certainly exceeded the warrant they held by virtue of their detailed researches into social movements and trends. Any claim they might have made to imaginative foresight in the 1890s seems to have been cut short by their adoption, in the 1930s, of a cultural model which proceeded on other assumptions than permeation, gradualness, constitutional change and democratic consent. The irony of this is that, by about 1930, the Webb-Fabian programme of the 1890s had,at least in certain respects, been realized in legislation and institutional reform.

1.3 Specific failures of capitalist civilization

We have seen that in their work as historians and social critics the Webbs judged capitalist culture a failure overall, despite its many achievements. Their recommendations for specific institutional changes implied many particular failings, in terms of efficiency criteria internal to capitalism itself and in terms of socialist values. However, although what emerges from their appraisal is a vigorous condemnation of the social, cultural and political order of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there is little of the sense of crisis and impending doom which characterizes many of the reconstructionist writers. At least until they wrote on Soviet Communism they saw reform not so much a survival and salvage operation for a society at the point of disaster, as a steady continuation of the "Common Rule" of Shaftesbury and other Victorian reformers who worked for legislation guaranteeing minimum conditions of employment, health, education, and so on. That this continuing reform was still needed, in the Webbs' estimation, was shown by Sidney's analysis of

conditions of labor throughout Queen Victoria's reign. In 1897, he said, the percentage of those falling below a "prescribed minimum" in the various departments of life was less than in 1837. But the total number falling below this minimum would be as high in 1897 if not higher than the number in 1837:

> "The depth of the poverty is as great as it can ever have been, its actual breadth even is as great or greater; the residuum of 1837 remains, indeed, undiminished on our hands and our consciences." (41)

This may be contrasted with the optimism of many of his contemporaries and it finds an echo in the "discovery" in the Britain of the nineteen-sixties of large pools of impoverishment. From their detailed chroniclings, the Webbs concluded that reform had been inadequate: in legislation, in the co-operative movement, in charity and benevolence, in the infrastructure of planning and administration both central and local, and in the evolving party political system. But instead of concluding from this that the evolving methods and procedures of reform were inadequate to the task, like the later J.S. Mill, they proposed reform through constitutional democracy instead of adopting the more violent and utopian solution of most other socialist theories.

The condition of society and of culture as it is described in the Webbs' historical and analytical works is one of large-scale destitution, accompanied "by a sort of moral malaria and spiritual degradation among the destitute themselves and by a distinct lowering of the moral purposes of the whole community." (42) Destitution they described as a preventable disease of society, characterized by the impairment of health and vitality and jeopardizing life itself. Its cure involves not only environmental change (e.g., public housing,

health services, unemployment insurance) but teaching the poor "how to live" (43). This implies both a standard or norm of "decency" and a developed and institutionalized technology of learning which they feel it was part of the Fabian mission to provide.

In their major indictment of capitalism, The Decay of Capitalist Civilization, the Webbs identified four specific "evils of capitalism". In addition to poverty, these were inequality of income, disparity of personal freedom ("the worst circumstances of capitalism") and failure to maximize production (44). They granted that in England until about 1850 capitalism "delivered the goods" by creating a "highly efficient machinery of ever-increasing production" (45).

However, the period of initial success, for which they adduced no Marxian inevitable, evolutionary causes, had given way, in their judgment, to a condition of society whose failures had come to outweigh its successes. These failures they judged according to the utilitarian criteria of maximization of personal well being as defined through material indices. The Decay of Capitalist Civilization, coupled with their earlier book, The Prevention of Destitution, constitutes a comprehensive indictment of the material conditions of society. Liberalism and laissez-faire had produced the specific failings mentioned above, together with a chaos of uncoordinated, selfish, individual endeavors at advancement. The resulting environment of competitiveness, inequality, squalor and disorder stultified both the development of man as an individual whose rights they defined in the "national minimum" and of society as a potentially self-organizing, coherent community.

But of culture in the sense of the arts, of contemplative intellectual pursuits, and of the texture of emotional life and feeling, the Webbs had practically nothing to say. Thus the crisis of capitalism was not,on the face of it at any rate,a crisis in the spiritual, emotional and moral spheres - the kind of breakdown used, for example by Wells, Mannheim,and Rugg as a basis for proposing drastic social changes.

Perhaps this should be qualified a little, since in his contribution to Fabian Essays Sidney outlined a profound transformation in nineteenth century England: the disintegration of an older cultural synthesis, succeeded by revolt and anarchy, which in turn was giving ground to an emerging new cultural synthesis. But, although this was a crisis in the cultural order, it was, typically, a gradual affair, unlike Marx's business cycle crisis, or the crises postulated by Mannheim and the experimentalists (see Chapter VI, section 1.4, and Chapter VII, section 3).

The moral malaise that the Webbs associated with destitution was real enough, but their interest in it was not so much moral or psychological as behavioristic and institutional. That is to say, they gave meaning and substance to the disease by itemizing its symptoms in ill-health, neglect of children, sweated labor, and the various other conditions for whose alleviation they devised the practical content of a "national minimum". Their solutions were in considerable part intended to achieve a degree of social hygiene and order (46).

A lack of imagination and foresight shows here, as no thought was given to the wider cultural implications of the various changes they proposed. We must then ask whether the diagnosis itself was

adequate: perhaps a more searching appraisal of the quality of life of all classes in society, not merely the "deprived", might have shown both that there were valuable qualities which the primarily administrative solution of the "national minimum" might vanquish and that there were attributes of the life of those above the "minimum" which were not so valuable. These are problems in material progress which have become more prominent since the Webbs' time (47).

That the diagnosis of the evils and the problems of the society of their own times was partial and limited was itself a consequence of the piecemeal, empirical method the Webbs adopted in most of their earlier writings. In place of holistic social prophecy and indiscriminate diagnosis, they attempted to identify particular, remediable problems and deficiencies. Thus, the Fabians have the satisfaction of being able to claim that their level of diagnosis has enabled reform programmes to be undertaken, and to some extent assessed. Furthermore, the method of social analysis used by the Webbs yielded data and incorporated judgments whose value many social historians have since acknowledged. This is not to say their diagnosis was adequate even for their own purposes, but simply that it has had substantial operational utility for scholars and administrative reformers alike. In this, it is unique amongst the reconstructionist forays into culture diagnosis.

2. The Webb Programme of Social Reform and Culture Renewal

For some twenty years from the middle of the eighties, the Fabian leaders were successful, in their own utilitarian and pragmatic terms, in bringing influential people and groups to their way of thinking. After the first decade of the twentieth century their impact was felt

increasingly through the emerging Labour Party. Sidney Webb turned from permeation of the Liberals to policy-making for Labour, and subsequently attained cabinet rank in the first Labour administration.

But the early practical achievements of the Fabians, whether working through Liberal intellectuals or with Labour trade unionists, give only a partial indication of their ideas about the proposed new social order and the manner of bringing it into being. Two of the books written jointly by Sidney and Beatrice Webb show clearly enough the sort of society they appreciated most. One is a characteristic study of a social system, into which they inject a systematic arrangement of value judgments, criticism and praise. This is the book that appeared in 1935 as "Soviet Communism - A New Civilization?, and then, when doubts had been resolved, as Soviet Communism - a New Civilization (1937). In their concluding remarks to the second edition of this massive study, undertaken when both were more than eighty years old, the Webbs wrote with marked admiration of the transformation of Russia into the new civilization under communism. Despite doubts over its enforcement of orthodoxy (e.g., the purges of 1936 and 1937 and opposition to its expansionist foreign policy) they valued highly both the community ethic of communism and the Soviet adoption of long-term planning. As we have seen, they had already indicted the capitalist civilization of the West. The Webbs were by no means alone amongst leading Fabians in finding other systems more attractive. On both economic and moral grounds, Shaw, always a close associate of the Webbs, chose communism in preference to capitalism. Shaw had, however, less distance to travel than the Webbs for he had always been a severe critic of liberal democracy (48). Wells, for a time an active Fabian,

was less favorably impressed with available systems. He would have Britain part of a world state, where co-operation and sharing were to be combined with the enlightened rule of a strain of supermen. R.H. Tawney, a second generation Fabian, proposed egalitarian co-operation on basically Christian lines as a superior moral alternative to acquisitive capitalism (49).

The other Webb book which reveals that after the first world war they were no longer satisfied merely to tinker slowly and carefully with institutions, is the political tract, A Constititution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain (1920). This blueprint for systematic and radical engineering shows that neither empirical research into past and present social life, nor a warm sympathy for the Russian experiment in social planning, was considered more important than an overall reconstruction of life in Britain.

Social reconstruction on the grand scale was no mere occasional concern of the Fabians, but came to be in the early decades of the twentieth century a pervasive characteristic of the work of their most productive thinkers. Thus some revision is required of the common view of Fabianism as "gas and water" socialism and of the Webbs as social reformers lacking interest in large scale social engineering (50). This view may have been given wide currency as a result of Wells' clash with the Webbs and the revenge he took in The New Machiavelli. In this semi-biographical novel, he attacked the Webbs' socialist commonwealth as a managerial bureaucracy, a naive, insufficient and merely formal answer to the social problem. Wells found their ideas lacking in the breadth, comprehensiveness, imaginative vigor and perfected emotional and spiritual life with which he amply endowed his own utopias. Of course, Wells was referring to the earlier period of

Fabianism, before the appearance of the Webbs' more ambitious schemes for socialist reconstruction of Britain and the world.

An examination of the Webbs' work on Soviet Communism shows that in their old age they lacked nothing by comparison with Wells in their enthusiasm for a new human mentality, produced in the course of a total transformation of a social and cultural system. It is noteworthy, however, that the Webbs closely related this transformation of man to the Soviet programme of institutional change. Thus they commended Leninism for finding social institutions both the most potent way of shaping man and, a typical Webb view, the most easily transformed of all elements in culture. The Webbs had no taste for describing the transformed conditions of life, in the projected Socialist commonwealth of Britain, in emotional, aesthetic, religious and spiritual terms: Hence Margaret Cole's criticism of The Socialist Commonwealth as a bureaucratic, managerial proposal which overlooked the human problem of social change (51). More surprising than this was their failure, in this book, to analyse the means for effecting and consolidating the transition to the projected socialist commonwealth. In discussing their educational policies, we shall see that they failed to relate educational ideas to social change and thus missed the opportunity to explore in depth the role of the school in the projected move toward a socialist society. Whether this reflects canniness in relation to problems of indoctrination and an astute judgment of the potential of teachers to act as culture change agents is again a question we shall postpone to Chapters XI and XIII. Whatever the reasons, the Webbs failed to consider the question of the instrumental agency of the schools or of any other set of major social institutions in discussing

the kind of society they would like to achieve. Thus we have a very un-Fabian hiatus between the society of the future, whose outlines they sketched, and the society of their own day and the recent past, whose main features and deficiencies they had expounded in great detail.

There is no single work of the Webbs or of any other of their Fabian contemporaries in which their scheme for a future society is set out. From their writings over a period of some fifty years it is possible to piece together an account of the major features of this society. Despite the Webb enthusiasm for a planned, organically inter-related society, consistency and coherence are not evident in their culture map of the future. What emerges will be examined under five headings, each comprising, if not quite a set of opposite positions, then a range of ideas whose reconciliation and integration would be a monumental task of sympathetic synthesis. Those who have commented on Fabian "organicism" do not seem to have noticed that at most this remained an aspiration (52). The topics I shall discuss are:

1. Centralized and decentralized institutions and decisions in a planned society.
2. The national minimum.
3. Managerial democracy.
4. Gradualism and revolutionary communism.
5. Internationalism and the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain.

2.1 Central and decentralized institutions in a planned society

We have already seen something of the hostility the Webbs felt towards the lack of social organization and political planning in Victorian and Edwardian England. In The Constitution for the Socialist

Commonwealth of Great Britain they implicitly accepted that capitalism had "broken down". The process of reconstruction should include the democratization of industry, for which they presented a more detailed case in their historical study, Industrial Democracy. They argued, in The Socialist Commonwealth, for a full apparatus of central, regional and local (municipal) planning, directed to achieve organized communities of consumers (built on the foundations provided by the nineteenth century co-operative movement); of producers (built on similar foundations provided by trade unions and professional associations); the creation of new national parliamentary institutions; limited nationalization; reformed local government; and educational reorganization. In The Socialist Commonwealth and elsewhere the Webbs tried to develop a system of planning in which authority would not be centralized, but widely diffused. They had no confidence in the superiority of centralized institutions in regard to innovativeness or administration, and in any case were worried about the possibility of hierarchical and autocratic relationships developing (53).

The Webbs' proposals for the reform of parliament included the introduction of a functional basis of representation. Man's functional self, on this argument, is no less important in a representative political system than his geographical self. This idea, which is comparable to Durkheim's argument for the primacy of the division of labor in determining social roles, expectations and, indeed, social selfhood, has not of course been incorporated into our political system. Possibly the practice of appointing life peers on the basis of specialized achievement is an exception. In general, it might be argued that the Webb programme anticipated in broad outline the bureaucratic-welfare state of the post World War II period. Despite this assimilation of many

of their reform proposals, the Webb blueprint was static in the sense that social forces operating and interacting in society were scarcely identified, nor did they examine the problem of the tensions existing among them. This is strange, since a distinctive feature of their research had been the genetic method (see Note 10). They assumed, as, indeed, did most of the reconstructionists, that there is an identifiable general will or common good of the community which sectional interest groups, once they are brought to perceive it, will accept as a criterion for all their activities (54). Similarly, they reduced problems of the moral basis of change to the crude utilitarian formula of identifying that which is "most advantageous" (55). Yet even as between central and local planning and organizing bodies, as Sidney's experience at the Technical Education Board might have suggested to him, there is ample scope for disagreement and tension. Furthermore, not even all relevant experts are agreed on the criteria for establishing the "most advantageous" administrative solutions. We may find evidence for this by comparing the qualitatively different criteria of benefit within the "cost-benefit" approach.

It seems that a set of criteria in addition to those outlined in The Socialist Commonwealth is needed to assess the value of the particular proposals the Webbs made in that book. Also, since no sources of social energy are proposed, other than the interests of the social sub-groups of consumers, producers, representatives, etc., in the "general good", something seems to be needed to get the socialist commonwealth moving, and to keep it active once moving. Disinterested experts and a rational utilitarian populace are assumed to provide all the energy needed. Even if "the general good" were an acceptable criterion, some means of gaining adherence to it - for example, educating people to its

acceptance - is needed. The Webbs had an amazing confidence in the capacity and the desire of interest groups to reconcile their differences, a kind of consensus by the mutual agreement of rational men to conform their beliefs for the sake of action. I shall return to this point in Chapter VIII, when I discuss the proposal by the later experimentalists to reform society through the method of practical judgment. The Webbs shared with these latter theorists a bland optimism about the universal adoption of communal decision-taking. In practice, this may very well have reduced itself to experts deploying strategic skills in group situations to secure the adoption of their own policies, a very different outcome from the intended democratic sharing of responsibility and diffusion of authority.

2.2 The national minimum

Some of the criteria by which qualitative change in people's lives might be assessed were provided by the infilling the Fabians gave to the concept of a national minimum. We have already considered this in outline, particularly with reference to the alleviation of destitution. In greater detail, a national minimum is a standard in social affairs comparable in some respects to a standard measure, like the yard or the pound weight. Though perhaps vague and arbitrary in its early approximations, its exact size comes to be determined by experts, and all appropriate measures throughout the country are made to correspond more or less exactly to its specifications. However, at least in a reformed-capitalist or partially collectivist society, the national minimum defines a standard <u>below</u> which wages, for instance, or years of schooling, may not fall. An upper limit normally is not set; perhaps the nearest Fabian equivalent to an unvarying national standard is the

idea of equality of income, as argued by Shaw (56). The two important concepts expressed in the thesis of a national minimum are: a lower limit of conditions of life is set by experts and enforced by community sanctions; and, it is a national standard that is set, applying equally to rich and poor areas, to privileged and underprivileged alike.

The expression "a national minimum", occurs frequently in the Webbs' polemical writings, and, according to Lord Beveridge, "the conception of a national minimum of income, health, housing, leisure, education", is the Webbs' most important single contribution to English thought (57). Beatrice Webb, commenting on her investigation of sweated labor in the eighties, made a useful distinction between the great mid-Victorian empirical pursuit of parts of a national minimum and the ideal that she and Sidney and other Fabians came to pursue:

> "It seemed to me that unless 'the capitalist system' was to destroy the body and soul of great masses of the wage-earners, it was imperative that 'free competition' should be controlled, not exceptionally or spasmodically, but universally, so as to ensure to every one a prescribed National Minimum of Civilized Life. This, in fact, was the meaning that Factory Acts, Public Education, Public Health and Trade Unionism had been empirically and imperfectly expressing." (58)

For a comprehensive outline of the Fabian policy of a national minimum, the writings of the Webbs need to be supplemented by the Fabian Tracts from 1884 onwards, and by the "community-saving" educational thought and work of the peripheral Fabians, Margaret and Rachel McMillan, whose main interest was the restoration of life through child nurture (59). In the 1889 publication, Fabian Essays, Shaw, Webb, William Clarke, Sydney Olivier, Wallas and others, laid various specific foundations for socialism. They argued schematically for the reorganization of society, in the interests of certain minimal

principles. In the Fabian Tracts, the concrete details of the minimum conditions of life were worked over. Specific demands included the abolition of poverty, the eight-hour day, improved standards of public health, a legal minimum wage, the abolition of child labor, the endowment of motherhood, a national medical service, free school meals for the needy, minimum conditions of housing, a national physiological minimum and a set of standards of educational provision. In 1901, Sidney Webb thought that an organized campaign for the formulation and enforcement of national standards of the conditions of life was something for which the country was ripe. This readiness, he said, was related to the decline of Liberalism and arose from the discovery of a category which Liberalism could not assimilate:

> "We have become aware, almost in a flash, that we are not merely individuals, but members of a community, nay, citizens of the world ... Hence the ordinary elector, be he workman or manufacturer, shopkeeper or merchant, has lost his interest in individual 'rights' or abstract 'equality', political or religious." (60)

A national minimum, then, was the basic policy for foreseeable reform espoused by the Fabians. Collectivism of a special sort was the method proposed for achieving and enforcing a national minimum, and it was regarded as the way of political life most suited to a well ordered democracy. In supporting collectivism as a better way of life than individualistic, competitive business and laissez-faire relations between government and citizens, the Fabians found themselves on the side of history and within the general spirit of democracy - an appropriate place for evolutionary democrats:

> "In all directions and throughout the whole civilized world, we may distinguish as the dominant characteristic of the social movements of the past three-quarters of a century,

an ever growing elaboration of organised common action." (61)

and

> "A large part of the impulse of this collective organisation, whether in Trade Unionism, or co-operation, factory legislation, or municipal developments, has come from that desire for popular self-government which is the spirit of democracy." (62)

In this passage, collective organization, the aspiration towards minimum conditions, and popular democracy are fused into a platform from which the Fabians proposed to guide the future. But, while the definition of a national minimum provided some substance for a society of the future, it by no means resolved the question of securing equality, which some of the Fabians, notably Shaw, and, later, Tawney, regarded as a necessary foundation of socialism. A national minimum, of itself, does nothing to remove disparities between rich and poor, since no formal limits are proposed for controlling levels of reward above the minimum. Nor are the participatory aspirations of popular democracy satisfied through the definition, by experts, of minimum conditions of life. It is a constant dilemma of reformers who espouse both particular changes and the principle of popular consent to show how the one relates to the other: if particular changes are proposed by x without procuring the assent of a, b and c, then only one plank of his platform has been achieved; if x merely tells us that he will seek the assent of a, b and c for any proposal, then his criteria becomes merely whatever the populace wants, and problems of how the populace knows what it wants, and the relationships of these wants to one another and to needs are neglected. For the Fabian, there appeared to be no dilemma: the national minimum, and the overall structure of society, were to be as he defined them, and,presumably through the rationalist principle of universal assent to reasonable

proposals, popular assent would be given to these proposals as a matter of course (and time and "education").

This may seem a harsh conclusion to reach in a discussion of two benevolent, energetic reformers who have played a decisive part in devising means for the creation of the modern welfare state. That it is not an unfair one, in relation to their theory, may be granted if one considers more directly their proposals for a "managerial" democracy.

2.3 Managerial democracy

Fabianism, as the Webbs developed and practised it, was a transition reform theory intended to achieve an amelioration of present social conditions. The transition from capitalism, ultimately to communism, was to be effected gradually and peaceably. It was the movement itself more than determinate outcomes that interested the Fabians, and their educational proposals were almost uniformly related to the mixed economy period of transition. Nineteenth century liberalism was to be transformed into a twentieth century movement emphasizing man's social relations and responsibilities, collective ownership in place of private property, democratic control of production and distribution through co-operatives, universal participation by the ordinary citizen in political life, and a new kind of education, properly organized as a national system and directed towards the social and collective aspects of life.

But Fabianism itself continued to evolve, perhaps from the need to adapt both to the starkness of life in the thirties and to the awareness that "gradualism" was not working quickly enough. In discussing Soviet Communism we saw how, by the nineteen-thirties, a more revolutionary outlook was tending to overshadow the earlier optimistic

belief that the gradual evolution of British society would create the conditions in which "Fabius" could strike (63). Shaw's 1908 criticism of the revolutionary "romantic amateurs", and his defence of the evolutionary process, may be contrasted with his Preface to the 1930 edition of Fabian Essays, where he urged the need for something more drastic, purposive, and perhaps cataclysmic than what had been foreseen in 1889:

> "The Fabian Society finds itself confronted with a task not contemplated in these essays. It must devise new instruments of government, designed, not to check governmental activity and neutralize the royal prerogative like our present instruments, but to organize and make effective the sovereignty of the community, and limit the usurped prerogative of private plutocratic interests. Until this is done all talk of reaching Socialism along constitutional paths is idle. The present paths simply do not lead there ...
>
> "Under such circumstances our old Plan of Campaign for Labour, which has now been carried out only to land us in a no-thoroughfare, must be replaced by a new plan for the political reconstitution of British society, eligible also as model for the reconstitution of all modern societies." (64)

The Socialist Commonwealth notwithstanding, no such plan was ever produced, although by inference from their enthusiasm for the Soviet reforms the Webbs may be thought to have suggested the directions the plan might take. Whether achieved by the evolutionary mechanisms of gradual adaptations of existing institutions, or by some more decisive revolutionary means (violence was never envisaged, nor was any worked-out alternative to graduation ever offered), collectivist action remained in Fabian thought an uneasy blend of democratic participation by the masses and government by experts. Who should have ultimate power is difficult to determine, but the attention the Webbs gave to the detailed role of the expert, together with the relative neglect of problems and procedures of mass participation in policy-

making, suggests that dominance by expert elites of managers, planners and policy makers would be extremely difficult to avoid. The homogeneity of these elites was postulated, presumably on the model of the Fabian Society itself, which, on the whole, managed to avoid the splintering characteristic of socialist movements. Problems of power, the demarcation of authority, and hierarchies of relationship amongst elites, were also passed over. This the Webbs were able to do because they had only a limited appreciation of sub-culture diversity amongst elites. Whatever the origins and specific responsibilities of elite members, all would come to adopt Fabian rationalism, like working class children being successfully absorbed into a Public School.

It would be a mistake to restrict a discussion of Fabian ideas on democracy to institutional reform. Democracy meant both direct participation by the masses in their own government through co-operatives and other participatory institutions. There are in the Webbs' writings occasional passages alluding to the enlargement of personality that could be expected from the assumption by the ordinary man of responsibility and self direction. It was by no means merely a well organized society which they wished to build. Their concept of collectivization referred to the personal value of common action, and their enthusiasm for Soviet communism arose partly from the opportunities which they believed that system to be providing for individual growth. Sidney Webb wrote of the enlightened and enlarged exercise of indirect sovereignty:

> "All students of society who are abreast of their time, Socialists as well as Individualists, realize that important organic changes can only be democratic and thus acceptable to a majority of the people and prepared for in the minds of all; gradual, and thus causing no dislocation, however rapid

> may be the rate of progress; not regarded as immoral by the mass of the people and thus not subjectively demoralizing to them; and in this couhtry at any rate, constitutional and peaceful." (65)

Despite their recognition of factors in democracy other than the elites dispensing justice, ensuring equality and promoting free inquiry, the Webbs tended to organize decision-taking through centres of professionally trained experts. Although these centres were not to be concentrated but diffused throughout society, they were to be united in a virtual acceptance of the Fabian culture of rationality. The apparent diffusion and variety of decision-taking procedures disguised a sameness of outlook which in many respects resembles the Reformation "church spiritual". Institutional diffusion according to this doctrine is quite consistent with a fundamental uniformity of outlook and action. The Webb elevation of expert roles has been accompanied by a mistrust of the ordinary man. Shaw expressed his distaste for "mobocracy" and, while he would not limit the franchise for an assembly of critics, questioners, and proposers, he would sharply limit it when the choice of an assembly of legislators had to be made (66). Similarly, Beatrice Webb exalted the expert, displaying at the same time the sort of sentiment for which she was pilloried by Wells (a woman lacking in "muliebrity" - "her soul was bony, and at the base of her was a vanity gaunt and greedy" (67)):

> "We have little faith in the 'average sensual man', we do not believe that he can do much more than describe his grievances, we do not think that he can prescribe the remedies ... We wish to introduce into politics the professional expert - to extend the sphere of government by adding to its enormous advantages of wholesale and compulsory management, the advantage of the most skilled entrepreneur." (68)

The Webbs tried to reconcile elitist and mass elements in the social democracy of the future. In <u>The Socialist Commonwealth</u> they endeavored

to unite the maximum utilization of expert knowledge with a representative democracy, in which popular sovereignty would be effectively exercised, directly as well as indirectly. They intended that collectivism should combine the efficiency values of government by the most carefully prepared and selected experts, with the person-developing values of active popular sovereignty. Again, the Webbs thought that this conception was being successfully demonstrated in Soviet Russia in the thirties, although the important role they foresaw for standing committees in their proposad social parliament was a far remove from the massive mobilization of technical experts under the banner of the five-year plans. Thus, trying to avoid mobocracy on the one hand, and a caste of philosopher-kings on the other hand, some of the leading Fabians found their advocacy of a national minimum and collectivism gradually leading them towards a communist solution. The Fabians were never, despite the sympathies of the Webbs and Shaw, Moscow communists. They enunciated their own version of communism (as William Morris had done in News from Nowhere), in preference to any binding allegiances with existing Communist Parties, national or international. Indeed, both from the extreme right and from the extreme left, the Fabians were denounced; Pound's attack on Shaw and the Webbs was no more vitriolic than Trotsky's scorn for bourgeois reformism (69).

It was through education that Britain should see the need for a collectivist-democratic or communist society; through education that the capacity to make the change should be developed; through education that the skills, understanding, and morality appropriate to a transformed society should be cultivated. Yet the Fabians failed to produce any body of educational writings at all adequate

to this task. Perhaps because of this failure they seem to have missed an important educational distinction - a distinction which they did nevertheless acknowledge in their social-political thought. There appears in their work to be no recognition of the differences between the changes needed for the partial, piecemeal reform of education in the "gradualist" stage of the mixed economy, and the more rigorous, systematic, and profound changes needed to produce the communist society and to make it function. I shall refer to this distinction again in later chapters where I discuss the concept of education as an autonomous cultural enterprise and contrast the subservience of education to other ends; for example, in totalitarian societies.

2.4 Gradualism and revolutionary communism

What the Webbs and Shaw saw in communism was a fuller and more systematic development of the various planks of their welfareism: freedom from exploitation, reduction of class differences, universal improvement in social conditions, freedom of personal expression, and so on. Furthermore, the Webbs welcomed the massive organization and direction of resources to help achieve policy objectives, the full scope apparently provided for their own blend of social inquiry and practical expertise, and, in more global terms, the definite concrete expression of new social, economic, political and moral goals, designed to achieve Lenin's "new Soviet man". Their account of the Soviet system was not uncritical but it was, on the whole, sympathetic, even enthusiastic, as, in Soviet Communism, they moved gradually from reporting to approving. They foresaw neither the ruthlessness with which these objectives came to be pursued, nor the inefficiency, nor the threat to the very objectives of impartial justice, tolerance and free, critical inquiry which

they themselves espoused.

Despite their insistence on British, not Moscow, roads to collectivization, there remains some uncertainty about both the extent to which the Webbs proposed to take collectivization and the possibility of their willingness to sacrifice the principles of tolerance, free inquiry and criticism, in the supposed interests of a comprehensive and stable new social order. Reference to the divergent interpretations by two thinkers who knew them well brings out the ambiguity. First, Russell:

> "Both of them [Webbs] were fundamentally undemocratic, and regarded it as the function of a statesman to bamboozle or terrorize the populace." (70)

Second, Tawney:

> "The conventional portrait of the pair as bureaucratic energumens, conspiring to submit every human activity to the centralized control of an omni-competent State, is a caricature, which the subjects chosen for their researches should be sufficient to refute." (71)

Russell, later in the same essay, moderated his criticisms and conceded that the Webbs had made a significant contribution to the Labour movement, and thereby strengthened democracy. While there is no evidence in their writings of any intention to terrorize the populace, as we have seen there are elements which it would be difficult to reconcile with the workings of a critical democracy. Nor does the fact that they wrote on the activities of unions and co-operatives prevent the Webbs from appearing to be obsessed in later life with the possibilities of central control of planning, as in the case of Soviet communism. Their contributions to social theory are, on these points, inconclusive and uncertain, containing many unresolved difficulties of inter-relationship of ideas, institution and movements in a society which they hoped to see moving towards a type of communistic structure.

2.5 Internationalism and the socialist commonwealth

The Webbs were not guided, as were Wells and Russell, by the imaginative prospect of a harmonious and unified world society. Rather, they proceeded from criticism of the consequences of individualism for the collective well-being of society to the idea of progressively wider forms of organization. These wider forms of organization included unions, co-operatives, professional associations, local government, and a division of powers at the centre into two parliaments: one concerned with international relations, and the other with the internal workings of society.

Beyond their belief that a reconstituted British socialist commonwealth was part of a world-wide evolutionary movement and could serve as a kind of model for other societies, there is little in the Webbs' writings to suggest a distinctive internationalist outlook, except for the qualified imperialism, adopted by the Fabian Society at the time of the Boer War. Qualified, in that government policies of the day were criticized (72), but imperialism in that the Fabians came out in support of a mission of the civilized to the uncivilized world. This is consistent with Shaw's idea of socialist Britain showing the world "the way". It also echoes the historicist belief in a necessary pattern of social evolution which is interpreted as meaning that those nations (e.g., Britain) which are, as it were, on the side of history, are entitled, if not destined, to bring order to those nations (the Boers) which appear to be moving in a "false" direction. Halévy has argued that Fabianism reflects the influence of the Prussian model of the European nation state achieving progress through science, militarism, industrial reform and state welfareism and benevolently imposing the standards in

the world at large. In discussing Wells, we shall return to this argument. While the Webbs were troubled by the disintegration of liberal society, and Sidney worked very closely with the German-educated R.B. Haldane on the reform of the constitution of London University, there are enough contrary tendencies to show that these Germanic influences were very partial (73).

Against the imperialist interpretation, is the Webbs' subsequent criticism of the workings of European imperialism, the commitment of the Society during the first world war to some form of international government, and the participation of many of the leading Fabians in internationalist socialist activities in the post-war period. Furthermore, in 1923, Sidney wrote a Fabian Tract calling for greater emphasis, through history and economics, on education for international understanding in the schools and universities of Europe (74).

The Fabian proposals retained overall a very definite national, and even a parochial, character. This in part is the "want of vision" for which Wells criticized the Society. Until they wrote Soviet Communism, the Webbs were almost exclusively preoccupied with issues of internal politics and social reform, and this despite Sidney's period in office in 1929-1931 as Dominion and Colonial Minister and as Secretary of State for Colonies. The culture whose reconstruction they envisaged and participated in was British and, to a limited extent, European. The post-war reconstruction outlined in 1917 in the Labour Party document, of which Sidney was the joint author, was primarily domestic (75). They offered no plans or blueprints for the creation of an international comity.

This interpretation is again at variance with those which attempt to treat the Webbs as "social organicists". A full-blown organicism

would include a theory of international social and political relationships far more elaborately developed than the Webbs' Boer War views on imperialism, their later enthusiasm for Soviet communism, and their membership of an extremely diverse, ill-organized international socialist community. Thus Letwin's effort to encapsulate the Webbs as social organicists fails in suggesting they had even the outlines of a worked out theory of world government. Their "holism", such as it was, accepted national boundaries in a way that separated the Webbs from most other reconstructionists. It lends support to an interpretation which emphasizes the mixture, in their thought, of piecemeal and utopian elements, and, incidentally, it suggests that Popper's division of social theorists into one or other of these categories needs to be revised.

CHAPTER V

UTOPIAN AND SCIENTIFIC RATIONALISM: WELLS AND RUSSELL

The Webbs and the Fabian Society contributed substantially to the development of the social sciences, through their advocacy and practice of the empirical study of social institutions and movements. Their involvement with the London Technical Education Board, the London School of Economics and London University resulted in a considerable strengthening of the institutional framework within which social inquiry could expand. However, neither Sidney nor Beatrice Webb, nor the majority of the leading Fabians, was scientifically educated. For them, learning the techniques of empirical inquiry was largely a matter of brief apprenticeship in social research (e.g., for Beatrice, in the Booth tradition of social surveys, and for Sidney, in the civil service) together with on-the-job self help. Their philosophical ancestry lay in the empirical tradition of Locke, Bentham, James Mill, and John Stuart Mill. It was primarily through their interpretation of this tradition, supplemented by their absorption of the genetic approaches of Darwin and Spencer, that they acquired their confidence in the social utility of science. For them, science was not merely a tradition of thought, an outlook and a methodology; it was a comprehensive ideology, as Newtonianism had been to the enlightenment. Beatrice's separation of "ends" (non-scientific) and "means" (scientific) did not prevent her from subscribing to naturalistic doctrines which effectively assimilated questions of value and purpose to that pattern of technical solutions which she and Sidney devised for society's problems. The Webbs and other leading Fabians thus adopted a scientific ideology without having much direct knowledge or experience of any of the sciences.

For Wells and Russell, the one scientifically and the other mathematically trained, social and cultural problems appeared in a rather different light. They conceived their intellectual mission to mean that society should be suffused with the experimental-rational outlook developed with such vigor and success in western thought since the seventeenth century. Significantly, they both found the Fabian approaches unduly bureaucratic, unimaginative, and insufficiently conducive to free, independent activity by creative individuals.

Neither Wells nor Russell was a primitive scientific utopian, confident in the eighteenth century style that the mathematicizing of knowledge and the application of scientific methods would serve to resolve all serious intellectual and social problems. On the contrary, they both had grave doubts about the impact of science on society, Russell in later life more so than Wells. But they both believed with passionate conviction that what is needed in society is the institutionalizing of scientific thought on a scale far beyond what had ever been contemplated except by a handful of enthusiasts. Both envisaged reconstructed social and cultural systems in which a scientifically grounded education would play major creative and sustaining parts.

Their styles of thought and expression were, however, very different. Wells was the great organizer and synthesizer of masses of data, historical, sociological, economic and biological; the vigorous contriver of numerous ideal societies; and the troubled, emotive, introspective critic of the bourgeois society of which he was himself a product. Russell was much more analytical but still interested in synthesis; a sceptical critic of utopias; and a

distressed but always elegantly clear interpreter of intellectual, political and social culture which he judged from the vantage point of his intellectual eminence and his aristocratic background.

The writings and achievements of both Wells and Russell are profuse and varied and many of them fall outside the scope of this study: Russell's mathematical philosophy, logic and epistemology; Wells' work in literature, popular science and history. These are of course the contributions for which they are so well known. However, I shall on the whole confine my discussion to their ideas on social change and the reconstruction of culture through education.

1. Wells

1.1 Culture diagnosis: bourgeois man and society in a period of crisis

Wells came from a respectable, working class family which struggled unsuccessfully to maintain the status of shopkeepers. After some initial false starts, well documented in several of his own novels and frankly appraised in his Experiment in Autobiography, he became a pupil-teacher and gained a scholarship to South Kensington School of Science, where, as a student of biological sciences, he came under T.H. Huxley's influence (1). He abandoned his family culture and aspired to membership of scientific and literary circles, where he gained success through journalism and the scientific romances that made him world famous. His assessments of British culture contain a great deal of his own experience and the sense of squalid meanness and wasted opportunity he felt in reflecting on this experience. Thus, his writings incorporate the shortcomings, as he had experienced them, of urban and semi-urban bourgeois life. He largely ignored

both the very poor and the very rich, and even the traditional intellectual elites, except to condemn their educational institutions, the Public Schools and Oxford and Cambridge.

Wells was a very alert and sensitive commentator on domestic cultural and social affairs for the first forty years of the twentieth century. His active interests extended also to current international movements in politics, the sciences and social thought. His cultural analyses thereby encompassed a very wide range of subjects, and his ideas evolved and changed during this time. Instead of attempting to make a detailed appraisal of the evolution of his thought, I shall identify a few of his main ideas and, where it seems important to do so, indicate significant developments and changes in his thought.

Wells was primarily a hostile critic of contemporary culture and of political, economic and social institutions, and an advocate of wholesale change. He was not interested in making Fabian-type detailed appraisals of the development of different institutions and their impact on individuals and groups. Instead, he painted broad pictures with major evils strongly highlighted. He saw western society, in the main, as an unstable system: disorderly, muddled, disunited, a chaos of relationships expressing personal ambition, greed and competitiveness. Unlike the more composed and cautious Fabian Tract writers, Wells could seldom contain his impatience with existing institutions long enough to give a clear and detailed account of them. His large popular adult education treatises, The Outline of History, The Science of Life and The Outline of Man's Work and Wealth, are exceptional in this respect. In writing these, he had the polemical intention of identifying mankind's achievements

and mistakes in order to incite his fellow citizens to build on the achievement and eradicate the mistakes. Wells' paper on "Locomotion and administration", read to the Fabian Society in 1902, shows his impatience with Fabian details. He spent little time on the history and functioning of administrative units of local government (a typically Webb quest), but quickly denounced both capitalist and communistic answers to property questions, and propounded his own scheme for relating the size of municipal units to forms of transportation then available and likely to develop in the future (2). What he emphasized in this paper was not, however, the technocratic ideal of adjusting man to the machine, but the idea of scale - a scale "appropriate" to modern conditions and transcending both transportation systems and municipal units. With this idea of scale, he subsequently criticized the parochialism of the Fabian Society, and "scale" became of central importance in his scheme for total social reorganization. He dismissed piecemeal reform as inadequate tinkering with problems whose depth and range demanded the reordering of the totality of cultural experience and institutions throughout the world.

In the early 1900s, Wells began to turn from the science fiction romances with which he first achieved a popular reputation to utopian speculation. He also curbed the doubts about technical progress and the beneficent consequences of social and physical science which he expressed in The Time Machine, The Invisible Man and The First Men on the Moon. However, so far from advocating a machine-orientated civilization, he embarked more ambitiously on imaginative outlines of future societies in which machine technology was firmly subordinated to intellectual and artistic ends. As well

as projecting future social states emerging from some drastic upset of or impingement upon the regular features of the scientific universe, like "the hour of the green vapours" In the Days of the Comet, he embarked upon social prophecy by extrapolating selected trends. This he undertook in Anticipations (1901), where he projected the trends of technological civilization: growth of land transport and traffic chaos, megalopilses, emergence of a new technician class, middle-class opulence, the permissive society and war. Looking back on these predictions, although they were governed by no clear theoretical principle, we can appreciate their boldness, imaginativeness and accuracy. On the other hand, Wells showed a boyish sense of adventure in anticipating the massing of armies in the coming war. This shows that side of his character which delighted in technical and strategic possibilities with scant regard for the wider consequences. It was this that repelled Huxley, who embarked on Brave New World as a parody of Wells' Men Like Gods (3).

In the second part of Anticipations, Wells entered upon the occupation in which he became almost obsessively interested for the rest of his life: not merely outlining possibilities but plotting the structure and relationships of the desired society of the future. The obsessive quality of this interest is shown by the repetition, in one utopian romance after another, of roughly the same set of proposals. These proposals were, on the whole, predicated on the failings he diagnosed in his own civilization. Most basic was a quasi-religious notion of order which Wells contrasted with the confusion and disorder he found all about him. Wells looked upon the search for order as a modern religious quest which would in time result in a new scientific-moral creed replacing both the old intellectual styles and

customary morality. In this, we may see the germs of one of the major themes of the whole reconstructionist school of thought.

At first Wells gave only highly generalized accounts of cultural disorder. Thus, in 1906, in Socialism and the Family, he defined socialism as:

> "a large, and slowly elaborating conception of a sane and organized state and moral culture to replace our present chaotic way of living ..." (4)

and as:

> "something more than an empty criticism of our contemporary disorder and waste of life, it is a great intimation of construction, organization, science and education." (5)

He presented a more concrete account of this "disorder" in In the Days of the Comet, where the emphasis on preventable shortcomings anticipates the Webbs' The Prevention of Destitution (1911). The utopia which followed on the passage of the comet eliminated at one blow all the old confusions: the disorder, disease, pain, harshness, stupidity and cruelty of social life; the dishonesty, ignorance, obscurity, conventionality of customary thought and religion; the furtive, defiant, and angular qualities of sceptical and critical reasoning; the strikes, lockouts and unorganized production of economic life, and the general institutional malaise of life in industrial Britain:

> "How higgledy-piggledy was the whole of that jumble of mines and homes, collieries and potbanks, railway yards, canals, schools, forges and blast furnaces, churches, chapels, allotment hovels, a vast irregular agglomeration of ugly smoking accidents in which men lived as happy as frogs in a dustbin. Each thing jostled and damaged the other things about it ... Humanity choked amidst its products, and all its energy went in increasing its disorder ..." (6)

He took no aesthetic pleasure in the particularity of phenomena nor in unexpected juxtaposition. It was the total effect which offended and

irritated his passion for control, regularity and predictability, and stimulated his enthusiasm for the Fabian criterion of a defensible minimum of civilized living (7).

In Tono Bungay (1909), Wells criticized the possibilities for exploitation and commercial trickery which he thought to be characteristic of a free enterprise system. The commercial success story of the patent-medicine racketeer, Edward Ponderevo, is complicated by the quest for order, clarity and rationality which his nephew George, the narrator, is pursuing while at the same time participating in the patent-medicine racket. This ambiguous or double life is perhaps intended by Wells to express the plight of the reformer in society: the Puritan problem of being in but not of the world.

The strength of capitalist institutions and their resistance to change was a theme Wells had developed in New Worlds for Old (1908). He rejected the "administrative socialism" of the Fabians as a workable alternative, whilst accepting the Fabian emphasis on minimum standards. Fabianism he felt to be lacking a theory of change adequate to meet the resistance and power of entrenched institutions. "Gas and water" socialism was, in the words of William Clissold, no coming tide but "just a few Fabians piddling under a locked door" (8). This may have been of no consequence, except that for Wells any possibility of Fabian success raised the spectre of a bureaucracy no less entrenched than the old institutions. Thus the disorder Wells struggled to describe was not quite the kind which the Fabians documented. At least,it was not susceptible to the same treatment even though, like the Webbs, he linked science and socialism, arguing that in both the fundamental principle was that of order: science seeking to impose an order of knowledge, and socialism criticizing and developing "a

general plan of social life" (9).

The New Machiavelli (1911) is a novel of social and educational criticism and reform in which Wells disclaimed any autobiographical intent (and thus provided himself with a convenient escape route for any criticism of the substance of the proposals his characters made). Once again, he attempted to found his case for socialism on the shortcomings of contemporary culture. This time, he presented only fragments of criticism:

> "A world full of restricted and undisciplined people, overtaken by power, by possessions and great new freedom, and unable to make any civilized use of them whatever" (10).

Individualism under capitalism meant,not each enlightened individual truly and tolerantly pursuing his interests, but "a crowd of separated, undisciplined people all obstinately and ignorantly doing things jarringly, each one in his own way" (11). Crowds reminded Wells of the power of agglomerated irrationality; the mob was to be replaced by an orderly community and many of Wells' proposals for collectivization, political union and a world state reflected his determination to be rid of "bourgeois man", individually and in his more dangerous condition as a member of the mob. Wells contrasted with the chaos of individual, competitive, aggressive aspirations a highly organized scheme for selecting and training an elite of decisive, determined social leaders. This solution, as we shall see, brought him into close alignment with the Webb cult of the expert, even though, in The New Machiavelli, in the characters of Oscar and Altiora Bailey he savagely satirized the managerial bureaucracy of Sidney and Beatrice Webb (12).

The advent of the First World War, the ensuing disruption of political, economic and social life in many European countries, and

the vain attempt to achieve a measure of supra-national sovereignty through the League of Nations, provided Wells with ample material to sustain his case for the decline of European civilization into disorder and even chaos. In Mr. Britling (1916), which Wells himself described as "a chronicle of contemporary thought and feeling" (13), he berated the British government for failing adequately to organize the war effort. More profoundly, in the character of Mr. Britling, he portrayed the state of mind of England at the outset of war: parochial, neglectful of European affairs, ignorant of the causes of international tensions, committed to a false confidence in the balancing mechanisms of international relations, Mr. Britling was, at that stage, an optimistic, rather muddled British liberal. This disorder of mind, according to Wells, sprang from lazy, unexamined beliefs and the distortions imposed by a negligent society: a false consciousness. It was the consciousness not of an isolated individual but of the ruling classes. Wells in most of his polemical works looked to education to eliminate this false consciousness. But in Mr. Britling the drama of events dictated other solutions. It was war itself which shattered the illusions, and Mr. Britling, in the early stages of the war, reflected "that it is only through such crises as these that the world can reconstruct itself" (14). In the course of the novel, Mr. Britling is brought to a realization of his inadequacies, and adopts an outlook characterized by determination, dedication to clear ends and to organizational efficiency, not altogether unlike that of the German socialists of the time (15). Outside the novel, other means are available. It was a firm belief of Wells' that it is not war and other crises but the instrumentalities of popular, mass education that should bring about the sorely needed

awakening.

In the pedagogical romance, Joan and Peter (1918), Wells returned to one of the themes of Tono Bungay: disorder was primarily a commercial and economic phenomenon, or, more broadly, an attribute of the laissez-faire system, in which the "captains of industry" each sat in his own works "and ran them for profit without caring a rap where the whole system was going" (16). Imperialism, in the eyes of the central figure, Oswald,had been reduced from the ideal of Britain acting as "working guardian" of the world,to "a scheme for world exploitation in the interests of Birmingham ... the most atrocious swamping of real issues by private interests that it was possible to conceive" (17).

As in The New Machiavelli, it is very difficult in Joan and Peter to determine how far Wells himself accepted the "new tory" outlook of elitism and regenerated imperialism. His position, as we shall see, was less equivocal in the post-war utopian romances, Men Like Gods (1923), The Dream (1924), and in his late essays in World Brain (1938). However,in The World of William Clissold (1926), a meandering, psychological study which Wells, unconvincingly, disclaimed was in any way autobiographical, doubts about his own position again arise. Against a hazy background of European society in decline and confusion, William Clissold ruminates on his experience and proclaims the need for a structure of beliefs and institutions developed and operated by the kind of intellectual elite proposed in The New Machiavelli and Joan and Peter. Social efficiency criteria were given definite priority over democratic considerations (18).

The most comprehensive of Wells' later diagnoses of culture were Men Like Gods and The Dream. In both, a detailed contrast

is drawn between the ideal worlds of the future and the wretched muddle of present conditions. These conditions were summed up as an "Age of Confusion" from which, after prolonged wars and economic crises, mankind ultimately escaped. Confusion was a composite consisting of the adventurousness and risk-taking of private venture capitalism and competition; increasingly violent and destructive wars; organized religion; centralized, authoritarian government; environmental ugliness and inefficiency; jealous, possessive relationships, and narrow petty private lives. The Dream is perhaps Wells' most graphic and imaginative critique of the life-denying environment of late-Victorian England. Its details are reminiscent of Shaw's criticism in plays like Mrs. Warren's Profession, Widowers' Houses and The Doctor's Dilemma (19). Wells condemned the uncertainty, wretchedness and poverty of the petty-bourgeoisie; the selfish, decaying land-owners, the pheasant-shooting gentry; "universal ramshackle insecurity" ... "want, anxiety, and illness ill-tended and misunderstood"; "essentially a world of muddle-headed sophisticated children, blind to the universal catastrophe of the top-heavy and collapsing civilization in which they played their parts" (20). Wells caught the detail of the poverty of life in a perfect piece of criticism. We are in utopia, and one member of a small party questions the narrator, the dreamer who has been recounting his dream of life of the distant past:

> " "What's a hearth-rug?" asked Firefly suddenly. "What sort of thing was your hearth-rug?"
>
> "Like nothing on earth to-day. A hearth-rug was a sort of rug you put in front of a coal-fire, next to the fender, which prevented the ashes creeping into the room. This one my father had made out of old clothes, trousers and suchlike things, bits of flannel and bits of coarse sacking, cut into strips and sewn together. He had made

it in the winter evenings as he sat by the fireside, sewing industriously."

"Had it any sort of pattern?"

"None.""(21)

Wells was a most prolific writer and his culture critique embraced many different themes. We have seen that a recurrent criticism was the lack of order and pattern in individual lives and social structure. Despite many repetitive attempts, Wells never reduced this criticism to a set of definite and coherent ideas. He was profoundly dissatisfied with almost all aspects of contemporary culture:

a. the lack of order and unity in culture;

b. the selfishness, inefficiency, injustices and authoritarianism of capitalism;

c. the cycle of war and depression;

d. social class divisions and uncriticized, class-orientated assumptions of inferiority and superiority;

e. the theology and institutional apparatus of established religion;

f. conventions of authority and freedom in family life, especially their restrictive effect upon women;

g. the lag between the progress of scientific knowledge, and morality and social organization;

h. the ugliness, drabness and muddle of urban settlement;

and i. the timid, prejudiced, insular, fettered, fearful, anxious, uncreative and irrational lives forced by circumstances on most people, irrespective of social class (22).

From such a wide-ranging critique, it is difficult to extract a few leading ideas which might provide a basis for a practical reform programme. We should, however,note three major features of this criticism. First, Wells' basic objection to bourgeois society was

not so much its failure to equalize opportunities as the unfairness of the traps it prepared for potentially vigorous and creative individuals. Many of his most vivid passages are those in which he depicts some unfortunate victim of a morally, intellectually and emotionally restricted environment struggling to achieve personal freedom and a wider vision. Second, Wells subscribed, as none of the Fabians did, to a "crisis" theory of social change. According to this view, the destructive forces, as he saw them, of international competition, of warfare, and of general muddle would lead in a relatively short time to a total breakdown of the social system unless radically checked by the adoption of alternative social and educational models. Third, unlike most of the American reconstructionists, Wells did not claim the crisis was itself in large part a consequence of the institutionalizing of science. Rather, it seemed as if the problems of civilization arose primarily in industrial, social and personal relations - which science undoubtedly affected, but not so much as to have transformed them. It was man's natural aggressiveness and unreasonableness, his selfishness and stupidity and ignorance that had brought him to the verge of total social collapse. Although Wells provided no theoretical explanation of this aggression and irrationality, he built up a social-psychological model whose inputs consist broadly of unregenerate human nature and the institutions and values of industrial capitalism. The outputs are virtually identical with the inputs, except that, by some unexplained good fortune, a few courageous and clear-sighted individuals survive the turmoil and uproar of the system. It was to them that Wells looked for the initiative and skill needed to break the cyclic processes of the system.

The difference between Wells and the American reconstructionists

who were his contemporaries was much less marked in their common confidence in the future possibilities of scientific control of society, and the capacity of education to remove the sources of trouble. But, starting with a much more dismal view of man's nature and his social heritage than did the Americans, Wells had to propose much more drastic, far-reaching proposals if this uncongenial material, man, were ever to be civilized. In this respect, he was much more akin to Shaw than to the Webbs, since Shaw, too, outspokenly mistrusted the common man and human nature in its raw state. However, despite his occasional use of the language of racial evolution, Wells did not share Shaw's view that a new stage in evolution would have to be achieved before any real progress could occur (23).

1.2 Proposals for the future of culture and society

It might seem surprising that a writer of Wells' pessimism should continue until very late in his life believing in the possibility of utopian social reform. He was by no means a complete environmental determinist since he posited both biological and spiritual determinants of growth. He presented his own life experiences, and those of many of the characters in his novels, in terms of a spark of individual energy, or a kernel of freedom, which could grow into something quite different from anything its cultural origins might suggest (24). Furthermore, he regarded setbacks to reform as a stimulus to further effort, not as an indication of the hopelessness of idealism. In The Undying Fire (1917) the hero, a Job figure with many resemblances to Sanderson, the headmaster of Oundle, whom Wells greatly admired, suffered the most fearful adversities. But he used them as a spur to formulating his own moral and educational credo and never lost hope.

Wells is known both as a science fiction and social novelist and as a creator of utopias. Russell, although by no means convinced of the virtues of utopian existence on the Wells model or of the solidity of many of his proposals, respected his role as "a liberator of thought and imagination". He was attracted to Wells' utopianism because it initiated a thoughtful response, avoided superstition, and embraced a belief in the merits of scientific method. He would also have supported Wells' criticism of that type of mind which looks ahead blankly, and readily submits to existing constraints, whether they be legal, moral or social. However, Wells' equation of the modern, abundant, constructive scientific mind with Wellsian-type prophecy is something to which Russell was less attracted (25).

From these more general features of Wells' utopianism, we turn to some of the more specific features. I shall discuss six of these:

1. Science and rationality.
2. Interpersonal relations and collectivization.
3. Elitism and democracy.
4. Creativity and the pursuit of beauty.
5. The "new man".
6. Social and cultural dynamics, including socialism as a means of achieving utopia.

1.2.1 Science and rationality

In every utopian scheme that Wells produced, comprehensive theoretical science is presented as the core of the conceptual thinking of the utopians. Science is also their chief source of intellectual satisfaction; it is the chief engine of organized community life, in the form of technology; and it serves as a great spiritual harmonizer (26). The ideal societies are neither science fiction technocracies, in a

state of restless subservience to machinery, nor machine-reactionary pastoral enclaves,like Butler's Erewhon, or Fourier's communes, which were based on fear and rejection of the machine. But they display some of the qualities of each. The utopias are pastoral and quietistic in the sense that material life is extremely simple and unpretentious: landscapes of great beauty are conjured up, providing an appropriate setting for the scattered, small-scale, communities in which the utopians live and work. Despite his attacks on Owen and Owenism, Wells' post-industrial, rational utopias bear many resemblances to the schemes of Owen and his followers for communities of scientifically-minded rationalists set in rural landscapes (27). Wells' ideal communities are machine-using, in that labor is virtually eliminated and machines, as instruments of research, are indispensable for the advancement of knowledge. This quest for knowledge introduces a fundamental intellectual restlessness which Wells tries, not very successfully, to harmonize with spiritual serenity and rationalistic resignation to as yet uncontrolled biological functionings.

Science was of interest to Wells not only in his utopian schemes but in many other ways as well. He attempted to document its achievements in his popularization of biology and in his Outline of Man's Work and Wealth, and he adopted the hopeful and now banal Baconianism which sees science as a servant carrying no inconveniences in its train:

> "The plain message physical science has for the world at large is this, that were our political and social and moral devices only as well contrived to their ends as a linotype machine, an antiseptic operating plant, or an electric tram-car, there need now at the present moment be no appreciable toil in the world and only the smallest fraction of the pain, the fear, and the anxiety that now make human life so doubtful in its value. There is more than enough for everyone alive. Science stands, a competent servant, behind her wrangling, underbred masters, holding out resources, devices and remedies they are too stupid to use" (28).

Surprising as it may seem, Wells did not suppose that progress lies in the indiscriminate application of scientific procedures to social and moral problems. Nor did he subscribe to the mythology of science as exact and certain knowledge. His training in biology gave him a more historical and interpretative outlook, and led him to view science as a way of thinking which might be related to social and historical modes of thought. Anticipating Popper's interpretation, he described Darwinism as a historical method which dealt, not with universal regularities, but with the conditions governing the emergence on earth of unique units, entities and activities (29). Thus it was the undogmatic, hypothetical, experimental, critical activity of scientific thinking in its manifest variety of forms which he most valued and which he wished to relate to all spheres of social action, although not to the exclusion of other categories of experience and knowledge - e.g., history, literature, and other forms of aesthetic awareness (30). Wells' greater openness to new experience, and his search for meaning in human history, and especially in religion and spiritual life, may be contrasted with the more rigid and materialistic forms which much popular scientific thinking, following Spencer, took in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (31).

On the wider uses and applications of scientific thinking, Wells' views are similar to those of the American experimentalists, except for his stress on the validity of religious thinking. Just as he shared with them the merits of the open-minded and flexible approach to scientific thought, so he shared with them an optimism which at times is naive, and a confusion of scientific with other forms of judgment. Thus, he placed his faith in a scientific education and thereby underestimated the difficulty of using self-conscious, critical

procedures for cutting through customs, traditions and established institutions which serve existing interests. Further, he failed to sustain a distinction between descriptive and evaluative judgments. This led him at times to assimilate all domains of human inquiry and action to a vague and undifferentiated scientific culture, his concern for the vitality of other forms of experience notwithstanding.

Science, for Wells, was not simply the total of the sciences, their procedures and traditions, but a way of life, a culture, a perspective and a set of dispositions integrally related with socialism, which it was the task of educational institutions to develop and sustain, as their principal contribution to the rehabilitation of the social order (32). His conviction that science as a way of life represented the best hope for humanity was thus inextricably bound together with his socialist ideals. At times he saw clearly that a scientific culture was only part of the wider world he was seeking, but there are many instances of the confusions to which I referred in the preceding paragraph. The reductionist view of human experience which they represent is one of the strands in reconstructionist thinking which we have already observed in the Webbs and which is very obvious in the American experimentalist movement. Comte may have been criticized but his influence remained strong.

1.2.2 Collectivization and interpersonal relations

For all his dislike of her "bureaucratic socialism", Wells shared Beatrice Webb's fear of mobs and masses and her wish to curb their influence. We shall see that Mannheim, after experiencing the mass political movements in central Europe following the First World War, felt an even greater alarm at the prospect of undirected mass democracy.

Wells attributed to Marx a large share of the blame for elevating the principle of dominance by masses. While he was appreciative of Marx's achievements as a social researcher, he was extremely hostile to the finished appearance Marxism presented, its lack of administrative infrastructure, and to the dogmatism of many of its adherents. It was in a critique of Marxism that he developed his misgivings about mob rule, ascribing to Marx a cryptic doctrine of "the People" (33). He had no use for the "historic destiny" of any particular class in society (although he shared certain other historicist beliefs with Marxists), least of all for the working class. This was the class from which, through great persistence and with the support of formal education, he had extracted himself. The working class, so far from being a repository of worthwhile culture, whether "organic" or "revolutionary", was, he thought, badly organized, illiterate and culturally impoverished. Thus, his communitarian ideal in no way resembled the doctrine of the international solidarity of the working classes, based on their supposed unique perception of social realities and inciting them as a class to take over the apparatus of state power. Instead, his communitarianism consisted of a more organic attempt to join all the classes into a classless society. All were to share in common symbols, ideals and experiences, and a common medium of communication. These were to be provided initially through a common education and other common cultural experiences, particularly those of primary group relationships. But Wells agreed so far with the practical Marxists as to postpone the idyllic, classless society to a very remote future. In the meantime, transitional situations call for transitional arrangements, including the rise to power of a benevolent elite. Their role is to interpret to the masses their best interest, and to design

institutions which will facilitate the eventual emergence of a true socialism (34). But, whereas the Marxists developed an explanatory framework which purported to show how class society might (indeed, must inevitably, according to their theory) eventually become classless society, Wells lacked any single explanatory model and, at different times, tried various expedients. While this strengthened his claims as an investigator of possible future strategies, it certainly weakened the political impact of his proposals, and diminished their theoretical significance.

Wells' ideal of communitarianism closely resembles Owenism and the ideals expressed in Morris' A Dream of John Ball and News from Nowhere. The aspirations they share include: the disappearance of a servile and exploited class at the bottom; disappearance of distinctions and barriers arising from class and property rights; the emergence of a common fellowship based on informal, friendly, mutually respectful, and equalitarian relationships; a common subscription to utilitarian morals; and the absence of the massive centralized institutions of the modern State. However, the ideal of fellowship which he strove to formulate in First and Last Things and other of his later writings seems to suffer from the same vagueness and mysteriousness which Wells found in Marx's doctrine of "the people". Having given up his earlier faith in expert managers - recognizing that there could be no assurance that they would not degenerate into a freedom-stifling political clique - Wells was left with ideals which were to inform the total life of the community. Since these ideals predicated neither particular social groups nor institutions, it is by no means clear that they would fare any better than the Fabian tactics of permeation which Wells attacked as a naive compromise with the existing system (35).

As transitional short term measures, in New Worlds for Old, Wells envisaged the nationalization of major industries and a socialization of relations of work such that exploitation would be supplanted by a vaguely defined benevolence. His proposals on these matters lacked the concreteness of the Webbs' ideas for industrial democracy. On the international plane, he campaigned ardently for comprehensive supra-national institutions, toward which the League of Nations was but a halting first step. However, he made both reasoned and satirical attacks on international institutions and leaves the reader feeling that not any existing institutions but only something more solid and sincere will do (36).

His ideas on all of these topics remained extremely general, lacking in clarity or in theoretical vigor. For example, he opposed Fabian bureaucratization and, as he saw it, their elevation of the state as an all-powerful organization of control. Yet he wished to see established some kind of supra-sovereign system for eliminating war and lessening economic imperialism, which would be even less subject to checks and individual intervention. His thought was dominated by his abhorrence of the existing pattern of sexual relations, family life, economic relations and the aggressive diplomacy which he believed characterized interpersonal relationships in his lifetime. For each element in the pattern he adduced particular causes which, collectively, comprised the "dis-order" and "chaos" he condemned, but he could offer neither a systematic explanation for these relationships nor a coherent set of criteria against which their development might be assessed. Nevertheless, by presenting in his imaginative accounts of possible societies the outlines at least of new sets of relationships and a pervasive communitarian ideal, he made that contribution to imaginative

understanding for which Russell praised him. His work serves as a reminder to policy makers and administrators that the doctrines of "works" and "functional efficiency" need to be supplemented and illuminated by less tangible considerations of human kindliness, friendship, warmth of relationships, as well as by equality and justice.

1.2.3 Elitism and democracy

Wells did not share the Whitmanish or Jacksonian enthusiasm for the wisdom and virtues of the common man which distinguished some of the nineteenth century exponents of the democratic faith, and their twentieth century experimentalist followers (37). His enthusiasm at various times, for "Open Conspirators", "New Machiavellians", "Samurai" and "Modern Utopians" reveals an eighteenth century hope that through a unity of businessmen and intellectuals social perfection might be achieved. This hope, which is very marked in The World of William Clissold, is only one expression in Wells of a definite strain of elitism, which, if it does not contradict, at any rate complicates his communitarian ideal of a complete elimination of barriers of class. Leaving aside his expectations concerning life in utopia, he did not believe a representative, institutionally complex political and industrial democracy to be a meaningful possibility. Given man's present inadequacies, it could only be a sham. The mass of his contemporaries, he reflected, were dominated in their thoughts and attitudes by the culture of the Northcliffe Press,and even the intelligentsia was mostly backward-looking (38). His energetic, life-long campaign to extend and universalize adult education was intended to lift his fellow citizens to the condition in which intelligent political behavior became a practical possibility: a democracy of discussion, reason and tolerance.

To this end, he appealed to a self-conscious elite of intellectuals to join him in his work. This rational, classless elite echoes Owen and anticipates Mannheim and Rugg. By inference, the plea divides society into a needy mass and a potentially provident elite. At no time did Wells give the impression that he thought his own society sufficiently well educated and mature to function as a full democracy, and even in utopia the elite still had a role as guides and leaders and creative innovators. In Anticipations, prophecy and prediction merged: Wells foresaw a managerial-technocratic take-over, as the educated classes gradually replaced the leadership provided by political parties and the well-to-do. However, this would be no easy transition, since he foresaw first the outbreak of a "passionate national war" precipitated partly by inept political leadership, then the stalemate of World War I, as great armies, again poorly led militarily and politically, ranged against each other, then authoritarian, fascist dictatorship and,only after all this, the replacement of nation-states by a world state under the overall direction of educated technocratic managers (39). In his later utopian romances, these technocratic managers had been replaced by wise leaders, on very close terms with their fellows, but able to rise to higher levels of understanding when important decisions had to be taken.

But was not the technocratic proposal the Webb managerial bureaucracy elevated to power on a world scale? Wells, in his 1914 Preface to the re-issue of Anticipations, claimed that the samurai of his A Modern Utopia had been the product of Webb influence: "The fruit of this transitory and never entirely harmonious marriage of minds". Recovering, as he claims to have done, from this bureaucratic influence, Wells wished to eliminate the idea of the "New Republic" as a type or

class of persons - an elite - and to substitute for it the idea of a "power in men's minds and in mankind" (40). This is a kind of collective will, or, in Rousseau's terms, it involves merging the will of all with the general will. This was undoubtedly Wells' aspiration,as it has been of all utopian socialists, but he was frequently obliged to express this vaguely defined "power" in the concrete terms of an elite guiding the masses towards perfection. Wells was consequently no more successful in grappling with the problems of "general will" theory than was Sidney Webb, who likewise had tried to marry the principles of leadership and mass participation through general will mythology.

Even in his utopian schemes, there was an uneasy alliance of forces: world society, in Men Like Gods, was decentralized; there appeared to be no great conurbations; and government took the form of a "church spiritual" which, by virtue of the universalization of rationality and the elimination of vice, rendered legislation, coercion, and almost every kind of established institution unnecessary. Yet there were, nevertheless, in this semi-anarchy, commanding figures whom the utopians respected and whose culture was not entirely shared by all; they certainly had a better grasp of the requirements of general will than most of their fellow utopians and assumed an appropriate authority over their fellows.

Even in his utopias, Wells did not take sufficiently seriously the problem of creating communitarian democracy, on largely anarchist lines, out of a civilization in which elitism, in the form of class stratification, as he himself admitted, has been endemic throughout history. It is not sufficient to advocate; what is also required is an analysis of resistances and difficulties to be overcome. It

is one of the most obvious shortcomings of Wells' utopianism, as perhaps it is of all forms of utopian thought, that he virtually neglected counter-revolutionary forces. In Men Like Gods the only resistance and opposition to utopian policy came from the visiting earthlings who, with one or two exceptions, were portrayed as wretched specimens of the ruling classes of twentieth century England: arrogant, volatile, dogmatically opposed to all that lay before them, upholders of traditional religion, of political manoeuvering, and of competitive, exploitative capitalist production. The utopians had no difficulty in vanquishing them, thus symbolizing their cultural superiority. The relative unanimity of the utopians and their purity and firmness of purpose were in no way threatened by internal forces. All such threats had faded away, centuries back, in the dark ages which marked the transition from earthly to utopian existence. Thus, Wells adopted a form of social developmentalism. According to this form of optimistic evolutionism, man in the twentieth century is still bound and dominated by his animal and tribal ancestry. He is still in his impulsive life a member of the Freudian primal horde,having not yet submitted to the disciplines of civilization. His aggressiveness, jealousy, hatred, irrationality, and competitiveness could only be sloughed off through centuries of development sparked off, not by the accident of a Darwinian mutation, but as a result of the Lamarckian and Platonic purposiveness and determination of an elite of his species. In this respect, Wells' ideas about elites and masses were very similar to Shaw's.

His neo-Lamarckianism, however, unlike Shaw's, or for that matter Freud's, does not appear to have presupposed any mysterious, unscientific connections between genetic material and the psyche.

Each generation would have to learn anew the destructive consequences of undirected impulsive life. Only very gradually could the old customs, habits and institutions which nourished the destructive impulses be replaced by a culture directing the impulsive life into activities like science and the arts (41).

This gradual progress depends on elites, but,since Wells also believed in social justice, equality, fellowship, and the perfectibility of man, he could not accept that it would be necessary indefinitely for elites to perform these roles. Eventually, responsibility for community well-being could be widely shared. For Pareto, by contrast, elites and their circulation are a condition of social movement and there will always be a wide gap between elite and mass culture. For Wells, elites are necessary in getting a new system going, but can thereafter be more or less absorbed into the culture fabric, as the rest of humanity moves up to their level. The elite are never,however, fully absorbed, and some utopians, as we have seen, are certainly more intelligent and more powerful than others. Embedded in this communitarian ethic is perhaps an incipient totalitarianism. This is a consequence of the fact that, while there are individual differences of intelligence and power, all subscribe to a common ideology: there is no real plurality of elites and of cultural purposes. Such plurality was a form of "confusion", long since left behind in humanity's development. This possibility of a subtle totalitarianism is what has alarmed some of Wells' critics who might in other respects appreciate his communitarian ideals and high standards of cultural attainment. Unfortunately, he did not take up this issue, beyond implying that disunity meant disorder, a very doubtful assumption even for utopia.

Wells was contemptuous of the Fabian preoccupation with the limited,

specific problem of the transformation era, and of the conservatism and ultimate defeat for reform which, he claimed, inevitably resulted from the policies of permeating existing institutions. But he had nothing comparable to offer by way of showing how elite insights and judgments could be reconciled with the demands for political and culture expression which the masses had been taught to make by popular journalism. Nor is it clear how a common, communitarian culture could be achieved, save by force. Sustaining this common culture in a society whose grounding in science at once divided the scientific researchers and their cultures from the rest would also be a much more serious problem than Wells envisaged. We shall see, in Chapters X, XI and XIII, that his educational proposals hardly went so far as even to address themselves to these issues.

1.2.4 Creativity and pursuit of beauty

> "About this time (early twentieth century) appears a note of personal distress in Wells' writing. His work is filled with a longing for beautiful things, for the lofty and noble, a longing all the more poignant as clearly the author himself did not believe his dream would ever come true. There are only treacherously tempting allusions to the beautiful in real life. Beauty is the stuff of dreams; in real life it is only a mirage" (42).

The note of longing for beautiful and noble things certainly comes out in Wells' contrast between the squalor, dreariness, ugliness, inefficiency and misery-making complications of ordinary domestic life, and the splendid vistas, romantic landscapes, light and elegant structures and the overall simplicity and purity of relationships in utopia. He expressed this longing, too, when reflecting on his own ideas. In First and Last Things he likened his beliefs to a work of art; they were not a mere "distillation of facts". He interpreted pragmatism to

mean that the validity of beliefs was as much a matter of their aesthetic qualities as of their workability. They had to satisfy his "desire for harmony and beauty" (43).

Despairing of achieving a socialist society in his own lifetime, Wells at times consoled himself for the defects of the present world by looking longingly into a glorious, distant future. The Webbs, by contrast,limited their visionary outpourings to romanticizing Soviet Russia and got down to the business of patching up the British social and political system as they found it. Beauty was no elusive quality but an outcome of patient reform of ordinary, real life institutions.

Wells did not divide real life and dreams quite in the manner suggested by Kagarlitski, who, while sympathetic towards Wells, as a Marxist, thought him a dualist and hopelessly utopian. Wells' enthusiasm for utopias was an expression of both a religious and an aesthetic quest for order and unity, as well as a reflection of his criticism of the muddle and inefficiency of society. But religious and aesthetic considerations also had some part to play in Wells' proposals for ongoing social and cultural change. Religion, for Wells, was a quest for order and collective purpose, a search for meaning through scientific reasoning and the construction of ideal communities and a means of expressing faith in humanity. I have already referred to the aesthetic qualities of order and harmony, embodied in his utopian communities. The aesthetic quest, for Wells, was not primarily a matter of literature and the fine arts, but an effort to recreate the total human environment. Wells regarded this quest as a task for the present, not for the distant future. He was interested not only in utopias with the contours of an enlarged Owenite or pre-Raphaelite community; but, like

William Morris, he railed against the particular ugliness of contemporary Britain. This railing was intended to awaken his fellow citizens to an awareness of environment and to stimulate them into a massive effort at tidying-up and re-making. As we shall see, it was through education that man was to be brought to an understanding of the possibilities for creating new environments. Wells gave little attention to the more disinterested pursuit of the arts or to aesthetic contemplation considered as worthwhile activities in their own right. Presumably Wells would not wish to exclude these enterprises, and certainly opportunities for them were not precluded by the design of his utopias, but he was much more interested in the more communitarian and applied form which the aesthetic impulse, properly schooled, could take in environmental planning. His more prosaic modern equivalent in this respect is the landscape architect employed by a road-making authority to reduce the environmentally destructive effect of a motorway and to find ways of enhancing it visually.

Wells designed his utopias to embody his more expansive aesthetic ideals. These ideals included providing opportunities for many different types of creative activity. It was largely because he found contemporary life so cramping and distorting of individual expression that he condemned it so vigorously. But, in Joan and Peter, he satirized looser forms of "expressionism", which lacked criteria of selection and ideas for the direction and tutoring of impulses in individuals (44). Creativity was for him an acquisition or a development of diverse individual capacities in a challenging and structured environment: it required a sustained educational regimen.

Wells offered no proposals or predictions concerning the particular character of art works in utopia any more than he tried to forecast the particular achievements of scientific thought. To have done so would be to commit the mistake of precluding the very freedom and inventiveness he wished to encourage. The most exalted creative workers in utopia were not unlettered visionaries and romantic critics of the status quo, nor were they artists and poets, but the leading research scientists, and the older and wiser members of the community who offered guidance on social policy. The highest form of creativity was thus equated, as in Plato's Republic, with a combination of intellectual maturity and varied experience, within some defined mode of inquiry. It was not a mysterious, capricious force, but an accumulative element in both individuals and societies. Wells wished to convey the impression of a creative community of people who in many different ways displayed originality, initiative, and deep interest in making and re-making, in inventiveness and in expressiveness. Indeed, these creative efforts were intended to yield new ideas and criteria for the future development of society, and so were of central importance. We should note that Wells in his utopias repudiated social realism, however much he may have practised it in novels like Kipps and Ann Veronica. So far from the arts reflecting or mirroring society, they were expected to provide criticisms, and to make suggestions concerning future possibilities. This critical and exploratory role rescues Wells' utopias from the charge of static and rigid totalitarianism. It also strengthens his claim to have pointed to certain forms of education as providing a fundamental cultural dynamic, even though his own contributions to elucidating the concept of a critical and creative

education were never more than fragments.

1.2.5 The new man

Much more sharply than the Webbs, Wells portrayed the ideal lineaments of the "new man". For the Webbs, the "new man" of Soviet Communism provided a rough but pretty adequate model. Wells was dissatisfied with all existing examples and based his own composite portraits largely on the rejection of man in his present form: "Only the most superficial mind would assert nowadays that man is a reasonable creature. Man is an unreasonable creature" (45). Since much can be inferred from what has been said already, Wells' account of the "new man" may be presented quite briefly, and mainly with reference to his accounts of the "new man" in utopia.

The "new man" was a god-like creature in utopia, possessing attributes, in particular a new awareness, to whichno earthly analogue could be found. Hence Wells made no attempt to analyse this consciousness in any depth: he merely hinted at it, and described feats which implied a staggering increase in intellect and a striking subordination of impulse to rationality. Given that the new man was to be creative and inventive, Wells wisely avoided any detailed account of the psyche that, he hypothesized, would evolve through generations of strife followed by further generations of purified life (46).

Wells ignored the problem, created by the hypothesized subordination of impulse to rationality, of explaining how anyone could come to wish or try to be rational, submerging all such difficulties under a general characterization of man as pervasively rational. Yet his "new man" was by no means a disembodied intellect. He was described as having feelings of kindliness, affection and love and enjoying a social and communal life. His feelings on the whole seemed to take

the form of calculated pleasures, not dominating passions. Despite the calculating element, man retained a naturalness and simplicity and an overall integrity of personality. Presumably, because the calculated pursuit of pleasure was universal and because consciousness had reached a peak, all were aware of each other's quests, and they accepted them as legitimate expressions of personality in no way involving deceit, manipulation or exploitation.

I have been talking about the "new man" but Wells meant by this the "new woman" too. No inequalities and only minimal differences of function were proposed. Furthermore, the universalizing of the concept of the "new man" takes in all cultures: distinctive differences of heritage, nationality, creed and custom were absorbed into a single world culture, present and future orientated, forgetful of the past except as a record of human folly and aberration. A historian's and an anthropologist's nightmare? So the eighteenth and nineteenth century critics of enlightenment universalism might have supposed. However, some of the critics, the early post-enlightenment exponents of cultural diversity, were fundamentally much less critical than they imagined and there are some interesting parallels between them and Wells, as well as some significant differences.

Fichte, in 1807, set educationalists the task of fashioning "an entirely new self" and encouraged them to search out ways of penetrating to "the roots of vital impulses and actions" in all children, not, as hitherto, in a minority only. However, his object was not the Kantian (and Wellsian) ideal of a universal civilization, but the much more limited determination to turn military and political defeat by Napolenn's armies into a moral and political regeneration of Germany, as nation, language and culture - i.e., "the fundamental reconstruction

of the nation". Despite his enthusiasm for the pedagogy of Pestalozzi, which has a universal, not merely a national, reference, it was but a short step from Fichte's regeneration of the nation through education to state absolutism (47). The step was taken by Hegel, the more ferocious critic of the universal and democratic ideals of the enlightenment. Thus this effort at creating the "new man", which at first appeared as a determination to maintain variety and diversity under the guise of national identity, lapsed into a system which aspired to monolithic and absolute status - the Germanization of the world.

Another enlightenment critic, Herder, seems in the course of one (admittedly voluminous) work to have achieved the feat of extolling national cultural diversity and assimilating all progress to the single concept of the diffusion of scientific knowledge. Early in his Reflections on the Philosophy of the History of Mankind we find him extolling the diversity and variety of man, his works and his culture, and castigating as stupid and vain those who suppose "that all the inhabitants of the World must be European to live happily". An idyllic picture is presented of nations blessed by Nature with health and well-being, susceptible to improvement in happiness ... "that imperturbable joy and tranquillity, which many Europeans admire in the countenance and lives of foreigners". However, while at first rejecting the doctrines of perfectibility through self-awareness and rationality, and the notion of linear progression, Herder subsequently adopted as a norm the rational, liberal ideals of European culture. This led him to posit inevitable progress, the uniformity of the laws of nature and man, and, through selective treatment of historical evidence, to "demonstrate" the increase in happiness attributable to

cultivating the arts and sciences. Thus a selective historical treatment of culture is made to yield a single model of universal progress - essentially the European, enlightenment rationalistic ideology (48).

Fichte and Herder demonstrated some of the dangers, as well as the inconsistencies, of the effort to sustain national variety within a framework of international order. For greater consistency and hostility to the imposition of universal norms we must turn to the poets. The concepts of the new man, and of cultural order, as the product of reason, have never been more devastatingly attacked than by Blake. Reason, he affirmed, looks back, not forward, and gives us no grounds for supposing that through its use we can depict the lineaments of ideal, or future, man: "Reason, or the ratio of all we have already known, is not the same that it shall be when we know more" (49). Nor are harmony and uniformity in culture to be desired: "Without Contraries is no progression. Attraction and Repulsion, Reason and Energy, Love and Hate, are necessary to human existence" (50). Not only is there no progression, but the quest for some single unifying thread in man's experience and his cultural world leads to the unleashing of dark powers. Blake anticipated some of the modern dystopians: neither the individual psyche, nor the communal world of culture, can submit to this kind of order but must rebel:

"I have sought for a joy without pain,
For a solid without fluctuation.
Why will you die, O Eternals?
Why live in unquenchable burnings?

Lo! I unfold my darkness, and on
This rock place with strong hand the Book
Of eternal brass, written in my solitude:

"Laws of peace, of love, of unity,
Of pity, compassion, forgiveness;
Let each chuse one habitation,
His ancient infinite mansion,
One command, one joy, one desire,
One curse,one weight, one measure,
One King, one God, one Law.

The voice ended: they saw his pale visage
Emerge from the darkness, his hand
On the rock of eternity unclasping
The Book of brass. Rage siez'd the strong,

Rage, fury, intense indignation,
In cataracts of fire, blood & gall,
In whirlwinds of sulphurous smoke,
And enormous forms of energy,
All the seven deadly sins of the soul
In living creations appear'd,
In the flames of eternal fury." (51)

Despite the romantic revolt against "one law", the crises of twentieth century economic and political nationalism and the sense of a lost core of socially unifying values have induced a return to the quest for a unifying world culture, not only by utopians but by sociologists and anthropologists and many others (52).

It should be remembered that the time-scale Wells had in mind was vast. The difficulties arising out of the meeting of diverse culture patterns had, centuries before the achievement of utopia, resulted in real enough crises, including universal warfare. However, by implication Wells repudiated the romantic argument. The "flames of eternal fury" arise out of dis-unity, in his reckoning, and can be quenched only in a new, unified cultural order. This was in fact a return to the enlightenment faith and to its mediaeval confidence in the socially and spiritually unifying power of a single, transcending ideology (53).

The god-like qualities of the new man,his future-directedness, intellectual genius, his creativity, his enlarged consciousness, his

social hedonism, his self-conscious management of his emotional and bodily life, his mastery of the symbolic system of science and language, are none of them the result of a genetic accident. Nor, as in Wells' earlier science-fiction writings, are they the incredible result of some mysterious gas, or the passage of a comet. Instead, they are the cumulative effect of educational and socialistic policies, gradually built up and strengthened through centuries of effort by an enlightened benevolent minority, the forerunners of future civilization. Thus there was to be a gradual transition, from the miserable products of late-Victorian, urban England, through the semi-enlightened, half-aware, but still passion-ridden figures of whom Wells regarded himself as a sample, to a distant, godlike humanity.

Sustained educational policies became the dynamic of the emerging social system and the means for producing the new human race. Through education, man frees himself of the cultural legacy of his ape-ancestry and achieves "body-liberation". By projecting his new maninto the distant future, Wells attempted to avoid some of the obvious criticism of the remarkable transformations of bodily chemistry and psychology which underlie the enhancement of conscious, rational control of body-mind processes. Wells also tried to avoid the criticism that educational means, in the context of a plurality of competing influences on human development, are inadequate. How far, then, does his image of a new man satisfy Russell's criterion of imaginative stimulus to the young? No definite answer can be given to this question but, for all the grandeur of his conception, we may consider whether shadowy figures in a distant utopia, every one of whom is submerged in the obscurity of their author's moralistic treatises

and romances, have much chance against the heroes of popular mythology: popular entertainers and the now legendary symbolic figures of the revolutionary counter-culture and guerilla movements. Ideas, possibilities and problems of great significance for contemporary thought lie deeply embedded in a voluminous body of Wells' writing which it may be safely guessed is seldom read by the present generation of radicals. Yet it may be doubted whether the current idols - Marx, Marcuse, Roheim, Goodman, Reich and others - possess the fertility of speculative thought whose absence in contemporary society the radicals so vehemently condemn (54).

1.3 Historicism

We turn finally to a consideration of the peculiar blend of imaginative prophecy and predictive extrapolation of cultural trends which provide the foundations for Wells' "futurology". Russell might have been referring to Wells when he wrote:

> "There are two ways of writing about the future, the scientific and the Utopian. The scientific way tries to discover which is probable: the Utopian way sets out what the writer would like" (55).

Wells practised both ways of writing about the future. Russell, even though he criticized the utopian method, in the same essay went on to extrapolate trends only to finish up, very much like Wells, advocating a single world order as necessary to human social survival. Perhaps the two ways are not so easy to separate after all. Popper attempted to draw a sharp distinction between piecemeal engineering, which is cautious, open-minded, self-critical and limited in its aspirations, and holistic utopian engineering, in which the predictor's preferences are very marked. His distinction in fact is not clearcut, but is a matter of emphasis and degree (see below, Chapter VII, section 5).

Certainly there are differences between those (if there are any) who claim to be able to predict the future in detail by positing inevitable social development, and those who adopt a more hypothetical method of predicting particular characteristics of the future,using selected current practices and ideas as models. Also, there are differences between those who, like the contemporary futurologists, try to calculate what will happen, irrespective of their personal preferences, and those who adopt the procedure of wish-fulfilling prophecy. But, amongst reformers who wish to influence the future in certain ways, and who believe that active intervention is both possible and effective, these differences should not be emphasized to the exclusion of similarities. One very marked similarity is the tendency to assimilate extrapolated trends to desired outcomes. The explanation for this tendency lies,not so much in any particular conceptual difficulty in maintaining a distinction, but in the motivation of the analyst. Thus, neither Marx, nor Russell, nor Wells, nor Orwell nor Huxley wrote disinterestedly about the future but used their speculations about the future and their interpretations of the past to assess present-day society. Futurology in their hands was a form of ideological argument, intended to persuade their readers to adopt one course of action on another in order to avoid possible future harm and to achieve desirable goals.

Whether, as Popper alleges, this kind of speculative discussion results in a disease of sociological method depends on the interpretative uses that are made of it. I have already argued that ideological thinking sets out to encourage people to embark upon certain forms of action. Ideology incorporates empirical

generalizations which are susceptible, at any rate in principle, to testing. Thus the action projected is by no means entirely conjectural and speculative. It can and should be informed by knowledge. Futurology includes a number of confused propositions, subtle and otherwise, blending empirical and normative judgments, which can be extracted and analysed. Furthermore, this kind of thinking includes a large number of evaluative recommendations for present and future action, which are susceptible to rational analysis and discussion. If these arguments are accepted, then the ideological elements in futurology are corrupting of social science only insofar as they are unrecognized and are confused with the empirical procedures of social science. This still leaves open the question of whether social sciences can or should be "freed" of ideology (56).

These points aside, Wells claimed that his analysis and recommendations were not intended to contribute to sociological method, but were one man's view - i.e., an appraisal of the world in which he lived. However, he also inextricably linked prophecy with scientific research. At times he subscribed to a belief in the possibility of a theoretical history and argued that ignorance of the future is "curable" (57). He appeared to mean by prophecy, in this context, an art of forecasting involving the extrapolation of trends, and personal judgment. Despite his enthusiasm for the scientific mentality, there is no evidence that his utopianism makes any provision for the testing of his own predictions concerning the evolution of human consciousness. Instead, the life of the utopians, as we should expect of an ideological theory, merely confirms these predictions. Indeed, it is difficult to see how he could have written

his utopian romances at all, except as confirmations of selected trends. Again, despite his enthusiasm for novelty, and creativity, and his many references to the remarkable discoveries of utopian science, he believed it possible to forecast trends of social development, and, on the whole, was a very, though not completely, successful practitioner of that art. Unlike the Webbs, whose writings were mostly in the empirical tradition, his method of social commentary was schematic and predictive - i.e., he interpreted masses of data according to a grid which was always suggestive of some desired unity and coherence of human experience.

Yet the trends he detected and, by selective manipulation, projected into future ideal states for man, resembled the terrestial regularities of the evolutionary laws or principles of biology rather than the hypothetical universal regularities of the laws of physics. These trends did not ignore initial conditions; on the contrary, their direction and momentum were affected by them, nor were they depicted as absolute and irreversible: they were open to the unpredictable influence of subsequent human thought and knowledge.

In conclusion, then, we should judge Wells not as an empirical analyst of cultures, but a cultural prophet. While he loosely used the language of prediction and theoretical history, and was at times plainly historicist, he mainly emphasized the uncertainty of the future, and the role of future, unknowable knowledge, and the effect of contingent factors, like education, on future society. His task, as he saw it, was not to predict an inevitable future, but to encourage his contemporaries and later generations to strive to create a more attractive civilization than the one they had inherited. Thus, to

disentangle and to criticize the empirical generalizations and the social predictions in Wells' writing would by no means exhaust the interest and value of his thought. His recommendations for present action did not depend upon the validity of his forecasts and predictions, except insofar as the bleak picture he painted of a race between education and catastrophe was intended to shake his contemporaries out of complacency and to reverse dangerous political and economic policies. Despite a deepening pessimism, he retained a belief in the ultimate efficacy of rationality in human affairs, and thought through his own writings to stimulate rational discussion, reflection and constructive socio-political action. But rationality is not achieved lightly in human experience; it can only be acquired through a struggle within the self, and within society at large, for the mastery of ancestral impulses. It was to the processes of formal and informal education - for all their shortcomings - that Wells looked, therefore, as a means of personal and social regneration. Society, in his judgment, had to be persuaded by its best minds that its own survival depended upon the creation of a universal, educated consciousness.

2. Russell

I shall deal much more briefly with Russell's ideas than with Wells'. This does not imply an eccentric assessment of their respective standing as theorists but rather it refers to the limited scope and scale of Russell's contributions to reconstructionist thinking. Indeed, there is some doubt as to whether he subscribed to this position at all. Russell has presented no substantial account

of a desirable future state of society. We have to rely mainly on essays critical of existing cultural and social trends and recommending particular changes. Doubt about characterizing his thought as a reconstructionist arises from his criticism of those political and social theories which elevated the state or organized society and called for the enlargement of social infrastructures at the expense of individual liberty. Thus, in Education and the Social Order, he distinguished the creativity of the individual from the conformity and acquiescence of the citizen. He should have preferred the former concept, but admitted the political need to conceive of people as citizens. This grudging admittance of social and political roles runs right through his more popular writings (58).

Russell always maintained a place in his thought for the older idea of liberty as freedom from social constraints. Nevertheless, he was dissatisfied with the more extreme laissez-faire theories and worked out a variety of policies for international social reform. In Principles of Social Reconstruction he advocated typical reconstructionist reform, and treated education as the principal means for effecting the change he sought. With some reservations, then, his thought may be regarded as reconstructionist in the sense in which I am using the term (59).

In his more popular political, social, and ethical writings, Russell displayed a remarkable gift for simplification and clarity of exposition. This is a refreshing change after the more turgid of Wells' romances. But this simplicity and clarity were not attained without loss of subtlety and complexity of thought. For example, Russell's failure ever to reconcile his pleas on the one

hand for individual freedom, critical and sceptical thinking and hedonism with, on the other, the restraints demanded by his proposals for single, organized world government. In The Impact of Science on Society he specified conditions for a stable scientific society which would certainly entail a reduction in the discretionary rights of individuals and national governments. These conditions are a single world government, to enforce peace; the general diffusion of prosperity, to forestall envy; a controlled, low birth-rate; and the diffusion of centralized power, to provide for individual initiative (60). Similarly, the conditions which, he argued, should be satisfied within states if adequate standards were to be enjoyed by all clearly required a higher degree of political and social organization than Russell normally found congenial. For example, the maximization of "rational" production, justice in distribution of goods, and the achievement of something approximating to the Fabian national minimum, all set targets for organized political action which, certainly in periods of national difficulty, it has proved extremely difficult to reconcile with the liberty, scepticism and criticism which Russell valued. In his advocacy of individual and collective goals, he gave too little attention to the processes of reconciling these values, even though, from his own experience, he was very well aware of problems of free thought and speech - for example, on questions of sexual morality, religion and patriotism (61).

2.1 Changeability of human nature and social institutions

Russell surveyed his European contemporaries with a Voltairean mixture of compassion, cynicism and despair. He hated cruelty, injustice and intolerance and railed against the irrationalities and prejudices which he thought characteristic of the semi-educated societies

of the west. This is not to say that his own thought, for all its lucidity, is free of these vices.

Human nature, was not, in his judgment, incurably evil. He accepted that man's impulses are aggressive and selfish, yet believed his nature could be modified by better or worse means. He referred to anthropological evidence for the variability of human behavior and argued that by such means as education, propaganda and coercion we may increase variability of behavior, induce belief, and so forth. As human nature is not unchangeable, and as war is a function of the interaction of men in society, especially their economic relations, the long history of warfare in human society is no evidence for its inevitability:

> "If political organization were such as to make war obviously unprofitable, there is nothing in human nature that would compel its occurrence, or make average people unhappy because of its not occurring" (62)

This, of course, does not resolve the problem of explaining how political organization comes to be as it is. Russell wrote the essay from which this passage comes at a time when he had come passionately to believe in the necessity for eliminating war from human affairs, if society were to survive at all. He had also, by this time, reverted to that type of philosophical empiricism which is the foundation of the liberal ideology. This takes the form of combining belief in the uncertainty and tentativeness of knowledge with a love of liberty, toleration and opposition to absolutism. Man's nature does not preclude reform, and through upbringing and education, despite all the difficulties, man is ultimately capable of rational judgment.

Although he castigated ideology as the new, dogmatic religion,

Russell blended Lockeian empirical method with the spirit of democracy, to arrive at a position very similar to Dewey's experimentalism: open-minded and tentative with respect to the particular outcomes of inquiry, but very firmly committed to scientific forms of inquiry and naturalistic explanations. However, unlike Dewey, Russell wholeheartedly accepted the virtues of traditional, individualistic liberalism, with the addition of those social virtues taken to be necessary for survival and communal growth in a war-ridden, internationally competitive world. Given this liberal conviction, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that Russell was giving an ideological meaning to the term ideology, and ascribing to his opponents doctrines whose formal properties were little different from those of his own doctrines, however different their substance may have been (63).

2.2 Impulse and rationality

During the first World War Russell had adopted a somewhat different approach to the problem of the changeability of human nature and its susceptibility to modification. In Principles of Social Reconstruction (1916), his aim was to suggest a philosophy of politics based on Hume's belief that men's lives are more moulded by impulse than governed by conscious purpose. At this time, and for some years afterwards, he was influenced by popularized Freudian psychology although, characteristically, he gave this an optimistic turn and certainly did not adopt Freud's conclusion about the degree of personal inhibition required for the survival of civilization (64).

Russell divided impulses into two classes, by the device of an evaluative distinction, arriving at possessive and creative types. The possessive impulses aim at acquiring or retaining something that

cannot be shared (private goods); the creative impulses aim at values such as knowledge, and goodwill, in which there is no private property (public goods). By extension, the good life is built on creative impulses, and political institutions should be designed to promote creativeness at the expense of possessiveness. This proposal for the design of political institutions suggests a move away from the laissez-faire elements in the liberal ideology towards a more direct and positive role for the state. But,by a curious piece of essentialist reasoning, recalling his intellectual ancestry, Russell included the state, with war and property, as embodying the possessive impulses. Little, then, might be hoped from the reform of state institutions since it was in their "nature" to suppress creativity. How far Russell was forced to abandon this undiscriminating view of the state was shown by his later advocacy of enhanced state action and supra-national government, concepts very far removed from the syndicalism, and the simple and amiable anarchism he had advocated at an earlier stage.

Education, marriage and religion embody, or ought to embody, the creative impulses, and "Liberation of creativeness ought to be the principle of reform both in politics and in economics" (65). But just why these institutions were thought to be capable of reform while, leaving aside war, the state and private property ownership were not, Russell failed to indicate. He certainly did not believe that the existing conditions of any one of the three "creative" institutions was satisfactory, hence his books and practical efforts to reform all three.

To ensure the preponderance, in human affairs, of the "creative" impulses, it was not sufficient, in Russell's judgment, to introduce

rationalistic schemes of the type proposed by the Webbs and Wells. In his essay, "The recrudescence of puritanism", he set a sharp limit to the effectiveness of education in modifying behavior, although this is not a position he consistently maintained. He asserted that the unconscious life of impulse has a profound effect on our lives, and that it is not capable of direct control. He equated impulses with passions, as the well-spring of human action (66). Full reflective, rational activity, at the other extreme, was a goal, but a remote one for humanity as a whole, and not an adequate one, even for intellectuals. Hence the care he always took to avoid appearing a pure rationalist. In an essay on Whitehead, he exculpated his old mathematical tutor and associate from this charge:

> "Socially, he appared kindly, rational, and imperturbable, but he was not in fact imperturbable, and was certainly not that inhuman monster, 'the rational man'" (67).

Between the extremes of impulse and rationality, Russell introduced a third level of activity - desiring. We can direct our desires, or, at least, they are susceptible to modification through circumstance, education and opportunity. Given that rationality is an achievement, or a disposition to behave which education can profoundly affect, and that desires are educable, and that we can, therefore, learn to desire what it is wise and good for us to have and to be, is not human nature plastic?

Russell seems to have believed that the deeply rooted impulsive life was not plastic. But how, then, is it possible to achieve the better world he so ardently desired? Unmodified impulses, sustained and rationalized by desire and thought, might merely produce horrifying structures of state absolutism, universal warfare, and inhuman property rights. The fundamental importance of impulses is, then, on Russell's

theory, a means of criticizing the naive rationalists; by the same token it lends to rational planning of the kind he advocated the most unfortunate possibility for perversion into absolutism and tyranny. Russell could very justly have argued that just such outcomes occurred in his own lifetime, and he could consistently have maintained, as he did in1916, that these were the result of reformers and managers of institutional life attending to superstructure while ignoring the substructures of impulse. But there would be a paradox in this argument, as there was in Russell's own rationalistic writing, since, on his own argument, impulse is vital, yet controllable, not through reason but only through passion. How, then, are reformers of a rational persuasion ever to get anywhere?

Russell's belief in the power of impulse derived not only from his study of Hume and Freud. It was also, as I remarked above, an outcome of his reflections on the first World War. He saw this war as an outgrowth of ordinary human nature, and expression of passion, not merely of incompatible economic and social institutions. That is, as far as he was concerned, the liberal could explain the war just as effectively as could the materialist and collectivist. What might control war is not merely a reasoned criticism of it, and a demonstration of its consequences of misery and loss. Reason alone Russell found "too negative, too little living". What was needed was "a positive life of impulses and passions antagonistic to those that lead to war" (68).

Thus we are brought back to the creative impulses, or, more precisely, to the problems of recognizing the impulsive foundation of behavior and of finding ways of directing impulses towards "life and growth". Without quite proposing sublimation on Freudian lines,

Russell set against aggression three "forces on the side of life", which are not at all rare and might, under more propitious social conditions, be made quite common. These are the impulses of love, constructiveness, and the joy of life; and these are, or may be, united in man, proceeding from, or perhaps comprising,a central principle of growth. Unlike manyof the developmental psychologists, but in the tradition of Froebel and the romantic school of educational theory, Russell recognized that the term "growth" does not merely describe whatever happens to the organism, but evaluates and prescribes a form of experience. With Dewey, he treated growth as a good, and as goal-directed - not a mere indiscriminate happening.

2.3 Social, ethical and educational reform

From this summary review, we may see from what basis Russell's subsequent programme of social and educational reform proceeded. He advocated for individuals and societies those kinds of experiences, in love, marriage, education, international relations, economic affairs, etc., which he thought might embody and further stimulate the creative impulses. These experiences might serve to counteract the institutionalized and traditional power of the destructive impulses: a limited reform, perhaps, but in the long run profoundly transforming. Part of this limitation arises from Russell's preoccupation with the institutionalized strength of the "destructive impulses", his fear of institutions of any large size, and his scepticism about the possibility of rapid massive transformations in society. Both his caution and his use of the psychology of impulsive behavior speak for his rational scientific temper. Wells was no less cautious than Russell in his expectations of the immediate future, but he underestimated the significance of feelings and emotions and their

institutionalized expression in social institutions. This inclined him to give an unduly passive account of the mentality of the utopians, or at any rate to eliminate tensions and inner conflict without showing how this might be accomplished. Perhaps as a result of his own experience as a reformer Russell was very conscious of the power of institutions to resist change and of individuals to cling to existing mental and emotional patterns. But, despite this awareness, Russell lacked any theory of organizational and institutional change which went beyond specific educational reforms and a series of proposals affecting marriage, censorship, etc.

In ethical terms, Russell advocated Sidgwick's hedonism: "All moral rules that are generally recognized can be deduced from the principle that we ought to aim at maximizing pleasure" (69). Without further analysis, he "roughly accepted" that good is pleasure, and claimed a place for intelligence and aesthetic sensibilities as "goods". Concern for maximizing pleasure meant taking note of consequences, and of the interactions of individuals bent on pleasure of one sort or another. Ethics are part of the attempt to make man more gregarious than he naturally is, but many of the things that are best in the human species are the result of individual initiative and effort. It is part of the task of moral education to ensure that the concern for others implied by these acts was universalized.

"Pleasure" is an individualistic concept, inasmuch as it is the individual who experiences pleasure and knows when he is pleased. It is not reducible to any specific set of goals, but raises the possibility of an endless quest, in individuals and for a society, over time. Thus, for Russell, values are not fixed,but susceptible of growth and development, or, rather, of enhanced awareness and appreciation over time.

Russell appears not to have considered any of the philosophical objections to hedonism, although by implication he touched on some of these in criticizing Kantian ethics. While disdaining any possible philosophical critics,he carried the attack to the guardians of public morality, whom he stigmatized as "puritans". These were the enemies of tolerance, of free inquiry, of pleasure save within severely circumscribed bounds. Theirs was a repressive and ein practice. an ineffective answer to problems of conduct.

It is difficult to form a clear impression of the kind of conduct, society and culture Russell proposed as an alternative to that which he condemned. There are weaknesses in his theory of passions, and inconsistencies in his denunciation of the state. His argument that impulses are of primary importance in the analysis of action is sound, if not of great practical significance, since he had little to offer by way of explaining how the impulsive life might be modified. To assert that impulses may be directed or led to "constructive" ends is to beg the question of how we are to reorganize a level of experience and volition which, on Russell's own argument, cannot be reached by rational means. By seeking out the primary sources of behavior, Russell may in fact have exaggerated a difficulty. His metaphor of a battleground occupied by destructive and constructive impulses is, for an action theorist, too simplified and over-dramatized. It is more appropriate to conceive of a complex system of action, in which habit, indifference, frustration, inertia, rage and many other forms of expression interact with one another. To reduce this complex psychic model to the imaginative simplicity of a mediaeval morality play is to leave too many questions about psychic levers of change unanswered.

We saw that Russell condemned the state as the embodiment of destructive impulses, and advocated severely delimited state institutions and powers. Yet he wished to see an increase in interventionism, going beyond legal definitions of right (e.g., action to counteract economic injustices) and he envisaged first the international rule of law - including the outlawing of war - and then the development of coercive supra-national institutions. Just how the power of national interventionist agencies and a supra-national government was to be prevented from curtailing the scope for creative, individual action, he seems not to have considered at all. Furthermore, without institutional checks to formalize and regulate the exercise of supra-national power, the liberal ideology would prove a very ineffective bulwark against the organized tyranny Russell himself condemned. Individual liberty for all in complex, closely interacting societies is impossible without an elaborate and increasingly international apparatus of rules and provision. Yet this apparatus in itself is no guarantee that the scope for individual action which Russell recommended would be achieved. For this, there is required a more powerful and comprehensive analysis of freedom in the planned society than Russell, or, for that matter, Wells or the Webbs, undertook.

Despite the evident affinities of his theory of the passions with Hume, and his sharing Hume's doubts about the efficacy of education, Russell thought the changes in man and society that he desired could be brought about. His doubts about education were mitigated somewhat by his confidence that powerful and beneficent influences may be exerted on children through improved environmental provision. This confidence owes more to the Locke of <u>Some Thoughts on Education</u>

and to Rousseau than it does to the sceptical tradition. Through controlled upbringing of children, and sustained attacks on particular injustices and social problems, Russell believed that, in the long run, the rationalistic scientific temper could be made to prevail. Despite the great differences between Wells and Russell over structures and procedures, Russell's conclusion is not very different from Wells'. They shared the belief that, in the very long run, education can be made so effective as to eliminate or control the destructive forces in man and society and establish the rule of reason and benevolent impulse. This belief expresses a less naive confidence than that of Helvetius and some of the other eighteenth century rationalists. Russell and Wells were of course familiar with the history of nineteenth century reform movements, with criticisms of utopian theorizing, with the great modern irrationalities of war and depression, and with some aspects at least of depth psychology. This familiarity did not shatter their optimism but it gave to their thought a qualified cautiousness and led them both to think of the renewal of culture as a task for all the generations,not for one or two generations of revolutionary fervour.

Perhaps of necessity the models of culture and of conduct which both Wells and Russell developed were over-simplified. To sketch out the contours of an ideal society, and to sharpen our awareness of the shortcomings of present life, are tasks which require a high degree of selection and emphasis. Yet neither Wells nor Russell showed much awareness that they were operating with limited models. In this respect, despite the advance of their thought over eighteenth century rationalism, there are marked affinities between them and the enlightenment <u>philosophes</u>. The images of ideal society which

they project are like Plato's Republic, minus the mass of mankind: a haven for reflective, creative intellectuals, but not very comfortable places for those whose life style is altogether different. Rationality as an ideal tends to be all-absorbing, in the sense that it seeks to conform all forms of experience to its own ideals. This, at least, was what lay behind the enlightenment aspiration to "mathematicize" all experience (70). The alternative approach, not surprisingly, is indicated by exponents of literary culture, and it is Blake's commentary on his painting of Chaucer's Canterbury Pilgrims that underlines the difference between the enlightenment and romantic ideals (71). The diverse types of humanity portrayed by Chaucer were reduced, by the unifying or systematic character of enlightenment thought, to the one model, the rational, humanist intellectual.

CHAPTER VI

AMERICAN EXPERIMENTALISTS

The polarization of "individual" and "society" was one of the consequences, in American educational thought, of the mounting criticism during the 1920s and 30s of the individualistic bias of progressive education (1). Subsequently it became common amongst commentators to speak of a society-centred and an individual-centred approach. Useful as it is denoting two widely diverging outlooks this is not a clear-cut distinction, for both the society-centred and the child-centred theorists proceeded on the assumption of an elaborate network of relationships between the two. For example, the theories of growth and culture advanced by the society-centred experimentalists were intended to account for individuality and provide for its cultivation within a social context of mutual interests. Dewey, the major theorist of this group, located the ideal of individual development firmly within the contemporary cultural context:

> "Ideals, including that of a new and effective individuality, must themselves be framed out of the possibilities of existing conditions, even if these be conditions that constitute a corporate and industrial age. The ideals take shape and gain a content as they operate in remaking conditions." (2)

The person, in experimentalist thought, is a nexus of cultural forces which shape it from birth, and of individual biological and psychological traits. Persons exist in and through communication with one another and within particular, if varied, cultural contexts. Their actions cannot be understood or explained without reference to this cultural context. Thus, understanding persons involves studying their behavior, past and present, in the various group situations in

which they function. While this approach does not deny persons a private, unique "life-space" it does tend to emphasize and to cultivate what they have in common and their social and cultural relations (3).

The polarization of individual-society is misleading in discussing experimentalist thought, but it does have the limited heuristic value of drawing attention, in a particular context, to sharp differences of opinion amongst different schools of educational thought about the role of the school as a cultural agency with respect to individual growth, in a period of great cultural upheaval and anxiety. On this interpretation, it is useful to talk about the social perspective which the experimentalists introduced, or rather re-introduced, into educational thought and practice.

Experimentalism, in educational theory, is a term which refers to the generalized method of inquiry - he called it the scientific method, or reflective thinking - which Dewey recommended as the intellectual foundation of the educational process. This educational use was a particular application of the method with which, in the spirit of enlightenment rationalism, Dewey hoped to see all cultural issues and problems examined and as far as possible solved (4). It is convenient to extend the term experimentalist to include the group of extremely active and influential educational theorists, principally at Teachers College, Columbia University, and, later, at the University of Illinois and elsewhere, who were heavily influenced by,and in some respects developed,Dewey's thought. The experimentalist movement in education was by no means confined to this circle, nor has its influence yet been spent. I cannot examine in detail the whole movement, but shall discuss selected aspects of the thought of Dewey, Childs, Bode, Kilpatrick, Counts and Rugg. In

Chapter Eight, I shall consider some of the more recent exponents of experimentalism.

1. Culture Diagnosis

1.1 Experience and change

Before considering some of the features and problems of American culture identified by the experimentalists, we should notice that it was chiefly this group who, amongst educational theorists, have brought about an awareness of the category of culture and the values and problems of culturally-related educational study (5). The explanation for this lies within the experimentalist conceptions of growth, individuality, society and culture. From the influence of Hegelianism and Darwinism on his early thought and from Mead, a colleague at the University of Chicago, Dewey acquired a basic cultural determinism to which he subsequently gave expression in his account of how originally impulsive and plastic human nature quickly assimilates the expressions, customs, values, inhibitions and meanings of the surrounding culture. He tried to combine with this environmental determinism a belief, which he seems to have acquired from a Christian upbringing and from the Froebelian branch of Idealism, in some vital, inner impulse by which the individual conceived as an "inner" force is able to impinge upon the outer world and, indeed, is obliged to do so, both on survival and on moral grounds (6).

This is an uneasy combination, hardly consistent either with Dewey's vigorous attacks on all forms of dualism and on the invoking of forces beyond experience, or with the radical, empirical behaviorism which he adopted (7). Yet it is a combination with which he and his followers operated an elaborate conceptual structure, now veering towards a "pure

plasticity" account of human nature, and now affirming the independence of the individual in relation to his culture. Despite its problems, this theory drew attention to the cultural context of individual growth and encouraged the followers of the experimentalists to take an interest in social trends and issues and in school-society relationships comparatively rare amongst educationists until the advent of modern empirical sociology (8).

Dewey's active work as a philosopher and a social and educational theorist covered the period from the 1880s until the 1940s (9). From his enormous output, during this period, I shall examine more closely a number of issues relating to two fundamental aspects of his thought. Those aspects are, first, a metaphysical doctrine of universal flux, and, second, a theory of accelerating social change (10). Dewey's commitment to these sets of ideas underlies his treatment of human experience and the problems of twentieth century culture.

While the experimentalists sometimes set themselves up as anti-metaphysicians, their theory incorporated particular beliefs and assumptions about the theoretical limits of knowledge, the nature of experience, and the instrumental qualities of thought. A summary statement does scant justice to these, but is needed to show how they proceeded in defending their cultural diagnosis.

Accepting Hegel's criticism of Kant's "reality beyond experience", Dewey and his experimentalist followers asserted that what we know and can know, including the categories and methods of thought, is limited and defined by human experience. Again following Hegel, Dewey attached great importance to the historical analysis of experience, as a way of knowing. Experience is analysable into a set of relationships or transactions over time between the human organism and environment,

in which there occurs a continual interplay of action and reaction. In experience there are primary and secondary elements: primary encounters with the qualitative world, characterized by immediate feelings of suffering and enjoyment; secondary reflection or inquiry. Dewey's interest lay mainly in secondary experiences and, since these are instrumental in the sense of resolving felt difficulties, yielding knowledge, and effecting relationships with others, his philosophy has also been called "instrumentalism".

Experience, according to the experimentalist interpretations, yields not, as one might expect, any and all perceptions, understandings and relationships the human race has had, but a very distinctive and partial view of the world. This view limits valid beliefs to those sustained,or capable of being sustained,by the "naturalistic" methods of scientific reasoning. According to the doctrine of experience, we have no warrant to entertain beliefs which are in their nature incapable of such verifications - e.g., beliefs about God, first cause, immortality, or the "truths" yielded by mystical intuitions. At least, according to experimentalism, all such beliefs must be operationalized and brought to the test of the empirical and hypothetico-deductive procedures of science. To the extent that evidence for them is a matter of faith or private, uncommunicable awareness, they cannot, or, rather, ought not to, be affirmed. Experience is not therefore self-validating by whatever expressions or modes of utterance it chooses, but must test its claims to validity against the criteria of the developing culture of the sciences. Scientific thought is the most successful area of human experience and sets the standards for future experience.

But science permits us only to hold beliefs and truths provisionally.

They are always subject to modification or refutation. It might seem that, holding this, Dewey would treat scientific method, or, as he often called it, reflective inquiry, as a problem-raising, doubt-inducing enterprise. However, the opposite is the case: thinking is a functional, adaptive process, which operates to settle doubt in problematic, indeterminate situations. Doubt is not settled for long, though, as one problem is replaced by another in an endless succession.

It is this kaleidoscopic movement of experience, the endless variety of events, that led the experimentalists to depict the world as "precarious and perilous" (11), a scene of novelty, almost of flux,which we can know and begin to control to the extent that we can, through inquiry and reflection, identify and order operations and events. Behavior is conceived, in Darwinian terms, as a rest-less pattern of adjustment to surroundings. Thus what we know is behavior, actions, operations, motives; and, from a historical study of these and their inter-relationships, the experimentalists built up a picture of western culture undergoing a vast and profound trans-formation.

This transformation, as described in the generalized interpre-tative writings of Dewey and his associates, has certain characteris-tics. They are not quite the same in the different experimentalist writings but there is sufficient similarity for it to be not too mis-leading to present a composite outline, at least of the general inter-pretation of culture in America in the 1930s. The experimentalist characterization of culture in transition may be divided into three sets of ideas:

(i) Fundamental instability of culture: industrialization;

science; cultural lag.

(ii) Failures of American democracy.

(iii) Crisis.

1.2 Fundamental instability of culture

The culture to whose problems the experimentalists addressed themselves was American, yet of the major factors which they claimed were leading to change and instability only the distinctive American heritage, combining the reality and mythology of the frontier and the movement of social criticism dating from the 1880s, was uniquely American. The remaining factors, industralization, science and cultural lag, which supposedly separated social and moral from technological progress, were all phenomena of the western world generally. Apart from Dewey, who was well read in European thought and an active commentator on current world events, the experimentalists tended to treat their cultural predicament in a parochial manner. Consequently, their reform programme was on the whole, like American foreign policy at the time, isolationist. Despite the fact that the processes making for cultural upset were international, to a considerable extent it was assumed that the remaking of American culture could proceed as a separate endeavour and their proposals for collectivization were mostly confined to the nation state.

1.2.1 Industrialization

For Dewey, industrialization - the relentless expansion of a tool technology - and urbanization were a complex of forces which by the late nineteenth century had achieved their own dynamic. In his early writings, he treated this as socially unsettling, but not critically so. Later, Dewey came to regard industrialization as a major source of instability, requiring a major effort of readjustment in individuals and society.

The culture of industrialization was vastly different from that of the "old farm", still familiar to town dwellers at the turn of the century, and it was itself fluid and constantly developing. It created dislocations and challenged institutions, including education, to make radically new adaptations. Industrialization did not comprise an isolated set of institutional phenomena, but was a complex and profound disruption of traditional customs, relationships, values and ways of life (12).

Yet, unsettling as industrialization had been in American culture, it was not, for Dewey, an inexorable force. The best form of adaptation was the systematic application of intelligence to social affairs, including the industrial culture itself. Dewey did not adopt a single-factor change-theory - although he attributed to western science the greatest power for changing the world - but instead characterized cultural change as a complex phenomenon. Contemporary culture was basically a change culture, but it did not, or rather, need not, carry all before it in a mindless torrent. Resistance to change is built into human nature in the form of habits, great stabilizers of action, and into social institutions (13). Furthermore, industrialization for all its damaging side effects was at least in part an expression of the scientific intelligence, socially organized. The limited, haphazard organization of an earlier period could be replaced by a systematic redirection of industrial factors to satisfy the needs man defined for himself. Other forces making for change were perhaps less susceptible to control. In summary, Dewey noted three main sources of social action and reaction: habit, violent force and intelligence (14). He wished to eliminate violent force as a factor in human affairs, an aspiration of the whole reconstructionist

movement, and to develop a reciprocating relationship between habit and intelligence such that an effective division of labor, as it were, could occur without either the disruptions of total innovativeness or the stagnation of total stability. Industrialization, then, a function of rational and empirical thought, had produced many harmful side effects. The more systematic and organized application of intelligence to social affairs could, in the future, take advantage of the enormous social power of industrialization, and direct it to more humane and universally satisfying ends than those achieved in the earlier stages of the industrial revolution.

The diverse cultural consequences of industrialization were described in some detail in Rugg's polemical works where his diagnosis of the harmful human effects of breakdown led him to propose a large-scale programme of planned change (15). But this was in the 1930s, when the great damage that could result from the collapse of finance and of industrialized production and distribution were being universally experienced in American economic and social life. In Dewey's earlier writings, while industrialization was treated as a transforming factor, it was not seen as potentially harmful. Indeed, Dewey taught, and practised in the Laboratory School of the University of Chicago, a policy of learning about industrialized society through practice-based craft and social studies (16). However, the depression shocked and outraged experimentalists no less than other social commentators by its demonstration of the frailty of many of the great institutions of industrial society and the precariousness of living standards.

In his 1926 lecture-series, Education for a Changing Civilization, Kilpatrick, Dewey's most influential educational disciple, gave a brief account of the industrial factor in cultural change, treating it, with

the philosophy of pragmatism and the legacy of democratic ideals and institutions, as one of three basic tendencies in American life. Industrialization brought with it problems of bigness and mass servitude: "the fatalism of the multitude", the increased destructiveness of war, and a greater encroachment of machine production on every-day life (17). Yet, on the whole, Kilpatrick's approach to his subject was more descriptive than critical and he gave a hint of his later weakness for accommodating thought to the status quo by subserving philosophy to the "changing civilization":

> "It appears that we must have a philosophy that not only takes positive recognition of change but one that includes within it change as an essential element" (18).

Less than ten years later, industrialization had itself been re-interpreted by the experimentalists to become an ominous force. A sinister combination of advanced technology and laissez-faire in business and government had led to chronic insecurity in work; a popular mentality of acquisitiveness and escapism; excessive, anti-social competitiveness; pessimism; and a distrust of intelligent planning (19). Rugg's earlier bright picture of progress, achieved through industrialization and applied democracy, was replaced, in his own writings, by accounts of acquisitiveness, unemployment, poverty, inequality and the failures of collective action as the great industrial machine unbelievably sank into depression (20). Thus, his 1933 Wells-type study in adult education, <u>The Great Technology</u>, was subtitled "Social chaos and the public mind", and contained an ambitious outline for rebuilding a semi-Fabian society in which the propulsive scientific and technological forces of the industrial culture would be directed by a collectivist morality, within a planned capitalist economy (21).

Other reconstructionists, notably Bode and Counts, similarly attacked the failure, in national governmental policy-making, to direct to defensible ends the forces released by science and technology in society. Bode, who had from the beginning condemned the "child-centred" school of progressive education for failing to identify worthy ends and criteria for growth, gave greater emphasis to the national failure to define objectives (22). Counts, who had been strongly critical in the 1920s of the class bias of schools and school boards, concentrated his criticism on the school, and, almost alone among the experimentalists, turned for a time to the Soviet Union for lessons in social reconstruction (23).

The strenuousness of the experimentalist criticism of the impact of industrialization on American life in the 1930s compared with the relatively uncritical descriptions, in their earlier writings, of the great changes it had produced and was presaging. In the earlier period, the great and challenging task facing twentieth century man was adapting his institutions and values, indeed his very consciousness, to the cumulative, mounting changes introduced through industrialization, science and the rapid evolution of the American tradition. Later, this task was modified: it was not only individual man that had to adapt, but society through its corporate institutions had to find means of bringing the industrial system under some kind of control for a more complete satisfaction of human needs.

1.2.2 Science

A difference of emphasis is detectable between the thinking of Dewey and other experimentalists on the relationship of science to society. While Dewey in later years was primarily interested in

science as understood by Bacon, Locke and the enlightenment philosophes, i.e., as an outlook and a praxis which could transform the conditions of social life, he was also interested in philosophical questions concerning the logic of science, its methodology, the relationship of empirical and normative judgments, and the paradigmatic function of scientific reasoning in other realms of thought. Industrialization, therefore, was but one aspect of the uses of science in society and Dewey treated it as such.

However, most of the other experimentalist writers concentrated their culture diagnoses on the applications of science in and through capitalist industry. Dewey argued that science is the greatest force for producing social change and determining human relations:

> "The true and final source of change has been, and now is, the corporate intelligence embodied in science" (24).

Rugg, who had traihed as an engineer before turning to pedagogy, identified as the prime mover not science, but machine technology harnessed to capitalist uses:

> "Many factors turned our fathers' quiet world of the 1890s into the dynamic America of the 1940s, but one provided the chief impetus for all the others. This was the astonishing speed and efficiency with which the engineers perfected machine technology, and the business and financial men of six industrial countries built the modern corporation and organized a world wide system of efficient enterprise" (25).

The difference between these two approaches was to prove important, since all the experimentalists advocated that the school curriculum should be substantially built upon an analysis of contemporary culture. An analysis that identifies the culture of science, or the sciences, as prime mover will yield different materials and methodologies of study than one which casts technology into this role. The difference

may be illustrated by comparing the study of pure science with the Soviet polytechnical curriculum. The former has no central concern with the history, application and social uses of science, whereas the latter takes as its starting point a normative (Marxist) analysis of work culture and tries to see how the sciences bear or might be brought to bear upon this culture (26). The experimentalists, as indeed did most other reconstructionists, generally followed Rugg rather than the Dewey approach; hence the prevalence of "core curricula" in which science and mathematics are definitely subservient to various forms of social study including the social uses of science (27).

Dewey has been criticized for reducing knowledge to socially instrumental uses and for evading the problem of theoretical knowledge. Yet his treatment of science as a factor in culture suggests that this is a misleading, or at least a one-sided, criticism. He was certainly interested in industrialization amongst other cultural elements as an example of major applicative uses of science, but this was not the only use he had for science, nor did he reduce the structure of scientific thinking to Baconian applied science. He saw science as the most creative and successful of the great symbolic systems, an intellectual structure in its own right.

1.2.3 Lag

Dewey and his fellow experimentalists were agreed that a serious hiatus had developed between the rapidly changing elements in society - science, technology, urbanization, population movements, etc. - and the more stable moral, political and educational norms and institutions. They were, on the whole, uncritical exponents of cultural-lag. This theory of social change, popularized by Ogburn, finds in technological

innovation a culturally disintegrating force. The integration of the various components and sub-systems of society is postulated, and it is argued that this hypothetical balance is disrupted primarily as a consequence of the rapid development, both quantitative and qualitative, of scientific discoveries and mechanical inventions and their diffusion throughout industry. These changes precipitate a "maladjustment" between material and non-material culture. Moral and other ideals consequently are said to have lost their validity since they refer in various ways to a cultural whole which lies forever in the past. One major assumption of the lag theory is that the growth of science and industry set a pace and direction for social movement to which other sub-systems should adjust. The adoption of the lag theory by the experimentalists gave to their thought a concreteness and relevance to contemporary events, but at the cost of oversimplifying the inter-relationships of the parts of the social system, and of introducing deep uncertainties about the scope of critical thinking. Also, the lag theory creates ambiguities about the status of moral judgments - as to whether they are all relative to particular social contexts, or in some respects universal (28).

In recent years, culture critics have increasingly pointed out that the unimpeded growth of science and technology might be destructive of other cultural values. The direction of "lag" has therefore come under doubt. These criticisms raise fresh questions about social progress, since it is no longer clear that making the social uses of industrial processes more "intelligent" will suffice, as the experimentalists often seemed to assume.

The experimentalists advocated a highly generalized and often rather vague programme of political and social planning, including

the utilization of technology for the advantage of the many, not merely the few. However, their analysis of lag was an exceedingly naive one, as may be seen from the following summary of the main arguments:

1. Scientific knowledge, technology, industrialization, etc., have progressed very rapidly by adopting rational empirical, problem solving, and functionalistic procedures.

2. Social-moral knowledge has clung to traditional categories, and methodologies.

3. Prejudice, uncertainty, bewilderment, and moral timidity are widespread.

4. Science has wrongly been made the scapegoat: the industrial society is wrongly blamed for the imbalance that has developed.

5. This imbalance is to be righted by putting moral-social affairs on a scientific, realistic, practical basis (29).

Although Dewey, as we have seen, did not reduce culture change to the impact of a single factor or set of factors, his analysis of cultural lag and his proposals for remedying it rested on an unduly narrow account of culture. Rugg was subsequently to recommend incorporation of the systematic study of theories of culture change into teacher education programmes. The adoption of this recommendation at an earlier stage might have rescued the experimentalists from the confusion and ambiguities of the culture lag theory (30).

1.3 Failure of American democracy

From criticizing the failure to humanize and socialize the blind forces of industrialization, the experimentalists extended their attack and enunciated a more general failure of American democracy. In some ways, this was for them a sharper reversal to make than had been their ultimate recognition that industrialization is not a self-righting and self-justifying process. Industrialization was a world-

wide phenomenon to whose advancement America had contributed: but democracy, despite its European origins, had acquired a distinctly American patina, a power to evoke sentiment, to still criticism, and to effect good beyond what even science might achieve. Evidence in the twenties and thirties that democracy was seriously jeopardized by American political, economic and social movements was therefore all the more shocking to those who had assumed that the American system somehow proved or proclaimed the superiority of democracy over all other forms of social and political organization.

Dewey had never been uncritical of the workings of American society. Indeed, for decades before the 1930s he had been one of the most active and critical of the country's social commentators. But he still managed to convey confidence in a heritage of values, ideals and feelings which in moments of crisis could be effective as a spiritual unifier of the nation. It was as though the ideology had hidden reserve power, free of institutional trappings, to which appeal could be made in moments of crisis. In this sense, democracy was to Dewey a perennial faith, an enduring ethical system which yielded criteria for the assessing of current practice as well as an ineffable inspiration and encouragement to action. So far as Dewey was concerned, what was needed was that people should (a) adopt the democratic creed as a working philosophy of life, and (b) acquire the disposition to think scientifically. But Dewey did not suppose that these needs could be readily met. He over-simplified the range of problems, and the barriers that confront democratic change agents without, however, minimizing the difficulty of surmounting those problems which he did identify.

Dewey himself seems never to have abandoned this optimistic confidence in the ultimate capacity of the ordinary man to resolve his

difficulties by acting intelligently and democratically:

> "Democracy is a way of life controlled by a working faith in the possibilities of human nature ... [of] intelligent judgment and action if proper conditions are furnished" (31).

But he was frequently moved to criticize the actual workings of so-called democratic government and he and other experimentalists drew attention to a number of specific failings which amounted to the conviction that democratic institutions and relationships in America were profoundly threatened by avowedly anti-democratic forces. Like Russell, he found a natural affinity between science and democracy, to which were opposed a common enemy. The revolt against science, Dewey argued:

> "proceeds from representatives of those who have enjoyed the power of control and regulation of other human beings, because of the earlier set-up in political, ecclesiastical and economic institutions" (32).

Faced with what they believed was the threat of an anti-democratic reversion to authoritarian social and educational control, some of the experimentalists, in the 1930s, embarked on a campaign of ideological warfare which was to lead a few of them, notably Counts and Childs, to the illogical advocacy of indoctrination of values which were supposed to include those of free inquiry (33). Dewey and most of the leading experimentalists, as we shall see in Chapter X, resisted this move. However, Counts, the most outspoken critic of old-style liberalism, made an impact, for thereafter the experimentalists appear to have taken far more seriously the problem of opposing anti-democratic trends in the culture.

With the exception of Counts' studies of socio-political factors affecting schools, experimentalist thought lacked anything approaching

the detail and meticulousness of social analysis to be found in the work of the Fabians. The experimentalists resorted to highly generalized assertions about the "failure of democracy". These failures were of four principal kinds:

1. A mounting authoritarianism and intolerance in political, social and educational relations. (In response, they advocated shared responsibility and participation, principally in education but also in economic affairs.)

2. Inequality, particularly economic and educational. (To this they opposed rudimentary forms of a national minimum of welfare, and arguments for a national, subventionist educational policy.)

3. Acquisitiveness and competitiveness in economic and social relations. (To this they opposed their basic democratic tenets of the sharing of experience and enlargement of interests, together with what was on the whole a cautious advocacy of increased state economic interventionism.)

4. Flights from reality and avoidance of social issues. (The experimentalist response was a sustained campaign of political enlightenment and knowledge through popular education.) (34)

To these wider trends which they found in American society in the thirties, the experimentalists opposed a never very clearly defined, but deeply felt, democratic ethic. America was a democratic society, by and large, but it fell short of the highest ideals, or failed to achieve the utopian standards of the "American dream". The experimentalists looked upon themselves, if not exactly as guardians, then certainly as the principal educational interpreters of the meaning and significance of this traditional democratic creed in the changed conditions of industrial and urban life. In this respect, they may be regarded as an elite of moralists, determined to eliminate the imbalances and the maladjustments which in their theory of culture lag they had attributed to rapid, partial social change. They were

confident that the democratic aspirations and values of equality, shared experience, freedom of thought, tolerance and so forth could form both a major objective and a powerful social dynamic. Thus, while in their lag theory they appear as semi-Marxists, by positing the social primacy of changes in the production sphere, in their remarks on democracy, they appear as utopian and ideational change theorists.

1.4 Crisis

As the economic recession following the financial crash of 1929 deepened into massive unemployment in America, the experimentalists deplored the waste of human resources and the widespread social and economic failure. The "American problem" emerged in the form of what they derided as political and economic and financial palliatives, and a failure to fulfill the "promise of American life". To this, in the later thirties, was added an awareness of the impending threat of nazism. Democracy was embattled, both within the nation and internationally in a looming battle for survival with dictatorship (35).

From all this it may be appreciated that by the mid-1930s the experimentalists felt deeply uneasy over what they termed a national crisis. Economic and social events had propelled them into a deepening sense of total breakdown. However, serious as they found it, the reconstructionists so defined the crisis that redemptive action was possible and the spirit of optimism was, in spite of everything, sustained. Despite Marxist arguments adduced by some critics, despite the widespread national despair and apathy, despite the extent of economic dislocation, the experimentalists felt that capitalism, suitably socialized, could be restored, and that education could play a vital, although by no means an isolated and unaided, part in this

restoration (36).

Where politicians, industrialists, and economists were unable to explain the depression or, prior to the second world war, to develop policies for eliminating massive unemployment, several of the experimentalists were sustained by a remarkable confidence in their diagnostic skills. There is nothing, however, in their culture studies of that period which provides solid support for such confidence. First, their analyses, however sincere and concerned, were partial, personal and impressionistic rather than empirically based; and, second, no basic theoretical framework to explain the crisis was provided. Instead, the inherent tendencies in ideological theorizing to substitute wish fulfilments for empirical generalization, and generalized prophecies for specific predictions, were very apparent.

Since few, if any, of the theoreticians seemed able, at the time, to explain the crisis, this criticism may seem excessive. However, it is directed at the pretentiousness of the inflated culture diagnosis that Rugg, in particular, embarked upon. Dewey, by contrast, kept nearer to the requirements of the empirical method. His accounts of crisis reflected the widespread anxieties of intellectuals at the time, and emphasized commonly admitted national problems. But, leaving aside his more popular journalistic forays, he attempted no grand overviews and embarked upon no oracular prophecies. As always, he affirmed the relevance of scientific inquiry to specific social problems and pressed for the adoption, in education and society at large, of the scientific culture (37).

There are many examples of superficiality and the over-hasty drawing of conclusions in the experimentalist diagnosis of a crisis, yet this diagnosis emphasized matters of great importance for educational

policy. Reconstructionism is essentially a future-directed theory which seeks to involve educational thought and practice in wider fields of social planning. By virtue of their environmentalist approach to personality formation, and their concern for education as a continuing process of growth, the experimentalists were deeply alarmed by the threat to education posed by the profound problems of unemployment, poverty, severe social inequality and so forth. These social problems, by their pervasiveness and persistence, militated against the successful implementation of sound educational policies. For example, the depression of expectations and opportunities resulting from large-scale unemployment jeopardized the success of school reforms which were intended to enhance children's understanding of the opportunities and possibilities of life. Thus, while the experimentalist portrayal of culture crisis lacked the power which arises from detailed and penetrating analysis, it nevertheless underlined some of the fundamental questions in the inter-relationship of educational and social reform.

2. Culture Reconstruction

With the exception of Counts, who for a time happily contemplated state collectivism on the Soviet model, the experimentalists were either extremely general or cautiously particular about the alternative system they would substitute for the culture they condemned. The generality is best illustrated by Rugg and the caution particularly by Dewey.

2.1 Culture synthesis and individual creativity: Rugg

Before the depression, Rugg had embarked on two programmes of inquiry and reform which he was subsequently to elaborate and repeat in everything he wrote: first, the attempt to strengthen experimentalism

by incorporating within it a theory of the value of individual expression and creativity; second, the attempt to unify culture and society which, partly as a consequence of industrialization, had been disastrously split (38). Both concerns were intensified without being basically altered by the impact of the depression. They may be brought together under the simple rubric of a new cultural synthesis, which the very format of Rugg's books presages (39).

This synthesis was to incorporate the "best" elements in the heritage, combined with the most exciting and valid of current achievements. It was to be characterized as a dynamic system of manageable tensions in which all could find satisfaction, and as a mutuality of interest. Rugg set forth the framework of this great synthesis in successive studies: Culture and Education in America (1931); The Great Technology (1933); Democracy and the Curriculum (1939); Foundations for American Education (1947) and Imagination (1963). Rugg saw his framework as historically limited in time and place, and his own outline as liable to be rapidly superseded by other studies in a swiftly changing society. However, the methods he proposed for achieving cultural synthesis were presumably intended to be more enduring. These methods were advocated without reference to pre-existing theories of social and cultural change, apart from culture lag, although, in a later book, Rugg analysed and recommended the study of such theories in courses for teachers (40).

Rugg's own views on methods for achieving a cultural synthesis cannot be completely separated from the substantial programme of reform which he advocated. We saw in the Introduction that ideological theorizing is distinguished by an inextricable blending of substantive reform proposals and procedural rules. Rugg produced this blend in

historico-socio-political studies of the American culture, which seem to have been directed, like Wells' utopian romances, at that minority of adults who might form a spearhead group for social reform.

In characteristically broad outline, Rugg traced the history of industrialization and the rise of capitalism, with emphasis on both their productive potential and their moral and economic weaknesses. What was needed was a new, revitalized "great technology", an economy of abundance, providing a "fine standard of living for all", directed by technocratic managers working within the framework of "controlled private capitalism" (41). For all its failings, it seems that private enterprise and single-nation capitalist organization still had the best potential for economic, social, moral and cultural growth (42). Since the "economic axioms" which Rugg propounded as part of The Great Technology had chiefly emphasized consumer needs, managerial efficiency, and the capacity of the economy to expand and diversify, he may be fairly regarded as a prophet and advocate of the general style of American post-World War II capitalism.

Rugg proposed three major steps in social reconstruction in a democracy: first, overall design of policy objectives and institutions by co-operating experts; second, consent, produced through the persuasive efforts of "the intelligent minority" (perhaps the biggest elite in history - some 25 millions of activists); third, democratic control and technical operations - i.e., representatives were to be chosen who would subject their designs to experimental trial and turn their timing and sequencing, etc., over to experts. This curious mixture of mass participation, elitism, and representative government may be compared with the more modest means proposed by the later

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experimentalists for initiating policy changes (43).

Anxious to avoid an autocratic solution, Rugg thus proposed combining "a centrally controlled technology with representative democracy" (44). His argument was largely instrumental: such a combination would be more likely to achieve reconstruction without violence and disintegration. Unlike the Marxists, he repudiated violence as a means, adopting the characteristic reconstructionist belief in a community of persuasion and consent as the most desirable instrumentality for change (45).

Avoidance of tension, violence and disintegration could not be achieved without a massive programme of persuasion. The "inner psychology of the people", notwithstanding the virtues conferred upon them by their participation in the democratic heritage, was a serious obstacle, since it comprised the gospel of personal success at the expense of others, conformity, and hypocrisy (46). This "inner psychology" was in turn fortified and exploited by the public opinion-forming agencies. To resist these powerful institutions, Rugg made direct appeal to his "thinking minority". To these he addressed his urgent pleas for "a warlike psychological program" of self-help and self-education - a loosely co-ordinated, partly voluntary, partly government-sponsored national programme of adult education (47).

The overall incoherence of Rugg's programme rests less on his failure to identify the structural requirements of effective social change than on his enlistment as change agents of a very large minority who, according to his own analysis, would already be hopelessly demoralized and hostile to corporate action. Rugg and several others of the reconstructionists were confronted by a basic dilemma in wishing

both to initiate a massive programme of specific changes and to institutionalize direct mass-participatory democracy, whose policy objectives could hardly be prescribed in advance. Furthermore, this mass was, by virtue of the crisis and other factors, demoralized, unable or unwilling to co-operate and unsure of its own best interest. Rugg in no way contributed to the resolution of this dilemma. Indeed, it is difficult to see why he should advocate universal consent at all. His argument for universal consent was not in fact primarily democratic, but rested on the belief that consent meant the avoidance of violence. However, there is no more assurance that the procedures he recommended for achieving consent would be freer of violence than more autocratic measures of policy enforcement. If violence were avoided, then we may not unreasonably suppose that his elaborate system of policy initiation and implementation would be dominated by experts and politicians, both working hard, post hoc, to secure consent, or rather assent, to policies already in operation.

Yet Rugg made at least two contributions whose significance may be lost in criticizing specific problems raised by his proposals. The first of these was to endeavor to characterize American culture as an ongoing system of interacting parts, social, economic, political, intellectual. Action in one sphere, including education, is affected by and in turn may help to modify that in other spheres. Proposals for directed change need to take account of consequences in spheres other than that within which this immediate action is to occur, and to recognize the limitations imposed by the beliefs and institutions of these other spheres. The increasing impact of technological change on the human and social environment, and the growing realization that specific intervention ramifies in many directions, reveal the

foresight of those holistic writers who thirty and forty years ago and more urged the need for wider viewpoints. That neither Rugg nor Wells, two of the chief advocates of the wider view, succeeded in presenting profound analyses of their own culture hardly lessens the value of the example they set for further, if more tightly controlled, studies of the interactions of various parts of the cultural system.

Rugg's second important contribution throws up a peculiar difficulty in the experimentalist position. This is the problem of accounting for individual imaginativeness and giving its cultivation any place in a system directed towards sharing and communication of experience. Dewey's fundamental behaviorism makes it difficult to explain original genius, and it is significant that his social and educational discussions deal almost exclusively with the common man. Few, if any, of the experimentalists have given much attention to the questions of genius, originality, high intelligence or even individual difference, except insofar as they attacked traditional education for inducing conformity, and proposed individual and small group learning situations. There is a paradox here in that, while the traditionalists had an elaborate theoretical apparatus for explaining individual difference, and tended in their educational practice to obliterate differences, the experimentalists were embarrassingly devoid of an adequate theory to account for the idiosyncratic and personal aspects of individualism, but highly successful as critics of the anti-individualism of traditional schooling. Rugg did not fill the theoretical lacuna, but he did give far more emphasis to background elements in experience, to non-behavioristic psychologies, and to the fundamental diversity of modes of experience, than did any other experimentalist. In this, he

may be thought to have compensated in part for the unfortunate characteristic of main-stream experimentalism, of seeming to many observers to provide a ready-made intellectual apparatus for inducing mediocrity and conformism. Neither of these weaknesses was endemic to the theory, but "social adjustment" could very readily be converted into "social acceptance".

Rugg himself saw his contribution in emphasizing and, late in life, analysing, expressive and creative aspects of experience, as going well beyond a compensation for an undesirable emphasis in instrumentalism. He wished to provide that philosophy with a "missing dynamic". Most critics have found instrumentalism unduly preoccupied with foreground activity and neglectful of both a background of contemplation and of personally valid experience. Rugg found it, on the contrary, too passive an outlook, in accepting which one is moved to interested contemplation, but not to action. Those who "move us to action" are not the analysts and abstract speculators but the artists, with their "characteristic way of knowing" (48). Rugg used a historical and comparative method to demonstrate the contribution of "other modes of human response than that of the experimental method of knowing" (49). He drew attention to a difficulty many critics have felt, that Dewey's use of the concept of scientific method was either too inclusive or too limited: it assimilates a diversity of scientific modes to a single model, and then reduces all forms of knowing to the schematic requirements of the model.

2.2 Social reform: Bode, Childs, Counts and Kilpatrick

Rugg was not alone amongst the experimentalists in expounding comprehensive schemes of social reform. Bode, Childs, Counts and Kilpatrick, all were attracted in one way or another by the alluring prospect of a new cultural synthesis, created by intellectuals; accepted by a public

disheartened by the economic and moral consequences of depression; and propagated primarily through the agency of educational institutions. The attempt to incorporate everything in an encapsulated definition of the proposed synthesis sometimes led to a ludicrous eclecticism. Paraphrasing Dewey, Counts enjoined the progressive movement to create anew:

> "a tradition that has roots in American soil, is in harmony with the spirit of the age, recognises the facts of industrialism, appeals to the most profound impulses of our people and takes into account the emergence of a world society" (50).

Feeling the threat of havoc in the release of the great new forces of science and technology in industrial and economic structures, Bode enjoined progressives to define educational objectives and to redefine the aims of society. The school was to create and exemplify a new culture of democracy, and social institutions and practices were called upon to "justify themselves on educational grounds". Government was to extend its role through social welfare, economic intervention including democratization of industry, and nationally integrated educational policies. Bode went beyond the details of educational reform, to commend the idea of democracy, both as the free play of intelligence in human affairs, and as an all-embracing creed - "a community of interests and purposes". Without wishing to adopt their specific doctrines, he approved the "architectonic magnificence" of the doctrines of communism and nazism (51). Thus cultural synthesis need no longer appear as merely a vague aspiration. Working models could be demonstrated to those sceptics and critics whose pluralism and individualism was felt to fall well short of the requirements of contemporary cultural awareness.

Despite their strictures on the workings of American capitalism,

Rugg and Bode, and likewise Kilpatrick, limited their reform proposals to amelioration of its consequences and a re-arrangement of its parts. To be sure, this re-arrangement included the ideas of a managed economy and a half-hearted gesture towards a set of Fabian minimum standards. Nevertheless, despite the architectonics of communism, the culture models they proposed were essentially an abstraction of desired elements within the existing system. Hence Bode's great emphasis on the democratic heritage and Rugg's attempt to identify the makings of a new synthesis out of selected cultural tendencies which had emerged in the past hundred years or so.

More radical proposals for new directions for reform came from Childs and Counts. In Dare the School Build a New Social Order?, an incisive and vigorous attack on the individualism and middle class assumptions of progressive education, Counts advocated the abandonment of laissez-faire economics and their replacement by a state-managed economy, and envisaged at least the broad outlines of a socialistically planned society (52). Counts developed an enthusiasm for Soviet communism following his critique of the operation of social class and inequality in America in the twenties, adopting on the way a socialized, science-based but specifically American alternative to capitalism. Childs, more exclusively interested in moral issues than any other experimentalist, seems in the thirties to have reached a more extreme position than most of them by reflecting on the deep conflicts in American culture. These conflicts at that time posed educationists with sharp alternatives - there was no neutral or middle ground. By the 1950s, however, Childs had moved so far from the thirties' thinking that he was being chided for his "new conservatism" (53). Not surprisingly, Counts and Childs were the most active experimentalists

in advocating indoctrination for a time during the 1930s. For them, the choice was between the prevalence of one ideology or another. Seeing no possibility of educational neutrality they proposed that the schools advocate and practise that ideology which, to them, seemed more defensible (54).

True to his role as chief spokesman and popularizer of the experimentalist outlook amongst teachers, Kilpatrick avoided the extremes of quasi-Marxist class war and indoctrination, and romantic utopianism. He combined the characteristic experimentalist glorification of the democratic heritage with Dewey's method of reflective thinking and the Jamesian psychology of purpose and striving. To this he added a recognizably Christian concept of self, together with selected Christian virtues and the principle of universal hedonism. The resulting mixture he presented as "a philosophy of life" or "the life good to live". His model of the good life,most fully worked out in Philosophy of Education (1951), envisaged materially comfortable, healthy, moderately cultivated, outgoing, sociable and well-adjusted citizens, living in harmonious and equitable relationships with one another. His account echoed the elements of smooth individual-social adjustment in the utopias from Plato to Wells, but nevertheless was offered as being within the grasp of his contemporaries. It seemed as if only a little more effort all round were required to secure the universal adoption of "the good life". This effort was to be primarily educational: direct attack on the levers of the economy and the society seemed not to be required, least of all of teachers, whose task included the study of "any crucial problems of civilization - but it is not for educators as such to manage the social-economic situations" (55). Admittedly, this did not rule out the need

for more direct social interventionism, but the tone of Kilpatrick's Philosophy of Education had that touch of optimistic complacency about the nature and directions of cultural change which made the effort of more critical analysis and radical action hardly worthwhile. Things generally appeared much better than they had done in the 1930s. Despite problems like cold war tensions and the unabated inequalities of American society, traditional experimentalist optimism could in the end prevail over difficulties. Kilpatrick posed a number of problems concerning the role of the individual in a mass society, the continuing risk of war, the destructiveness of capitalist economics, and others. Thus, he was by no means unaware that beneath prosperity and a high measure of social order tensions were at work which might precipitate crisis. Nevertheless, Philosophy of Education is much less critical than Kilpatrick's social commentaries of the thirties.

2.3 Reflective inquiry and democracy: Dewey

It was Dewey, not Kilpatrick, who best managed to steer a course between the various intellectual hazards facing the reconstructionists as they attempted to delineate the general requirements of a new cultural order. Needless to say, he did not satisfy all his critics, not even within the experimentalist movement, and it was alleged that he had failed to clarify the targets of the new society, just as he was supposed to have failed to define targets or even criteria for individual growth (56). This criticism misses the basic intention of his thinking, which was never to attempt to define ends either as specific outcomes of action in the empirical-Fabian style or as grand schemes in the Wells-Rugg style. It would be more appropriate to refer to his proposals as procedural principles: proposals for action according to certain criteria, not the specification of definite ends. Thus we find that his emphasis continually falls upon criteria and processes not upon aims and general

models (57).

Dewey therefore made his proposals in terms of defensible general operations. It was not a particular planned society that was invoked, but the processes of planning in the form of applied social intelligence; not particular moral qualities (although he was not able entirely to avoid invoking them) but the complex, judgmental and comparative processes of valuing; not an "ideal society" conceived as defined relationships, but the effort to achieve community through the sharing of experience, and the interchange of ideas.

Basic to all this are the two ideas of reflective inquiry, conceived as a second order activity vital to the survival of the species, and a simple universalization of the notion of individual worth. The ideal society, then, is not any particular version known to us. It is to be achieved not by revolutions or violent upheavals, but by the infusion into actual social systems of these kinds of process criteria. We may illustrate this by considering Dewey's views on the favorite shibboleth of the American reconstructionists, namely "democracy".

Dewey's model of the ideal state has none of the vision and grandeur of Wells' utopias, nor the detailed infrastructure of the Webbs' concept of a national minimum. But it was not devoid of either romantic or institutional elements. The best state of society so far achieved was, in his judgment, western, liberal, constitutional democracy, because only this democracy gave full scope to universal, individual growth and encouraged the application of scientific method to human affairs.

Dewey was at his most eloquent on democracy:

> "Democracy is the belief in the ability of human experience to generate the aims and methods by which further experience will grow in ordered richness. Every other form of moral and social faith rests upon the idea that experience must be subjected at some point or other to external control ...

> If one asks what is meant by experience in this connection my reply is that it is the free interaction of individual human beings with surrounding conditions ... the task of democracy is forever that of creation of a freer and more humane experience in which all share and to which all contribute" (58).

However, Dewey's advocacy of classical liberalism was conditioned by two important considerations. These were, first, the recognition that science and industrialization had fundamentally altered the terms of social relationships and hence the meaning of individualism; second, Dewey shared the un-European and peculiarly nineteenth century American feeling for the virtues of the common man of the frontier (59).

Democracy therefore was conceived by Dewey not primarily as a constitutional arrangement or an institutional scheme. For him, its basic character was communal, not institutional, relational rather than substantial. That social system approximated to democracy which facilitated the widest sharing of interest and the emergence of an emotionally unified public - as distinct from stratified classes, masses and elites. This public he conceived as a loosely organized mutuality of interest, whether large or small, and unified through the joint production of and commitment to common policy goals. Furthermore, participation in policy making is a process which succeeds only to the extent that it sustains a momentum. The institutions of democracy must be recreated through the intelligent involvement of citizens (60).

If, for a large urbanized state, this seems unduly reminiscent of direct government of the small-scale New England townships or of Rousseau's argument that individual sovereignty is inalienable and should be directly exercised, Dewey also gave a schematic account of the principles of representative government and state bureaucracy (61). He was, too, a moderate exponent of federal government planning during Roosevelt's

reconstruction era. But he was far more interested in the romantic ideals of shared experience, fullness and freedom of contact, and the communal pursuit of ends, than he was in any particular forms of political structure. Thus democracy in his theory referred not only to a social system but to a quality of experience which he wished to ensure in any political society. This quality was communalism. No particular structure of society guaranteed it, although he seemed to think that American constitutional, representative government, with the addition of interventionist, welfare policies, came fairly close to a satisfactory system. He was thus opposed to more drastic solutions, like those of Rugg, Counts, Wells and the Webbs, but did not share Russell's misgivings about the capacity of the state to act constructively towards individuals. Again, he did not suppose that,because the state possessed a capacity to act constructively it would necessarily do so. It was a task of socially conscious adults to ensure that the institutions of state were guided by democratic considerations.

Dewey's advocacy of democracy as a liberating communal order anticipated the preoccupation of many contemporary thinkers with the problem of the "missing community" and harked back to more traditional forms of religious communal life. Indeed, his democratic creed is a good illustration of Edmund Burke's assertion that the newer civic culture is in many ways a secular version of the older, religious culture. This, as we have seen, was true also of Wells.

Yet, despite an intellectual debt, Dewey and Wells were neither of them romantic communitarians strictly in the Owenite and Morris tradition. A fundamental commitment to the values they saw in science, technology and industrialization led the reconstructionists to argue

for a new science-and industry-mindedness, to which schools were expected to make a substantial contribution. Both wished in some manner to see combined, in a single, new ethos, the values of small-scale, communitarian living and the industrial ethic. In this spirit, Dewey outlined the synthetic character of Democracy and Education, his most important study in educational theory:

> "The philosophy stated in this book connects the growth of democracy with the development of the experimental method in the sciences, evolutionary ideas in the biological sciences, and the industrial reorganization, and is concerned to point out the changes in subject matter and method of education indicated by these developments" (62).

Dewey's blend of science, of aspects of industrialism and of the mores of the rural township of nostalgic memory may be contrasted with Max Weber's nearly contemporary analysis of the emerging, mass, industrialized democratic state (63). Weber's purpose was different from Dewey's. He was more interested to find out how such a society could and did function than he was to secure for it some particular moral character - e.g., communality, or avoidance of anomie. Nevertheless, Weber was keenly interested in the relationship of politics to ethics and, like the experimentalists, criticized those ethical systems which, by ignoring consequences, seemed to undermine the basis of responsible action. Furthermore, Weber was, like several of the reconstructionists, a sombre prophet who believed that western society was confronted with a major crisis of order which required the exercise of the utmost political responsibility (64).

Like the Webbs, Weber drew attention to an intimate connection between the functional efficiency of the industrialized state and the rational management of affairs by professionally-trained experts. This form of control he designated the modern bureaucracy; hence bureaucracy is, or

rather may be, highly functional. The principal characteristics of bureaucracy, particularly its grounding in rational rules and its striving to achieve impersonality, objectivity and abstract equality of treatment, ensure a close relationship between its functional aspirations and the ideology of mass democracy, which likewise seeks the abolition of personal privilege, universal accessibility to office, and the firm establishment of equality before the law (65). These considerations, as we have seen, were linked to a remarkable degree in the thought of the Webbs and are perhaps the most significant modern development, in social theory, of the ideology of Destut and his fellow ideologues at the Institut.

Weber noted not only a harmony of interest but also profound tensions, between mass democracy and bureaucracy considered as systems of action, since the former seeks, through the enhanced power of public opinion, to contain the power and lessen the authority of officialdom. This power of public opinion, with the rapid development of mass media, is now, of course, considerably more potent than when Weber was writing on bureaucracy and democracy.

From an educational standpoint, Weber's bureaucratic-democratic state required a very different programme of schooling from that advocated by Dewey and the whole experimentalist movement. In the one case, there is need of highly selected, specially trained functionaries, able to cope with the hierarchial and routine demands of office; ready to administer rules, implement policy, and disperse justice impartially and impersonally; and seeking, both as a natural extension of their complex roles and as a consequence of pressure from an expanding economy, to enlarge their sphere of rational control.

Together with these elitist functionaries, in Weber's scheme, there were the breakaway charismatic leaders, and the mass who needed training in acceptance of and respect for the rationality of the officials. Discipline, however, is a quality a modern, organized society demands of all its members. Other needs, too, were posited, but the bureaucracy could not function without a basic measure of self control and mass acquiescence (66).

Dewey, on the other hand, reluctant to follow the consequences of his identification of the inherent restlessness and dynamism of the emerging rational, industrial state, gave no special attention to elites, whether administrative, political or artistic. Thus, as a matter of emphasis, the functionality of his own analysis of socio-economic trends was circumscribed by a moral, and a sentimental, preference for universalizing rewards, responsibility, and experience itself. Shared experience, diffused authority, conjoint activity, the pursuit of a common culture, these on the face of it are bureaucratically dis-functional. Not all experimentalists agreed with Dewey in minimizing or ignoring elite roles. Rugg identified decisive roles for elites as change agents and proposed what he recognized to be, in the short run at any rate, the socially-divisive policy of an all-out adult education campaign for the elite.

Yet widespread rejection in the 1960s and 1970s of the assumptions of the bureaucratic-industrial state indicates that the functionally operating system may still be unacceptable and that the communitarian ideology has to be accommodated in some form. If so, the positions adopted by Weber, the Webbs and Rugg on the one hand and Dewey on the other may be treated as, in certain respects, complementary. Weber virtually ignored the dimensions of diffused decision-taking, and of

active, participation by the masses in their own affairs. The question of the indiscriminate status of the individual, considered apart from any particular distinction or even role, is of central importance in the democratic ideology, as it has been in both ethics and religion. Dewey dwelt at length on this question, but minimized the role of expert managers and culture innovators, and failed to grasp the significance of authority and responsibility definitions in organized structures or institutions. Whether in fact these two models - the models, virtually, of modern industrial culture and its counter-culture - can be integrated into a new model or world view is a question for the future.

3. Inevitability and Interventionism

We turn finally, in this chapter, to the questions of how far the experimentalists conceived social change as susceptible to direction, planning and other forms of intervention. Were Rugg, Bode, Counts and the others who in the 1930s bewailed the crises in industrial civilization merely engaged in the ritual of post-hoc prophecy, commemorating the nemesis of society in the grip of forces beyond control? Are their calls for future action to be construed as an injunction, mainly to themselves, to identify with the emerging forces of the future, to get in step with history?

It is not surprising that Rugg, the writer in general style and outlook nearest to Wells, should have shown some evidence of belief in the inevitable outworking of historical forces. As with Wells, much of his writing was devoted to the exposition of larger cultural trends and forces: science, technology, social organization and the arts. His analysis emphasized the unity of these movements, their

coherence as forces with a history, a moving present, and a semi-contingent future. But, unlike Wells, he ventured little into futuristic speculation, and was content to bring his trends to the present and to make such proposals as he had for change, not by visualizing future utopias, but by seeking to reform existing institutions. Nevertheless, Rugg conveyed the feeling of a nation with a destiny: the promise of American life which had been cut short by the depression, like an organism laid low before running its full course. American culture was "emerging" (67). This feeling, shared to some extent by all the experimentalists, was a reflection in another context of the idea of manifest destiny, used to other ends by conservatives and imperialists in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Rugg proclaimed manifest destiny as the guiding spirit of America at the time of greatest crisis, in the 1940s:

> "When our people, committed traditionally to peace and to aloofness from quarrelling Europe, were faced by the gigantic tasks of arming half the world and training and equipping youth of hitherto slipshod habits and restless insecurities, they rose to the emergency successfully. Confronted by physical danger, Manifest Destiny still runs true to form" (68).

Bode, too, shared the belief in culture emergence, though his expression of it lacked Rugg's prophetic emotivism. Not only was there a cultural dynamic driving industry, but history is also a battleground for the perennial struggle between the forces of evil (aristocracy, vested interests, etc.) and good (democracy, the good life for all). In this struggle, some inner force drives democracy to its inevitable victory:

> "The whole drift of things has been towards the interpretation of the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness in the sense that we are members of one another, with a common interest in the cultivation of a common life. No one, not even the humblest citizen, is to serve simply as

> a hewer of wood and a drawer of water; but everyone is to be recognised as a member of a great brotherhood, and to share in the opportunities, the achievements, and the aspirations which are our common possessions" (69).

The inevitability of the victory of democracy - the whole drift of things - appeared much less certain only a few years later when the preservation of democratic values against counter-forces was treated as an urgent need of the times.

It may seem, then, that talk of the historic forces and destiny of the democratic faith in American culture was only a rhetorical and familiar way of enlisting support for it, or perhaps a ritualistic exercise of mutual reassurance about the virtues of some sacred object (70). There is undoubtedly something of both of these, yet the experimentalists were interested as well in the tasks of defining likely trends for their culture on the basis of its history. We have seen that the relatively easy confidence with which they first approached this task was shattered by the unpredicted experience of depression. Still, the interest remained, for example in Dewey, Rugg and Kilpatrick, and it was a vital educational interest since they all subscribed to that educational theory which directs teachers and children to the analsysis of contemporary culture. They needed to have some model for analysing this culture. Following Hegel and Darwin, the model they all adopted was historical evolutionism with man and his intelligence included amongst the evolutionary elements. Recognition of a creative role for intelligence and of the genuine novelty of ideas meant that there was nothing inevitable about trends: they were factors in an evolving situation which we need to take account of and to learn how to guide to even greater advantage. It is noteworthy that this culture model is a transitional one: no sharp breaks with the past

are possible, there is a legacy of cultural experience which should be maintained through transmission, the future has its roots deep in the past. When he wrote on habits, Dewey appeared very much as a culture conservationist:

> "The best we can accomplish for posterity is to transmit unimpaired and with some increment of meaning the environment that makes it possible to maintain the habits of decent and refined life" (71).

Because they were interested not only in the impartial analysis of culture but also in the advocacy, as moral norms, of the cultivation of certain qualities of cultural experience - particularly those they called "democratic" and "scientific" - the experimentalists were led at times into a faulty analysis of trends. They did not deny interventionism nor did they, on the whole, think that interventionism could have only a limited effect, but they did isolate trends and factors which suited their prescriptions: science, technology and industrialization, because in the "unfreezing" phase of reform they wished to emphasize factors making for change rather than stability; democratization, because they wished to promulgate the democratic faith; the role of deliberation and intelligence in social affairs, because intelligence they regarded as the central, most important human function, and so on.

However, a more comprehensive analysis of trends might have disclosed factors and forces not merely opposed in certain respects to those already mentioned, but tangential to them. Presumably one way around the difficulties of control and prediction created by the tendency of social and educational theorists to isolate in culture those elements in which they have an <u>interest</u>,is to incorporate into the study programmes they recommend alternative theories. Again, they might adopt Mannheim's recommendation to incorporate, in ever widening

interpretations, a host of particular perspectives. But this, too, is difficult, since it is tantamount to admitting that one's own culture analysis is partial or faulty and this is not easy for a theory, which is built around the very idea of culture analysis, to admit. The experimentalists were not at all distinguished by such impartiality of recommendation. However, their methods of culture analysis were not rigid, nor did they adopt in any dogmatic fashion a mono-casual theory of change which would preclude open-mindedness towards other perspectives. The later experimentalists, as we shall see in Chapter VIII, went some way towards achieving these wider perspectives by developing a method of policy making which required, as a first step, the effort to reach agreement on objectives and this required the abandonment of partial viewpoints.

CHAPTER VII

CULTURE CRISIS: MANNHEIM

We saw in Chapter IV that the Fabians identified serious problems of deprivation, inequality and lack of organization in British society. Yet the seriousness of these issues was not taken by the Fabians to indicate that British culture was in a state of deep crisis or imminent collapse. Wells, by contrast, became increasingly disillusioned with the rate of adaptive change in the democracies when confronted by the rise of political totalitarianism in continental Europe. Similarly, some of the American experimentalists, for a time at least, envisaged the possibility of widespread breakdown of their culture. However, it seems that an infusion of weighty central European thought and experience was needed for reconstructionist theorizing to achieve a condition approaching apocalyptic prevision of an impending total disaster.

It was Karl Mannheim, who, trained in post-Kantian romantic philosophy and political and social theory, unveiled the gloomy prospect of west-European civilization torn between amiable but aimless liberalism and the violent, mindless fury of totalitarianism (1). This prospect of dissension and decay was dark and unattractive, but Mannheim did not treat the decline it betokened as inevitable. By a total commitment to social, economic and political planning, he believed the surviving democracies could re-establish a new social order and that man's bewildered and divided consciousness could be reconstituted through a reformed, greatly enlarged, and carefully planned national educational programme. Mannheim shared Plato's longing for the lost unity of a previous cultural order, and Hegel's belief in the necessary imperfection of human institutions. But, although he wrote with deep misgivings about present

and future society, communicating a sense of impending disaster, he was forward looking, and did not lapse either into nihilism or into that kind of milennialism which sees salvation as a wonderful and divinely inspired intervention by some charismatic leader in the affairs of man.

Mannheim's contribution to the reconstructionist theory is not confined to his profound and detailed analysis of crisis symptoms, although this was to make a deep impression on Brameld and Stanley. Nor is his significance limited to the production of a coherent set of prescriptions for social planning. To the empirical methods of the Webbs, the philosophical reasoning of Dewey, and the speculative and synthetic projections of Wells and Rugg, he added a distinctive mode of culture diagnosis. This mode has been characterized and attacked by Popper as historicist, but historicism is at most only part of it, and how far Mannheim's theory is historicist is open to debate. His method is often referred to as sociology of knowledge. This term, despite Mannheim's own preference for it, is inadequate because it does not sufficiently bring out the peculiar importance he attached to the role, situation and perspective of the self-conscious participant observer. Properly trained, this observer is capable of exercising an interpretive function in grasping the meaning of complex cultural "wholes". This form of self-conscious culture interpretation is what Mannheim himself practised, in both his historical studies and in his diagnosis of contemporary culture. It is the constructive counterpart to the unmasking procedures so characteristic of the sociology of knowledge. The latter seeks to show how thought and action, structures as well as content, express both a historical reality and the interests of some group. Culture interpretation, or perspectivism, is a creative enterprise

of the intellectual who strives for understanding by transforming the particular viewpoints disclosed by sociology of knowledge into a comprehensive and unified total view of a cultural movement or epoch. Beyond understanding, the perspectivist is interested in guided change and he strives to indicate the conditions which should be satisfied if the situation and phenomena he has described are to be directed towards desirable ends. That is to say, the perspectivist is no mere diagnostician, but a culture reformer as well. Furthermore, just as by his method of analysis he strives to unify diverse viewpoints, so, by his reformism, he endeavors to create a new culture synthesis, a new, coherent order of thought and action (2).

The importance Mannheim himself attached to the methodology of culture analysis is shown by the fact that he devoted to it three of his six major books, as well as parts of all of the others (3). As with the Webbs, his proposals for a methodology of inquiry are a vital part of his overall strategy of culture analysis and regeneration. If his thought has a long term significance it is because of this methodology, not primarily because of his own application of it in diagnosing Britain's cultural problems in the 1940s (4). We will look first at his methodology, then consider his views about man-society relationships, his diagnosis of culture crisis, and, finally, his proposals for a planned democratic society.

1. Methodology of Culture Analysis

1.1 The cultural scientist

For Mannheim, the tasks of culture analysis are not reducible to specific inquiries into isolated elements, such as price movements in economics, elite recruitment in sociology, or voting behavior in political

science. Nor need, or should, all scientific analysis restrict itself to the models yielded by the natural sciences. For the human studies, especially culture analysis, the appropriate procedure is for the inquirer to strive to commune with reality, to become in some measure part of the events he is studying. Following Husserl in this matter, Mannheim argued that contemplation and theoretical analysis are insufficient. Mannheim described contemplation as of only "marginal" importance as a source of cultural understanding (5). Man is the son of his works, in Cervantes' phrase, and can only be understood by those who are prepared to immerse themselves in these works. But Mannheim, despite his professions, did not in fact take this ancient doctrine so very seriously - he remained very much the literary scholar. For him, perceiving relationships, seeing them as "wholes", was the foundation of theorizing and served as a substitute for more prosaic forms of the "works" doctrine, such as participant observation and field studies. Theorizing meant perceiving relationships amongst cultural phenomena, including human values and purposes, and grasping their significance. In culture study, things and events are perceived both as individually unique, which the phenomena of natural science are not, and as components of complex wholes. But these wholes are meanings which derive from or are a function of a system of interpretations which the inquirer imposes upon them. Once imposed, the meanings must be tested against further data, and compared with the meanings adduced by other inquirers.

1.2 Levels of meaning

Mannheim tried to show the difference between meaning in the natural and cultural sciences by classifying meanings into the three levels of: (i) objective meaning; (ii) expressive meaning; and (iii) documentary or evidential meaning (6). We must pursue his argument here to see how

understanding in the cultural sciences is supposed to differ from natural science understanding.

1.2.1 Objective meaning

Objective meanings are those of natural science, in which the object is given immediately in experience and, in Mannheim's words, is taken as "nothing but itself". In understanding objective meanings, no reference is required to the person observing or to his intentions. But two difficulties in Mannheim's position arise here. First, he has already argued that natural science objects are to be understood only as exemplifications of, or material for, some generalized concept, so it is not clear what it is for an object in natural science to mean "nothing but itself". Second, his emphasis on relationships and the interpretation of "whole situations" tends to reduce the individually unique phenomena of cultural science to counters in a system of more general concepts. Thus the difference between cultural and natural science, which Mannheim is seeking to establish, becomes blurred.

We may perhaps better appreciate the difference by noting his views on the sociology of knowledge and on traditional historical methods. Mannheim accepted the Marxist thesis of the sociology of knowledge, that in political and social studies the interests and preferences of the observer distort his interpretations, but he was not prepared to concede that the Marxist perspective is itself exempt from such distortions. Mannheim's extension of the Marxist thesis raises problems of validity in the culture sciences. These problems Mannheim supposed to be different in kind from those in the physical sciences and mathematics. He was looking for a method which would be both distinct from that of the natural sciences, and yet more scientific in character than the traditional methods in use in the humanities. He was not content to

employ the familiar, individualist historical methodology, by which culture analysis would be reduced to a narrative of unique, unrepeatable events. Such analysis would be useless in disclosing culture trends. Furthermore, as we shall see in discussing his culture prescriptions, methodological individualism is too closely related to piecemeal reformism to suit his holistic approach to reform (7).

Just why Mannheim wished to utilize in cultural studies some of the relativist conclusions of the sociology of knowledge while maintaining a culture-free preserve for science is not at first sight easy to understand. This was perhaps not so much a matter of conscious preference as of the enduring impact of Scheler on his thought - an influence which he appears to have accepted without much self-criticism (8). He did not, as we shall see, finally admit that relativism is a tenable position, but his efforts to extricate his own thought from relativist conclusions were unsuccessful. To overcome the problem of validating knowledge in the culture sciences, where observer intentions and preferences color the subject matter he is studying, Mannheim proposed combining the multiplicity of standpoints occupied by different social observers. This combining and transcending of particular viewpoints he referred to as "perspectivism". Leaving aside the claims he made for a privileged place for the "perspectives" of intellectuals, Mannheim's perspectivism has much in common with certain forms of scientific thinking. Yet he was not prepared to accept that perspectivism,with its emphasis on inter-subjectivity and a public community of knowledge, substantially reduces the differences of approach in natural and cultural science. From his interest in analysing culture wholes, notably German conservative thought in the nineteenth century, and from his later ideological prescriptions for British culture, it may

be inferred that he needed a method free of the caution and limitations of conventional historical or natural science inquiry.

1.2.2 Expressive meaning

At the second stage or level of meanings, according to Mannheim's analysis, objects acquire a "psychic content". For example, pigments and canvas, which quite appropriately can be subjected to a natural science analysis, at the level of objective meanings, are given "psychic content" when brought together as a "fashioned work of art". The choice of this example does not commit Mannheim to an expressive theory of art objects which would reduce their analysis (at the level of expressive meaning) to a history of psychic states in artists. He specifically warned against this reductionist approach by invoking the notion of "objective, visual aesthetic meaning, or form" (9). However, he was not at all clear about the differences and relationships between the artist's "stream of experience" and the more abstract realm of aesthetic form.

Mannheim not surprisingly evaded the problem of distinguishing expressive meaning from the meanings of natural science. Expressive meaning refers, not to the psychic state of the artist, but to a process of illumination of objects, or embodiment, or an investment of objects with symbolic or ritual significance. It might have been clearer had Mannheim called this not psychic but symbolic content. Just why these processes of symbol-using are not susceptible to a scientific analysis is not clear, unless some peculiar importance attaches to a personal stance which the observer adopts towards them, as in certain theories of religious and aesthetic experience. Mannheim did in fact attach particular importance to the "stance" and intention of the observer in the cultural sciences, arguing that unless he adopted an

appropriate mode of address to his material he could perceive nothing significant (10).

1.2.3 Documentary meaning

At this level, the spectator, adopting the appropriate, empathic stance of receptivity to gestalten, "grasps" or apprehends "the elements that go to make up the global outlook of a creative individual or of an epoch" (11). Thus, documentary meaning is that type which is uniquely yielded by the work of the culture scientist. This act of grasping, although psychologically it occurs at the pre-theoretical level of direct experience, is not simply a visionary or an intuitive judgment, free of the usual labors of scholarship. On the contrary, it is available only to those who soak themselves in details and, so far as possible, become actively engaged, as participants, in the form of the activity they are studying. Furthermore, for a science of culture analysis of wholes to be possible, the understandings achieved through a pre-theoretical grasping of meaning must be susceptible to subsequent theoretical analysis.

We may appreciate from his remarks on documentary meaning the ambitious nature of Mannheim's culture thinking: his use of the thought of the neo-Kantians and the phenomonologists on processes of symbolization and expression, his emphasis in sociology of knowledge on the particular perspective of the observer, his translation of Marx's notion of the special insight of the proletarian into a wider theory of knowledge through works, and his attempts to assimilate Weber's arguments on behalf of an objective social science. Paradoxically, though, Mannheim was not satisfied to treat the documentary level of meaning as an achievement of the synthesizing imagination, transcending science. Despite his earlier separation of cultural and natural sciences, he proposed that cultural studies should aspire to become scientific.

For example, the study of politics could become scientific, not, as one might suppose, by adopting an individualistic empiricism but by the perspectivist method.

Mannheim's definition of global or documentary meanings appears to be circular, in the sense that the act of grasping is defined by reference to what we grasp - i.e., "wholes" - but for the meaning of "wholes" we are referred to the act of grasping. There is the further difficulty of establishing the sources of any theory by which the validity of documentary meanings might be established, a difficulty not diminished by Mannheim's reference to a further "totality" which embraces both documentary meanings and the theory of weltanschauung. "Perspectivism" becomes an infinite progress of ever larger and more comprehensive interpretations, and validation becomes an endless task of creating these larger interpretations, for which Mannheim never provided clear criteria of adequacy. In Ideology and Utopia, Mannheim perceived this problem and argued that there is, in politics, for example, only a limited range of positions to comprehend (12). However, this does not fully meet the objection; because, while the positions may be limited, there is no limit to the possible interpretations of them. In making their interpretations, culture scientists, in Mannheim's view, should become deeply involved, personally, in the phenomena they are studying, and at the same time aware of the involvement. The "perspectives" yielded by the higher interpretation of these particular interpretations would be highly personal and subjective. It is significant that, instead of analysing truth criteria in the cultural sciences, Mannheim chose to examine levels of meaning and to delineate strategies of inquiry. It almost seems as if, providing he is working at the "right" level, and is using an "appropriate" strategy of inquiry, the

culture scientist is performing his duty. Such truth as is yielded by his inquiries will establish itself in the intellectual market place by vying for comprehensiveness and insight with the products of other inquiries.

We will return to these questions in considering Mannheim's claims to have escaped a purely relativistic account of cultural phenomena, and in discussing the mystical qualities of his theory of experience.

1.3 Methodological priority of wholes

Mannheim made several attempts to clarify his arguments about the fundamental methodological importance in culture science of grasping wholes. For example, while protecting himself from the criticism that not all modes of thought and experience need to be explored in terms of inter-relationships, in Ideology and Utopia he asserted the methodological priority of wholes to parts in his own research:

> "The sociology of knowledge seeks to comprehend thought in the concrete setting of an historical-social situation out of which individually differentiated thought only very gradually emerges" (13).

This has at least the merit of making very clear that his own culture diagnosis will be strikingly different from those in the tradition of classical empiricism. By contrast with the Webbs' dual role as objective researchers and social reformers, Mannheim was from the beginning no methodological dualist but a culture interpreter who incorporated semi-empirical inquiry into firm proposals for far-reaching culture change. After a lengthy review of the Weberian attempt to establish non-evaluative methods in the cultural sciences, he concluded that there is no way of eliminating evaluation in these studies. We should, therefore, find ways of becoming aware of our evaluations, and consciously rise above them to newer, more inclusive ideals.

Attempts to achieve objectivity and to use piecemeal procedures were dismissed, as a false trail in sociology. The effort to grasp wholes, and empiricism,were inextricably linked in a single process which plainly goes beyond intellectual analysis to a definite commitment to socio-political reconstruction:

> "Genuine sociological empiricism can never consist of piecemeal observations but must always include theoretical reconstruction of the nature of the whole process as well as an emphasis on petty details ... it is the total structure of society alone which reveals the real function and meaning of the parts" (14).

Despite the difficulty he encountered in spelling out the thought structures required for the analysis of "wholes" and in trying to find a way of verifying the results of such analysis, Mannheim made very telling criticisms of the claims of value-free, piecemeal empiricism to any special insights or "super-sight". Facts, he argued, "exist for the mind always in an intellectual and social context" (15). Contexts are liable to change over time. Is there, then, any way out of purely subjective apprehensions? Knowledge can progress, Mannheim argued, by becoming more comprehensive: not by expanding in the crude way of simple accretion of facts - the so-called "knowledge explosion" - but by assimilating divergent perspectives. We return, then, to the questions of what is a perspective, and in what does perspectivism consist?

1.4 Perspectivism

In outline, perspectives are the standpoints, or the socio-historical intellectual situations, which students of culture form as they build up their understanding from the objective through the expressive to the level of documentary meanings. Perspectives not only progressively define the direction of inquiry (not, however, the limits, since interpretations

can be endlessly reconstructed) they also define individuals, by structuring awareness and behavior. Thus, perspectivism is not merely a scholar's method, it is of fundamental importance in understanding human nature. Mannheim's contradictory views on culture determinism and individual freedom are discussed later in the chapter. For the moment, we should note that it was with some satisfaction that he saw the sociology of knowledge eliminating "the fiction of the detachment of the individual from the group within the matrix of which the individual thinks and experiences" (16).

Mannheim offered three ways of reducing the subjectivism implicit in his perspectivist standpoint: first, self-awareness, which may be achieved by combining Baconian and Freudian recognition of the temptations to self-delusion with a Kantian purposiveness of will (17); second, seeking "the broadest possible extension of our horizon of vision", which he sometimes said was the special task and unique merit of historicist thinking (18); this included making the effort to know other available perspectives; third, by recognizing that situations are, as it were, subject to group occupancy - that an observer is a member of a community of inquirers (19).

It is this third feature which Mannheim's most severe critic, Popper, seems to have overlooked. It resembles in several respects Popper's own notion of the inter-subjectivity of scientific thought, which gave rise to the possibility of freedom and progress in science (20). Mannheim, like Dewey, attached great importance to the growth of understanding through communication of experience. This communication is indispensable both for the growth of the individual - he accepted Mead's account of the emergence of the self in and through social experiences - and for freedom of inquiry in the cultural sciences. Furthermore, he

accepted a plurality of values in a democratic society. These considerations, and Mannheim's rejection of absolute truth, all point towards the inter-subjective position. However, by his opposition to unity of method in the physical and cultural sciences, Mannheim parted company with the experimentalists, for whom progress lay, not through the quest for a non-scientific form of inquiry, but by applying to all studies the outlook and procedures of the natural sciences.

Perspectivism as Mannheim defined it does not preclude a creative role for individual thinking in the culture domain, any more than the inter-subjective requirements of a mutually intelligible community of discourse rule out the (possibly at first unintelligible) leap forward by some theoretician in the physical sciences. How far Mannheim is justified, in Ideology and Utopia, in claiming to have "clarified the relations between the achievements of the individual and the group" is, however, a different matter. At one time he wrote of "the novel and uniquely personal mind of the individual who breaks beyond the bounds of the existing order" - a figure reminiscent of Hegel's world-historical individual (21). At other times, reflecting the German state-philosophy stage of Hegel's thought, be substituted "the individual participates in thought" for "the individual thinks" and reduced unique experience to a variant of some group norm (22). Similarly, he both accepted Weber's model of the charismatic break-away leader, and then reduced the genius of the leader to a collective impulse to which his achievement conformed (23). "Perspectives" would seem, then, to be both culturally determining and culturally determined, a conclusion which casts some doubt on Mannheim's supposition that the perspectivists, the intellectuals, are capable of achieving, through knowledge, a freedom denied to the ordinary individual in society.

1.5 Relational truth

Mannheim denied that his sociological account of the sources of knowledge and his perspectivist treatment of the truth claims of various sub-cultural groups involved him in the contradictions of relativism. In correspondence with the inter-subjective element in perspectivism, he proposed his so-called relational theory of truth. This assumes that in certain fields of inquiry, notably history and the social sciences, absolute truth claims are precluded not by any universal metaphysical considerations, but by the nature of the subject matter. The values and social situation of the historian and social scientist do not merely impinge upon his methodology, they themselves partly constitute the problem definitions he makes and the conceptual structures of his inquiry. To understand cultural phenomena the inquirer must seek out, in the manner recommended by Husserl, the truth that is "in" existence, by getting into communion with it. What confidence, then, can we place in the judgments of any particular inquirer or group of inquirers and how can any disputes amongst them be arbitrated?

Confidence should be proportional, Mannheim thought, to the extent and depth of exploration, by the inquirer, of the relations that exist "between certain mental structures and the life-situations in which they exist" (24). This would seem to imply that no inquiry can be successfully terminated, a problem which Dewey also encountered; or, rather, that we would not know what it is successfully to terminate an inquiry, since relations of the kind Mannheim has in mind are infinite. This, as we have seen, is unsatisfactory. It should be realized that it is a sacerdotal doctrine in that it invests a certain class or group of inquirers with virtually unchallengeable intellectual power, on the grounds that they alone are able to pursue inquiry with sufficient depth and persistence. Later

in this chapter, we shall see that Mannheim, following Husserl, ascribed a key role to the intellectuals, not dissimilar to that accorded them in Platonic and Scholastic philosophy (25). Having admitted that he had no means of eliminating evaluative factors from inquiry, Mannheim should have been exceptionally cautious in examining the role of intellectuals, to ensure that their particular evaluations were not enshrined in a form of cultural absolutism. However, he was not at all cautious in this respect and in the next section of this chapter we shall see how from relativism he progressed to relationism, which is in fact the distinctive perspective of the synthesizing intellectual, thence to a profession of faith in visionary truth, of which the synthesizing intellectuals would serve as the custodians. Mannheim's position is stronger when, in Ideology and Utopia, he criticizes the tendency of certain thinkers to hoist "the chance situation of the moment", which represents their own interests, into the absolute and eternal - a tendency which, despite his criticisms of the conservatives, his own culture diagnosis most eloquently displays. These weaknesses notwithstanding, Mannheim usefully reminds us of the need for caution and moderation arising from an awareness that no knowledge is free of certain presuppositions, metaphysical, ethical and so on, and encourages his readers to be ready to change their presuppositions.

1.6 Beyond history

However, the tentativeness of outlook that acceptance of this encouragement would lead to, fitted ill with Mannheim's own predilections for sweeping, holistic generalizations. Beyond the methodology of the social sciences, beyond empiricism and documentary level interpretation, lies a procedure through which access could be gained to higher levels of reality. This is the realm of Hegel's Absolute Spirit, whose existence

confounds all the efforts of reductionist social science to explain away culture and experience:

> "One may admit that human life is always something more than it was discovered to be in anyone historical period or under any given set of social conditions, and that even after these have been accounted for there still remains an eternal, spiritual realm beyond history ... which puts meaning into history and into social experience" (26).

Not that Mannheim uncritically accepted Hegelian thought. On the contrary, he criticized its "one-sided rationality" and its neglect of intuitionism and of the use of gestalten in culture diagnosis (27). Through the use of these procedures in inquiry, Mannheim hoped to penetrate to some deeper levels of understanding than are available to empiricists or even to sociologists of knowledge. Beyond self-awareness, achieved through situational analysis and reflection on one's methodological presuppositions, lies a more ecstatic and visionary realm of knowing, which almost seems to come as a gift to those receptive to it. The cultural scientist becomes a kind of seer who, by drawing upon the insights of religion in addition to the fruits of scholarly inquiry, penetrates a realm permanently veiled against empirical approaches. Mannheim did not try to elaborate higher vision as a "method" or to consider whether the truths it yielded led into the absolutism he was anxious to avoid. Nor did he face the problem this "perspective of perspectives" creates for the different forms of validity he had posited for the physical and cultural sciences. The significance he attached to religious knowledge and to ecstatic and visionary experience may be appreciated from the latter parts of Diagnosis of our Time and Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning, where he found in the moderateness of protestant Christianity in wartime Britain a realm of order and truth, a "basic vision of life", which was free of

the dogmatic and violent excesses of totalitarian absolutism (28). This order, it should be noted, already existed; it had a momentum of its own and the task Mannheim proposed was to refine the tradition, revitalize it, and lead it into the future. This is not exactly a task for a mystic or one undergoing ecstatic experience; rather, it is yet another of the tasks Mannheim set the intelligentsia. However, the emergent rational-religious order was to contain and provide for visionary and ecstatic experiences.

The transformation in Mannheim's thought which occurred after he arrived in England is often remarked upon. But, despite his wartime involvement with the Christian reconstructionists of the Moot, convened by J.H. Oldham, and its influence upon his thinking, it was not so much a transformation as a consolidation that occurred. The basic quest for order was present in Ideology and Utopia where Mannheim's analysis of modern European utopianism into (1) orgiastic Chilianism of the Anabaptists; (2) enlightenment liberal-humanism; (3) conservatism; and (4) socialism-communism provided him with just those cultural ingredients for the mix which emerged in his later books as the "third way" of holistic democratic planning (29).

Mannheim vacillated between stringent criticism of the ideological, interest-based and partial truth of all existing cultural theories, and a groping for some realm "beyond history" which would provide inspiration for a transcendent ideology. His vacillation enabled him to practise two forms of cultural analysis. The first of these was comprised of critiques of "ideological" history and social science, leading on to well-defined empirical inquiries of his own. Secondly, he engaged in prophetic, and apocalyptic, cultural overviews - studies in "crisis" and feverish projections of planned societies to rescue civilization from imminent

destruction. He always insisted that planning was a factor already at work in culture, and that he merely wished to refine it by making it more democratic and efficient. Whether this makes Mannheim a historicist, predicting the outcome of trends in present and future cultures and reducing these to the workings of an inexorable law of history, is a question that is best left until after we have considered his views on human nature and his diagnosis of culture crisis.

2. Man and Culture: Human Plasticity

Mannheim's culture crisis theory and his reconstructionist proposals may be viewed against his more general theory of the interactions between human nature and culture. Like Dewey, he tried to show that man is neither wholly determined by culture nor a being who could be defined outside a cultural context. But he went beyond Dewey by rejecting radical behaviorism and hypothesizing an inner, non-naturalistic essence. Thus, man is "plastic" but not to the degree imagined by enlightenment environmentalists, or contemporary fascists. However, Mannheim's primary objection to the fascists was not that they had a false view of human nature, although he believed they did, but that they sought to create, by force, a superficial, external harmony of interest (30). This is an ethical objection to procedures or possibly a planner's objection to inefficacy of means, but it does not settle the argument about whether, given appropriate means, human nature is indefinitely malleable. Instead of establishing his case by argument, Mannheim simply opted for the middle ground:

> "It is just as erroneous to believe that human nature remains eternally the same as it is to assume that it can be moulded at will and is infinitely plastic" (31).

Mannheim pointed to two sets of conditions which limit this plasticity.

The first of these consists of limitations in existing social and psychological technology. However, these presumably could, in principle, be reduced to the point where behavior and consciousness were subject to external controls through, e.g., drugs, electro-therapy, propaganda, reflex conditioning, etc. Much more has been done, since Mannheim wrote, to extend the range and effectiveness of manipulative devices. The second factor which limits behavioristic manipulation is the inner, spiritual "essence" of man, which is only capable of being understood by non-scientific and non-technical means, i.e., perspectivism, and visionary and religious experience. Thus, to know man, and how his behavior and experience can be influenced, requires both science and vision, and there can be no assurance that vision yields methods of influencing man's innermost being. Nevertheless, Mannheim felt that there was an urgent need to explore the whole subject of social control over individual action, and his own works were written partly with this in mind.

Mannheim made several inconclusive attempts to elucidate the scope of individual action within society. He criticized Marxism for treating the individual "merely as the tool of a collective leviathan" (32), and he accepted Weber's view that the unpredictable, charismatic leader can introduce genuinely novel ideas in a culture (33). But, as we have seen, he also argued that individual creativity, to be socially effective, must conform to the collective impulse of a group (34). He referred to consciousness as mind writ large, "of which the individual minds are merely vehicles" (35). Yet he argued that, although choices are socially structured, they are nevertheless individual and free (36).

At times, Mannheim visualized something very nearly approximating the conquest of those technological difficulties which stand in the way

of conditioning. Institutional manipulation in particular he singled out as a key instrument in "man-making", and, in common with several reconstructionists, he was prepared on occasion to subserve education to processes of indoctrination. The actual methods of "deliberately moulding behavior" - an odd expression in view of his belief in a spiritual "essence" - were provided primarily by the sciences of sociology and psychology. In view of his criticism, in Man and Society, of the superficiality of fascist behaviorism, it is odd to see him, in Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning, disdainfully dismissing as "obsolete" and "metaphysical" the question of whether human nature can be changed. The "true question" has become "can human behavior be changed?" and this is not a matter for guesswork and speculation, but for social science research, which can be expected to show how we may set about "constructing a social environment that will foster desirable personality traits and attitudes" (37).

By the time Mannheim wrote Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning he had lost much of his earlier caution. Instead of conceding that this kind of question is itself, in his terms "ideological", or, more precisely, "utopian" (38), he attempted to enlist social science in a highly specific and tendentious programme of social action to "remake human nature", not just behavior:

> "Once material conditions are manipulated from key positions, the deepest layers of the self will be influenced"(39).

It might be said in reply to this objection that Mannheim is at least consistent, for the social sciences,according to his theory, are not a comprehensive, eclectic community of discourse, but instead are themselves structured and articulated by certain models of human behavior. That is, they are unavoidably perspectivist, and their perspectives

are homogeneous. On this argument, Mannheim could claim to be making these perspectives clear, and drawing from them implications for action.

A review of other social science theories, including critiques of Mannheim's position (e.g., by Popper and Hayek) would show this to be a false claim (40). If the social sciences have a distinctive "perspective", it is in fact more comprehensive and eclectic than Mannheim allowed and does not logically entail the commitment of all social scientists to Mannheim's behavior manipulation. Yet, it is as well to appreciate that Mannheim did successfully identify some very powerful environmentalist and melioristic assumptions and movements of thought in the social sciences, and these provided him with many of the materials for the model of man-society relationships which he built up. This model may be briefly summarized: the self is not an unfoldment of coded potentialities; it is a product of the individual interacting with culture, and its integrity or unity is subject to continuous modification through experience of a changing world. Social relationships in primary groups are, after infancy, the most decisive influence on the self and they are the means by which the self may be most successfully modified. Various reference groups subsequently provide norms and behavior possibilities and structure role performance: not merely social classes but also vocational groups (trade unions, professions, intelligentsia) and, very important, generations (hence "youth culture") (41). In society, groups are often in conflict with one another - competition is a "co-determinant" of every cultural product as these groups seek to make their interpretation of the world the universal one. Education, as a social sub-culture seeking dominance, is no exception: indeed, its very subject matter is the "formation of man". Another example is the sub-culture of the economic system,

whose contribution to the formation of man is the criterion of success, or, more precisely, operationalizing the ambition to succeed. In further detail, "economic man" is adaptable, rational, ambitious, goal-seeking, self-confident, optimistic, and prudent. Against this model, may be set "renunciatory man", whose perception of reality will differ from that of economic man in correspondence with his different ambitions (42). Thus, the competition of cultural sub-groups with one another is not simply an inter-group phenomenon, but a powerful force in individual man-making: their interplay produces both a "social entelechy" and the materials on which individual personality feeds and develops (43). But the process is not a one-sided forming of plastic human nature, because human nature is not in fact entirely plastic. Also, individuals, mainly working in groups, react upon the "social entelechy", and test their developing perceptions of reality in concrete social situations which themselves change as a result of individual impact upon them. Furthermore, almost completely compartmentalized in the theory, the self exists beyond behavior as a spiritual entity, possessing, as we have seen, the capacity to penetrate a reality which transcends social experience.

Mannheim held that one "can admit the autonomous structure of the self and yet maintain that the conception of the individual as an isolated entity must lead to a distorted view" (44). However, his own theory seems fundamentally dualistic, not as between society and the individual, but as between levels of experience in individuals and levels of reality. Useful as this dualism was as a critical tool, enabling him to attack Marxists as collectivists, and sociological nominalists for overlooking collective situations, it was to prove a serious obstacle to his formation of coherent educational proposals (45).

In making these proposals,he vacillated between group behavior manipulation, and providing an inviolable preserve for contemplative and ecstatic experience. He tried to contain these extremes within the idea of a new democratic man, or men. Social reconstruction, which in Mannheim's view had become an urgent imperative, could only proceed on the basis of remaking man. He was both thrilled and disquieted by the possibilities of "psychological reconstruction" (46). But how to avoid the dangers of manipulation? Mannheim's answer is that we should strive to create individuals, insofar as that is a task for education and upbringing, using as guides the principles of regard for persons as ends, and independence of mind. For reasons which are discussed below, Mannheim found it difficult to keep firmly to the business of man-making along democratic lines. He was not able to make even a functional bridge between the realms or levels of experience. He did not wish to follow Plato, Pareto and other elite theorists who divide society into the two classes of the manipulators, enjoying spiritual insight, and the manipulated, functioning at the level of group-structured behavior. These two groups represented different levels of experience and, for Plato if not for Pareto, different levels of reality. Mannheim wished to combine them in a single reconstructed democratic personality, without abandoning the principles either of leadership or of social order conceived as collective and cohesive discipline and control.

3. Culture Crisis

By the time he came to make his diagnostic overview of the condition of British culture in the 1940s, Mannheim had largely dropped the mantle of dispassionate perspectivist inquiry. Detached, self-aware,

sceptical exploration of the historical roots of the thought of ideological reactionaries and utopian reformers was replaced by the near despairing plea of a convinced social reformer to his fellow-men to act before it was too late. In his own words, he was an "observer haunted by a sense of crisis" (47). This crisis was multi-dimensional, permeating culture at large, and, in accordance with the interactionist theory of man-society relationships, penetrating into the depths of personality. Mannheim not only diagnosed, he feared the consequences of this disintegration of personal meanings and values and of the wider culture. He feared the power of the mob, and the effects of the unsteadiness of norms of behavior, He sought a democratic "middle way" between the non-interventionism of classical liberalism and the totality of control pursued by modern totalitarian systems (48).

Mannheim's analysis of the crisis of the modern democracies was more than a generalized prognosis of impending chaos. Diagnosis of our Time and Freedom, Power, and Democratic Planning lacked the scholarly detail of his earlier methodological studies and of Man and Society. Nevertheless, in these later books Mannheim gave a schematized account of the factors which, in interaction with one another and in their impingement on consciousness, comprised the crisis.

The crisis factors combined in Mannheim's judgment to yield total change: "the technical and structural foundations of modern society have been completely transformed", and "both the social order and the psychology of human beings are changing through and through" (49). Mannheim's emphasis here is on social and psychological transformation, but taking his writing as a whole it is obvious that he conceived the inter-war years as one of the great shifts in history. Although he did not make this comparison, to appreciate his conception we might

liken it to the decay and rebirth of culture represented by such movements as the rise of Christianity, the decline of Roman imperialism, the waning of the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, the Reformation, or the Industrial Revolution. Yet the analogies are not wholly adequate, for the new factors of science and technology had changed saltatory movements into an accelerating dynamic which, for all the diversity of cultural enterprises, channelled the different, particular changes into a torrent rising up the narrow banks of a downhill gorge.

Mannheim did not locate the crisis of modern culture in a single factor, such as the disintegrative effect of Marx's substructure of productive materials and relations. His various accounts of crisis may be summarized in a list of those change factors whose interaction had produced it:

1. The failure of liberal-democracies to adapt institutions and socio-political processes so as to control the fissiparous tendencies of a semi-educated, industrialized, enfranchized mass.

2. The emergence of new techniques of persuasion, propaganda and direct control, making the irresponsible minority manipulation of masses and whole populations a practical possibility.

3. Political and technological changes making for the disruption of traditional authority relations and for an increase in personal power and in power agglomerations. These changes have resulted in the unco-ordinated exercise of power, and competition in society for central or key positions and territories.

4. Conflict between exponents of the rival organizational principles of competition and regulation.

5. The breakdown of traditional groups, especially small neighborhood groups, and the traditional recruitment patterns and leadership functions of elites.

6. The disintegration of traditional, relatively stable value systems and patterns of customs and mores, which have been replaced by striving for material success, acute status-consciousness, and individual competitiveness.

7. The increasing impact of the sciences and of technology, both of them sub-cultures which are characterized by constant innovativeness.

8. Accelerating change in thought structures in all fields - the emergence of new thought categories, conceptual structures, strategies of problem-solving, etc.

9. The "power of the irrational" expressed in the economic depression of the thirties and the rise of fascist and totalitarian states.

10. "Imbalance" and "disproportion", represented by (i) differential rates of change in different spheres of culture (e.g., "lag" between morals and science) and (ii) one-sided human development combining the expression of primitive impulse with high technical skills.

11. Psychic chaos and a deep spiritual predicament, resulting from the loss of traditionally accepted ordering principles in morals, religion and social behavior. (50)

The reduction of Mannheim's concrete and separate accounts of the cultural malaise of his age to a bald summary runs the risk of obscuring the argumentative force with which he pressed home his diagnosis. Yet there was in his own writing, especially in Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning, a distinct move towards this schematic approach. But, despite Mannheim's skill in defining critical change factors, we should notice that his schematization is basically descriptive, not explanatory, in character. Mannheim diagnosed a crisis - though by no means all sociologists at the time agreed that there was a crisis of the kind he described - but he did not in fact explain how the crisis had come about (51). It was "there", it expressed itself in many different spheres, and these seemed to be connected with one another, or at least a perspectivist appraisal could connect them. Yet just how they were connected - that is, whether causally or reciprocally - was never made clear. Nor did Mannheim give consideration, as he might have done, following his advice to social investigators in Ideology and Utopia, to other perspectives than his own. Had he done so, he

might have found that these yielded a quite different awareness, thus presenting the objective culture interpreter with the further task of examining the claims made by the rival diagnoses and the evidence offered in their support.

However, despite the great range and diversity of the crisis factors that Mannheim identified, he was most severely troubled by what he called the "moral crisis":

> "What we call 'the moral crisis' or the crisis in evaluations does not simply arise from wickedness in modern men but to a considerable extent is due to the failure of Great Society to re-establish on a larger scale the methods of value adjustment, value assimilation, value reconciliation and value standardization which were always active in small communities, and which, owing to the limited size of those communities, could do their work spontaneously" (52).

This now familiar assessment of the moral plight of mass society was, as we shall see in the next chapter, to make a particularly strong impression on the thinking of several post-war experimentalists. They took Mannheim's cue and worked out a procedure for establishing a democratic consensus by the method of "practical judgment".

Mannheim's description of a culture crisis is open to the objection he made in Ideology and Utopia to the theories of social conservatives, that they were over-generalized from specific situations and converted into absolutes. Applying this to Mannheim's diagnosis, I suggest that he converted a particular set of culture attributes into a culture whole, thus characterizing the total situation (contemporary culture) in terms of one set of its elements, and thereby distorting it. Taking his own device of "ideological unmasking", one of the useful if dangerous critical techniques of the sociology of knowledge, we might ask what interest Mannheim served in his reification of specific events and particular trends into determinate cultural forces? The answer to

this question - insofar as an answer can be given, since "interests" are ambiguous, private psychic elements as well as publicly ascertainable dispositions to act - lies in Mannheim's prescriptions for a planned society. Detecting in the world about him an increasing momentum of change, about which most commentators would agree, Mannheim elaborated change into crisis and thought to justify the very drastic measures whereby a cultural steady state was to be achieved through planning. In Sorel's terms, "crisis" is converted into a myth and provides the justification for building a new moral order. This fundamental justification is similar to Plato's, another participant-observer haunted by a sense of crisis, who, to achieve harmony and stability, proposed an even more rigorous structure of cultural organization and control. Both Mannheim and Plato invested this control in a sacerdotal class of culture interpreters and leaders - the intellectual elite. While this "unmasking" of Mannheim and Plato helps to reveal the strategy of their thinking, in particular the relationship of supposed factual accounts to reform proposals, it does not invalidate their diagnoses. If we were to accept Mannheim's perspectivism, the diagnoses could only be validated by building them into still more comprehensive inquiries. Mannheim avoided this scholar's nightmare and moved on from diagnosing crisis to planning the new society.

4. Planning the New Society

4.1 Democratic planning and cultural continuity

In characteristic reconstructionist fashion, Mannheim so defined the options for action that he was very quickly able to move on from the difficulties of justification to the more congenial territory of proposals for reform. The choice lay first between planning and chaos,

or between order and confusion. The next choice lay between totalitarian and democratic planning. Since one is no more likely to opt for totalitarian planning than, in the first instance, for chaos, we are left, as a result of Mannheim's argument, with the objectives and strategies of democratic planning, and to these Mannheim devoted the larger part of his energies and later writings. He was typically ambitious in stating the requirements of adequate planning:

> "the predictive strategy which strives to bring under its control the as yet unco-ordinated principia media of the social process";
>
> "a conscious attack on the sources of maladjustment in the social order on the basis of a thorough knowledge of the whole mechanism of society and the way in which it works. It is not the treatment of symptoms but an attack on the strategic points, fully realizing the results" (53).

To outline the total structure and major directions of a planning policy for democracy expresses the kind of theoretical ambition which largely passed away with the decline of nineteenth-century German metaphysics and social theory. The crisis Mannheim delineated appeared to him so grave that nothing less than the revival of this ambition would suffice, and his holism provided him with what he took to be a theoretical justification for making the attempt. He admitted the partiality of his own work and looked forward to a future age when social scientists could confidently embark on such heroic projects, fortified with extensive knowledge of human social behavior. This may have been false optimism, but it represents a progression over other reconstructionists who postulated crisis, notably Wells and Rugg. They were rather less conscious than was Mannheim of the problems raised by this kind of undertaking.

Mannheim's planning policy for a whole society incorporated not only a diagnosis of crisis and a set of procedural principles, but also regard

for cultural unity and continuity. In expressing concern for a renewal of worthy elements in existing culture, he gave voice to a nostalgia for the past which is to be observed in the writings of many of the reconstructionists:

> "The charm of the original pattern can often be preserved by giving a new meaning to former institutions and absorbing them in the new way of life. This is especially true of those traditions which are still of value to society after it has reached a new stage" (54).

It was this feature of his thought that greatly attracted Fred Clarke, former Director of the London Institute of Education, where Mannheim briefly occupied the chair of sociology of education. The Anglo-Saxon societies might sometime in the future need a traditional heritage, much less easily rebuilt than destroyed. Similarly, in discussing educational procedures for elite recruitment, Mannheim cautioned against "wholesale change". We should strengthen or improve valuable tendencies; for example, in schools, the tacit awareness of a common background and upbringing; and we should seek to readjust this awareness to new conditions (55).

These remarks may be compared with Dewey's definition of growth as the continuous reconstruction of experience and with Cassirer's plea for the continual recreation of the great works of culture (56). Change in all three theories is perceived not as a succession of discontinuities, but a constant reviewing, testing out, and reliving of ideas, beliefs, customs, etc., to decide upon their current worthiness. This is difficult to envisage as a universal process in view of the acute self-consciousness it implies, but neither Mannheim nor Dewey, and nor perhaps Cassirer, proposed a total self-consciousness. Dewey, for instance, emphasized the stabilizing role of uncriticized habits

in individuals, while Mannheim intended to plan for the retention of many institutions and customs. It should be noticed that he believed that only through planning could the heritage be preserved. In this planning process, the scholarly analysis of cultural products itself plays a vital role in stabilizing them.

Mannheim's selective approach to the heritage does,however, pose a problem for his diagnosis of culture crisis: a valuable heritage is just one of those orderly and ordering elements in contemporary culture which his diagnosis of total crisis ignored. Either the crisis is not total, or the heritage is not valuable. It seems that, having made the necessary strategic use of crisis, Mannheim was prepared at this stage of planning to make a tacit retraction in respect of several aspects of the heritage.

We have seen that Mannheim regarded social and individual formation as correlative, but that he had a bias towards cultural determinism which combined uneasily with a belief in an essence of personal spiritual experience. In his discussions of planning he called for a new level of consciousness and for the development of policies which could, in turn, "remake man". These proposals raise a number of issues which reconstructionist theorists have successively and, on the whole, unsuccessfully grappled with: theye include establishing an initial impetus for change, the relationship of elites and masses, and the intractibility of "unenlightened" human nature.

4.2 Elites as culture change agents

For a programme which involves the remaking of man, both man-makers and models of the remaking process are needed. How do we break the circularity which results from the argument that men as at present constituted, and their models for human development, are inadequate? The answer Mannheim

gave is the Platonic one, a small elite of intellectuals, invested with special properties of clarity of insight, vision, empirical knowledge, political acumen, and altruism is to be given or perhaps to claim responsibility for major cultural decisions. This carefully selected and trained elite contains within it the seeds of a new morality, although these seeds cannot adequately develop in advance of the new social order which is to nourish them. The elite is a vanguard, therefore, of progress, but it will not itself reach maturity, or fully achieve the "new consciousness", until the new society is under way. Mannheim maintained that "man making" need not and should not be seen as merely an assertion of dominance by the elites over the masses. The elites themselves still have much to learn, and, in any case, Mannheim's "third way" of planning was intended to be directed by various democratic considerations (e.g., shared responsibility). However, his ideas on elite-mass relations proved to be a strange mixture of fear of mobs, communalism, functional leadership and meritocracy. A brief review of his elite theory will help to demonstrate the balance he hoped to establish between a mass democracy of participation and shared responsibility, and the particular excellences of a traditional minority culture. From this we shall see that, for Mannheim, the remaking of man was by no means simply a technical matter of working from a blueprint of the "new man" devised by experts and insinuated into or imposed upon the social system (57).

The principle of minority leadership and decision-taking in different spheres of social action is, according to Mannheim, functionally necessary for both traditional and modern societies. He had no intention of eliminating elites, from deference to some higher order

principles of shared responsibility, equality and so forth, but he wished to redefinite their role, including its relation to popular consent, and to reform procedures for elite recruitment and education. This redefinition was necessary since the "crisis" of the liberal democracies had upset the traditional patterns of elite recruitment and authority, increased their numbers, broken down their exclusiveness, and produced the dangerous extremes of a growing social distance between elites and masses, together with appeals to the leader to act as savior. If they were to perform the vitally important tasks of inspiring and recreating the life of culture, and governing and organizing the social system, elites would need to undergo drastic changes (58).

The depth of crisis and the failure of traditional institutions to cope might suggest the need for a drastic revision of the whole elite operation in society. In fact, Mannheim proceeded far more cautiously than this. He was fascinated by the working of elites in Britain, and his proposals for reconstructing their role, recruitment and education in many ways anticipated the meritocracy of the post-war period:

> "The right course for the democratic forces of the West is not blindly to attack the old ruling groups, but to remodel them into a transitional group [more accurately groups, since in Man and Society he divided elites into six main types: political and administrative; intellectual, moral, artistic and religious] angled towards a new type of leadership. This can best be effected by enlarging their ranks by providing opportunities of ascent for all sections of the population with no lower but rather higher standards of selection.
>
> "Once admitted, newcomers will absorb valuable elements of upper-class traditions and skills" (59).

This would amount to an extension of the Fabian educational ladder into the very centres of cultural power. Proposals both old and recent

to open the Public Schools to bright scholarship holders exemplify the idea of an ascending ladder. Absorption, by the ascenders, of the sub-culture of those about them has been one of the most widely discussed topics in the post-war literature on education and culture. Efforts to improve management selection techniques are another post-war example of Mannheim's meritocratic plea for efficiency in elite recruitment. He urged politicians, administrators and educators to identify the functional tasks of leadership, devise appropriate training schemes, and select those with the best prognosis for success (60).

Mannheim sounded three warnings on elite recruitment and training. The first we may describe as a hearkening to the virtues of the traditional minority culture: do not so far operationalize the meritocratic achievement principle as to eliminate the traditional modes of recruitment - i.e., blood and property rights. These may not be functionally rational but they do preserve a vital element of continuity and background. The second was a sociologist's warning - a partial retraction of his enthusiasm for the technical possibilities of perfect selection. Prophetically, he warned against lending "a pseudo-psychological cloak to discrimination actually rooted in class distinctions rather than based on the alleged basic abilities and preferences of the pupils". His third warning was another reminder of past achievements: the possible dilution of standards. Like Eliot, he argued that it is "more important to preserve the highest forms of cultural achievement than to engage in sudden expansion" (61). Rapid expansion would prevent the elites from performing their vital role of forming tastes and maturing ideas before mediating these to the masses.

Mannheim's elite theory represents a bold attempt to combine principles of leadership and shared responsibility, but it raises certain problems which Mannheim himself never satisfactorily solved. The exercise of leadership, as he saw, could not be restricted to meritocratic elites modelled to a large extent on those of an earlier period. In a totally planned society, democracy can only be preserved by diffusing leadership and power widely in the periphery of society. To concentrate them in a few powerful centres would be to veer towards the extreme of totalitarian control. Leadership, furthermore, is a functional necessity at all levels and in all kinds of institutions. In a rapidly changing urban society a different type of leadership from the more or less subtle authoritarianism and patronage of the past is called for. But how this diffused leadership was to be functionally inter-related with central elite control Mannheim did not explain. Another difficulty, which Mannheim himself recognized, is that meritocracies may fail to achieve the vitality they seek through assimilation of selected able children and adults into the higher reaches of power. Assimilation could be a means of vitiating or destroying the very qualities which the new recruits are expected to contribute and which they might display in situations of authority other than membership of centralized elites.

In Essays in the Sociology of Culture, Mannheim stressed the creative, innovative, inspirational role of elites and tried to find a way around the problem elite theory itself creates, of social distance between elites and masses. The elimination and reduction of this distance was important for him for reasons other than efficient communication and administration, although these considerations were not unimportant. Upon elimination of elite-mass distance depended

the development of existential or psychic distance within all individuals. Only when the individual is seen as a person by others, and not treated merely as a member of a class or a mass, can he begin to perceive himself as a person, and come to appreciate his existence outside the role-defined situations of social life. This realm of existence, "beyond history", is that which sustains ecstatic, contemplative, private experiences - the very experiences which an efficiency-dominated democracy can easily overlook. For Mannheim, as we saw in section 1.6 above, this realm of existence is of ultimate value (62).

However, Mannheim's elite theory prescribes no ways of overcoming the tendency of modern society to create new forms of distance. He assumed that, because there was a trend towards democracy in contemporary culture, this would of itself virtually negate social distance. But his analysis, in Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning, of the likely consequences of meritocratic elite recruitment and training, showed that this trend could in fact be deflected. Indeed, his own proposals for revitalized elites would very likely contribute to this distantiation, especially as he envisaged a separate education for their aspiring members.

The conclusion Mannheim reached on elites was ambiguous. Elite formation, he rightly argued, is an inescapable and functionally necessary factor of modern societes. Elites should be redefined to incorporate the achievement principle, on grounds of fairness and efficiency. In order to maintain continuity, ways need to be found of preserving connections with traditional elite values and processes. Mannheim's arguments on these points are perceptive and sound. However, despite his far-ranging inquiry, he did not succeed in so defining

processes of elite recruitment, training and performance as to avoid serious problems of cultural discontinuity, loss of vitality, the creation of distance between leaders and led, and possible lack of agreement amongst the leaders themselves. Popper's criticism, that Mannheim's perspectivism does not answer the question as to which tendencies in an age we should identify with, is particularly apt at this point. Mannheim, in this respect like the Webbs, detected the two tendencies, or "trends" of managerialism through revitalized elites, and the democratic diffusion of leadership and widespread sharing of experience, and tried to combine them in a single theory. They are by no means easy to reconcile, and the result of Mannheim's attempt at synthesis is that an incompletely analysed theory of meritocracy is given precedence over questions of mass participation, shared decision-taking, and the validity of mass culture.

In Diagnosis of Our Time Mannheim assigned to the religious-moral elite the delicate task of establishing in the new society a quasi-religious world view, a core of consistent values and norms of conduct: the new spiritual order. Traditional Christianity could no longer successfully provide this, so a new secular clerisy was required to define this new public ethic. In every planned society, he foresaw, there will be "a body somehow similar to the priests, whose task it will be to watch that certain basic standards are established and maintained" (63). Such bodies have emerged, for example, to sustain the thought-restricting activities of totalitarian leaderships. There is a long history of clerisy proposals in British cultural theory, as Williams has shown (64). Mannheim agonized over the problem of individual conscience, freedom of inquiry, and consensus, but he did not seem to appreciate that thoroughgoing clerisy proposals beg the question of the

cultural validity of the values and the way of life of the ordinary man. Industrialization and the various other crisis factors, according to Mannheim, have destroyed the hypothesized older social and psychic unity; some "vision of aims" is required to restabilize culture sufficiently to enable freedom itself to operate. At times in his thought, consensus appeared as an achievement of reconciliation between different viewpoints. At other times, it was clearly a form of best interest or good for the community which an inspired minority would divine, formulate, and promulgate through educational and propagandist means (65).

Mannheim could only assert that the third way of democratic planning, with its inbuilt safeguards symbolized by Liberal-Christian virtues of mutual help, social justice, individual liberty, etc., would establish a balance between laissez-faire and totalitarian tendencies, between the aspirations of the masses and the insights of the few. He was unable to show that this very difficult balance could be reasonably expected to emerge, nor how the authoritarian possibilities inherent in his elitism and total planning could be forestalled. Instead, by proposing an elaborate structural apparatus of planning, with a key innovative and control role for elites, and a limited system of institutionalized checks to the highly centralized exercise of power, he left far too much to the chance that those actually exercising cultural and social power would do so in the liberal, tolerant spirit he envisaged (66).

The demands Mannheim made of the elites are not easy to reconcile with his assessment of the psychic depths of culture crisis. Personality and stability of character, he argued, are required in an uncertain environment and in unpredictable situations; so also are suppleness, adaptability, decisiveness and far-sightedness, as well as technical skill

and group-cohesiveness. Mannheim himself argued these were new requirements, not needed in a "static society". But how were they to emerge? If they were not needed in the society of the past, they would presumably form little or no part of the heritage which was to be preserved. His own theory of the cultural formation of personality made it unreasonable to expect that the very qualities needed to direct and stabilize a chaotic world could be produced by it in a manner suited to the proper education of the emerging elites. Since he had no way of accounting for the emergence of these traits in the right people at the right time, it would have been more reasonable for Mannheim to place less reliance upon them, and to divest the elites of some of that power whose defensible exercise depended on these and a variety of equally unpredictable virtues.

Despite his argument that his form of planning expressed democratic values, it was not so much the criteria of consideration for others, justice, freedom, and the sharing of experience that provided key concepts for Mannheim's planning strategy, as elite formation, the role of elites in preparing a new ideology, and their tasks in implementing and administering it (67). Central to the ideology is the remaking of human consciousness, whereby the elites themselves attain maturity of outlook through self-knowledge and devise the frameworks for total community growth. Mannheim's descriptions of the "new man" typically and obscurely combined the extremes of the striving, economically ambitious ihdividual and the mystic undergoing ecstatic experiences in communion with a transcendent reality. An analogue to the obscurity of these relations within personality is to be found in the social and authority relations among the elites. Mannheim divided them into two sets, those responsible for political

and organizing functions - the Marthas as it were - and the introspective, reflective, contemplative Marys (artistic, moral and religious elites). It is of course no simple problem, as Plato appreciated, to show how these two functions of leadership may be combined in an organic society.

Around this central cluster of ideas on leadership functions, Mannheim built an analysis of the needed forms of planning in future democratic societies. These forms were intended to operationalize the democratic ideology, the "third way" between totalitarian central control and laissez-faire indifference. Zones of freedom or spheres of individual initiative and various other checks to the indiscriminate exercise of power were proposed as a safeguard against arbitrary action. Planning was to be not merely functionally rational, producing a coherent but senseless system; it was also to incorporate substantive rationality - i.e., individual rational judgment was to be stimulated and not suppressed in the impersonal procedures of building and maintaining social systems. Consensus was to be sought and the creative, emerging power of youth was to be incorporated into decision-making (68).

Mannheim's emphasis on planning for freedom and rationality might be thought to counterbalance the possibility of dominance by dictatorially-inclined elites. But Mannheim undermined his own position by demonstrating some of the critical problems arising out of the exercise of power by elites. While firmly advocating the cultivation of "living forces" through planning, he could give no assurance that the centrally important role of elites would be performed with due respect for human diversity and freedom. Despite the impressiveness of his ideological structure taken as a whole, his several critics are justified in pointing out the

serious dangers of totalitarianism inherent in his position. These he might have avoided by making a more cautious appraisal of the wider problems of liberal-democratic society in the thirties and forties - an admittedly difficult task, given his experience of and sensitivity to laissez-faire collapse and the rise of totalitarianism. A drastic appraisal, however, led him to make drastic proposals for cultural reordering. Had the "facts" of the cultural situation been differently selected, the prescription for change might also have taken a more cautious form. Total planning requires the assurance of adequacy of procedure and resources and general acceptability of policy objectives. Mannheim's account, for all its imaginative power and intellectual vigor, gave insufficient reasons for supposing either adequacy or acceptability.

5. Historicism

The question of Mannheim's alleged historicism was postponed, earlier in the chapter, until his culture diagnosis and scheme of reconstruction had been considered. The reason for this postponement is that Mannheim's own practice as a culture interpreter throws light on his methodological discussions.

Even after the review of his culture interpretations, however, no definite answer can be given to the question of Mannheim's historicism. There are two reasons for this. First, it is by no means as simple to make a clearcut analysis of historicist elements in theories of social change as Popper imagines. Second, there is sufficient ambiguity and vacillation in Mannheim's methodology and his reconstructionist proposals to leave the question open. Despite these difficulties, I shall consider how far he was committed to any definite meaning we can give to

the idea of "historicism".

Popper's definition presents historicism as an approach to the social sciences which assumes historical prediction to be their principal aim and that that aim is to be realized by detecting "laws" or "trends" which underlie the evolution of history (69). This is a stipulative definition which at first glance narrows down the wide meanings of historicism in Mannheim's own methodological writings.

In these latter, historicism appears variously as:

1. The epitome of the contemporary socio-historical outlook (and therefore hardly a single thesis).

2. An idea which is crystallized in the concept of evaluation, thus providing an organic law of change that organizes separate motifs, forms, ideas, etc.

3. A form of understanding directed at the innermost structure and inner meaning of all-pervading change.

4. An orientation towards the world by which one gets "in tune with what actually is working itself out in the turmoil of history" (70).

These propositions fit Popper's definition. Furthermore, Mannheim's position is consistent with the following "anti-naturalistic" doctrines of historicism, as Popper has outlined them: that there can be a methodological separation of the social from the physical sciences; that social life is complex; that social prediction is inexact; that objectivity and evaluation are complicated by observer-observed relations (he tried,unsuccessfully, to avoid Popper's corollary, that this leads to relativism); that,because the group is more than the sum of its parts, methodological holism is warranted; and that there is a role for intuitive understanding. Mannheim accepted all of these, but, since many other social scientists who are not, according to Popper's definition, historicists also accept them, these doctrines do not of themselves commit Mannheim to a historicist position. In

addition, Mannheim accepted the following doctrines of historicism, which Popper has called "pro-naturalistic": that long-term prediction is possible (but he does not follow "the model of Newtonian astronomy"); and that social movement is determined by social (historical) forces (but he does not accept the implication of "wholly determined").

A major difficulty of the two lists of doctrines, "pro" and "anti"-naturalistic, that Popper ascribes to historicists is that many items in the one set cancel out those in the other. In particular, most of the anti-naturalistic doctrines specifically reject the notion of exact and precise historical prediction. Such "laws" as they posit are indeed different from natural science laws and provide no grounds of assurance for predictions. The single term "historicism" is confusingly and misleadingly applied to such a very diverse and conflicting range of positions.

Mannheim does not himself escape this difficulty, since he used the term historicism to cover a variety of outlooks, from a belief in the workings of evolutionary laws in history to a method of inquiry which seeks to understand and interpret cultural phenomena historically and developmentally. Several of Popper's criticisms of Mannheim's theory are sustained by the latter's ambiguity and his looseness of expression. Also, Popper effectively attacked Mannheim's holism as a methodology which cannot be verified by scientific means, and his utopian planning for its moral confusion. But Popper did not succeed in his more fundamental objective, which was to rebut Mannheim's (amongst others') theory as historicist.

The reason for this failure is that Mannheim was not in fact committed to the belief that the social sciences aim at historical prediction

by detecting laws. Despite his acceptance, in a very early essay, of the tenets of the historicist theory of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and his strategic use of the ancient rhetorical argument that his reform proposals were "on the side of history", he was fundamentally an interventionist. Popper appears to have accounted for this by arguing that the historicist admits activity in the form of cultural midwifery. But to reduce Mannheim's methodological procedures of culture interpretation through "perspectivism" to the prediction of laws and trends is to overlook Mannheim's own arguments concerning "relationism": that many standpoints provide valid insights into cultural phenomena, and that the observer must try to appreciate his own assumptions and to relate different interpretations to one another. These intellectual activities, furthermore, have the very important function of consolidating, stabilizing and recreating the very phenomena to whose understanding they are directed. This is very different from adducing law-like movements, even if Mannheim himself at times seemed to think he was doing this - as, for example, in Essays on the Sociology of Culture, where he described the trend towards democratization as "inevitable". Again, in Man and Society, he proposed a "predictive strategy" to identify the principia media and bring them under control. These principia media, however, on Mannheim's own perspectivist theory, are not simply forces emerging in history, but a form of interpretation and hence a form of possible control.

So much for the method of analysis. As we have seen, Mannheim's later work was not primarily analytic in this sense, nor predictive, but prescriptive. Although he predicted a culture crisis, this was partly a strategic device, and an unfortunate one, in certain respects, for justifying the elaborate apparatus of a planned society. To treat

this apparatus of planning as cultural midwifery is to invest the midwife with an even greater generative power than did Socrates, in his artful account in The Meno of how he attended to the birth of the slave boy's ideas.

Thus, Popper's decisive argument against historical prediction, that it takes no account of the unpredictable impact of human knowledge on future events, does not apply to Mannheim. He himself hoped to contribute and to stimulate knowledge and understanding which would help to transform the trends he detected into a more satisfactory social system. His knowledge was, he admitted, partial, and he believed that cultural studies and social sciences were still in their infancy. True to his role of reconstructionist, he believed that the creation of ideological programmes through the fusing of empirically grounded knowledge, values, and various principles of organization of ideas was one way in which the politically powerless intellectual could justifiably seek to intervene in events. He tried to relate the structures he devised to trends in cultural and social affairs, but this was a form of historical interpretation, which Popper himself was prepared to concede has value, however much he disagreed with the conclusions Mannheim reached.

CHAPTER VIII

LATER EXPERIMENTALISTS

Reconstructionist thinking in education, in the post-war period, has expanded and diversified in ways hardly imagined in the earlier period of the movement. Two or three examples will suffice to demonstrate the variety of issues which a thoroughgoing analysis of the contemporary development of reconstructionism would need to examine: the enrolment of educational institutions in the design of "counter-cultures"; arguments about the politicizing of educational theory; and the use of education as a major instrument of development policy in new societies. Careful studies of the educational significance of these wider trends is badly needed, especially as there is a growing tendency to treat educational processes as instrumental to more exalted political ends (1).

However, a much less ambitious exercise than that is more appropriate here as a single chapter which terminates the first part of my inquiry into the development of reconstructionist thinking in the twentieth century. Since it will be an exercise that seeks to identify some of the points of continuity and contrast with what has gone before, I shall limit my discussion to a small group of writers who consciously related their thinking to the experimentalist movement and who explored particular points that they felt their predecessors had failed to develop adequately. These writers are Brameld, Frank and the "social consensus" school of Benne, Raup, Axtelle, Smith and Stanley. The themes I shall discuss are: culture crisis; order; integration and world core culture; consensus; and scientific rationalism. They evoke ideas that are familiar in the context of earlier contributions to

reconstructionism, but the treatment of them in post-war society brings out new emphases and a different sense of the characteristic reconstructionist feeling of impending crisis.

1. Diagnosis of Culture Change and Crisis

1.1 Brameld

More than any other of the post-war reconstructionists, Brameld has maintained the tradition of generalized culture diagnosis developed by Rugg and Wells. In one of his later works, Education for the Emerging Age, Brameld claimed that on two counts his theses concerning culture upheaval were not simply a recapitulation of the doctrines of the thirties. First, he said, domestic (American) and world situations have dramatically changed, making the parochial reconstructionism of the thirties inadequate as a framework for the discussion of the contribution of education to the new tasks of international development. Second, understanding of educational processes, their cultural potentialities and their limitations, has been greatly enhanced by the growth of the behavioral sciences (2). Of course, neither of these points in itself establishes Brameld's claim to have gone beyond his predecessors. The fact of rapidly changing cultures throughout the world requires of reconstructionist theorizing a different strategy and content of culture diagnosis, but it is doubtful whether Brameld has provided this. His second point, too, sets a requirement for reconstructionist theory, which is highly relevant, but has yet to be satisfied. The growth of the social sciences, yielding new techniques of inquiry and models of analysis, makes it possible to develop new educational perspectives, for example, on the educational control of prejudice, and on the role of education as a culture change agency, in relation to other social systems.

But this enhanced understanding is only a possibility in the situation. Whether Brameld has significantly developed reconstructionist theorizing beyond what his predecessors achieved is a question that can be answered only by considering the strategy and the content of his diagnosis.

1.1.1 Strategy of inquiry

The strategy that Brameld has used is in some respects similar to, and in others significantly different from, that of his predecessors. The similarities are more apparent in Brameld's own essays in substantive culture diagnosis, which are, however, to some extent informed by the concepts of contemporary culture science, whereas the differences are more obvious in his most incisive and thorough theoretical contribution to culture analysis, Cultural Foundations of Education (3).

Taking this latter book first, the feature that stands out most obviously is Brameld's skill in analysihg and interpreting a very large amount of the literature of culture theory, primarily anthropological and, to a lesser extent, philosophical and sociological. Cultural Foundations of Education was intended, through a review of literature, to provide a foundation for educational study and practice and not as a study in its own right in philosophical anthropology. However, in his critical analysis and in his systematic exploration of a methodological structure for culture study, comprising three categories of order, process, and goals, Brameld made a more significant contribution to culture theory than any of the reconstructionists, apart from Dewey and Mannheim. We shall return to this book in Part II, where I discuss some of the educational issues that Brameld raises.

Despite his familiarity with the modern literature of theoretical

anthropology and his own achievement in developing a synthetic framework for inquiry, Brameld made relatively little use of this framework in his own substantive studies of contemporary culture in America. In practice, the strategy he used was the familiar one of the intuition of culture wholes - a process which Brameld describes in the language of Mannheim as providing a "culture perspective".

The identifying of culture wholes is an element in the methodology Brameld outlined in Cultural Foundations of Education, but it is only one element, and on Brameld's own account the culture wholes approach is in need of considerable refinement. The need is evident from his own subjective and impressionistic identification of crisis and trends in contemporary culture. Brameld's intuition of culture wholes is directed towards trends and crises in world-wide contemporary culture, not merely American culture, as in the writings during the thirties of most of the experimentalists. Furthermore, it embraced the culture of the underdeveloped and the developing world - e.g., Puerto Rico and Japan. The perspective has to be broadened, according to Brameld, to take in the leading ideas popularized by development theorists, particularly the gross idea of planetary transformation through industrialization and urbanization. In addition, the perspective has been qualitatively changed by the emergence of new factors, or the consciousness of new factors, rocketry and space exploration, population explosion, etc. (4).

The intuition of culture wholes is strengthened, Brameld claimed, by an awareness which was denied to his predecessors; that provided by social sciences developed in recent years and unavailable to earlier writers. Yet it is difficult to see just how this knowledge has in fact transformed the typical reconstructionist strategy of inquiry.

Brameld attempts to organize a large mass of data through massive generalizations in which empirical and prescriptive elements are entwined. Again, like Mannheim, Brameld cast his analysis of culture within the mould of crisis and thereby made the strategic leap right across problems of justification and into the domain of policy programming.

1.1.2 Crisis of contemporary culture

Characteristically, in Patterns of Educational Philosophy, Brameld introduced his discussion of the culture of contemporary America by immediately invoking crisis:

> "We propose to characterize the man-made environment of the present period of history as a crisis culture. By this is meant that our institutions, habits, symbols, beliefs, faiths are almost all infected by chronic instability, confusion, bifurcations, and uncertainty ... our culture may be diagnosed as, in grave respects, a schizophrenic culture, that is, a culture split by its own internal conflict" (5).

But to live in daily awareness of this acute crisis would be unbearable; people commonly adopt the defence mechanism of overlooking or deliberately ignoring many symptoms of "abnormality" in culture. Thus, Brameld presents a picture of a culture in crisis and a population bent upon concealing from itself knowledge of this crisis. If America, as the leading world power, is to exercise responsible leadership, its citizens must replace concealment by disclosure. They must recognize the crisis of their times and it is in this task of recognition that Brameld offers to guide them, even though, according to his own definition of crisis, awareness would impose heavy burdens on already overstrained personalities.

In different books, different accounts of this crisis are given. In Patterns of Educational Philosophy, the crisis consists of a set of

unco-ordinated oppositions or possible clashes within contemporary society and thought: self interest versus social interest, planlessness versus planning, nationalism versus internationalism, absolutism versus experimentalism, man against himself versus man for himself. To these Brameld added a series of massive transformations or revolutions: the revolution in technology, in economics, in politics (the clash of, e.g., communism, democratic socialism and fascism), in abundance of goods, and in human power (6).

In his later work, the new edition of Education for the Emerging Age, Brameld asserted that fundamental change was a "basic fact", and he proceeded from this fact to "the great imperative confronting American schools; to transform them into powerful institutions of cultural change toward the goal of a planet-wide democratic order". Why this imperative? Because - an argument Mannheim exploited - if left alone (i.e., "unreconstructed"), culture will "collapse of its own frustrations and conflicts" (7).

Brameld identified the crisis of culture during the 1950s as a series of large scale transformations and imbalances which ultimately impinge on individual consciousness: the impact on international relations and industry of nuclear energy and weapons, the succession of international tensions and growth of violence, rocketry and space exploration and population explosion. These are a sample of the world-wide transforming forces of which whole populations should become more aware as a first step towards imposing control and order upon them. Within the United States, Brameld implicitly linked the transforming factors with an unanalysed thesis of decline. Not merely was the United States changing, it was changing for the worse, or at any rate failing to achieve what it should be achieving. These domestic change factors included

deterioration of political relations with the world at large, uncertainty over minority rights, lack of union radicalism, acceptance of middle-class values of the meaner sort, and complacency in an era of prosperity. Many commentators might agree both with the description and the assessment of these factors without, however, sharing Brameld's confidence that through the agency of a reformed system of public education they could be significantly altered in direction or intensity (8).

In view of his strictures on American domestic trends of the 1950s, Brameld not surprisingly has come to support many of the more radical tendencies of the 1960s: the end of complacency over the values of a materialistic civilization; attacks on American foreign policy, especially in Asia; demands for greater member participation in institutional life; civil rights and so forth (9). This support underlines the essentially prescriptive character of his cultural diagnoses: they always appear, whatever their specific content, not as objective descriptions of cultural phenomena, but as persuasive elements in an integrated, comprehensive programme of action, that is, as ideologies. Thus, when Brameld refers to the contribution of the social sciences to cultural awareness, he does not seem to have in mind a dispassionate, inter-subjective community of understanding; he means instead that the social sciences have yielded methods and materials which might be used as weapons of reform. This may be the reason for his failure in his own cultural studies to make much concrete use of the eclectic framework of cultural inquiry which he discussed in Cultural Foundations of Education. Had he worked within that framework, he would have been considerably constrained in his enthusiasm for specific programmes of change. In

view of the poverty of methodological analysis of the crisis concept, which he himself noted, Brameld may have been led to the awkward conclusion that nothing so simple as a highly generalized condition of crisis and breakdown emerges from a dispassionate, comprehensive inquiry into contemporary culture.

Despite his contribution to defining a cultural content for educational study and practice, Brameld's diagnoses do not appear to have progressed significantly beyond those of Rugg, nor gone so far as those of Dewey, in synthetic interpretation, or the Webbs, in detailed empiricism. An illustration of the more prophetic and intuitional character of his holism is provided by Brameld's identification of "probable events" in education that will accompany the impending revolution in the behavioral sciences. These events are:

1. strengthened federal authority in the conduct of public education;
2. better paid and better prepared teachers;
3. a more strongly organised profession;
4. reorganized curriculum.

In Cultural Foundations of Education Brameld had more prudently substituted "desirable" for "probable", in his discussion of the implication of cultural theory for education. The "trends" he subsequently identified in Education for an Emerging Age coincide with his own aspirations for education and they conveniently overlook more complex issues, such as that:

1. strengthened federal authority has been accompanied by movements towards local control in American education;
2. events 2 and 3 above are both relative and are meaningless when treated in isolation from trends in other professions;

3. the reorganization of curricula did occur during the late fifties and the sixties, but in part as a result of social and intellectual forces towards which Brameld is hostile; for example, the U.S.-Soviet space race, and the intervention of university subject specialists.

The content of Brameld's intuition of large-scale cultural trends and problems was thus different at particular points from the holistic intuitions of his predecessors, but the fundamental strategy remained the same. However, he did introduce a type of awareness which many of his more optimistic predecessors lacked - an awareness of barriers to change. Amongst the "buttresses" needed by future reconstructionist theory he included an "adequate theory of social forces" (11). But, while he criticized the lack of a theory of social forces in educational theorizing, he has not developed a strategy of change which explicitly accounts for resistance to change or endeavors to overcome such resistance. In Cultural Foundations of Education he laid the groundwork for such a strategy, but he does not appear subsequently to have worked it out in any detail (12).

1.2 The psycho-cultural approach: Frank

1.2.1 Cultural change and personal growth

No explanation of resistance to change would carry conviction if it ignored forces and resistances within human personality. The question which reconstructionists should ask is not simply "how does impersonal culture change?" but "how does man change?". The historical pursuit of one set of answers to this question forms the subject matter of Passmore's The Perfectibility of Man. Passmore's demonstrations of the duration, complexity and ingenuity of this quest in the history of thought make it clear that further progress, if it occurs, will in some measure be the result, not of prophecy and general culture prescriptions,

but of close attention to the immediate cultural milieu of interpersonal behavior. Realization of this lies behind many of the more recent methodological departures in change theory; e.g., T-group and achievement motivation, to name but two of the more significant ones (13).

However, some of the recent reconstructionists have taken a preliminary step, drawing together the two more extreme positions of macro-cultural analysis (as practised by Wells, Rugg, Mannheim and Brameld) and the non-contextual schools of individual psychology (Freudianism, hormic psychology, laboratory behaviorism). This intermediate step has not been the exclusive contribution of any one thinker or group of thinkers. Those contributing to it, however, include so-called "psycho-culturists" - notably Frank.

For many of the reconstructionists, personality is an inference from culture. Their recognition of an element of individual creativity must be seen in the light of their belief in human plasticity and the growth-directing power of sub-cultural groups, and the symbolic system of the wider culture. The reconstructionists, on the whole, have been deeply imbued with the Durkheim tradition of social facts and conscience collectives, by the neo-Darwinian emphasis on behavioral adaptation to changing environments, by Mead's theory of mind as cultural product, by naturalistic denials of a duality in human nature, and by the overall social science preoccupation with the externals of observed behavior. These intellectual perspectives, rather than those referring to the dynamics of inner behavior, have provided the reconstructionists with their models of thought and action, and led them to infer human personality from culture experience.

With the limited exceptions of Wells' exploration of the psychology of old and new man in his social utopian novels,and perhaps Rugg's studies in creativity, Frank's work is the only example, in reconstructionist theorizing, of systematic analysis of the nature of the psychological experience which is required for - indeed, is a central part of - cultural renewal.

Dewey provided the groundwork for Frank's psycho-culturalism in his ideas on interactions and transactions between persons and environment and in his work on processes of habit formation and reformation, experiences and growth. Dewey's inspiration was acknowledged by Frank, who said that the main points and procedures of his paper "Culture and personality - the psycho-cultural approach to a democratic social order" were based on Dewey's Essays in Experimental Logic (14).

For Frank, culture renewal is not simply an aspiration of the utopian mentality - one option amongst many - it is a necessary condition of individuality and personal growth. He rejected the enthusiasm of his predecessors, especially Counts, for mapping out a future social order which the school was expected to bring into existence. His method was to specify the interactive processes of culture-personality relationship, although reference to democracy in the title of his paper made his own social preferences clear.

Man and his social order, Frank argued, may be best understood through the psycho-cultural approach, which itself is a synthesis of understandings yielded by social sciences and the arts. Frank did not expand the structural features of this synthesis, which sounds rather like the aspiration of Dilthey and his successors to achieve an integrated human sciences perspective (15). Instead of detailed

analysis of the psycho-cultural approach, Frank disclosed its nature through use. Thus his own methodology is that of the interpretation and synthesis of personalist psychologies and of personal experience in and through the arts. We may note in passing that this is a point well across the methodological continuum from Webb's empiricism and Mannheim's socially grounded perspectivism. For the first time in the social reconstructionist movement, an avowedly psychological humanism provides the starting point for inquiry.

Following Mead and Dewey, Frank argued that there is a circular, interactive relationship between personality and culture. It is this relationship which merits close attention: man the product of cultural experience is yet able significantly to modify the environment of which he is a part. Indeed, it is through culture modification that he discovers himself. Man, according to Frank's analysis, is not simply an undifferentiated living organism in interaction with its environment. He is uniquely free of the coercion of organic and bodily differentiation. Man's special evolutionary solution is not organic adaptation, but the development of tools and ideas, "whereby he could develop uniquely human ways of living". From this notion of bodily liberation, which echoes Dewey's discussion of tools and language, yet suggests the non-Deweyan bifurcation into "natural" and "spiritual", which I referred to in discussing Alsberg in Chapter III, Frank proceeded to affirm that human behavior is distinguished by purposive conduct,including most importantly the imputing of meanings and values to the world as experienced. Culture arises and is sustained as man imputes meanings to his environment, including his society, and then transforms his functional processes and impulses into purposeful conduct, related to these imputed meanings. This is the psycho-cultural nexus of

experience and action, with its emphasis on the constant organizing and reorganizing of experience strongly reminiscent of Dewey's theory of growth. Growth is a never-ending process, a constant movement of individual-environmental relationship, yielding meanings with which man re-interprets this environment and modifies it to suit his purposes. Thinking is the process of acting upon the environment, experiencing a reaction and modifying behavior in a further impingement upon environment. Whereas Dewey emphasized language as the distinctly human mode of action, Frank, under the influence of Cassirer and Langer, emphasized the full range of symbolic meaning systems. For him, the human dimension of experience is characterized by the symbolic manipulation of meanings, and education has the task of facilitating and structuring this manipulation.

1.2.2 Methods of culture study

In Frank's view, the way to make cultural study more systematic is by inquiring into four sets of universal human assumptions and their superstructures of symbolic thought. These four are: first, those concerning the nature of the world and the universe; second, those concerning man's place in the world and his relationship to powers controlling events; third, those concerning his relations with others; and, finally, those concerning human nature and the self-image. Each of these four sets of assumptions may be further sub-divided into "eidos" or conceptions for organizing, interpreting and validating experience; and "ethos", or awareness and sensitivity to experience and ways of responding emotionally to situations. These four categories of assumptions refer to very early occurrences in the history of culture and their subsequent history in human experience. Thus, systematic culture study, if one were to follow Frank's arguments

to their conclusion, would be an undertaking of truly Germanic proportions: a total history of culture through analysis of the levels of organizing concepts and modes of feeling-awareness. The proposals made by Wells, by Rugg and by Brameld for culture studies, vast as they were, fell short of this all-inclusive ideal. Admittedly, Frank did not delineate a curriculum of culture study, nor in fact did he even propose it, but, if these sets of assumptions are fundamental and if, furthermore, we are obliged to consider culture as a development of basic assumptions and elaborate symbolic systems for the manipulation of meanings, then we are committed to an impossibly large undertaking if we wish to "understand" culture.

Frank clearly advocated this understanding and wished to sustain individual freedom by locating the free individual on one side of a shifting relationship with culture as understood in this very broad sense. The psycho-cultural approach, having promised a means of negotiating the element of personal experience in culture change, thus has the unexpected result of bringing out the inherent tendency in reconstructionist thinking to produce not so much impossible utopias of action but impossible wholes of inquiry. These tendencies are to be found in both of the major theorists of reconstructionism, Dewey and Mannheim. We reach the paradoxical conclusion that only the psycho-cultural approach enables us to understand man's development, that man's freedom depends on this understanding, but the psycho-cultural approach is itself equatable with the totality of human cultural experiences. This is Hegelianism with a vengeance.

Methodologically barren as this outcome is, it underlines a basic difficulty facing the whole reconstructionist movement. Culture diagnosis in their theory requires the analysis of wholes. But there are no

methodologically secure ways of examining wholes apart from:

a. the totality of specific methods already in use,

and

b. personal intuitions supported by selective personal syntheses of mixed data.

The total of specific methods already in use does not yield a single account but an enormous array of partial accounts, which the reconstructionists are forever attempting to synthesize. Their results are in certain respects reminiscent of Bacon's criticism of scholastics and alchemists: that there are plenty of words but no gold. To take the action reconstructionists felt to be needed towards the "whole" requires in their judgment the synthesizing of the limited and partial accounts of academics: the grasping of a pattern amidst the diversity of shifting parts. But personal intuitions, as they recognized, have no special claim for consideration as a superior kind of grasping; hence the attempts to strengthen them by devising objective synthetic methodologies. Such strengthening as has been attempted, however, has either pushed the methodology back towards a manageable but programmatically inadequate empiricism, or forward towards an incoherent holism of which Frank's idea of a grid for the totality of cultural experience is perhaps the most extreme example.

We can rescue Frank from this dilemma by accepting that what we are being invited to do is not, after all, as he says in Culture and Personality, "to understand man and his social order" but to adopt a frame of reference appropriate to a programme of psycho-cultural reform - i.e., the proper education of man in contemporary society. The reforms that Frank proposed are discussed in the next section of this chapter and in Part Two of my study. They are built on the assumptions that culture is a human

environment of action and reaction; it constantly changes; it embodies aspirations; it provides means and materials for the growth of personality; and that personality best grows through the use of culture analysis, particularly analysis in the scientific mode. This analysis cannot achieve the comprehensiveness and unity Frank envisaged, but it will be the better for incorporating the perspectives he identified, in particular those yielded by inquiry into patterns of relationship and self-image.

1.3 Social Foundations Movement

A third approach in post-war reconstructionist theory to the problem of rapid cultural change is that of the social foundations movement. This was a movement to locate the study of educational theory in investigations into contemporary culture, its major features, trends and divisions. I have selected for discussion three important and influential examples of the movement: first, the pioneering work by Raup, Axtelle, Benne and Smith, The Improvement of Practical Intelligence, in which the attempt was made to define for experimentalism a particular instrument of democratic policy making, namely, "practical judgment"; second, Stanley's Education and Social Integration which, amongst other things, developed an extended rationale for the method of "practical judgment"; third, Smith, Stanley and Shores, Fundamentals of Curriculum Development, which argued for the understanding and stabilizing of contemporary cultural crisis as the basic task facing curriculum reformers. In this section, I shall consider a theme common to all three studies - the breakdown of unity in the fundamental moral norms of American culture (16).

I.3.1 Practical judgment: Raup and associates

According to Raup and his associates, practical judgment is an instrument of group decision-taking or of democratic planning which should be used at all levels and in all spheres of community policy making. It comprises four major steps:

1. Formulating and projecting an ideal future state of affairs.

2. Surveying existing conditions in order to prepare an inventory of means and agencies relevant to the problem under review.

3. Suiting ideas employed to the claims of the situation as a whole.

4. Fusing steps 1-3 into policy; devising procedures of policy implementation.

Details of the act of practical judgment will be discussed in the second part of this chapter. For the moment, we will concentrate on the arguments Raup and his associates offered for their proposal that practical judgment should be institutionalized as the basic policy-making procedure in American life. Their objective in devising and seeking to deploy this instrument was to build a community of interest and a national consensus, consisting not of uneasy and limited compromise between special interest groups, but a higher level of reconciliation and commitment to action than that achieved at any given point in time by any particular interest group.

Leaving aside, for the present, the question of the desirability of higher order social policy syntheses, what problem is this synthesizing process of practical judgment intended to overcome? Essentially, it is the familiar reconstructionist problem of deep-seated conflict and confusion of social standards and human character.
It should be noted, however, that the method of practical judgment

is logically separable from the hypothesis of crisis. Decisions on policy are inevitable in society, indeed, they constitute part of the meaning of social relationships. Practical judgment is, at one level, simply a decision-taking procedure. Whatever particular suitability its exponents thought it had for crisis situations, it can be extracted from that context and considered for adoption in non-crisis situations.

Raup and his associates affirmed that widespread social conflict and confusion over values are the effect of a century or more of development and diffusion of science and technology throughout American culture. More specifically, as a result of this diffusion the "common social orientations" of traditional culture have been replaced by various disintegrative orientations. These new developments include the minute division and specialization of labor leading to a compartmentalizing and a fragmenting of community, and extreme social mobility leading to the participation of individuals in groups with a variety of perspectives. Following Mannheim, whose inspiration they acknowledged, Raup and his associates treated these as symptoms of a general malaise of culture. This malaise is embodied in language and other forms of communication, in interpersonal relations and intergroup conflict, and in individual psychic turmoil.

In this situation of general stress, various escape and survival responses have been tried. These include irrationalism, reliance on the wisdom of the common man, and appeals to specialist experts. Coercion and compromise as methods of decision-taking have been widely adopted, but these have created problems as acute as any they have solved; in addition, they are faulty when tested against the moral-procedural requirements of democracy. Compromise, for example, is inadequate

because it presupposes equal power, sets up conflicts, lacks continuity, and produces no richer synthesis and mind growth. Raup and his associates concluded that what was needed is the development, not merely of an ideology of democracy, but of a procedure for operationalizing the democratic heritage in modern terms. For this purpose they devised "practical judgment", a procedure of deliberation whereby an uncoerced consensus of all affected by a decision could be achieved and implemented in social action. They did not claim to have developed something entirely new. Examples of this procedure already existed in America in the 1940s, e.g., the National Resources Planning Board and the Tennessee Valley Authority. However, these were isolated and very particular examples. Many different types of practical judgment procedures should emerge in different institutional settings. Furthermore, an analysis of the structure and strategy of practical judgment was lacking and this Raup and his associates attempted to develop.

1.3.2 Crisis and the rationale for practical judgment: Stanley

The Improvement of Practical Intelligence was intended to elaborate the meaning of practical judgment and to show how it might serve to overcome cultural disintegration by developing a new sense of common interest. Culture diagnosis in this book was, on the whole, limited to a re-statement of the pre-war experimentalist thesis concerning the basically disrupting forces of science and technology in a large-scale society. However, unlike the pre-war writers, Raup and his associates had no wish to set radicals against conservatives. Instead their "uncoerced community of persuasion" was intended to unify and consolidate the community in a programme of peaceable reform. Their ideal was "common action guided by common persuasion", an ideal which, they claimed, was long recognized

and expressed in the American democratic heritage (17). Stanley, in Education and Social Integration, gave a much more detailed account of crisis than had Raup and his associates. Careful, objective, and well-documented as this analysis was, it was not carried out simply to disclose a situation. Stanley himself admitted that crisis diagnosis is an ideological weapon: "The existence of crisis is the necessary condition of successful revolutionary action" (18). It does not follow either that revolutionaries invent crisis, or that all crises are suitable starting points for revolutions but, as we have already seen in discussing Mannheim, crisis theorists are quite capable of making very persuasive use of their diagnoses in recommending radical reform.

Stanley sought to disclose the main features and tendencies of the social context in which American education in the 1950s was being conducted. Beyond this, he argued for the development, largely in and through educational institutions and processes, of a new cultural synthesis to replace the disintegrating order which he diagnosed. This in fact was the aspiration behind the first of the four steps of practical judgment; namely, formulating and projecting an ideal future. Stanley's study is, together with Mannheim's, the most carefully documented of all the reconstructionist accounts of the crisis in culture, although it is broadly limited, as Mannheim's studies are not, to social factors.

As evidence for the crisis, Stanley adduced a wide range of factors operating in twentieth century life. These factors included: scepticism and doubt about basic premises in almost every field of inquiry; social unrest; loss of faith in established institutions and beliefs; moral uncertainty; the revolt of youth

against conventional morals; the depression of the thirties and the consequent loss of confidence in traditional socio-economic doctrines; the disaffection of the intellectuals; and others (19). In Stanley's book, the backdrop to contemporary crisis is, as in all the experimentalist writings on this theme, a more or less romanticized version of a stable community of intimate relationships, and of homogeneous and slowly changing values. This is the "old farm" environment of Dewey and Childs, similar to the organic community whose demise Leavis and Thompson lamented, a true community, so it was said, which lingered on until late in the nineteenth century, when it was rapidly eclipsed (20). Stanley argued that this collapse was the consequence of four major transforming forces: industrialization, specialization, urbanization, and improved communication. In place of the old, organic community, there had emerged the modern society, dominated by organized, sectionalized interest groups. But he was careful to point out that the "collapse" was not total, since a vital core of common values had survived the transformation. This, as we shall see, was a fortunate circumstance for Stanley's theory, as it had been for Mannheim's, for without this core there would be nothing but a memory of the old order on which to build a new cultural synthesis.

Stanley also incorporated into his diagnosis a critique of historicist, monolithic theories of change, thereby providing himself with the theoretical means, subsequently, for interventionist action. His criticisms of the cosmic theories of Sorokin, Sumner, Ogburn, Marx and others were substantial but nevertheless question-begging, since he condemned them for denying a role to genuine novelty and human intervention, but was unable to offer a definite refutation.

Stanley attributed the cataclysmic changes of modern society in part to human action based in some measure on conscious purpose and evaluations. If man could remake culture he must have contributed to its unmaking. At least, if not the logical, then the psychological argument for interventionism would be greatly strengthened by showing man's own part in creating the crisis. However, Stanley did not suggest that crisis in America was a consequence of wilfulness and the intention to create confusion. Man in society had committed himself to exploiting science and technology for his mental and material advantage, and from this had flowed the unexpected and morally unacceptable consequences of personal and social maladjustment. For personal maladjustment, he turned for evidence to those social psychologists, criminologists and sociologists who attributed neurosis, delinquency, criminality, suicide, etc., to social conflict and cultural contradiction (21). To avoid the circularity of treating personal maladjustment as both a <u>consequence</u> of social conflict and cultural contradiction and <u>evidence</u> for a conflict theory, Stanley invoked the experimentalist thesis of individual-social interaction: a culture crisis manifests itself no less in individual behavior than in social trends and relationships; whatever affects the one will affect the other. However, this presupposes some factor or group of factors operating as key culture transformers. By attributing to science a fundamental disturbing role, Stanley seems to have adopted just such a monolithic anti-individualistic theory as he condemned in other writers. Why should science be described as monolithic and anti-individualistic? Science may function initially at the level of intentionality and remain at that level for a few scientists and policy makers, but it would be odd to maintain both that the innumerable symptoms of crisis

were unwanted because hurtful, painful, etc., and yet intended. This suggests that science at some point assumes for the mass of mankind the character of a juggernaut. Alternatively, it may be that men want the benefits of institutionalized science, through material production, medicine, consumer goods, etc., but not many of its other consequences. Stanley seems to have adopted this latter explanation. While,for the sake of his interventionist proposals, he needed to preserve both an intact core of values and the principle of the efficiency of human purposiveness, he nevertheless had to justify drastic reform by invoking cataclysmic cultural breakdown. This breakdown could not be complete or there would be no remaining intact core of values. Nor could it be entirely the consequence of human purposes, or we could have no confidence that purposive action would in the future help resolve the dilemma. But what model of cultural change would fit these constraints? One contender, for which Stanley was able to provide a mass of empirical data, was the "imbalance and lag" model. Imbalance takes two forms in his theory: first, an imbalance between and among beliefs and habits, on the one hand, and the functional demands of specialization, urbanization, etc., on the other; second, the imbalance between science and other areas of thought, particularly moral thought; or, putting this slightly differently, a lack of coherence and unity in socially expressed purposes.

These two kinds of imbalance are manifest throughout society and have their profoundly unsettling effects on individual outlook and ultimately on social morality. They can be corrected, but this is a supremely difficult task, involving the creation of a partial cultural synthesis, built upon democratic values and rationality and incorporating the experiences of life in modern large-scale institutions. Creating

a cultural synthesis is a problem in part of social order which Stanley saw as coming to focus:

> "in four fundamental tasks which, in a peculiar way, define the crucial and persistent challenge of our day. First, the establishment of an international order capable of adjusting and controlling the economic and nationalistic ambitions of the people of the world without constantly resorting to war on a global scale. Second, the development of an economic order capable, within the framework of essential human freedom, of fully releasing the productive capacities of modern technology and of reconciling the claims of the various social classes with respect to both the control of the productive machinery of society and the distribution of its fruits. Third, the building of a social order capable of harmonizing the just aspirations of different races and classes to share in the social and cultural goods of society. Fourth, the construction of an intellectual and moral order capable of defining, in a way acceptable to the major social groups of our time, the fundamental principles, purposes, and values operative in the international, economic and social orders" (22).

In this book, Stanley concentrated on (a) the forces and conditions responsible for confusion and conflict in American education, (b) problems of re-establishing social and moral order. Thus he did not set out to analyse the totality of culture, or to offer a Rugg-type model of a complete new cultural synthesis. Stanley did, however, deduce the need for this more ambitious undertaking from his diagnosis of crisis. His diagnosis located the crisis ultimately in the intellectual and moral outlook of a whole society. The crisis manifested itself in personal experience and in interpersonal and impersonal situations. It was kept active by the continuing impact of the prime unsettlers, science and technology as they affected the substructure of work-culture. Thus, to propose the stabilizing of elements in the social order, without considering the larger problem of cultural order, was to create a serious hiatus between diagnosis and reform.

1.3.3 Crisis and culture cores: Smith and associates

In fact, Stanley's proposals, for a moral and intellectual consensus, did go beyond the problem of social order, even though he claimed only to be examining the requirements of social integration. I shall return to this point later in the present chapter.

In Fundamentals of Curriculum Development, Stanley, together with Smith and Shores, identified the critical problem of the times as being one of cultural order; and these authors gave to education a major share of the task of guiding and shaping an emergent culture. In this setting, curriculum making itself became a form of culture analysis and renewal, as in the Idealist tradition.

Culture was defined, in Fundamentals of Curriculum Development, as morally eclectic, superorganic, and coherent. Culture is:

> "the fabric of ideas, ideals, beliefs, skills, tools, aesthetic objects, methods of thinking, customs and institutions into which each member of society is born." (23)

The basic structure of individual personality is shaped by culture, yet individuals and groups are able, subsequently, to participate in schemes for cultural renewal, e.g., curriculum building, which do not take the form merely of a perpetuation of the past.

Smith and his associates adopted Linton's structural framework of cultural analysis which classifies the diversity of cultural meanings, objects and events into universals, specialities and alternatives. These factors are then grouped into (a) a core, comprising a central integrated body of universals and specialities, and (b) alternatives, or innovations, the source of subsequent cultural change. It is interesting to note that the model of an integrated core of established meanings, separated from new ideas by a threshold which the latter seek to cross to be absorbed into a new core, almost exactly

parallels Herbart's theory of mental behavior. In this theory, ideas in individual consciousness are organized into coherent systems which articulate action, while,across the threshold in the limbo of unconsciousness and semi-consciousness, are new and perhaps alarming ideas, struggling to cross over and to influence the character of the central, organizing core. The latter-day experimentalists, in their pre-occupation with the problem of a moral-intellectual core designed to order culture, owed much to the Herbartian legacy of socio-moral order. In Stanley's case, this legacy appears to have been mediated through the Herbartian curriculum theorist, Morrison (24).

Proceeding from Linton's schematization, Smith and his associates suggested that it is only when culture is changing rapidly that a problem of maintaining a stable, integrated core emerges. When change is minimal, the core is "large" and "strong" in relation to alternatives, and the culture is largely taken on unconsciously by the individual. Change develops, however, in the Marxist manner and as explained by the earlier experimentalists: science and technology transform the work culture and this by degrees permeates and transforms the superstructure of thought and experience. The resulting imbalances, which Stanley had examined in greater depth in Education and Social Integration, reverberate and develop into a widespread but by no means complete disintegration, with its attendant social and personal discomforts:

> "The difficulty is to be found in the partial disintegration of social consensus under the impact of changing conditions and institutional malfunctioning" (25).

Smith and his associates divided their treatment of the culture crisis of the 1940s and 1950s in America into two main parts: macroscopic

social behavior, and value disorientation. At the social level, they found five major elements in the crisis: increased specialisation of labor, combined with greater social interdependence; loss of community - the breakdown of primary group relationships - and the decline of consensus; emergence of divisive and exclusive social classes; loss of the capacity of the family to build in its members a common social perspective; mobility and displacement in employment. Later in their study, they added the socially-dissolving effects of the growth of communications and transportation.

However, Smith and his associates noted, serious as these elements are in contributing to the destruction of unity of outlook, they do not operate at the level that, according to Parsonian social analysis, is most basic to change - i.e., value change. Smith and his associates appear not to have been influenced directly by Parsons, but, like him, they found value awareness the most sensitive area of cultural upheaval:

> "The acids generated by these twin elements (viz., science and technology) have trickled down into the American system of values, dissolving fundamental ideals and leaving the entire system in a state of confusion" (26).

Nevertheless, as in Stanley's account of the crisis, the acids had not completed their damage, since the American heritage of democratic values remained sufficiently intact to provide a platform from which a new cultural synthesis could be developed by the schools. Smith and his associates were careful to point out that the schools could not get ahead with cultural re-making free of constraints, or unaided by other social institutions. We shall consider their arguments on the process of culture remaking through education in Part II. On constraints, they had more to say than merely pointing to the

disintegration of old principles and practices. The schools would have to function in an emergent, not a wholly fluid, situation. On the basis of their analysis of crisis, Smith and his associates predicted certain trends in culture, within whose broad outlines schools would have to proceed.

These trends provided them with a convenient framework for their own positive recommendations, just as Brameld's trends coincided with his preferences. None of these trends constituted a serious barrier to their type of culture reformism, though they all set problems to be resolved. The trends are eight in number:

1. Increasing interdependence arising, not from any desire for co-operation but "inevitably" from increasing specialization and social complexity.

2. "Positions from which the entire pattern of relationships among human activities can be perceived without the aid of education designed for that purpose are decreasing, and fewer and fewer individuals are able to reach these positions." (27)

3. Increasing regulation and integration of social processes by deliberate, trained human effort.

4. Greater public concern for sharing by all in the benefits of material production.

5. Greater militancy by suppressed races and social classes.

6. Development of a world order, with certain sovereign powers retained.

7. Thoroughgoing reconstruction of value systems in democracies.

8. Transformation of habits of thinking and social skills carried over from earlier cultural phases.

These trends suggest an emergent social order, which Smith and his associates wished to "democratize". For them to describe their trends as "broad prognostic facts" is to overlook the element of personal judgment involved in their prediction. We should also notice

the omission of other "trends" which might less readily be accommodated to a reconstructionist thesis. The second trend, incidentally, is unimaginable, since such universal perspectives are precluded methodologically by the lack of any appropriate procedures, and in more concrete terms by the very complexity and momentum of culture which Smith and his associates marked out as one of the factors in the crisis. However, it is again worth noticing, as characteristically holistic - just such an aspiration as signifies the reconstructionist wish to stabilize change by containing its very diversity and irregularity within a single vision of order, or pattern.

Instead of accepting this list as a schematization of <u>trends</u>, we could better appreciate its significance by seeing it as yet another instance of a typical reconstructionist strategy. This strategy consists of introducing ambiguity into the ascertainment of factual trends by conflating them with the prescription of key points of planned action: not key points in the sense of elements in a morally and politically neutral description, but as aspects of culture requiring concentrated attention if the reconstructionist programme itself is to be realized.

2. <u>Prescriptions for New Cultural Order</u>

In this section, I intend to abandon the separate treatment of individuals and groups adopted in the previous section. From that separate treatment we have observed overall similarities and differences of approach to the problem of culture change amongst the later experimentalists. Also, we have perceived the directions in which they would wish to see the culture whose ills they diagnosed moving. Now we shall consider those directions more closely, not in full detail

but under the broad headings of:

1. Techniques of culture awareness and renewal.

2. The principles of order and integration.

The role of education as culture-synthesizer I shall postpone to Chapters X and XII.

2.1 Techniques of culture awareness and renewal

Both by implication from their own culture diagnoses, and as a direct recommendation, all of the writers discussed in this chapter advocated that, as a first requirement, we should become much more self-conscious of ourselves as beings caught up in one of the great transformations of history. In his appreciative essay on Cassirer's contribution to philosophical anthropology, Brameld paid tribute to Cassirer's power as a synthetic thinker, orientated towards the future conceived as an ideal for present life (28). Brameld further enjoined schools to develop the kind of awareness he displayed in his own writings in order to help children understand the world-wide transformations of our times and to form ideas of possible futures. This is a global awareness, not just of the physical globe, but the totality of contemporary life. It encounters the same difficulties of realization that we have already noted: the appropriate methodologies for achieving meaningful simplifications are lacking. Despite the efforts of the synthetic theorists, each fresh synthetic overview adds to the already large number of particular perspectives. Each may be criticized for its significant omissions. Thus Cassirer, one of the greatest of the modern synthesizers, was criticized by Brameld for neglecting social substructure, reifying spiritual and subjective insights, and displaying a rationalist partiality towards the topics he examined. Brameld's own cultural awareness again is highly partial and tendentious, and lacking the philosophical

rigor which characterized Cassirer's thought. Whose kind of "cultural awareness", then, is to serve as the model? To expect school teachers to act as arbiters of awareness systems and synthesizers of the new culture is no solution to this difficulty. But there are nevertheless various ways of getting this awareness process going, short of the exalted standard set by "global awareness", and we shall discuss these in Chapters XI and XII.

There is, however, a further difficulty in Brameld's proposal that children and youth should be encouraged to think about the kind of society they would like. In practice it is frequently difficult to persuade many of them even to think critically about the immediate situations they are in. For example, liberal studies teachers in technical colleges, who attempt to enlarge the horizon of vision by discussing changes in arrangements at work, encounter indifference and resistance, or even a simple bewilderment concerning what is possible. The reconstructionists wish to stimulate and, as far as possible, to universalize logical, abstract and speculative thought. If the conceptualizing of most children and youth is still concrete, in Piaget's terms, and restricted by the limited worlds of school, work and leisure in small town settings, more limited and precise and more personalized curriculum proposals are needed than those Brameld and Rugg indulged in, to engage individuals in critical and creative processes of thought.

Raup and his associates, and Stanley, envisaged a more limited structure of pupil awareness than did Brameld. For them, a good start at least could be made by attempting, through education, to universalize the so-called "social perspective". This has its difficulties in that much of modern social science is itself empirical, lacking any coherent perspective, or rather displaying many perspectives.

Yet it is a prescription which could be brought to realization, for example, through the universal introduction of social science teaching both by teaching social science subject matter in schools, and by incorporating within all teacher training programmes a sociological dimension which might, as a consequence, come to pervade the teaching of many school subjects. This recommendation may not be far short of realization. It is one practical change on which all of the reconstructionists, back to and including the early Fabians, are agreed. But it is clearly insufficient even for the purposes for which it was intended. The reason is that, in the tradition of Durkheim's concept of "social facts", the "social perspective" frequently sets itself in opposition to psychological and other perspectives. All the reconstructionists, and particularly those in the tradition of Dewey, have tried to show that rapid cultural change is serious and often harmful just because it results in imbalances, disturbances, and more destructive neurotic manifestations in individuals, which acquire their own momentum and lose some of their social contingency. Realization of the consequences of social change for character formation and personality is a definite gain in understanding, over older views, and should not be lost to sight in the upsurge of interest in institutions, roles and organizational behavior.

For this reason, Frank's exploration of the "psycho-cultural" approach is of very great significance in the development of reconstructionist thought from an older society orientation to the more complex and inclusive culture orientation. The very powerful superorganic tradition in cultural anthropology not only raises difficulties in explaining cultural innovativeness and individual creativity, it also distracts attention from the qualities and problems of individual experience of change.

Lack of attention to this personal, delicate, often ineffable, area, is one of the great deficiencies, not only of all totalistic and totalitarian theories, but also of many modern policy and managerial change theories in the democracies. Behavioristic models of action and response are reasonably posited as part of research procedures, but may become hypostatized in the manner of nineteenth century economic man, or twentieth century organization man. One way to avoid this is to emphasize, in all social and cultural studies, the realms of personal and interpersonal experience in real and imaginary concrete situations. The Dilthey tradition, in its endeavor to understand the meaning of individual expression in all its variety, has been strengthened by Frank's emphasis on the discernible human consequences of cultural change. The plasticity of human nature testifies to the possibility of the remaking of culture; the attribution of unique value to the individual argues for a continuing concern for the morality of the procedures of culture remaking; opportunities for warping, distorting and destroying personality intrinsic in certain of the operations of modern social institutions call for particular care in using them.

These considerations point to the form of culture-awareness that Frank prescribed for an age which should, he thought, commit itself to universalizing scientific thinking. While they go beyond the understandings yielded by science in the narrow sense of controlled experimentation, they do not constitute a "corrective" to science in the broadest sense. Frank accepted the experimentalist belief in an integral harmony between, indeed the integration of, scientific method and democratic concern for individuals. But Frank's contribution was to emphasize what was lacking in some of the reconstructionist

enthusiasm for wholesale cultural renewal, namely, the perception of the human consequences of change and the involvement of the whole person considered as an emotional and moral being.

Awareness of the conditions and human context of change is one part of the culture prescriptions of the later experimentalists. The other part is the methodology of consensus and practical judgment. A detailed discussion of this is not possible. It forms a major topic in its own right in the light of more recent practical applications, for example, the use of the architecture-devised "charette" method of educational policy-making for creating school building designs, and curriculum and management policies. Also, substantial use was made of these methodologies in the U.S.A. in the 1950s movements to increase community participation in curriculum-making, and this experience has thrown up many significant issues (29).

Brameld's advocacy of reconstructionism incorporated the device of policy-making through a consensus of the views of as many as possible of those affected by policy decisions (30). Through this, he hoped to differentiate his proposals from all previous ones, which he judged were not recommendations on method so much as substantive changes based on limited interpretations of particular cultural situations. However, since he accompanied his consensus proposals with his own views on desirable substantive changes in culture, a difficulty arises and it would be interesting to see how far Brameld, or one of his followers, would in a consensus-seeking group seek to impress into the consensus the prescriptions underlying his own culture diagnosis.

It may be argued that Brameld's definition of consensus in no way precludes the presentation of utopias and trend predictions for group inspection. But, since he claims that the truth of culture diagnoses

and goal-seeking interests is a function of majority agreement, Brameld would certainly have an interest in persuading the majority. Ascription of truth qualities to agreement over goals may seem an odd throwback to the pragmatism of William James. Brameld supposed that he was Peirce's heir, even though Peirce's theory of truth was concerned with scientific knowledge, not the formation of social policy goals. Brameld, like most experimentalists, at times appeared to think that judgments of value, such as those locked into the notions of goal and interest, may be demonstrated true or false by empirical methods. This belief would give him reason for supposing that he could persuade fellow members of the group that his convictions were not merely desirable, but correct.

The consensus procedure that Brameld described envisages policy making at the different levels of primary groups, communities, nations and the international community, conducted as an open quest for agreed clear-cut commitments to action on specific issues. Higher order agreement and reconcilation were sought, but majority decisions were not precluded. According to Brameld, majority rule itself may be consensual in that it assumes the best decisions on common welfare are achieved when the widest consensus is sought. Anything short of full agreement is, however, less than wholly satisfactory. The quest for consensus, if it is to avoid tyranny and the imposition of mass preferences on minorities, presupposes a high level of rationality and a mature society, as may be seen by reference to earlier versions of the consensus ideal:

> "At the general assembly of the tribe ('folk moot') the minority was gradually intimidated into acquiescence (the men signified approbation by clashing their arms, and disapproval by a hollow murmur!). The slave bearing no arms and the boy unripe for war had no place in the folk moot.

> "Church councils, too, acted on the theory of unanimity until the Vatican Council of 1870, when majority rule was accepted" (31).

Brameld was aware that,for consensus procedures to work fairly and efficiently, people need to be appropriately educated. I have already argued that it is neither necessary nor desirable to subordinate all social policy decisions to the principle of unanimity. A higher level of participation in decision making than is now common would be desirable, in promoting respect for the views of all who are affected by policy decisions. However, the consensus method is only one way of achieving this. We could, for example, diffuse responsibility to individuals, in certain institutions, and restrict consensus procedures to very general issues. Brameld's partisan approach led him to neglect weaknesses in the consensus theory and to ignore alternative and complementary procedures.

Raup and his associates, and Stanley, were more cautious than Brameld in their advocacy of consensus. They were prepared to submit their ideas, not to majority judgment, in the first instance, but to the more expert community of discourse of which their own works were part, and to rest their claims for validity on argument and demonstration, not majority agreement. This makes them more accurate interpreters of Peirce than Brameld was. It may also have prompted them to prepare a much more carefully structured proposal for the operations of consensus and practical judgment than did Brameld.

We have already seen that Raup and his associates felt the lack in experimentalist theory of social mechanisms for seeking adjustment of social conflict and confusion. They postulated an increasing intensity of culture crises and argued for the development of a policy method adequate to the crises and responsive to the democratic tradition. Indeed,

their method of practical judgment was intended as a means of resolving differences and sorting out confusions within the domain occupied by this tradition (the domain of "practical" as distinct from "theoretical" knowledge in Aristotle's terminology), namely, preferences and judgments of value and principles of practical conduct. Democracy for them meant at least three things: first, participation - "whoever may be affected by a decision on policy shall in some way have a part in shaping it" (32); second, a sense of community, or common interest; third, a commitment to the universal value of individual worth and dignity. Even if it could be shown that coercion and compromise could achieve functionally adequate decisions in modern society - and they tried to show that this ought not to be assumed - the very notion of functionality in a democratic social order should incorporate these value preferences. Furthermore, the method of practical judgment was not only intended to determine the meaning of and resolve the differences between answers to unresolved community situations. In Platonic style, the method was also intended to educate, or "reconstruct", individual character by building into it a methodological dimension - a disposition and a set of skills (33).

This, again, was a factor which Raup and his associates believed the earlier experimentalists had neglected: the effect of character on situations and the potential of selected methods of social procedure for educating character. But it will be recalled that Dewey showed very great interest in dispositions and habits of thought, and advocated the democratic value of shared experience and the reflective method of inquiry. It is therefore doubtful whether the claim of Raup and his associates that their emphasis on the role of character in judgments

of practice is a development of Dewey's thought so much as a reiteration of it. What undoubtedly is a development is the definition of a method for achieving consensus in the sphere of practical judgment - the rules of moral procedure in society. However, even this method incorporates three very distinctive Deweyan ideas: the conscious reconstruction of experience; the ideal of "common actions guided by common persuasions", which is Dewey's democratic sharing of experience; and the quest for a consensus which should not be a compromise, but a higher order resolution and agreement.

Whereas Dewey believed that one method, that of reflective thinking, provided a paradigm for all problematic situations and their resolution, Raup and his associates thought that the differences between theoretical and practical knowledge warrant at least two paradigms of inquiry: that, or rather those, of the empirical sciences and the fields of theoretical knowledge on the one hand, and that of practical judgment in moral discourse on the other. Further, they argued in anticipation of the now popular operational and policy-orientated research that there are many situations in which the quest for facts should be normatively orientated. This argument helped to rescue the later experimentalists from Dewey's equivocations over the empirical demonstrability of judgments of value. For Raup and his associates these judgments required commitment to democratic ideals which were not scientifically verifiable. Yet the method of practical judgment does little to solve difficulties of moral thinking, for it made no advance on existing moral theories. Instead, by accepting the validity of the democratic heritage, or American utilitarianism, combined with Dewey's reasoning about moral values, the exponents of practical judgment virtually limited their contribution to demonstrating how this moral theory might be exemplified in social

decision taking. The advocates of practical judgment recognized the dangers of power dominance through compromise and persuasion, but it is difficult to see how these are to be avoided. At any rate, procedures of group decision taking through discussion and higher order agreement are not in themselves free from manipulation by skilled group engineers. Apart from this, there are four main defects in the method of deliberation recommended by Raup and his associates. First, to get going at all it had to presuppose a consensus on procedures which, as Stahley's analysis of the working of interest groups in society was to show, can by no means be assumed. Perhaps this problem could be overcome by developing those situations in which there is already some agreement. Second, the theory of practical judgment neglected to consider the role of individual, non-group located inspiration in the formulation of ideal solutions. While it did not specifically exclude them, they received very little recognition as important sources of change. Third, it was assumed that common persuasion is the principal desideratum of democracy. As a result, too little consideration was given to the institutional apparatus in society which proceeds not on the assumption of a foreground of common persuasion but on procedures like majority rule, constitutionally-defined rights, institutionalized checks to institutional power, and on the creative outcome of clashes of policy. These are not just matters of machinery but vital safeguards of liberty in a democracy. Fourth, by neglecting institutional safeguards and clearly defined procedural rules, the proponents of practical judgment ran the risk of lapsing into subtle coercion. The subsequent emphasis on the art of engineering change through groups brings out the danger and the paradox of the whole movement: to work well, practical judgment requires skilled group activists.

But the crisis in moral values, on which practical judgment was postulated, indicates the presence in society of many individuals and groups who no longer understand or accept democratic values. For them, the technique of practical judgment represents the gift of a respectable and potentially very influential instrument for shaping public policy (34).

2.2 The principles of order and integration

The quest for order appears so consistently in the reconstructionist writings dealing with what they designate the fundamental problems and trends of culture that it might suggest not simply misgivings over particular changes but opposition to change as such. However, although there is a lingering Platonism in many of the proposals for wholesale reform, and echoes of the mysterious "One" of Parmenides in their hankering for a unified cultural core, the order they sought was not a condition of rest. True to their enlightenment ancestry, they could not accept as a goal a quiescent condition of harmonous unity but wanted to find ways of transforming cultural activity from a confused eruption of mindless forces into a well-contrived, orderly expedition of like-minded travellers.

For Frank, the order was not primarily totalistic, taking the form of a cultural synthesis; instead, it consisted of personal organization and integration of experience through rational thought: the capacity to receive, interpret and judge ideas, including those profoundly discordant with previous experience (35). The organizing mechanisms for this essentially stabilizing process include purpose and patterned thinking. Frank assumed that these deliberative, conscious processes were capable of directing experience; if not transcending feeling and instinctual drives, then not necessarily undermined

by them, and capable of organizing them. Thus thinking is not reducible to rationalization of passions, but it takes the form of an ordering of relationships between the dynamics of the individual psyche, the concrete world of events, and symbolic systems. This organization of experience is the goal of rationality. Thought is susceptible to testing and validation. It is able to organize behavior and in this way to contribute to the renewal of culture.

Of the symbolic systems, Frank treated science as the most significant, accepting the experimentalists' argument that science was the most powerful of all cognitive and social-influence systems. Hence, the quest for psycho-cultural order is sustained in individuals by their purposive reconstruction of experience in the light of scientific awareness. The vitality of this quest, and its continuous pursuit by individuals, are the guarantee of cultural renewal. That education which best contributes to Frank's notion of this assimilation of scientific modes of thought is the most effective remaker of culture.

It is surprising that Frank, as a psychologist and advocate of the knowledge that is yielded through the arts, should have restricted his quest for personal order to the structures yielded by scientific cognition. The only barriers he foresaw were those external to the psyche, viz., pressure groups in society, and teacher inadequacy (36).

Brameld's quest for cultural order was, at the other extreme, all-inclusive. He abandoned the earlier experimentalist aspiration to achieve a planned society in America, in favor of the more inclusive ideal of a "world culture". His model for this world culture was an odd mixture of universal struggle and organic unity. History, Brameld noted, on the one hand discloses universal struggle, and gives us no

reason, on the other, to suppose that struggle will suddenly cease. What is more, Brameld valued struggle as generative of "new arrangements" (37). Yet history has also disclosed cultural unities, e.g., mediaeval civilisation. Again, Brameld's enthusiasm for consensus denotes an interest in conflict resolution and in the achievement of policies in which differences are absorbed and, perhaps, forgotten. Further, Brameld had argued that the rate and scope of change and the depth and extent of dissension in culture had brought western society to the point of collapse. Sheer survival seemed to demand the rapid development of new cultural unities, new institutions and policy agreements, on a world-wide basis, since the disunities were world-wide in scale. A postulated "basic drive" in all men directed this world-wide movement towards self determination and self government (38).

But it is not at all clear just what particular forms of cultural reintegration Brameld had in mind. Society should be democratic, planned through a plurality of institutions, and built on existing national cultures, but it should also transcend all this and become international. It is impossible to relate Brameld's vague idea of a "world organism" to the realities of international relations in the contemporary world. Existing institutions and systems move slowly towards increasing integration with the possibility of breakdown always in the background. Brameld envisaged what at times appears as a grass-roots operation in institutional and social self help, largely by-passing existing sources of power.

It is interesting in this context to see how the ideal of a world culture has attracted the anthropologist Margaret Mead, who, in her earlier writings, had been sceptical about the whole idea of culture synthesis and of education as a culture-transforming agency. Mead

has more recently found contemporary culture fragmentary and discussions of it limited, contradictory and inconclusive. She has outlined the requirements for a shared, one-world, future culture: suitability for all peoples (i.e., not twisted toward the European tradition); freshness ("it must be such that everyone, everywhere, can start afresh, as a young child does, with a mind ready to meet ideas uncompromised by partial learning"); built around single universal themes and imaginitive works; incorporating a synthesis and reduction of all knowledge (akin to Wells' World Brain); built on a new system of graphic representation and a world language (39). As a field worker, in New Guinea, Mead had been far more impressed by the formative power of tradition and by the arguments for cultural uniqueness, and continuity. She offered, in her later paper, no concrete proposals for achieving a new world cultural order, nor any explanation of her abandonment of her earlier beliefs about the values of tradition, continuity and cultural heterogeneity. Nevertheless, it is significant that her sense of contemporary world problems has led her in the direction which, as we have seen, provided one of the main bearings of the whole reconstructionist movement.

Returning to Brameld, we may see that he has fallen between the two stools represented by the methodology of Raup and his associates, which does not entail any particular world order, and the utopian speculations of Wells, which, referring to events in the very distant future of mankind, require no particular assessment of the potentialities and limitations of existing international institutions. As vision, Brameld's proposals lack imagination and vigor; and, as a method, they suffer from the limitations of his consensus proposals. However, as we shall see in Part II, his proposals for educational change are full

of suggestive possibilities.

I shall consider, finally, the idea of integration underlying Stanley's analysis of crisis culture in post-war America. Stanley, as we have seen, initially set out to restrict his analysis of crisis to the forces and conditions in society that have been responsible for certain problems in educational thought and practice. But, because he saw that education is itself enmeshed in a network of determining relationships with culture, the diagnosis broadened out into a holistic appraisal of culture trends. From this appraisal, Stanley concluded that, due to the impact of science and technology, the old organic community had been replaced by an impersonal type of society, conflict-ridden, sectionalized and compartmentalized, incoherent in its aspirations and moving into an era of "confusion and conflict in basic human purposes and perspectives" (40). In the light of his analysis he accepted the earlier suggestion of Raup and his associates, that efforts should be made, in and out of schools, to systematize and extend use of the model of practical judgment. Following Mannheim, Stanley posed the alternatives of drift or plan. He rejected drift or a piecemeal reform policy as unpractical and internally inconsistent; again, under Mannheim's influence, he repudiated dictatorial and coercive measures, and so concluded that the only defensible policy was to attempt to achieve national social unity and cultural order through consensus (41).

Stanley conceived this order of culture as primarily external to individual men, but it was not simply an institutional arrangement, or,in the eighteenth century style, a new constitution. The order was tp be intellectual-moral, or, as I should prefer, in the light of my discussion, to call it, an ideological order. What Stanley

aspired to achieve was a consistent core, comprising commonly acceptable procedural principles for a democracy, and "a sense of unity growing out of a common world of experience" (42). This was not intended to serve as myth or hallowed law, but a set of criteria against which could be tested particular action programmes and reforms. This core, he argued, was an essential pre-condition of unity in educational policy. At the level of habit and custom, it was to serve as a social stabilizer, like Linton's universals. Principles could be achieved by analysing and refurbishing the American democratic heritage, in particular by translating abstract values and traditional imperatives for conduct and relationships into decision-taking procedures: the procedures of consensus achieved through the method of practical judgment. These procedures would serve as guidelines for future action. Thus, for Stanley, order consists of a unified methodology of decision-taking embodying procedural principles; it does not necessarily comprise a particular pattern of institutions or a single substantive set of social goals.

Since this conclusion did not differ fundamentally from that of Raup and his associates, and since the methodological solution he adopted was broadly in line with Dewey's continuation of scientific method and the democratic ethic, the interest of Stanley's proposals lies more in his detailed defence of the crisis hypothesis and in his elaborations of traditional experimentalist thought than in his very sketchy proposals for a new cultural synthesis.

Stanley, by wholeheartedly accepting the method of practical judgment, exposed himself to the criticisms to be made of that method. However, he kept clear of some of the dangerous attractions of holistic projections of ideal cultures. Whether he avoided them completely may

be doubted, for the proposals he made for a unified and unifying core of experience sound very like a new creed to be expressed in symbols, myths, rituals, and works, and in more theoretical expositions. The school, as an agent of culture, would be forced to choose either to join this expressive movement,and thereby to some extent indoctrinate, or to act as culture critic.

We should also ask whether the translation of the idea of unity of outlook, belief, custom and habit characteristic of a real or imaginary organic community of the past, into the very massive, complex industrial societies of the present, constitutes an adequate solution to the problem of cultural order. In the first place, such a proposal overlooks the actual diversities and disunities within the organic cultures of the past, and invests them with an order which they may have possessed but not to the exclusion of disordering tendencies. For example, the organic culture praised by Leavis and Thompson was a post hoc interpretation of a particular subculture. Within even so circumscribed an entity as a village, what they described was by no means the whole of that village culture. Secondly, order and integration can mean many different things, not simply a unity of outlook or a sharing of ideals: there can be an order of different but reciprocal functions, or a hierarchical order, and neither of these requires a large core of shared values. Indeed, differences in value and outlook may be greater than similarities, in, for example, the order of a functionally integrated industry where all may share a common commitment to the industrial process, but may be very different in other respects. Thirdly, the importance the experimentalists attached to sciences and industry as social transformers suggests that a much more radical step is needed in re-creating order than simply invoking a

past value system and looking for ways to operationalize it in contemporary society. Total cultural order, even if we were to accept that it is needed, must be achieved by a creative attack on present and future problems, and,in the process of renewal, values themselves will change, if not in their schematic outlines, then, much more significantly, in content and experiential significance.

CHAPTER IX

OVERVIEW AND CRITIQUE OF PART ONE

"New things succeed, as former things grow old" (Herrick).

I have now completed the review of the ideas of individual reconstructionists about cultural and social change, and of their methods of culture analysis. Before proceeding to examine their views about the cultural role of education I shall summarize and compare these ideas. I shall also consider some of the more general difficulties and contributions of the reconstructionist position. First, I shall review the argument which led me to approach reconstructionism as an ideological theory. Then I shall summarize and contrast the culture critiques, the proposals for change and the methods of analysis employed. Following this, I shall raise some more general problems and weaknesses in the reconstructionist position, contrasting it with certain other change theories. I shall conclude with a review of the issues raised and attempt to show why we need to turn to the specific educational ideas of the reconstructionists in order to see how they thought culture might and should be developed in the future.

1. Education, Ideology and Culture Theory

1.1 Educational theory

I maintained in the Introduction that theories of education are more or less systematic prescriptions for certain kinds of practice concerning human growth. By exploring the arguments for these prescriptions, the assumptions on which they rest, and the wider institutional, social and cultural contexts to which the prescriptions refer, we may see that educational theorizing implicitly or explicitly advances

a wide range of moral and social ideals. For the purposes of the present study I argued that it is useful to introduce the concept of ideology in considering the wider issues raised by reconstructionist thought. In doing so, I suggested that the term ideology could with advantage be restored to currency in educational thought, since ideological thinking appears to act as a powerful stimulus to action, in addition to providing a coherent theoretical structure. For these very reasons, of course, ideology is a form of thought which is particularly prone to mis-use. Dogmatism, lack of critical self-awareness, self-deception, appeal to irrationality and readiness to adopt the pervasive devices of propaganda, indoctrination and myth-making for purposes of exploitation point to the more obvious dangers.

It may well be argued that a great deal of specific and limited theorizing is and should be carried on in education in what I have termed a value-spare framework; or, at least, that the wider frame of reference can be taken for granted without recourse to debate over ends and purposes. Hence the determination of O'Connor, for example, to direct attention to the empirical issues in educational theory and his argument that we should concentrate on research and on forming sound empirical generalizations. It would be time-wasting and tedious to enunciate and reflect upon, say, the democratic ideology every time one tried to reach decisions about teaching specific types of subject matter, or home-school relationships, or many of the specific questions requiring attention in the ordinary life of the school. Where empiricism is constantly referred to some justifying creed, dogmatism and authoritarianism are also commonly found. Yet, the assumptions and preferences underlying practice, research and policy-making at some point need to be examined if only to bring out confusion, uncertainties

and limitations of thinking. Also, many action proposals tacitly assume assent to highly controversial assumptions about the interests and needs of pupils and teachers.

1.2 Reconstructionism as ideology

But whatever arguments there may be concerning the extent of cultural assumptions underlying the more specific and detailed forms of action, toward which a great deal of contemporary educational theorizing is directed, the theory of reconstructionism is one of those larger syntheses in educational thought which quite explicitly raises questions about the ends of human action. We have seen some of the ways in which political, social, moral, and personal dimensions of experience have been explored by the reconstructionists, very often inadequately, but nonetheless guided by a determination to develop and make interpretative use of general principles of action. Because reconstructionism is a theory or a movement in thought which not only criticizes contemporary life, but plainly prescribes group action for the re-making of institutions and other elements of culture, I suggested that the ideological framework may be very appositely applied in attempting to understand its particular features and claims.

However, a complete ideological analysis of theory calls for a psychological exploration of motives, or of inner meanings, and for a socio-historical account of the origins of ideas and the interests they serve. Instead of embarking on these sorts of Freudian and Marxian enterprises, I have attempted to analyse the ways in which the reconstructionists have interpreted their key concept, that of culture transformation.

1.3 Culture theory

In order to examine reconstructionist thought on culture change, I

classified the variety and complexity of usages of the concept of culture into the two categories of value spare and value laden. This classification is useful in distinguishing qualitative judgments about how culture should develop, from explanations of how cultures do in fact change. Nevertheless, too sharp a distinction would oversimplify the issue, because the apparent value neutrality of empirical studies of culture disguises significant, if not always very explicit, culture preferences. By discussing one or two examples, I tried to show that differences between the classical, prescriptive use of the term culture and the modern descriptive use are matters of degree and emphasis, not of sharp conceptual distinction.

To the distinction between value spare and value laden uses of the term culture, I added a further distinction. This is the distinction between those super-organic theories of culture which are directed towards analysis of pre-existing patterns of meaning, behavior and expectation into which the individual is to be inducted, and those which draw attention to the role of the individual as an active, creative being making his way into these wider systems of action, and, in the process, contributing to the re-making of the culture pattern. In the super-organic theories there is an emphasis on transmission, induction and acquisition: what Ausubel calls receptive learning. In the individual-creative theories, emphasis is on the change that meanings undergo in communication, and on the concepts of growth and inquiry: what Ausubel calls discovery learning (1).

1.4 Reconstructionist strategy of development

The concept of culture, whatever position is taken with respect to these distinctions, has played an important, if not always adequately recognized, part in educational theory. I argued that a broad grouping

of historical theories of education into those directed by the notions of (a) assimilating a heritage of culture, and (b) exploring children's interests within schools that form, as it were, culture islands, provides a way of bringing out the distinctive cultural claims of the reconstructionist theory. To refer back to the two-fold classification of theories of culture, all three types of educational theory are value laden, not value spare. The culture heritage theory features the receptive element of super-organicism, while not denying to individuals a creative role in learning. The child-interest theory of education emphasizes the process of discovery and individual creativity in culture-acquisition and, in some instances, its exponents have deliberately isolated themselves from the wider society in an effort to build up their own sub-cultural identity. Reconstructionism, while not falling neatly between these two, has something in common with both. It does not ignore the cultural heritage, but treats it as a legacy of human experience which is susceptible to re-interpretation, in urgent need of re-appraisal, and incapable of transmission except by being modified in the process. Determined individual or, more often, group action can be effective in reconstituting cultural experience through the mapping out of fresh areas of policy in all the major institutions of society. Culture adaptation, on this view, is a critical, re-adjustive process, not merely an assimilation of the given, or the passive acceptance by the populace of what its leaders decide. The reconstructionists share with the individual interest theorists the view that pioneering groups and individuals - a new type of elite - are needed to try out new ideas. On the whole, the reconstructionists separated this elite from the legislative and executive branches of the state. We shall see, in the following chapters, that the teachers were cast into this

role and the schools committed to the task of leading, or at least actively sharing in, culture transformation.

I discussed the Report of the Kothari committee as an example of the deliberate attempt to shape a country's cultural future in, and primarily through, its schools. The Kothari committee pointed to an urgent and critical culture crisis in India, due primarily to the growing and unsettling social impact of science and technology. They examined the problem of reconciling the claims of modernization with the continuing vitality of a traditional culture. This report is a striking manifestation of one strand of reconstructionist thought - that which sees in education the chief lever of planned change. I raised certain difficulties in discussing this conception, notably: the problems of the relationship of processes of individual education to possibly miseducative elements in the national drive towards modernization; the difficulties of teacher inadequacy and institutional deficiency; and the problems of indoctrination which arise out of the proposal to develop through schooling a new civic culture.

I argued that the Kothari committee, despite, or perhaps because of, the imaginative boldness and vigor of its proposals, had not reached adequate solutions to many of the problems to which its own proposals give rise. Whatever social, political and economic barriers may exist in India itself, and these I did not attempt to discuss, the Kothari proposals revived many of the enduring problems and weaknesses in the reconstructionist theory.

One of the most obvious of these problems arises from the difficulty of reducing the massive institutional and ideational complexities of modern culture to simple generalizations and to models for action. We lack adequate conceptual structures and procedures for generating data

for this purpose, with the result that generalizations and slogans and broad policy objectives are frequently substituted for more detailed analysis. In this situation, the larger concepts of culture, society and development have acquired an inspirational significance which often masks the poverty of infrastructural analysis. Thus talk of re-making a culture, or of developing a new society and of employing the agencies of education to those ends, fails very often tobring out our lack of knowledge, even of the necessary tools of knowledge to undertake these tasks. Numerous practical difficulties are well recognized, but this is not at all the same as recognizing that we lack theoretical models adequate for the range of phenomena encompassed by the all-inclusive concepts of culture and society. To illustrate this point, we may consider the inspirational concept of consensus. The proposal to govern through consensus needs to be examined very closely indeed, since, while it expresses an aspiration of the democratic faith, the forms the aspiration might take will vary considerably in different situations. These forms will be affected by the influence of educational provision, the decision preferences and requirements of an expert-dominated economy and polity, the voice of the masses, the existing apparatus of participation, representation and decision-taking, and the heritage of assumptions and preferances concerning mass involvement in corporate social action. Thus it is by no means clear just how, in a proposed new cultural synthesis, even the single objective of consensus is to be interpreted and how it might express itself. Thus, when reconstructionists invoke consensus ideals, we cannot be sure just what these mean. When particular meaning is given to them this is inevitably partial, as, for example, in the writings of the later experimentalists.

Reconstructionist thinking has typically been incorporated into the development planning of many new nations. This may be regarded as a demonstration of the foresight of its exponents, earlier in the century. The problems are real, and the thinking, for all its inadequacies, is directed towards solving them. This is the optimistic interpretation of reconstructionism, and it suggests that further analysis of the models of social action underlying reconstructionist ideology would be worthwhile. However, there are some commentators who, prophesying the end of ideology, would maintain that reconstructionism is a theory without a future, a movement which has exhausted itself without achieving any very profound or satisfactory resolution of its own inner tensions. The fallacy of a similar prediction made of the future of theories of socialism and communism only a few years before the appearance of The Communist Manifesto should at least induce caution, even if the analogy is far from exact (2). Instead of indulging in these types of predictions we could more fruitfully seek an understanding of the reconstructionist approach by perceiving it as an expression of the ancient and continuing quest for cultural reform which will enable man to organize his experience and feel at ease with the world. The reconstructionists are heirs to the Platonic and enlightenment traditions, in which cultural order is a perennial quest for forms of public thought and social institutions that sublimate impulse and structure experience.

1.5 Holism

Despite considerable variation in emphasis and interpretation, certain common themes stand out in the reconstructionist analyses of culture. Conspicuous amongst these common features is cultural holism, meaning the effort to conceptualize culture as a totality of interconnected

elements and not merely an aggregate of separate systems. Reason, as in the enlightenment, is conceived as a synthesizing, unifying force: the doctrine of Montesquieu, that thought brings about the order of the things which it conceives.

Many of the reconstructionists felt justified in referring not merely to specific sets of problems, but to the crisis of the age, or the threatening breakdown of civilization which thought, at Mannheim's level of planning, could avert. They did not necessarily envisage total collapse, although Wells, Rugg, Mannheim, Brameld and Stanley argued that, unless drastic forestalling measures were taken, there would be complete, but not very clearly specified, chaos. More often, the totality of collapse was seen in terms of key institutions and central areas, or cores, of common experience. Mannheim and the later experimentalists, although they outlined a large number of factors making for breakdown, pointed to social and moral values as comprising the most critical culture realm.

It was the belief of Dewey, Mannheim and others of the later reconstructionists that the emergence of the modern, mass, industrial society had been accompanied by breakdown of the traditional communal assumptions, norms, expectations and beliefs. The central core of culture values, on this view, had been shattered and was in need of rebuilding, to provide a framework for agreed action in a democracy. The Webbs, by contrast, gave greater emphasis to specific deprivation and to the inadequacy of institutional structure, mainly political and industrial, to sustain the demands of an expert-managed democracy. In later life they, too, sought a wider vision and turned to the unities of Soviet communism to provide it. Dewey and Rusell, although more cautious in their use of crisis language than most, thought that

the most serious problem was failure to spread throughout society the values and techniques of scientific humanism, and thereby to achieve at least a common methodology - a unity of rational thought. For them, the cultural short-comings of their times were bound up with ignorance and prejudice, and these could best be dispelled by the universal cultivation through schooling of more critical, reflective forms of thinking. Society was seen to be largely irrational and only the diffusion of rationality as represented in scientific method would correct its mal-functioning.

Wells shared this confidence in the ultimate efficacy of scientific culture, but added to it outraged descriptions of the miseries, meanness and missed opportunities of bourgeois culture. Unlike the experimentalists, who retained a faith in the values, the common sense and the practical shrewdness of the common man, Wells looked upon him as the bruised and dogged survival of a brutal past, who had to be educated out of existence. This attitude towards the average representative of humanity in the industrial society reflected a fear of, and hostility towards, mob power and potential mob rule under demagogic leaders. The masses were an unfortunate consequence of industrialization and had to be diffused, as in the decentralized utopias Wells described, or, in the shorter term, extracted from their intellectually and spiritually impoverished sub-culture and trained into rational humanists.

Mannheim shared this dislike of the masses. Without adopting Wells' ambivalences about elitism, he proposed schemes for the clear division of responsibility in society which would ensure elite dominance of the central areas of cultural development within a system which expressed the democratic criteria of shared experience, widespread participation in policy formation, and high standards of common education. Although

several of the reconstructionists made free use of the minority-mass culture distinction, the task they proposed was not simply the dominance of masses by minorities, in any of the common forms taken by mass-minority culture theories. The reconstructionist determination to build a democratic social order which included roles of innovation and leadership for minorities may be contrasted with traditional elitism: Plato's combining of political authority with intellectual prowess in a rigidly divided class system; the Eliot-Bantock solution of ascribing unique value to mass culture while ensuring that its bearers are excluded from centres of power; the Marxist investment of the proletarian mass with qualities and virtues destined to supersede those expressed in the culture of exploiting minorities; and the counter-culture generations thesis of the young, creative, ascendent minority working towards the transformation of a commercial mass society.

The reconstructionists were by no means unanimous in their proposals for extricating man from the dangerous and evil situations in which they found him. They were unable to resolve the dilemmas produced by seeking to combine into a single prescription for social action the various ingredients of: technical expertise, large-scale planning, individual liberty, participation in corporate decision-taking, innovation, stability, diversity, and common core values. These ingredients were variously combined to produce programmes which ranged from the Webbs' managerial bureaucracy, to Dewey's mildly anarchic theory of the wisdom of the common man, to the arguments by Wells and Brameld for a world state. However, the holism of the more extreme reconstructionists should be distinguished from totalitarianism. This distinction is not adequately maintained by Popper, who, intent on demolishing holistic theory,

used all possible weapons including the charge of totalitarianism. Aron has identified five main elements in totalitarianism which envisage a role for the state quite at variance with the cultural pluralism of the majority of the reconstructionists - even of Mannheim, who came nearest of them all to centralizing power in the elites. Aron's elements are:

1. "The totalitarian phenomenon occurs in a regime which gives to one party monopoly of political activity." (cp. reconstructionist support of multi-party systems.)

2. "The monopolistic party is animated or armed with an ideology on which it confers absolute authority and which consequently becomes the official truth of the state." (cp. reconstructionist critiques of absolutism in thought.)

3. "To impose this official truth, the state reserves for itself in turn a double monopoly, the monopoly of the means of coercion and those [sic] of the means of persuasion. The means of communication, radio, television, press, are directed and commanded by the state and its representatives." (cp. reconstructionists' rejection of coercive-power models of change.)

4. "Most economic and professional activities are subject to the state and become, in a way, part of the state itself ..." (cp. autonomy of education in reconstructionism.)

5. As all activity is state activity and subject to ideology an error in economic or professional activity is by the same token an ideological fault (3).

Turning from the distinction that needs to be drawn between holism and totalitarianism, to the problem of achieving a common culture, a more apt distinction for my purposes than that between mass and minority culture, is that which Hoggart has drawn between "processed" and "living" culture. The former is audience directed; it never imagines individuals, only masses, typical audiences, and status groups. The latter "speaks to individuals or to genuine communities", "has its eye on the subject, the material", and is concerned particularly with

the diversity of experience (4). There are certainly difficulties about this distinction. The same cultural phenomena could appear as "living" or as "processed", depending on one's standpoint - i.e., as producer or perhaps entrepreneur, and consumer; and a single experience may be judged "living", for example by the members of a pop concert audience who have the experience, and "processed", by a critical observer. Nevertheless, the tendency of "living" culture is to involve individuals and communities in explorations, challenges and critiques, and it is in these kinds of enterprises that the reconstructionists intend to find ways of involving not just a minority but whole populations. This means eliminating the massifying characteristics of mass society and replacing them with much more discriminating, diverse, and creative functions for individuals and groups.

1.6 Universal change

The reconstructionists were united in the belief that the most basic characteristic of modern western culture is universal change brought about, sustained and intensified by what they took to be the closely related sub-systems of science, technology and industrialization. They differed from the classical and Christian theorists, who both disdained the particular, unlawlike character of historical events and proposed grand developmental theories of cycles of generation and decay (5). Despite their many affinities with the philosophes of the enlightenment, in particular on the relationship of science and social progress, the reconstructionists did not accept the inevitability of progress. They did, however, take from the enlightenment the idea of the possibility of progress, which depends on a rejection of inevitable decay or inveterate corruptibility (6). Again, the reconstructionists were influenced by the nineteenth century evolutionary theories of Comte,

Spencer, Marx and others, but not to the extent of accepting the doctrines of predictable directions and uniform causes of cultural movement. They were tempted by the historicist theory of inevitability, but, on the whole, abandoned this in favor of the belief that the effects of unpredictable knowledge on events and of the complex interactions of innovations are such as to preclude exact predictions. Wells is a major exception, but it should be noted that his very accurate forecasts did not lead him to advance purely historicist explanations of social change.

The reconstructionists adopted the Marxian argument of the primary importance in social change of modifications in the substructure of industrial and technical processes. Unlike Marx, none of them fully subscribed to a single cause theory, although there is evidence of uncritical acceptance of the technological theory of cultural lag amongst the experimentalists (7). They were far more impressed by evidence of universal and rapid change than by evidence which indicated the strength and endurance of stabilizing factors. But by conceding the persistence of institutions, traditions, customary beliefs and behavior, they admitted that cultural change is not a unitary, and all-pervasive phenomenon. However, none of the reconstructionists was able to explain how differing rates of change impinge upon one another or, indeed, why there should be these differences. They were more interested in so defining change processes as to make them susceptible to a form of human intervention which might make change purposive. This was not to be purposive in any non-naturalistic sense, but change was to be harnessed to the combined, preferably the consensual, purposes, however these were defined, of mankind. Thus the reconstructionists adopted a non-ideational explanation for the origins of the crisis in

culture and proposed a set of ideational controls to stabilize and direct future change. As a consequence of adopting the more extreme form of the ideational theory which attributes to ideas the greatest importance as directors of change, the reconstructionists tended to minimize barriers and difficulties. The virtue of an idea, in change theory, is that it is not limited in space or time by existing institutions or previous experience. The idea can project any and all possibilities, thus converting a determinate, historically-rooted situation into an indeterminate, historically-free situation. But to convert imaginative possibility into specific proposals, as is required to make the situation determinate in the fashion desired, the actual and possible impingements, the deflections and resistances of other idea systems and of other cultural phenomena must be considered. For example, business-men may resist or try to circumvent the requirements of a government credit policy. For the policy to work, it is necessary, if not sufficient, to control these circumventions, and the idea of a credit policy needs to be enlarged accordingly. Ideational theories achieve their imaginative vigor and optimistic tone by minimizing the force of these sorts of resistance and constraint. The reconstructionist theorists, on the whole, were preoccupied with what almost all modern change theorists have come to accept as a centrally transforming dynamic process, namely industrialization (8). Although they outlined various schemes for directing the process of industrialization, they persistently minimized the strength and flexibility of countervailing forces, especially existing institutional arrangements, entrenched customs, and habitual expectations.

1.7 Social control and the future

The crisis of culture diagnosed by the reconstructionists brought

out the need for purposive control. There was indeed a crisis just because mental structures and social systems commensurate with the scale and rate of social change had not been developed. Of all the reconstructionists, Mannheim was the most conscious of the dangers of a reaction into either totalitarianism or calculated indifference. He argued compellingly, if not logically, that if the crisis is total then total measures are needed to control it. I pointed out that in fact the reconstructionists could not consistently diagnose a total collapse, and that they used the idea of total breakdown as a polemical device to justify or to give urgency to the strategy of interventionism. But these total measures, according to Mannheim and to the other crisis theorists, need not and should not entail the loss of the traditional liberal and democratic values of liberty, tolerance, equality of consideration, opportunity for individual development, and so forth. I suggested that Mannheim's proposal for planning for freedom in the form of an elite-directed democracy is far from satisfactory, but that he was nevertheless conscious of and troubled by the problem of reconciling expert planning and individual liberty. All the reconstructionists agreed on the desirability of social planning, although few of them gave any attention at all to the traditional liberal objections to wholesale planning. Instead, like Dewey, they tended to "reconstruct" traditional liberalism and its values into a modern theory of social planning.

Russell, more than any of the others, wished to sustain the traditional liberal tenets of individualism against what he took to be collectivist pressures for joint action, conformity, policy agreement and obedience. But, since he also advocated collective action to achieve the basic policy objectives of universalizing rationality, and since he

advocated various forms of quite elaborate communal relationship, extending to world government, his individualism might be thought to depend rather less on the younger John Stuart Mill's defence of freedom <u>from</u> various restrictions and more on the nineteenth century socialist theories which looked for ways of universalizing and equalizing opportunities in a collective setting. The experimentalists virtually identified the democratic heritage not with individual liberties but with communal and communitarian values; for example Dewey's sharing of experience. They did not, on the whole, protest against the absence of freedom in contemporary society; for example, intolerance and repression. However, they did find inequalities, lack of opportunity for individual expression; and, most frequently, they noted the loss of traditional cohesiveness and unanimity of outlook. Primary communities had been supplanted by a confusing array of impersonal groups, each demanding allegiance and competing for influence in society. To remedy the breakdown of community, there were various proposals ranging from Wells' advocacy of perfect harmony in decentralized, semi-anarchic, world communities, to the development, by the later experimentalists, of the community-binding and character-building instrument of practical judgment. Through this technique of policy making by the organized quest for consensus it was hoped to restore the missing community and to enlarge the shrinking core of basic agreements and value commitments.

Despite the innumerable problems they found in contemporary civilization, the reconstructionists remained optimistic about the future. The Fabians sustained and nourished their optimism by drawing up specific practical reform proposals to alleviate or eliminate the many problems which their researches into the workings of capitalism disclosed. Wells

felt that the crisis of civilization was far more serious than the Fabians' reform proposals signified; not merely were man's institutions inadequate, but his thought and experience were in a condition of intellectual and moral chaos. However, neither he nor any of the Fabians accepted traditional religious ideas about incorrigible human weakness or the redeeming power of grace. Man, if not quite, either as a species or individually, perfectible, is nevertheless capable, himself, of re-organizing his experience and his culture to achieve rationality and happiness in sufficient measure. Nothing short of a massive, organized effort could achieve this, but whether through altruistic elites, or by more widely participatory procedures, the reconstructionists supposed that the desired changes could come about.

This confidence in man's capacity by deliberate thought and action to redirect the main lines of his own future development means that, on the whole, the reconstructionists were not methodological historicists, in Popper's meaning of that term. There are, however, sufficient evidences of historicist influences in their thinking to make it an interesting question how far theymanaged to combine historicist forecasts of social trends with a belief in the powers of unpredictable human knowledge. It is sometimes argued, with logical impeccability but in defiance of the evidence from history, that moral effort depends on our believing that something that is possible will only be realized, or more quickly realized, by our efforts. If we thought something either inevitable or impossible our efforts would be "imbecile" (9). This makes both Calvinism and Marxism, or at least the more deterministic interpretations of them, imbecile. But action theorists, and their followers, seem quite well able to combine a belief in inevitable historical processes with a

much more strenuous commitment to intervention than is to be found in many who entertain non-deterministic views. There is in the feeling of inevitability itself, especially the inevitability of a massive transformation, an incitement to its prophets to involve themselves as agents in the very process whose future they have predicted (10). While there is little evidence of this belief in inevitable historical forces in reconstructionist thought, where it does occasionally occur it in no way leads to an attitude of resigned acceptance of what must be. The reconstructionists found no adequate reason for believing in inevitable collapse or an inevitable future golden age. They thought the former (but not the latter) a possibility, unless very active counter-measures were taken. Of these counter-measures, what they uniformly believed to be the most significant was the universalization of certain kinds of education. Thus the measured optimism of the reconstructionists rests not on any confidence about the inevitable outworkings of history, nor on any expectations of a supernatural kind, nor on any theories hypothesizing innate human goodness, but on the possibilities of individual control and social development through education.

Few of them went so far as Wells in sketching the outlines of a reconstructed human nature in utopia. The "new man", on the whole, remained a shadowy figure, or, as in Mannheim, an uncertain blend of assertive and renunciatory qualities. But there can be no question about the commitment of all of the reconstructionists to what might be called a renovatory theory of human experience. All took the view that experience is susceptible to improvement; hence they were all in a sense progress theorists. Dewey's equation of growth with the reconstruction of experience, and the reconstruction of experience with

processes of reflective inquiry implied an emergent rationality. Most of the reconstructionists, even including some of the experimentalists, separated humanity into that minority from whom much could be expected, and quickly, from this reconstructive process, and the mass or majority from and for whom only much longer term results could be expected. Thus there was no suggestion of a millennial transformation: education is a slow process in individuals, and only slowly permeates a whole culture. But nor was there any admission that the difficulties of the task envisaged were so great as to jeopardize the whole enterprise. Man and cultures could be remade, initially through the enhancement of self-awareness, in the manner outlined by Frank, and,over time, through the mounting impact of a reformed, universal education.

2. Assessment

It is sometimes said that attempts to assess ideologies, especially those whose full realization is projected into the distant future, are confounded by their ethical ambiguities and the impossibility of empirical testing. Be this as it may, there are a number of questions that can be raised, and which it is important to consider, the more so now that reconstructionism is being revived as part of developmental or modernization theory in the newer nations of the world. Several of these questions I have already raised, in relation to the proposals of individual writers. At this stage, before we have considered the educational claims of the reconstructionists, more general questions can only be partial and any answers given must be treated as tentative.

I have selected for discussion what I take to be the more important of these questions. These I shall raise under three main headings:

1. How adequate is the reconstructionist analysis of the culture whose problems they set out to diagnose?

2. Are they justified in claiming that human nature has the degree and type of malleability presupposed by the doctrine of the new man?

3. How effective are their arguments for a model of culture of which directed change is the central feature?

2.1 Diagnosis of culture

The question of adequacy of diagnosis is by no means straightforward. Specific weaknesses abound, and I have commented on many of these. But there are no general criteria of adequacy apart from all the particular sets of criteria embodied in different traditions of inquiry. These traditions are not themselves homogenous, and in the literature of change theory alone there is no agreement, for example, about the relationship of ideational to non-ideational factors. This relationship is particularly important, and in a later section of this chapter we shall consider some alternative theories of culture change. From this there will emerge at least an indication of the complexity of the problem of evaluation. Prior to that, it can be said that two major weaknesses are apparent in most of the reconstructionist theorizing about contemporary culture. The first of them is the lack of an adequate methodology of analysis, and the second is the relative neglect of barriers and resistances to change.

2.1.1 Method of analysis

I have already discussed in particular instances the methodological weaknesses of reconstructionism. They all arise from over-ambitious attempts to establish synthetic, holistic overviews of the totality of culture movement and experience. These attempts are not an extraneous consideration; they are integral to the theory and have been used to demonstrate not only the extent of the crisis but also the possibility

of embarking upon total planning. Such attempts necessarily depend upon schematization and simplification. But schematization and simplification, in situations where detailed, factual knowledge is extremely patchy and there is no established tradition of inquiry within which to work but only a mixture of reformist and particular empirical traditions, inevitably involve a high degree of personal intuition and impressionistic judgment. Of these limitations, the absence of a developed tradition of inquiry is the more serious, since upon it alone depends the amassing and interpretation of data relevant to the problems under review. It is indeed an important contribution of ideological theory, that it provides a direction and a sense of relevance in the gathering and use of data, which is needed if we are ever to succeed in relating policy-making, practice and research as parts of a single system. In education, the practitioner commonly asks about the relevance of research, and is advised to learn to interpret it and apply its findings as best he may. This is for the most part useless advice, the more so as much educational research takes the form not of replication of experiments but of plotting some new territory. Only the researchers, and perhaps not even they, are able to appreciate the significance of fresh inquiry in any given area. Ideological theory runs the very grave risk of using or distorting research to confirm hypotheses, especially those hypotheses agreeable to its own preferences and expectations. If this risk can be avoided, the construction, elaboration and public discussion of defensible ideologies - for example, of rationality, or of democracy - could help to identify issues and questions about which more empirical knowledge is needed if we are to proceed with understanding. This gives to empiricism not only its traditional critical roles of scepticism and refutation but also the

role of illuminator of issues upon which we have committed ourselves to action.

A proposal of this kind is of course potentially dangerous. Wherever culture diagnosis is avowedly motivated by a wish to modify and change in quite substantial ways the material being studied, a very powerful set of interests operates selectively on that material. Thus, the reconstructionists extract "trends" which bear very close resemblance to future directions in which the theorist would like to see culture moving, and counter-trends and movements are given much less notice. In this situation, the strategic importance of the assertion of a crisis is so very great in justifying far-reaching changes that we must ask whether these changes would be justified at all, were there no crisis. Many of the reconstructionists gave, at least by implication, a negative answer to this question: if there were no crisis, the changes would not be justified. There are some significant exceptions to this, notably Dewey, Frank, the Webbs and Raup and his associates. All of these gave other reasons than crisis for culture reconstruction. However, even with these writers there is an emphasis and an urgency in their proposals which derives from their feeling that very profound changes are occurring in western societies and that we need to intervene far more directly and massively than heretofore in order to prevent these changes from becoming destructive in their effects. Thus interventionism is justified not by actual crisis but by the possibility of future crisis.

The concept of crisis is normative in that crisis denotes a condition which one finds troublesome, threatening and unsatisfactory - a condition which one wishes to modify. But, in society, not everyone who studies the problem agrees about what is troublesome, threatening,

etc. This is not merely because everyone is not equally threatened by it, since there exist some objective indices (e.g., stockmarket prices) which might be accepted as an objective measure. The problem is rather the lack of an agreed set of indices and interpretative models to show how serious and far-reaching any crisis may be. For example, given that a culture seldom completely disintegrates except by violent invasion, what sets of indices and models are there to enable us to agree about degrees of overall breakdown? Of course, none of the reconstructionists denied these disagreements. Further, they could reasonably claim to be refining our understanding of the nature of indices, for example, by exploring the relationships in children and youth between material deprivation and subsequent availability for political participation, or the socially repercussive effects of a succession of economic crises. This brings out the point that, just because it is normative and is deployed in a pluralistic culture, the concept of crisis embodies values which are not universally shared. Thus there could only be single models or agreed sets of indices under pure totalitarianism. We are brought back to the problem of different sets of criteria and the impossibility of eliminating all but one set.

The reconstructionists assumed, and attributed to one another, a power of diagnosis altogether beyond the capability of their instruments. They thought that there was very widespread agreement amongst the whole community of those interested in questions of culture development about the reality of crisis. But, as we have seen, there is and can be no such widespread agreement at the level of diagnosis; consequently there must be lack of agreement amongst commentators about what should be done. This is a situation in which methodological exactitude and caution are

extremely important, and those writers, like Mannheim and Stanley, who carefully try to relate their diagnosis to a wider and more diverse community of culture study carry more conviction than the more impressionistic, if more imaginative and comprehensive, writers like Wells, Rugg and Brameld. Two things are very clearly needed: first, the use of more comparative materials, particularly those yielded by other frames of reference; for example, systematic comparison of one change theory with another (as recommended and, indeed, in a limited way, undertaken by Rugg and Brameld); the use of historical materials which show how "crisis" has been understood and reacted to in other circumstances; and the effort to rebut rather than confirm one's crisis diagnosis, by the search for contrary indications; second, and as a consequence of the first suggestion, more analytic methods are required; for example, those recommended by Brameld, but not, unfortunately, used by him, except when he studied other cultures than American. These methods cannot be purely empirical, for the reasons I have given. They will involve the use of skills of synthesis and interpretation as well as incorporating the morally judgmental element which, I have suggested, the very definition of terms in this field requires.

2.1.2 Barriers to change

The second major question I wish to raise about the reconstructionist diagnosis of culture is: did they observe any barriers and obstacles to change in the culture whose problems they diagnosed? The answer to this has been partly given already, in that,by interesting themselves in trends which pointed towards the outcomes and results they desired, the reconstructionists tended to overlook or to minimize the power of countervailing forces. This was a general tendency of their thought but

it must be qualified in certain respects. The Fabians, at least in the earlier stages of permeation, were very well aware of political and social opposition and indifference. Dewey was always very conscious of a variety of authoritarian tendencies in American life which militated against the realization of his ideals of a sharing of experience and the elimination of class barriers. Russell's theory of impulses recognized some of the psychological barriers to the changes he desired. Wells railed constantly against the ignorance and stupidity, which he had to propose ways of eliminating or controlling in order to achieve the utopian society.

Many such exceptions can be cited, yet the overall optimism of the reconstructionists, and their concentration on what they supposed were remediable factors, led them to minimize or ignore other factors not so amenable to control by their methods. These factors, to mention some of those widely discussed in contemporary culture change literature, include: population increase and movement; nationalism; alternative ideologies such as Christianity, and communism; unconscious and unreasoning factors within the psyche; institutionalized interest groups, such as trade unions, management associations, professional groups; the infrastructure of governmental administration, including the civil service; the force of habit and tradition; and alternative theories of social change.

I can find no evidence of these and similar factors being seriously assessed as sets of major structural and methodological barriers standing in the way of implementation of reconstructionist proposals. For example, population change was admitted as a factor of change in culture, but just how far the structure and mobility of a population might complicate the implementation of reconstructionist proposals was overlooked, unless we

count Mannheim's generational theory of the innovative power of youth as an adequate recognition of the population factor. Bramold has drawn attention to the problem of barriers to change, but, as yet, the reconstructionist theory has not been suffused with the new awareness and it may be justly criticized for proposing system-wide changes without adequately considering system-wide resistance to change. Recent developments in organizational theory and the theory of innovations are beginning to yield the necessary understandings, so that any future formulations of reconstructionism should be able to offer a far more systematic account than in the past of those cultural factors which predictably will inhibit specified change processes.

2.2 Claims about the malleability of human nature

The second set of questions I wish to raise concerns the degree of malleability presupposed in the doctrine of the "new man". These questions could be pursued indefinitely and inconclusively. I shall restrict myself to a few specific objections, which I shall preface with a passage of passionate criticism:

> "'above all, when I hear people speak of reshaping life it makes me lose my self-control and I fall into despair.
>
> 'Reshaping life! People who can say that have never understood a thing about life - they have never felt its breath, its heart - however much they have seen or done. They look on it as a lump of raw material which needs to be processed by them, to be ennobled by their touch. But life is never a material, a substance to be moulded. If you want to know, life is the principle of self-renewal, it is constantly renewing and remaking and changing and transforming itself, it is infinitely beyond your or my inept theories about it.'" (11)

Three limiting factors which the reconstructionists neglected in their assumptions about malleability are: individual heredity, the effect on adulthood behavior of early childhood experience, and the emotional and institutional strength of traditions, both sub-cultural

and national. They have good reasons for wishing to minimize the significance of these factors, since to admit them as significant in determining human performance and beliefs is thus far to restrict the claims of reconstructionism to make a significant difference to culture through educational reform. If it were the case that all forms of intelligence were wholly inherited and incapable of significant modifications through the environmental manipulation of one or several generations, then a change agent would be prudent to restrict his claims about human malleability to factors other than intelligence. In Brave New World style he might begin to take a great interest in possible ways of intervening in the processes by which inherited characteristics are transmitted. Since, after the fashion of Godwin, they generally believed that intelligence is largely an environmental function, the reconstructionists were neither prudent in the manner suggested, nor did they succumb to any temptations to take a more direct route to their desired goals by interesting themselves in biological engineering. Shaw is a possible exception to the latter point, but he is the only one, and even he failed to adopt those manipulations for which totalitarian behaviorists have been savagely satirized by Huxley and Orwell.

However, the more optimistic reconstructionists failed to show how their arguments about malleability were affected by the findings of the emerging sciences of genetic psychology and cultural anthropology. While their proposals were, on the whole, either so general or pitched so far into the future as to be unaffected by any particular empirical findings on biological and cultural inheritance, a theory which claimed to be naturalistic and laid so much stress on the universal application of the scientific method too readily discounted or ignored highly relevant evidence. Just how far even those who were engaged in the frontiers of the

science of human behavior were constrained by their findings is another matter. Freud, for example, argued that cathartic experience in the individual is necessary for him to use his cognitive and moral faculties to assess himself calmly and objectively - to acquire rational control over himself. His own therapeutic practice was built on this idea, and through it the analyst provided opportunity for catharsis. This therapy was long drawn out and arduous and of necessity it could reach only a fraction of those who needed it, not as a cure for neurosis, but as a form of self-knowledge. It might seem, then, that rationality was a faint light in society which could hardly be sustained under the pressure of all the irrational forces of the psyche and of civilization. Yet, so far from despairing, Freud believed that the scientific culture is not an illusion and that through science we can gain objective knowledge of ourselves and of the world. Thus the enormous scope which in Freud's thought the unconscious and the irrational achieve is yet limited by the power of rational thought and the culture of science. By contrast, other writers, like Nietzsche, Sorel and Pareto, who laid stress on the permanent role of unconscious and unreasoning elements in society, placed little confidence in schemes for rational social reconstruction. From a very different starting point, Freud reached a conclusion similar to Russell's and Dewey's: man is capable of dispelling illusions and controlling irrational forces in the psyche, and science provides him with a model (12).

The reconstructionists operated with a much less complex model of human behavior than was to be found in the psychological schools. First, they tended to reduce the diversity of experience to the single mode of cognitive self- and society-awareness. This was not so much a matter of definite exclusion as of emphasis. Not even all forms of cognition

or symbolizing were emphasized. On the whole, it was a scientific or, more broadly, a rationalistic mode of cognition that most interested the reconstructionists. Again, there were exceptions, notably Wells and Rugg, and, not altogether consistently, Mannheim. Second, the reconstructionists tended to assimilate individual differences to one of two models. For Dewey, individual difference was overlaid by the cultural blanket of the common man, a peculiar mix of a homely frontiersman and a rational humanist. For Mannheim, individual differences were frequently reduced to mass-identity and elite-identity. At least, these were discernible tendencies in the thought of these writers. Both explicitly argued for educational programmes which would encourage individual initiative and creativity. They rejected traditional theories of individualism because, they claimed, these theories posited an unreal distinction between individual essence and the external world and thus failed to explain how character interacts with surroundings. But the new individualism they proposed runs the risk of assimilating differences and variety to homogeneity of experience. The texture of diverse experience, the idiosyncratic qualities of personality, the realm of personal awareness, taste, and value are not discounted but, because of the attention given to larger culture features and processes, they fade into a very distant background. When this fading takes place, it becomes easier to assume that human experience is contingent on those environmental factors which are susceptible to manipulation. There is in some of the reconstructionists a tendency to break experience into manageable elements, e.g., concepts and sensations, and to neglect the totality and integrity of the self in experience. This atomization is in marked contrast to the reconstructionists' emphasis on the interrelatedness of elements in culture. Also, it may seem a strange comment

to make in view of Dewey's very powerful formulation of the interactionist theory of experience. However, Dewey's interactionism, while it does not preclude intra-psychic interaction, addresses itself mainly to the individual's cognitive relationship with outer events; hence his argument that practice rather than contemplation provides us with the right conditions for testing ideas.

2.3 . Directed culture change

The process of assimilating diversity of experience to a single mode is most marked in those writers whose quest is for cultural unity, namely, Wells, Mannheim and Stanley. In these writers, malleability of human nature is linked with malleability of culture, and both are directed by the ideals of harmony and unity.

It may be admitted that the concepts of integrity of personality and of the social system presuppose some harmony and unity. However, the concepts of personal and social systems do not presuppose the elimination of tensions and disunity. Apart from the tensions involved in appetites and their satisfaction, there are ineluctable tensions in cognitive experience. These may be inferred from the symbolic systems which presuppose in individuals some kind of mental disunity. For example, moral reasoning, as distinct from the unthoughtful application of rules, includes the reconciliation of conflicting or disparate preferences and values. Thus the quest for order and unity in experience and society cannot proceed at all without acknowledging the social and personal significance of disunity. Dewey's moral theory acknowledges this by giving central importance to uncertainty, reflectiveness, and moral appraisal, although, as we have seen, his quest is for reconciliation of differences and it involves the ultimate absorption of all the reflective processes into a single thought system.

The reconstructionist quest for order and for the effective dominance by rationalistic science of all other modes of experience raises problems which conservative theorists have been quick to seize upon. However, the reconstructionists had no difficulty in demonstrating that the conservative attitudes towards cultural change themselves cannot be sustained without strong interventionist action. The supposed "common life" of the past, the slow maturing of traditions of thought, these have already been seriously disrupted, if not undermined, by the impact of technology, by urbanization, mass culture, and the catastrophic events of war and economic depressions. Thus the reconstructionists rightly argued that the preservation of a traditional culture could no longer be taken for granted. Preservation itself becomes a matter of active intervention and the argument shifts from the desirability of change as such to questions about the re-direction and tempo which might be given to changes that are occurring.

It is difficult to understand why some of the reconstructionists should have sought, not merely to participate at certain key points in the processes of culture renewal, but to engage in what in retrospect appear as futile and even absurd efforts to design a new cultural synthesis. I have already suggested that the speculative reconstructionists have played a valuable part in projecting images of a possible future, and it may be that for their images to appear as recognizable cultural entities some grand, unified vision of the future had to be presented.

Those thinkers, like Mannheim, Stanley and Brameld, who did not project grand images of the future, but argued for a method for establishing the unity of values and of modes of thought, were reacting sharply to the ambiguities, uncertainties, and confusions of their own societies. The personal and social problems created by these disunities are serious,

but do not of themselves establish the need for either a substantial unified core of cultural values and aspirations or for total planning. Beyond the minimal procedural virtues of a democracy - for example, tolerance, freedom from various constraints, and rationality - there is in a pluralist society room for much disagreement about desirable forms of experience. Methods of reconciling differences are needed, but, for united action to occur, shared assumptions are perhaps required, but not unanimity at the level of social-moral values. This has been demonstrated in education by Maritain, who strongly disagreed with Dewey's naturalistic metaphysics, and the foundations of his epistemology and ethics (13). Yet Maritain was able to show how, despite this disagreement over matters of theory, he shared many of Dewey's educational ideas. This could mean, as is sometimes asserted, that there is no clear entailment of educational by philosophical beliefs. What is more probable is that Maritain shares with Dewey many assumptions and values which are never formally stated as philosophical propositions. It is perhaps from these that agreement on educational matters stems, and this is the strength of the Mannheim-Stanley case for attempting to rebuild at any rate a limited common core of procedural principles and values.

The selection, simplification and comparison required, if a synthetic overview is to be intelligible, is difficult to achieve without lapsing into abstractness, a thinness of analysis, and extreme partiality. The more obvious problems of the present and immediate past are likely to receive attention at the expense of more subtle, deeply rooted and less tangible considerations. There is, as conservationists remind us, a tacit element in a tradition - for example, a local craft technique such as that of the dry stone wall construction which, in Gloucestershire,

appears to have been in continuous use since the Megalithic period. It has been transmitted informally, and only occasionally, until recently, given foreground status as a self-contained, deliberate and prized activity. A more explicit and tool-affected set of crafts are those involving the utilitarian use of wood. Leavis and Thompson, unlike more romantically-minded preservationists, correctly grasped the principle of continuity in woodcrafts, by proposing that aesthetic, technical, communal and other ideals embodied in particular forms of wood use (the wheelwright's shop) are values which should be expressed in new forms as tools, materials and social contexts change. Within the innovative traditions of science, technology, industrialization and mass communications, a different set of problems arises, since what is old and established is forever being challenged or simply bypassed by the new and the hypothetical, thus requiring a very explicit, conscious and rational control as a governing condition of the continuity and, indeed, survival of these traditions.

These three aspects of the problem of culture continuity and renewal have enough in common for us to talk, as the reconstructionists have done, about <u>the</u> problem of cultural change; but the differences between them, while no less important, are easily overlooked in proposals to synthesize a new culture. They express different degrees and forms of cultural continuity and plasticity. The task of ensuring continuity amidst change demands different sets of procedures for different subcultures, a point which the holistic overviews of culture renewal have unduly neglected.

These problems of culture change, it is important to note, if they have not been solved, have not been created by the reconstructionists. The common life, that Oakeshott extols, has been disrupted; many of the

tacit elements in culture are threatened; once-stable institutions are in upheaval; and, with the emergence of mass and pop (as distinct from the Hogarth type of popular) culture, older forms of culture experience have been disrupted and challenged (14).

We may be living, as the reconstructionists claim, in an era of unparalleled complexity and confusion of thought and action. There are undoubtedly many contenders for dominance of what might be termed the cultural heartland in modern societies. These contenders include the totalitarian state, with its ambition to politicize culture; the commercial beneficiaries of popular and mass culture with their ambition to dominate consumer markets; various schools of traditional and preservationist thought wishing to stabilize and contain change; and the exponents of various forms of high culture, scientific, humanistic, literary and so forth. The reconstructionists are themselves one such contending group and they, no less than the others, must be confronted by the challenge to substantiate their authority and demonstrate their responsibility. As we have seen, the reconstructionists have repudiated as sources of authority the doctrines of supernaturalism, so-called laws of historical inevitability, the consciousness of the working classes, and any form of moral and political absolutism. The sole, ultimate source of authority in Dewey and Russell is a rational method of inquiry from which they claimed to be able to deduce minimal moral values. Stanley, Rugg and the other advocates of practical judgment operationalized this method and argued for its universalization at the level of social policy-making. But most of the reconstructionists built more elaborate and less defensible authority structures, converting what is essentially a critical, sceptical, exploratory <u>method</u> into a set of <u>doctrines</u> ascribing to intellectual elites, of whom they themselves are members, special

virtues of knowledge and understanding. The American advocates of the authority of the instrumental procedures of reflective inquiry claimed that to these procedures should be added the authority of the democratic heritage. This heritage could not have survived unaltered into a present society so drastically disrupted as to be in a condition of crisis. In some measure, this heritage had to be reconstituted and assessed before it could provide suitable myths and concrete values to serve as guides to future action. Such uses of the past or of a heritage amount to mystification: what is being appealed to is the sentiment of nostalgia, and what is obscured by this appeal is that the authority no longer resides in the heritage but has been effectively assumed by those who re-interpret and use the heritage; in other words, the elite of culture critics and synthesizers. I do not see any alternative to this re-interpretative use of the past, in periods of rapid and widespread change, but it is surely better to acknowledge that we are re-interpreting and remaking rather than to claim authority as guardians of a substantially intact heritage.

The more constructive and speculative reconstructionists encountered another difficulty in projecting the outline and some of the substance of the ideal society. There is no scientific way of testing these structures save by implementation, and we should need to have very strong reasons indeed for embarking on them since the changes required are virtually irreversible. This does not mean accepting Durkheim's admonition, to intervene only when "everything is not all it ought to be", correcting, partially improving, but never replacing. Nor are Popper's piecemeal reformism and methodological individualism adequate to problems which by their nature are complex and far-reaching - e.g., decisions about major roads, housing subsidies, or the structure of tertiary

education. The reconstructionists are right to maintain that tinkering and unco-ordinated effort solve limited problems, create others in doing so, and make no significant impact on or contribution to the resolution of wider problems. Thus, decisions on road routes, if taken by a special interest group (e.g., a highway department) are likely to produce roads at the cost of a variety of other amenity considerations no less socially significant than efficient transport. Some set of procedures between the piecemeal and the holistic seems to be required. If these are to satisfy the criteria of participation by interested parties, responsibility for policy decisions must be neither fully centralized nor fully decentralized, and certainly not wholly vested in technical elites and political representatives, since these provide no assurance that all the relevant interests will be spoken for. One warning provided by experience of twentieth century totalitarianism is that, once in process of implementation, new structures are protected from criticism and critics are branded heretics, or diagnozed as diseased, to be either imprisoned or subjected to a cure.
An additional point is that unintended consequences are likely to accompany any change, so long as we are unable to control all the factors in the situation. The more speculative reconstructionists, while bent on demonstrating the evil, and often unintended, consequences of the system of actions they opposed, gave too little attention to the assessment, as distinct from the promulgation, of their culture models. But we should not concentrate exclusively on the dangers of centralized power and neglect the problems of local initiative. Desegregation of racially separated school systems was not achieved in the United States without Supreme Court and national government intervention. Local community control in education is now being ardently supported by critics of

of monolithic central government, but local option would certainly mean, in many areas, increased racial segregation. Thus neither concentration of decision-taking power, nor diffusion, of themselves solve these problems. In both cases, more general sets of criteria are required. The reconstructionists who proposed using the schools as means of building up new cultural syntheses, at least by implication, have committed themselves to the risky enterprise of cultural canvas-cleaning and repainting. Beyond a certain point of unanimity of outlook and policy agreement there is danger of excessive conformity. Yet, without some general acceptance of procedural principles, neither social life nor the community pursuit of various forms of excellence is possible. Continuous and intelligent adjustment is required to maintain a balance between co-ordination of effort and diversity of experience.

2.4 Alternative theories

The reconstructionist theory, taken as a whole, provides no definite and agreed solutions to the problems of defining forms of worthwhile community effort which avoid the extremes of conformity and chaos. But the theory raises many of the relevant issues and it has successfully identified some of the major factors of which the continuing search for solutions should take account. Have other culture change theorists been any more successful? I can attempt only a very sketchy reply to this question, and in doing so I shall refer to some of the issues raised in Chapter III.

2.4.1 Durkheim and Marx

In Chapter III we saw that Durkheim, in his attempt to establish a logical distinction between psychological individualism and sociology, tended to elevate "social facts" into a realm virtually beyond human

intervention. Man was reduced as an object of sociological analysis to a performer of roles, and morality converted into the disciplined observance of the rules and prescriptions of the social group. While this theory may account for the existence of social order and solidarity, it is difficult to see how it avoids relativism or provides significant scope for individual action. In Parsons' interpretation, Durkheim is resuscitated and praised for grasping the social quality of constraint and for conceiving the social:

> "as consisting essentially in a common system of rules of moral obligation, of institutions, governing the actions of men in a community" (15).

This theme, of the unifying, constraining and directing power of fundamental social-moral rules, was explored by the reconstructionists, and has continued to appear, most recently in Mannheim's and Stanley's writings. Durkheim's perception of the problem of transmitting and developing these basic rules was, however, very different from that of the reconstructionists. For him, there was, it appears, hardly any problem of cultural continuity: the fundamental rules, together with the institutions and traditions enshrining them, and the roles in which they are expressed, define the structure of social action. In this kind of theory, the problem is not to show how continuity may be maintained, but to explain the possibility of innovation and individuality, and to justify the moral authority which society exercises. Those who conceive the individual, in Frank's terms as a remaker of culture, are dismissed as "victims of the illusion of having ourselves created that which actually forced itself from without" (16).

Marx and the Marxists have been the most vehement critics of capitalist society for separating man from his work, and his ideas and thoughts from his productive processes (17). The fashionable

currency of the concepts of reification and alienation is attributable to other sources in addition to Marxism, but it is not relevant to my argument to pursue these sources. By drawing attention to the forces and means of material production processes, their shaping power over individual thought and experience and their impact on the class structures of society, Marx dealt what he thought was a decisive blow at the traditions of rationalistic optimism and atomic individualism. Durkheim followed up this attack with his own onslaught on both traditional individualism and on utopianism. Thus, twentieth century social thought has been presented, by two of its most influential precursors, with orientations which minimize the freedom of creative individuals, limit the scope of rational planning, and deride visionary and speculative thought. It is against these powerful systems of thought that we should consider the utopian rationalism of reconstructionist theory.

According to Marx, whatever may be expected of man's spiritual development when the proletariat finally seizes power and inaugurates the era of true history, for the foreseeable future, man as a spiritual and free individual is submerged in class struggles, the "therapy" of violent confrontations, and the onward momentum of vast technological forces, which shape his thought and action. Marx's theory does not entirely exclude intellectual freedom in the transitional era, but restricts it to the economically educated intellectual and those of the working class he is able to retrieve from the confusion, like Plato's luminaries dragging one or two of the chained figures from the cave. Much play is made by certain commentators on the younger Marx's argument for a human capacity to intervene to affect the transition of society from one stage to the next, and of the older Marx's eventual

acknowledgment that the "inevitable" laws of development are specific to particular times and places. Nevertheless, in addition to seeking interstices in the theory into which we can insert rational initiatives by individuals and groups, we should recall that those who advocated transitional forms of constitutional socialism were savagely attacked by Marx and Engels, and that the method of intervention which Marx conceded was not that of rational argument and constitutional reform, but violence and subterfuge. The vehemence of Marx's criticism of his predecessors and his socialist contemporaries does not prevent us from appreciating the continuity of his thought with earlier socialist theory (e.g., St. Simon, Fourier, Proudhon) and the subsequent assimilation of certain of his ideas by non-revolutionary theories, especially those ideas which concern industrial change, and the historical and practical significance of thought. In mainstream Marxism, man is reduced to the level of consciousness appropriate to and consequent on material productive processes and to a level of political activity in which revolutionary violence is the only appropriate instrument (18). Furthermore, by reducing ideologies to the expression of material interest, Marx reduced thought in all save its Marxist form to a common measure of illusion and error.

Classical Marxist theory is one kind of evolutionary theory of social change: a theory of historically determined instability for which Marx prophesied an eventual termination in a classless utopia. The dialectical processes of history express themselves in the evolution of productive processes, the disruption of productive relations and a continuing struggle of the classes, in which the capitalist is no less a victim than the proletarian. Within these productive processes, highly significant innovations occur. Thus, work is a source not only of

economic value, but of cultural innovation. We may detect in this emphasis on the culturally generative power of the industrial processes one source of the reconstructionist arguments about the transforming influence of industrialization. But Marx treated even those who innovated in work processes as instruments of wider historical processes, spiritually, morally and intellectually unfree in any condition of society short of a classless utopia. For the reconstructionists, the scientists and technologists were not instruments of inexorable historical trends, but engineers of the future, rather as, for a short time, they appeared to be under Lenin. Marx briefly toyed with the idea of an elite of disinterested, benevolent leaders who would guide the revolution and educate the proletariat, but he subsequently abandoned this idea on the grounds that the elite would be powerless in the face of a hostile regular army and an untrained, supine proletariat, an insight which later change theorists might have taken more to heart. The proletariat themselves would have to become aware of their mission, but it appears that this could only occur as a consequence of historical evolution. They would ultimately perceive the truth of their situation. This they have not succeeded in doing, to the despair of their intellectual mentors, who, even today, are still hoping for a realization by the proletariat of their historic mission.

Undoubtedly Marx had a keener sense and a profounder knowledge of the difficulties confronting change agents than had the reconstructionists. He rejected the composite, knowledge-based elite as a significant agency for change, but in appealing to the practical intelligence of the proletariat,and by stressing the revolutionary significance of a knowledge of historical processes, he was not so opposed to educational solutions

as might appear at first glance. We may note other similarities between Marxism and reconstructionism. Dewey believed in the special insights into history yielded by labor and incorporated what looks like a Marxist interpretation of labor-understanding into the system of occupations developed by the German Idealist, Froebel, for the education of young children (19). There are other similarities and points of contact arising from the common origin of large parts of the two theories in nineteenth century German Idealism and socialism (20). Despite Marx's criticism of the optimistic enlightenment doctrine,that ideas decisively influence history, his own theory has contributed to this end. The reconstructionists in varying degrees shared his hostility to capitalist society, but, except for the Webbs, they did not share his remarkably detailed knowledge of its workings. They uniformly repudiated violence and attributed to education the long-term impact on thought and action that Marx attributed to the inevitable, historically-determined succession of capitalism by socialism.

The reconstructionists rejected the more grotesque vulgarizations of Marxism in Soviet propaganda, which sees history as a morality play acted by the wicked bourgeois and the virtuous proletariat. They condemned dogmatism, violence, and, with occasional exceptions, deliberate incitements to class-based antagonism. But, of all the differences between the two positions, that which is most significant is the role each ascribes to the educated individual and community as remakers of their own culture. In this respect, we may link Marx and Durkheim as nineteenth century critics of utilitarianism, ethical individualism and individual rationality. By contrast, the reconstructionists attempted to rebuild the enlightenment and individualist

philosophies in part on the basis of the social awareness provided by the Durkheimian and Marxist critiques. Thus, the very real and important differences notwithstanding, there are fundamental continuities between these starkly deterministic nineteenth century theories and the benevolent rationalism of the reconstructionists.

Parallels and contrasts might be drawn with other macro-sociological theories. In Chapter VI, I drew a contrast between Dewey's and Weber's views on democracy. There are interesting parallels between Weber's ideas on the innovative role of the charismatic leader and the elitism of Wells, Rugg and Mannheim. Similarly, the elite theory of Pareto was a powerful influence on Mannheim's thought, as were the discussions of irrationality in Sorel's Reflections on Violence and Freud's later cultural writings. The American reconstructionists have been strongly influenced in their views on "culture lag" by Ogburn. Their inchoate economic thought derives partly from William George and from Veblen. In proposing a directing role for organized intelligence in human affairs, they were rejecting the highly influential teachings of Sumner. However, in concluding this discussion of alternative approaches to the problem of culture change, instead of attempting to explore further parallels and contrasts with macro-theory, I shall make a brief reference to some of the more recent empirically-grounded change thinking.

2.4.2 Samples from recent change theory

Some of the recent empirical thought on change processes has in part developed from the work of the later experimentalists, as efforts have been made to reduce general ideas about group participation to the particular strategies of group dynamics (21). This is part of the larger movement in the social sciences away from primarily normative

and toward primarily empirical inquiries. There is a close resemblance between many of the current models in system theory and organizational theory and Dewey's outline of the stages of reflective thinking. For example, in Planned Organizational Change, a content analysis of some two hundred research studies on organizational change, Jones proposed six major interacting elements in the change process: change agent; client system; goals; strategies and tactics; structuring of change; evaluation. The tasks he set change agents are similar to those proposed in Mannheim's analysis of planning and by Raup and his associates in their discussion of practical judgment (22).

Another influential study of innovation research, Rogers' The Diffusion of Innovations, sharpens a distinction of which the reconstructionists might have made more use: the distinction between change that is new to a system and that which consists in the wide diffusion of what is already there (23). In cultural terms, an innovative change occurs when, for example, a new kind of institution, like the London School of Economics, is first established in a society; a non-innovative diffusion occurs when the values and procedures the institution was established to promote are diffused through all relevant parts of the culture. The distinction is by no means clearcut, but it is a useful one for reformers who, in order to effect large-scale changes, need to consider the problems of suffusing a total system with whatever changes they have in mind. This emphasis on innovation, as Rogers shows, owes much to the growth of advertizing in a mass society and to the application of science in industry and agriculture. These developments have rapidly accelerated since the earlier years of the reconstructionist movement, as have the now numerous studies of the processes of political modernization and political socialization which

have followed the end of the colonial era. We should not be surprised, therefore, that, by contrast with these developments, the reconstructionists seem to have touched very lightly indeed on problems of innovation, diffusion, and the infrastructural problems of political development. The basic argument of reconstructionism in relation to empirical inquiry and specific policy proposals is that which is common to all ideological theorizing: action always occurs in a cultural context: it presupposes preferances and embodies judgments of value. Assumption about this context, these preferences of judgments from time to time need to be made explicit and justified. Whatever their particular weaknesses, the reconstructionists have effectively challenged educational thinkers to make their own position clear. How well they have succeeded in developing an educational theory of their own is a question which we shall consider in the following chapters.

PART TWO

CHAPTER X

EDUCATION: CONCEPTS, OBJECTIVES AND PROCESSES

The reconstructionists looked to the agency of schooling and the processes of education as the chief means for achieving the renewal of culture. In trying to see what they meant by what on the face of it appears to be an absurd claim for a single cultural sub-system to make about the whole of culture, I shall consider the answers given by the reconstructionists to three questions. First, is education defined by and through whatever takes place in schools? Second, if it is not to be defined simply by reference to schooling, to what does the reconstructionist concept of education refer? Third, is cultural renewal a process governed by clear objectives and, if so, who determines these; or does it refer to procedural principles not necessarily related to a clear goal and, if so, how are these principles or criteria validated?

The reconstructionists unanimously rejected the equation of schooling and education. Their rejection took two forms. First, and most obviously, they defined education normatively: for them the term education refers to certain desirable processes, many of which are not as yet to be found in schools. Second, other agencies than schools educate, and some of them are of greater strategic significance for cultural renewal than is the school system alone.

1. Kilpatrick and Dewey on the Good Life, Growth and Experience

Whatever processes it embraces, and I shall discuss these below in greater detail, education for the reconstructionists is a good whose pursuit ought to be one of the highest aspirations of culture. Education,

as they usually defined it, refers to fundamentally important and valuable human activities; it is life-enhancing, not life-destroying; it ministers to the "good life"; it is a qualitatively defined growth process, a development of valuable dispositions; it sets standards for judging other activities; it is an achievement of understandings and of values which are worth possessing and aspiring towards. To be educated is better than to be uneducated. The reconstructionists agreed with John Stuart Mill: Socrates may be troubled by his knowledge of the dangerous world in which he lives, but his state of awareness is nevertheless preferable to and more to be sought after than the pig's unawareness, however pleasurable the pig may find his ignorance. Not that education is to be precisely equated with acquiring formal knowledge, or even cognition, although these do feature prominently in most reconstructionist definitions. There are other worthwhile forms of experience, such that the more typical of the reconstructionist accounts refer to a comprehensive ideal of excellence, an attempt to embrace a wide range of modes of experience and forms of knowledge in a unified culture ideal.

1.1 Kilpatrick: the good life

Kilpatrick saw education as the attaining of freedom to be one's "best self", which is not the same thing as a hypothetical natural self:

> "Education must aim at developing in the individual the best possible insights into life's problems as they successively present themselves before him; at helping him to make ever finer distinctions in what he does, to take more and more considerations ever better into account, and finally to bring the best social-moral attitudes to bear on each decision as made or enacted. For the only proper aim of education is fulness of living through fully developed character" (1).

What Kilpatrick meant by this expansive but rather vague ideal of personal fulfilment he outlined in his concept of the "good-life". This

is an eclectic ideal, combining all the major forms of symbolic expression with personal adjustment and satisfying inter-personal relations. Furthermore, it is an ideal not merely of individual but of social "best self". Kilpatrick, however, failed to consider either the problem of opposition of parts and of priorities, created by his method of eclectic combinations, or the social question of alternative theories of "best self". He did not attempt to provide arguments to justify his aim, nor did he seek to identify process criteria with which we could test any given claim to be pursuing the good life. Still, the overall intention of his reconstructionist strategy is clear: it is not by direct political action, nor by the contriving of models of a future society, that the school is to make an impact. Rather it is through the creation of communities of children who are brought to experience in their school lives the forms of awareness, knowledge and action which they will be expected to display as adult citizens. Education is to be "through living" and "for living" in the sense that schooling is not confined to cognitive development but provides opportunities for the critical exploration of a wide range of common human activities.

1.2 Dewey: growth and experience

Dewey's concept of growth, upon which Kilpatrick built his notion of a life good to live, gives rise to problems similar to those I have mentioned above. However, the difficulties in Dewey's theory are not a consequence of failure to grapple with the issue of qualitative determination of the constituents of satisfactory growth.

In his many efforts to explain what he intended by the term education, Dewey gave central place to a set of inter-related concepts: experience, reconstruction of experience, interest, growth, and community. For him,

unlike some of the other reconstructionists, education need serve no ends nor satisfy any criteria other than those which are internal to the concept of education itself, in order to act as a great transforming force in society. It is the continuous reconstruction of experience, within "embryo communities", which ensures individual growth and a constant criticism and reconstruction of all the domains of culture. For this purpose, no blueprints or models of cultural synthesis are needed. A successful education is one which develops the dispositions to act in such a way that reflective inquiry becomes second nature. To universalize reflective inquiry, which was Dewey's ambition for education, is revolution enough, without turning the school into a missionary reform agency (2).

Dewey defined experience as an interactive process (3). Individuals and groups act upon the world, habitually or reflectively. They undergo various consequences of their actions in the world. These consequences are perceived and felt and perhaps reflected upon. The awareness yielded by these responses provides a basis for fresh ideas and plans for future action and there develops a continuous cyclic process of acting, being acted upon, reconstituting ideas and reacting on environment. On this account, experience is a process which unifies contemplation, critical thinking, habitual response, various forms of physical activity, and the perceived environment. There are no completely separate realms, e.g., of contemplation, or perception, but each is intelligible only by reference to the others. Consequently, there is no separate and distinct human experience which we could call contemplation; or, at least, we won't understand or secure the advantages of the contemplative act without considering the issues and questions of practice to which contemplation, according to Dewey, always refers. With characteristic

ambiguity, in discussing his theory of experience, Dewey vacillates between description and analysis of the acts of experiencing, and recommendations for the improvement of these acts.

Experience always involves an environment and the distinctive human environment is culture, itself a product of previous experience. For Dewey, what is distinctive about a cultural environment is that it is shared; it may be uniquely perceived, but its meanings and values are not the unique possession of any individual. Thus, to experience culture is to experience other people; in some sense or other it is to enter into a common, public life. The process of experience itself is thereby socially reconstructive, a process of trying out and responding, in group situations. The reconstruction of experience on this interpretation is not a remaking merely of material objects; it is a reconstituting of human relationships and a constant renewal of the self.

Experiencing is the distinctive human mode of action. But Dewey was not interested merely in trying to explain what happens. Experience is susceptible to improvement and improvement, he argues, is a consequence of reflective inquiry. It is through reflection that we can adjudicate amongst our conflicting wants, make rational choices, and achieve primary satisfactions at the level of feelings. We are encouraged by this theory to become more self-aware, more cognitively orientated, more critical. Reflection is capable of being taught, in schools, through the utilization of subjects, which in Dewey's terms are the fruits of previous inquiry; that is, they are traditions of controlled experience. There is thus a great educational task of connecting children's limited experiences and modes of experiencing with the content and the strategies of inquiry embedded in subject-

matter (4).

The principal task of the teacher is to build a programme for growth based in part on a study of the child's life history of experience. This growth programme is not reducible to individual acts of cognition. Culture experience is experience of others, and traditions of inquiry embody group experiences. Growth as the directed control of experience therefore involves an awareness of other people, and a contrasting of oneself with others. One of Dewey's criticisms of the child-centred school, stemming from Rousseau, Pestalozzi and Froebel, was that the importance of common, shared and socially interactive qualities of experience was diminished in the preoccupation with patterns of individual, inner unfoldment (5). Despite these criticisms, he acknowledged the continuity of many of his own ideas with theirs. His characteristic method of thinking was reconstructive in the manner he recommended: the sensing of difficulties in existing ideas or formulations of belief on some subject; a review of the ideas of his predecessors; the identification and analysis of weaknesses; and the attempt to reformulate valuable features in terms of modern conditions, specifically those of the industrial society. Thus he set out to reconstruct the concept of growth by showing both the inadequacy of the unfoldment thesis and the value of the emphasis on the individual's activity in his own self-development, and rephrasing the concept as a culturally-interactive process involving group experience (6).

Dewey has been criticized for elevating child interests into criteria for determining curriculum content and for failing to give a clear specification of the criteria which govern satisfactory or desirable growth (7). The first criticism is mistaken, since in

The Child and the Curriculum and The School and Society he clearly stated that for purposes of involving the child his interests should be understood and used by the teacher, but that present interest does not of itself provide a guide to future possibilities or directions. The child, just because he does not unfold according to some pre-programmed plan, because of his capacity to change, because his character is not fixed but may be modified by subsequent experience, because his interests are volatile, and reflect past and present environments, would be badly served by any educational provision which simply reflected something as ephemeral, partial and backward-looking as present interest. Dewey criticized the Herbartian doctrine which seemed to him to treat interest as extrinsic to a child's vital energies and experience, but he so far agreed with the Herbartians as to argue that interests may themselves be stimulated and re-built and that the criteria for judging the educational worth of interests are not located wholly within the child's own experience (8).

By defining the aim of education as "growth leading to further growth" Dewey appeared, not only to his critics but also to some of his supporters, to be offering a formal definition which yielded no substantive criteria for distinguishing between educative and miseducative experience. This would be a serious omission for a reconstructionist who must have ways of distinguishing between the actual growth of culture - hence of experience - and the improvements he postulates. In Experience and Education Dewey tried to meet the charge that his theory of growth was no more than uncritical teacher acceptance of any interest or activity of the child. He rejected the approach which seeks to specify definite, comprehensive ends in view, both as a

false model of education and as unduly limiting for a general theory, whilst accepting that in any particular educational scheme some specific objectives would have to be set. He offered two general criteria of growth, not as targets but as principles of procedure: the sharing of experience, and continuity in development. The traditional classroom, by emphasizing individual attainments in a competitive setting, provided too few opportunities for sharing and, by Dewey's definition of democracy, was thus far undemocratic. The progressive classroom, by emphasizing spontaneity and following present interests, failed to recognize the importance of habits for character formation, and the need in intellectual development not for discontinuities but for systematic, even routine, learning. This last point in effect introduces a third criterion for growth. Dewey's account of the improvement of experience referred to reflection. He wished to build reflectiveness into individual character and into society as the prime responsive disposition for all problematic situations. Thus, growth for him was very largely growth into rationality, or into the reflective, critical mode.

Unlike those in the Aristotelian rational tradition, Dewey believed all children, in however small a degree, to be capable of growth conceived as the reflective, critical reconstruction of experience. In curriculum terms, this meant making extensive use of existing bodies of subject matter. Dewey recognized that the subjects are, in their conceptual structures and modes of inquiry, our chief intellectual resource, and there can be no continuity of growth into reflectiveness which does not involve systematic subject-matter learning. Again, Dewey has frequently been criticized for overlooking the claims of subject teaching, but this criticism seems to me to be based on a

limited view of how subjects might be taught (9). Dewey's treatment of subject matter as a resource for learning does not, of course, entail the traditional separate-subject curriculum. But we can accept the value of subject-matter learning without adopting that particular form of organization. From the claim that the logically discrete forms of knowledge and the traditions of inquiry and experience constitute the major resource in learning, nothing follows for the particular organization of subject matter into separate-subject, correlated, or integrated curricula (10).

Dewey thus, in his analysis of growth, sought to avoid that extreme of teaching which depends upon children's expression of their interest and that which proceeds from the belief that the most significant challenge in education is to find ways of transmitting the content and methods of separate subject disciplines. "Growth leading to further growth" does possess the qualities of reflectiveness and continuity which characterize the best teaching of subject matter, but Dewey's emphasis is on the relationship of the child's changing experience to the values and procedures of the subjects, not on the techniques of organization and transmission of predefined bodies of content.

Dewey proposed that the teacher take up four principal tasks in relation to children's growth conceived as the systematic reconstruction of experience:

1. to find ways of enriching, balancing and clarifying the child's present experience;

2. to simplify experience by reducing the undifferentiated mass of cultural phenomena and of the child's own experience to manageable ideas;

3. to refine experience - that is, to induce reflectiveness by making the child aware of the grossness and inadequacy of the categories with which he operates; to guide his inquiries by building up increasingly

sophisticated conceptual structures;

4. to find ways of systematically connecting the child's experience with the diverse ways of life and modes of experience of his culture, including its heritage.

These are all processes of mediation, through which the teacher interprets the world to the child and encourages him to interpret the world reflectively and critically. The mind, on this account, is not "given" but "emergent". Meanings and patterns of behavior develop through guided experience in group settings, and they are mediated through language. Growth is participatory, active, and interactive. In growing, in the normative sense (that is, in becoming educated) the individual acquires the capacity to restructure experience through reflective awareness, and it is this, basically, that results in culture reconstruction, since culture itself lives and has significance only in experience. Hence Dewey's claim that education itself, apart from any particular programme of social action to which the educated commit themselves, is potentially a culture reconstructive process. Whether the potential is realized depends upon the opportunities available in society at large, and on all kinds of institutional considerations. As an educational reformer, Dewey gave particular attention to the latter: the conversion of schools from custodial,and at times miseducative,institutions into centres of education; universalizing education; preparing teachers as educators and not as functionaries in bureaucratic systems; securing political and administrative support for educative programmes, to name but a few. In the chapters that follow we shall see that Dewey did not rest content with a formal definition which demonstrated the theoretical relationship between education and the reconstruction of experience, and of culture. Specific programmes were required to ensure that reflectiveness was

directed towards the problems of society and the issues dividing contemporary culture. These programmes, moreover, should be directed towards improving the future, and not towards the assimilation of the cultural values of a remote past.

Dewey has sometimes been criticized for eliminating personal and idiosyncratic qualities from growth and experience by giving an account of them which stresses only that which is shared, communicable and public (11). However, in Experience and Nature, where he most fully develops his ideas on this subject, Dewey distinguished between instrumental activities, in the form of the secondary experience of reflection and public inquiry, and consummatory acts, in the form of the primary experience of personally-felt satisfaction. Reflective experience is thus instrumental in that it is directed to the promotion of enjoyable primary experience, or consummations (12). Nevertheless, in his educational writings, Dewey gave considerable prominence to the instrumental forms of experience. Since it is these instrumental forms that schools and teachers have direct access to and ways of influencing, we should not be surprised at the emphasis. As we have seen, it does not follow from this emphasis that Dewey's theory excludes the notion of private domains. It was not only in his educational thought, however, that Dewey emphasized what might be termed the public domain of experience. Dewey's concept of democracy identifies shared, communicable experience; and education, in promoting democracy, would be directed towards inquiry into forms of experience which are in this sense instrumental - e.g., knowledge of the workings of democratic and other types of society - and into the processes of participation in democratic institutions within a school.

Authority in this context is intrinsic to the processes of inquiry and reflection. By this I mean that Dewey believed that reflective, critical inquiry itself discloses canons of evidence, principles of verification, the nature of truth claims, and forms of valid reasoning. There is no valid source of authority of any kind, other than inquiry itself. Teachers, as experienced inquirers, by degrees disclose the criteria of inquiry to pupils - who are not thought to be capable of discovering them by their own unaided explorations. But teachers no less than pupils are subject to this authority. By the same token, they are not subject to the authority of a tradition, as tradition, or indeed of any form of authority which cannot rationally justify itself in the face of sustained, open criticism. It is this feature of intelligence as controller of experience (i.e., experience brought under the direction of reflective inquiry) that makes of Dewey's theory a far more radical proposal for the reconstitution of culture than the apparently more comprehensive schemes of, say, Rugg and Brameld. Casting aside all of the great security systems invoked in the history of thought, from Plato's myths to Pascall's religion, Dewey confronted teachers with the almost unbearable challenge to abandon all certainties and to accept only the authority of thought itself.

2. <u>Education and Enculturation</u>

Dewey and Kilpatrick contrasted prevailing practices in schools with the possibilities for universal growth, the good life and enhancement of the child's present living which a true education would provide. The miseducative character of much schooling is not, for the reconstructionists, simply a remediable problem of schools, for various practical

reasons, falling short of attaining their own adequate ideals. In Stanley's words, confusion penetrates to "the fundamental purposes of education" (13).

The reconstructionists were in general outspokenly critical of schooling, because they found it directed by inadequate or harmful conceptions of the educative process. The Webbs, though relatively devoid of interest in the processes of teaching and learning, were strongly dissatisfied with the neglect of scientific studies, especially social sciences in higher education, and with the dominance of the classical curriculum. Wells, Rugg and Brameld almost totally condemned not only schooling but rival theories of education. Mannheim supported the experimentalist criticism that typically the content of education was backward-looking and dis-functional in a rapidly changing society, whose basic norms were in turmoil. Dewey was perhaps the most sustained and consistent critic, basing his objections not on the failure of the schools to achieve a new cultural synthesis but on their neglect of critical thinking and of children's personal uniqueness and worthiness.

Although they were clear that education could not be precisely equated with schooling, not all of the reconstructionists succeeded in distinguishing it from other forms of cultural induction, assimilation and re-creation. Certain difficulties, as we shall see, arise out of their claims that schooling reflects and is in some sense an agent of the wider culture, and that education is a form of enculturation (14).

2.1 <u>Brameld: cultural role of the school</u>

The confusion of education and enculturation arises from the attempt to make the term education serve too many uses - or rather in the failure to distinguish these uses. Brameld has rightly criticized many educationists and others for ignoring the actual and possible cultural roles

of schools and teachers, and he has shown how agencies other than schools contribute to cultural renewal. But in doing so he has not always adequately distinguished two uses which he himself wishes to make of the term education. Several passages bring out the difficulty:

> "School systems and college policies always reflect the milieu to which they are bound" (15).

> "Because education is always an agent of the wider culture that creates and provides it, the conflicts, confusions, pressures, and counterpressures that permeate that wider culture are bound to appear also in education" (16).

> "Education is the agent of culture ... its policies and functions are fashioned and sanctioned by the culture ... education is just as strong or weak, independent, or dependent, effective or ineffective, as the culture itself permits" (17).

> "Enculturation is the inclusive way through which every culture engages in the task of transmitting and modifying its beliefs, customs, and institutions. Without it, no culture could have arisen in the first place and no culture could have survived ... To perceive learning and teaching in the indigenous sense of enculturation is thus ... to put the educational enterprise back where it belongs - that is, at the very centre of the 'complex whole'" (18).

Smith and his associates used the metaphor of reflection:

> "The curriculum is always, in every society, a reflection of what the people think, feel, believe and do."

Stanley adopted the Durkheim image of moulding:

> "The contours of education are inevitably moulded by the culture of the community which it serves; its philosophy and objectives are invariably framed with reference to the ideals, the aspirations, and the needs embedded in the culture" (19).

The reconstructionists were guided by several purposes whose value we can accept in talking of school in the language of enculturation, culture agency and reflection. They wished to disclose the wider cultural sources of educational ideas, the network of social influences impinging on schools, the need for schools interested in problems of

cultural renewal to become aware of and develop their relationships with other social institutions, and to sensitize teachers to opposition they may encounter from other elements in the social system. These points represent a clear gain in understanding over the more simple-minded proposals to use schools in an all-out crusade against other hostile social forces - for example, the frequently-recommended educational mission against "commercialism" or "materialism".

2.2 Criticism of education-enculturation confusion

However, these advantages are gained at the cost of a confusion of processes and an apparently insoluble problem for those adopting the reconstructionist position. The confusion consists in the failure to distinguish educative from non-educative forms of enculturation. The experimentalists clearly want us to maintain this distinction but often fail to do so in their own writings. Conceiving education in the "indigenous sense of enculturation" as Brameld enjoins us to, may put the educational enterprise at the centre, but it prevents us from distinguishing between those processes within that enterprise which are educative and those which are not. To suppose or imply that all forms of enculturation are educative can hardly be what Brameld intended since it is trivial, if true in the widest sense, and would leave him only efficiency criteria for distinguishing good from bad schooling. Similarly, Stanley's claim that the "contours of education" are culturally moulded is also trivial, though true in the widest sense that the ideas and materials out of which educational programmes are built will be drawn from some culture or other. But culture is a composite, comprising many and often conflicting sub-cultures, including the sub-culture of education conceived as a way of life or a form of excellence which can be critically directed against certain undesirable ways of life. This is

the Socratic idea of education, and it is an idea which the reconstructionists need to use. This is because, despite the confusing references they sometimes make to an indiscriminate process of enculturation and to the school reflecting society's requirements, they wish to set one sub-culture, the reconstructionist educational ideology - in combination with like-minded sub-cultures - against all others. Brameld, for example, extensively criticized alternative educational sub-cultures (the theories of progressive education, the essentialists, the perennialists and others) and not merely on grounds of "inefficiency". Furthermore, many reconstructionists explicitly attacked the educational enterprises of alternative socio-cultural systems, such as laissez-faire liberalism, communism, state capitalism, and fascism, on quite definite moral grounds. Yet of each of these systems, except for liberalism, it could be claimed that education was so organized as to "reflect society's requirements". The difficulty lies in the ambiguity of these "requirements". For the reconstructionist to accept enculturation as equivalent to education would mean accepting the determination of these requirements by other social interests, and this would be inconsistent with their reform role.

Thus the concepts of "the culture moulding the educational system" and of "the school reflecting culture" are altogether too undiscriminating for the reconstructionists themselves to use consistently. If it were the case that the policies of schools and colleges reflect the milieu to which they are bound, and only that milieu, it would only be possible for them to participate in that very reconstruction of the milieu which Brameld and others proposed, if the culture reconstruction were already well under way. The curriculum, in any case,never reflects all of what "the people" think, feel, believe and do, but only certain

selections and representations of these ideas and activities. As Smith and his associates themselves argued, the curriculum may be used as an instrument for modifying these ideas and activities. For these reasons, then, the metaphors of "the culture moulding" and "the schools reflecting" are unsatisfactory, and would be best dropped altogether from reconstructionist vocabulary. This is not merely a question of words, for behind the terminology lies the issue of the relationship of educational thought to politics and of the institutions of education to the apparatus of the state. In affirming a fundamentally selective, critical and creative role in relation to the transmission of culture, education avoids absorption into other systems. A considerable measure of autonomy and a recognized critical role are essential for major cultural sub-systems, especially education, if monolithic and totalitarian forms of social control are to be avoided.

Is any situation conceivable in which education could be consistently equated with enculturation? Leaving aside the practical and linguistic problems unnecessarily raised by the absorption of more particular processes (education) into more comprehensive ones (enculturation), there is one situation in which the reconstructionists could consistently speak as Brameld does. This is the situation that could be anticipated if the kind of socio-cultural system the reconstructionists envisage were to come into existence. In Wells' utopia, where anti-educational forces have been eliminated, the process of enculturation is equivalent to induction into the good society, by educationally defensible means. Even in utopia, however, it might be thought that an educational system not in all respects in perfect harmony with the wider culture would be worth having. The tension between the ideal and the real is a necessary condition in all ideational theories of change. The

educational pursuit of moral and social perfection should, in utopia as well as in more familiar situations, contribute a steady flow of ideas for the ideal side of the equation, and hence contribute to cultural dynamism.

In non-utopian situations, a distinction must be maintained between, on the one hand, the critical, discriminating processes of education, and the institutions in which this occurs and, on the other, the normatively and conceptually undifferentiated processes of cultural transmission and change to which the term enculturation refers. It is only by maintaining the distinction that the reconstructionists can claim to have any definite theory of education at all.

3. The Dilemma of Elite Education

Of course, certain difficulties arise for the reconstructionists from the effort to sustain the distinction between education and enculturation. A normatively defined sub-culture of educational ideas is in social terms the sub-culture of a particular group. This group must be differentiated from the total society and from other groups if its distinctive educational mission is to be fulfilled. Any critical and moralistic ideology, such as reconstructionism, depends for its survival and for any ultimate effect it may have on educational processes and institutions upon a group whose numerical smallness, ideological homogeneity and sense of community, and opposition to at any rate some mass norms, make it into an elite. This is an uncomfortable position for democratic ideologists to be in, although by no means an untenable one. However, Dewey in particular made the position unnecessarily uncomfortable by constantly railing against conceptual distinctions and social separatism.

The kind of society towards which the experimentalists aspired

incorporates purged and purified democratic values and, although elitism is not inconsistent with democracy, its tendency towards exclusiveness and separatism and its assertion of moral superiority set up tensions with these values. For some of the reconstructionists - for example the Webbs - these values were mostly pretty abstract, having to do with justice and fairness, and the elimination of class barriers. When particularized these values appear as both collective and individual rights and freedoms. The Webbs could consistently argue that Fabianism was democratic in that it attempted to institutionalize various democratic values in reform programmes, devised by benevolent experts who seemed to exist on a different plane from the masses, without, however, being morally superior to them (20). Most of the reconstructionists adopted a more sociable, participatory and communitarian ideal of democracy, defining democracy as a communal society of shared experience, easy and equable social relationships, common purposes and objectives. Wells' utopians were described as classless and non-elitist; Dewey preached communitarian and classless ideals of fellowship; Mannheim, despite his wish to strengthen elite sub-cultures, envisaged a community-uniting spiritual order; Stanley, Raup and other of the later experimentalists proposed means of achieving social consensus in the form of a fundamental unity of moral conviction. Elitism was not precluded by these communitarian aspirations but it certainly played a subdued role. Yet the reconstructionists made it very clear that the culture, including the educational system, whose ills they all diagnozed, does not at present display these desirable features. Indeed, the more serious the crisis the farther were these democratic ideals from realization. One of the recurrent criticisms made by the reconstructionists is that democracy itself is threatened by the forces of scientific and industrial change and by

rival political movements. A less acute crisis would, presumably, have meant a larger group of people, perhaps even a majority, who could effectively participate in developing ideas and programmes for the future renewal of culture. The severity of the crisis and the strength of the opposition were such that the culture renewers appear and are seen by others as an expert minority, or elite, and their educational schemes as involving minorities of pioneers. So long as the crisis persists, even Dewey, the most sociable and egalitarian of the reconstructionists, must conceive educational change as a sustained effort by a minority to bring the majority to its point of view. Unfortunately, his theory of the universal reconstruction of experience obscures the inevitable qualitative differences between different groups and sections of the population.

Just as the true culture is qualitatively different from the culture of ordinary experience, so is the true education qualitatively different from indiscriminate forms of enculturation. The diviners and guardians of the ideals of true culture are a minority, altruistically determined to keep alight ideals of reform. Since these ideals are to be realized through an educational system which is as yet unreconstructed, the true educators are a minority, sharply distinguished by the quality of their ideas from the mass. These are implications of reconstructionism which many of its exponents, especially the experimentalists, were reluctant to acknowledge.

The procedures which the reconstructionists advocated to effect the transformation of a majority from obliviousness, unawareness, false-consciousness, resistance and hostility varied from a benevolent but imposed rule by Fabian experts to the more shadowy doctrines of consensus. Consensus was proposed by Brameld as a procedure for taking educational and

other social decisions which avoided coercion and arbitrariness. It required a subtle balance between rule by a majority whose lack of enlightenment was both a condition and a consequence of crisis and the expertise of the already enlightened minority. This balance was not at all clearly delineated by the exponents of consensus. Dewey, on the other hand, by avoiding the more drastic doctrines of the crisis theory, and by professing a profound faith in the sense and wisdom of the common man, sought to effect a reconciliation between mass participation and minority leadership. There were, in his judgment, critical problems in contemporary society, but they had not reached the point where the common understanding had been undermined: nor did he have such firm and clear views as to desirable future culture patterns that he felt the Platonic need to impress them on his fellow men. However, as I suggested above, Dewey tended to evade some of the problems of leadership in a democracy. His optimistic confidence in human readiness to adopt the detached, reflective procedures of rational problem-solving prevented him from appreciating the true dilemma, that created by the minority, reconstructionist determination to reconcile the universalization of rationality with majority self-determination.

This dilemma is most apparent in Rugg, Mannheim, Stanley and Brameld. All wished to combine the insights and prescriptions of their own culture diagnoses with some form of majority decision-taking. They criticized educational institutions for failing to teach children in a manner that might yield the dispositions, attitudes and skills needed to participate in a democracy. Not only schools, they maintained, but almost all other social institutions failed, or were inadequate in this respect. Partly this was because these other institutions had failed to change, and had kept to the traditional, more authoritarian ways. Whatever the cause,

the alleged failures of schools and of other social institutions results in a sharp separation of the mass of social institutions and ideologies from the tiny minority of reformers. Thus the reconstructionists emerge as an elite movement, whose exclusiveness in present culture is not diminished by their proposals for a future democracy of shared experience. Elitism in some form appears to be necessary for directed, radical culture change, but the reconstructionists had, on the whole, no wish to be regarded as elitists and, Mannheim apart, little interest in justifying elitism. Instead of unequivocally proclaiming themselves a distinct minority group determined to rebuild culture by rebuilding education they proclaimed theirs a democratic educational theory, which incorporated as central elements the principles of consensus, mass participation and shared decision-taking. Thus many issues concerning the relationship of "education for leadership" with "education for participation" are obscured or submerged instead of being clearly examined.

Since the majority, in a state of society which is unreconstructed, is not by definition ready to participate in the prescribed manner, education must do much more than cultivate a dispassionate, reflective growth of rationality. At least, it must perceive this task in terms of a very determined programme to modify attitudes and behavior: hence the argument by Bode, Brameld, Rugg and other experimentalists that a more determinate character must be given to the educational process if more definite cultural ideals are to be achieved. These educationists recognized what Dewey appears to have overlooked, at least in his later writings, that a more determinate policy of character education is needed for young children than is provided by the more abstract ideals of democracy and reflective inquiry.

4. Democratic Character and Indoctrination

4.1 A determinate character for education

Giving education a determinate character is necessary if one is to say anything particular about how the educational enterprise should be carried on. However, as Dewey was aware, it is difficult both to profess an open-minded rationality and belief in the wisdom of the majority and to prescribe very particular designs for the future of society. More precisely, if, through education, society is to be made more democratic in various defined ways, open-minded rationality will have to be guided by certain moral principles and directed towards certain possibilities of concrete social action. In any case, the reconstructionists, even the most utopian among them, were not only theorizing about hypothetical future societies but analysing particular cultural situations whose problems they sought to resolve. Without exception, but with varying degrees of precise commitment, the reconstructionists argued that the determinate character in individuals and society which education must strive to achieve should be intimately related to wider culture ideals. Thus education becomes not just any conceivable process of critical inquiry and rationality but a series of moral-political enterprises in which certain kinds of dispositions and skills are established, namely, those thought to be required in western democratic societies at a particular phase of their development. Does this then mean that we adopt a simple means-ends model, with the ends prescribed by moral-political designs for culture, and education reduced to the most effective means for achieving these ends? With varying degrees of success the reconstructionists tried to avoid the difficulties raised by means-ends models.

These difficulties are essentially those of failing to recognize that

means presuppose ends and that ends are unintelligible unless some idea of means is predicated. What is required is not means-ends models, but criteria for assessing processes. To adopt a means-ends model is unfortunate for another reason, in that it subsumes education to other forms of activity, instead of recognizing that education comprises activities that are themselves worthwhile. For reconstructionists to adopt means-ends models is to beg the question which I raised in section 2 above - that of the culturally critical role of education. Subservience of means to ends runs the risk of forgetting that the ends include critical thought and tolerance and respect for the moral worth of persons. These are qualities which govern the conduct, not merely the consequences, of educational procedures. Unless appropriate means are adopted, or,more precisely, unless the objectives of criticism and so forth are operationalized and converted into procedural principles, the exercise will be self defeating.

Just such a criticism as this was in fact directed by Dewey at some of his fellow experimentalists. The issue arose when, in the 1930s, the problem of indoctrination was raised. Counts argued that schools always communicate a value system, and that at that time anti-democratic value systems were being actively promulgated, in schools and in other social institutions. Should not schools, Counts asked, in Dare the School Build a New Social Order? and, subsequently, from the editorial chair of the journal The Social Frontier, use every means in their power to impress upon pupils the rightness of the democratic creed? (21). In reply Dewey, Bode and others argued that democracy was not a fixed system of values and beliefs but an open-minded, critical way of life. It would be contradictory to attempt to indoctrinate the spirit of criticism or to anticipate the outcome of reflective inquiry. This would be to pre-empt

growth, not to further it.

Thus Dewey's belief that children should be encouraged to develop and reflect upon their own values led him to condemn Counts' proposal as a form of indoctrination. But this rejoinder did not satisfy many reconstructionists at that time. It seemed too optimistically rational. Also it appeared, from Dewey's apparent lack of any definite beliefs, that there was a wide gulf between his thought and the very profound conviction held by most reconstructionists, the conviction that only a highly structured, value-laden educational programme would be adequate to the task of reconstruction in an era of crisis. This difference seems never to have been brought out, but it is an important one. If education, even in co-operation with other social agencies, is to be capable of significantly affecting the future of culture, then the more sceptical, critical and individualistic approaches need to be replaced by more positive, concrete and articulated ideas. Bode's criticisms of progressive education as aimless and socially irresponsible, and of Dewey's theory of growth as undirected by any clear criteria, was a later version of Counts' challenge (22). Bode argued that educational policies at all levels, from the nation-wide system of public schooling to the individual classroom, should be consciously directed by clear social objectives. The objectives which Bode in fact proposed, however, appear to be no different from the two fundamental principles in which Dewey grounded his educational theory - namely, universalizing critical thinking, or reflective inquiry, and judging social institutions and relationships by democratic values. Bode occasionally spoke of democracy as a creed of specific beliefs, commitments and forms of action, but for the most part he adopted Dewey's more general criteria, and thus appeared to vacillate between the very aimlessness he criticized in Dewey and a feeling that firm commitment was needed. As to what it is we

are expected to commit ourselves, Bode's highly generalized prescriptions give inadequate guidance. The "democratic school" is a shadowy ideal which Bode did little to elucidate.

4.2 Reconstructionism and indoctrination

Shadowy as the democratic school ideal is in Bode's discussions, the intention that he and, indeed, all the experimentalists announced, to promulgate it, raises the question as to whether an education which expresses the beliefs and values they held and recommended amounts to indoctrination. It is commonly thought that ideologies inevitably seek to implant themselves by any methods short of violence - and not always excluding violence. Thus there would be nothing strange about an ideology adopting indoctrination as a way of commanding support. There must, however, be at least one exception to this, if we count reconstructionism as an ideology and if we accept some distinctions between education and indoctrination. My reasons for wishing to consider reconstructionism as an ideology were given in the Introduction. But what of the distinctions between education and indoctrination? These are distinctions which are not always adequately acknowledged by some of the reconstructionists. As we have seen, several of them wished to make democracy militant and to have a set of beliefs taught in schools as a creed to which children should be committed by persuasion and subtler forms of influence - e.g., by means of myths, rituals and background institutional assumptions.

However, it is only in weaker senses of the term indoctrination that we can regard even reconstructionists who advocated militant democracy as indoctrinators. Those who advocated a militant democracy had in mind some kind of creed or system of inter-related beliefs about the conduct of life which they wished to see taught in schools. More than this, they wished the ethos of the creed to permeate the school on the

grounds that, as atmosphere rather than as creed, it would be more influential on conduct and the formation of dispositions (23). So far, we might suppose that some form of indoctrination is being proposed. Furthermore, the hypothesized militant democratic school was not to be an occasional pioneering institution. It was intended that in the long run the whole public school system should adopt the doctrines of democracy and not those of alternative socio-political systems. At first glance, then, it might appear that Counts' "militant democracy" and Brameld's "defensible partiality" constitute a form of indoctrination. However, as Dewey pointed out, the experimentalist theory from which this militant democracy sprang provides no support for those who engage in the promulgation of propositions or sets of propositions for which no evidence, or supporting argument, or relevant criticism is provided. For older children these critical enterprises would be directed at all forms of belief system, democratic and anti-democratic. There was to be no foreclosing of discussion and argument by invoking the authority of one system or another (24). Even for the education of very young children, the experimentalists proposed methods of joint action, discussion of consequences, and interchange of ideas which were intended to break down or forestall fixity of belief and conviction of righteousness. Dewey placed great emphasis on the formation of habits and dispositions through directed experience as the basis of moral education, and so seemed to associate himself with the Aristotelian idea of habituation to goodness. However, a gradual transition to rationality in all children was to accompany the processes of habit formation. Thus habits, attitudes and dispositions to act were, in the very process of formation, to be scrutinized, discussed, argued about even in the early stages of moral education. This is not indoctrination,

although it may be criticized perhaps on other grounds as uncompromisingly rationalistic and insufficiently responsive to the different styles of perceiving and thinking in the growing child. None of the other reconstructionists gave so much attention to the reflective processes in the early education of children as did Dewey, but nor did any of them propose that any kinds of beliefs should be taught and held uncritically.

Dewey and Kilpatrick both advocated a critical approach to values and specific forms of conduct in a rapidly changing society. But was this critical approach intended to hold of the particular values of democracy, or of the methodology of inquiry, or of the structures of culture analysis, and the designs for culture renewal? The reconstructionists had no important contributions to make to the problem of justifying moral values. With the exception of Mannheim and Clarke, their ethical systems were naturalistic in these two senses, that:

1. they identified non-supernaturalistic sources of moral authority, and criticized all claims to derive and validate values, by reference to supernatural authorities;

2. they advocated the incorporation of empirical findings from psychology and sociology into ethical theories (25).

Did they not, then, indoctrinate their naturalistic ethics, at least by refusing to consider, or simply overlooking, alternatives? The answer to this question is that their recommendations for more sophisticated moral education were on the whole recommendations for an understanding and appraisal of moral theories, including the moral theories of non-western cultures. A further question we might ask is whether rationality, or, in Dewey's terms, reflective inquiry, did not function as a subtle form of indoctrination: itself always assessing, and begging the question of the suitability of its own procedures in relation to certain forms of experience? There is a problem here, certainly for Dewey, who seldom gave

much consideration to non-reflective processes in experience (26). But there is also a paradox, since to question rationality is itself a form of rationality.

Perhaps the solution to this difficulty lies not in the question-begging processes of conscious questioning and further deliberation but in adopting other forms of action - a form of stipulative definition of modes of experience significantly different in form and substance from reflection and deliberation on the enlightenment model (e.g., engagement in the arts, reverie, and various body-involving activities, like gymnastics and modern dance). Despite his concern to see a more practical approach adopted in schools, Dewey gave relatively little attention to these kinds of activity. Other reconstructionists, notably Rugg, in their curriculum proposals advocated a shift in the balance of education from the more rational-reflective to different modes of experience. These proposals, if implemented, would yield the experience which might provide alternative frames of reference to experimentalist cognition.

Like any other theory articulated through the symbols of language and according to the conventions of ratiocination, it could be said of reconstructionism that it presupposes and asserts the cultural importance of cognition. In this very weak sense it could be said, I suppose, that reconstructionism sets out to indoctrinate. However, there are enough safeguards in the theory to justify our saying that the practical implementation of the full range of its educational recommendations would not amount to indoctrination even in a very weak sense of that term. The particular designs for cultural renewal, those of Wells, Rugg, Mannheim and Brameld, for example, were all argued for sincerely. They were not proffered as one possible design amongst many for the free-ranging intellect to take or leave. But nor were they treated, as would be necessary

in stringent forms of indoctrinating a system of ideas, as complete, unassailable systems to be taught and propagated as such. On the contrary, as we saw in Chapter VII, Mannheim pointed out how limited and tentative were his proposals, given the immature and confused condition of the social sciences and human studies. Brameld and Wells were engaged, in their different ways, on a quest for order, for a new cultural synthesis. But Brameld has never given more than a highly schematic outline of this synthesis. When he has related it to formal curriculum proposals, these have taken the form of an exploratory and critical quest by groups of students for desirable and defensible culture systems, and this is very different from the absorption of some predefined system of ideas (27).

Wells gave detailed and concrete accounts of utopia but in his specific proposals, for example on adult education, he made it clear that not any particular solution was important, only the building up of understanding of cultural processes and the commitment to achieving a control over them, insofar as this is possible. Thus it is only in a very loose and misleading way that the reconstructionists could be described as indoctrinators. Such an ascription would be based on their advocacy of schemes for reform and the enthusiasm of that advocacy. But there was only a very occasional suggestion by any of them that teaching should ever proceed in such a manner as to preclude a questioning critical response. The explanation for this lies both in the diagnosis of cultural change and uncertainty, for which adaptable and flexible thinking is more useful than fixed outlooks, and in the nature of the reform proposals they advocated. The experimentalists, for example, hoped to cultivate through education qualities which the indoctrinator discourages. These qualities include: an understanding of cultural phenomena and their inter-

relatedness; habits and dispositions of reflective inquiry, tolerance, sociability, sympathy, creativity and so forth; willingness to participate as a constructive critic in social and political affairs; enthusiasm for reform and some relevant skills; and various forms of knowledge both symbolic and practical. Although highly ambitious, this was a minimal list. If we add to it the aspiration to communicate various perspectives, visions, and ideals of a more holistic kind, we might appear to be approaching one of the most exalted ambitions of the indoctrinator: to provide his subjects with a complete frame of reference, so complete and so integral to personality that all future experience and judgment can be accommodated within it, without any awareness that this experience is not critical but assimilative, dependent and parasitical. When proposals are made for a new man in utopia, a new spiritual order, a social-moral order of fundamental principles, we are in danger of lapsing into the single vision of this totalistic perspective. That danger does underlie the more holistic versions of reconstructionism, and the propagators of these ideals were not sufficiently aware of this danger. Nevertheless, it was one of those holistic proposals that incorporated a kind of defence against this very danger. This is Mannheim's perspectivism, regarded as a cognitive process rather than an achieved cognitive map or orientation. By this I mean that the process of building up a perspective, as Mannheim described it, is the intellectually and socially liberating process of analysing and comparing and assessing ideas like the new man, or a new spiritual order, or particular theories and paradigms, like Marxism and Newtonianism. Admittedly there is a danger in restricting membership of the community of perspectivists to a clerisy, as Mannheim at times seemed to be advocating. In a common school system, we can avert this danger, for example, by taking care to maintain a variety

of institutional arrangements, a variety of forms of initial and inservice education, and considerable autonomy in curriculum making. These are some of the ways of preventing single thought systems and models of behavior from assuming an ascendancy over all others. An education which at every level adopts the more analytical, comparative and critical processes of considering alternative viewpoints and variant explanations, and which seriously explores other modes of experience in addition to cognition, is unlikely to succumb to the more subtle indoctrination of an uncritical assimilation into a single orientation and perspective.

5. Educational Processes of Reconstruction

So far in this chapter we have been considering proposals for education, initially defined as a reconstructive process. We have seen that by education the reconstructionists had in mind forms of experience which need not and, indeed, should not be confined to schooling, although few of them, apart from Clarke, Mannheim and Dewey, showed much awareness of the wider implications of their ideas. If it is education that is potentially reconstructive of culture, then the question of the role of schooling is a secondary one, and it may well be that other institutions can, more effectively than schools, challenge existing patterns of culture and engage in the design and criticism of new ones, while still performing an educative role. From the reconstructionist standpoint, it would be more exact to say that other institutions, by being educative, could participate in the kind of reconstruction they advocate. We shall consider the question of institutions, schools and others, in Chapter XIII. But we still have not seen just how the reconstructionists, with the exception of Dewey, came to select education of all the activities and institutions

available to man in society for the role of rebuilding and renewing culture.

5.1 The Webbs

Different writers gave rather different answers to this question of the role of education in culture change. For the Webbs, educational processes and institutions are only one means of effecting desirable changes, and they should share with other forces, notably political ones, the building of a socialist society (28). Educators should undertake a variety of tasks. They should universalize a minimum of: child nurture, literacy, social skill and political awareness; provide a fully articulated system of public education at all levels; educate a highly skilled force of modern-minded, expert administrators and contribute to the development of service industry; provide facilities for the advancement of scientific knowledge, through research; and contribute by their actions as educators and citizens to the evolution of that social-political culture of which Fabianism is an example. The definition of socialism itself includes provision for growth and transmission of new ways of thinking and it is to education that the Fabians looked to prepare socialist consciousness, equip its leaders, and consolidate its reforms in the minds of the populace. This makes education no less important than nationalization, the national minimum, and administrative efficiency, as a transitional factor. Indeed, education is not only a single transitional factor; it is constitutive of all transitional factors.

5.2 Wells

Wells envisaged a very much more ambitious structure of educational ideas and institutions than the Fabians (29). He aimed to produce new, gregarious, tough-minded individuals who would in time precipitate a new

order of society. Through many generations of a reconstructed education, expressed in integrated patterns of scientific, technical, historical and sociological studies, man could hope to free himself from ignorance, stupidity and aggression, replacing this ancient destructive inheritance by an unprecedented depth and organization of knowledge, by universal love, and a new scientific humanism (30). Thus a higher moral-rational order, the fruit of education, would supplant the present "muddle". In the short run, Wells thought adult education the most strategic point of attack, and his own utopian romances, social and scientific treatises and political tracts exemplify the content of that education. Like the Fabians, he believed it necessary to universalize education, instead of exclusively concentrating resources, in the Platonic fashion, on a transforming elite, although there certainly was a leadership role for the pioneers of the new culture. The broader changes in culture would well up, as it were, from the whole society, assuming that a cadre of enlightened Wellsians could accept the slow and painful task of leading the masses into the forecourt of modern studies. How this was to occur, given the very low opinion he had of the teaching profession, is difficult to envisage. Wells seemed to think that the conventional apparatus of schools and other institutions would be by-passed in an educational exploitation of the mass media, an enterprise in which he himself enjoyed great success, opening up new possibilities to his successors. Again, like the Webbs, Wells so defined socialism as to make education its inseparable ally and sustainer - a proper education is education in socialism: "building up the collective ideal and organization of humanity" (31). He repudiated violence and force and rejected the doctrine of inevitable transition. Despite a lingering interest, Wells discarded the idea that

the new society could be realized through a highly trained elite imposing its will on the majority. Universal education, enlisting other social agencies as rationality gradually spread, would itself bring enlightenment, and this would be sufficient, over a long period of time, to counteract the anti-educational forces in man himself and in society. Lest this should appear merely a restatement of enlightenment optimistic rationalism, Wells was aware of psychological theories of the unconscious and of the limits they appear to set to rationality. It is worth recalling that Freud himself, for all his scepticism about reform, introduced the concepts of self-awareness and understanding as the most decisive factors in the cure of neurosis.

5.3 Russell

Russell had a simpler and more direct faith than Wells in the capacity of an enlightened elite of teachers and other reformers to identify and develop the constructive elements in human nature and society, although he, too, was familiar with research and theorizing about the resistance of irrational factors in personality and society (32). Social and political awareness were for him less a matter of apprehending the contours of utopia and associating them with an emergent spiritual order than of critically appraising existing institutions. The individual function of education is to develop the person through systematic training in rational inquiry, strengthened by balanced knowledge and experience of the symbolic systems. Its social function is primarily critical, not cohesive, with the expectation that criticism would be accompanied by dispositions and skills appropriate to social renewal - e.g., the construction of an international political and cultural order. Russell's position is, in these respects, similar to Dewey's except that he attached more importance than did Dewey to systematic training in the

disciplines of knowledge. Education is for both of them a form of individual renewal, even rebirth. But individual experience is always part of a network of group and social experiences. The liberation of the individual through education guarantees no particular future pattern of culture; indeed, such a guarantee would be inconsistent with belief in individual freedom of choice and creativity. However, a rational education, supported by a grounding in defined moral virtues, was, for Russell, despite the many hazards of contemporary civilization, the surest way of achieving a better future.

5.4 Experimentalists and classical humanism

Earlier in this chapter, I discussed several aspects of the experimentalist concept of education, as a form of reconstructionist thinking. Of all the reconstructionists, Dewey and his followers made the most systematic attempts to explore the possibilities of effecting cultural change through education. In this respect they are sometimes set in opposition to those who conceive of education as initiation into the established traditions of thought and inquiry and to those who treasure the uniqueness and primacy of the individual. I have already discussed the latter point: on the former, I remarked in Chapter III on the many resemblances between classical humanism and reconstructionism. Both positions are utopian in that, if realized in practice, they would result in a transformation of the culture of any society ever known to history. We may take Peters as a recent exponent of the classical humanist position:

> "Educational processes are those by means of which public modes of thought and awareness, which are mainly enshrined in language, take root in the consciousness of the individual and provide avenues of access to a public world" (33).

Of the educated man, Peters wrote:

> "His experience is not only transformed by all that he has mastered, learnt, and understood, but is always exemplifying the processes by means of which such mastery, knowledge, and understanding has been acquired. The achievements constantly generate new tasks" (34).

We see revealed in these passages an ideal of the structuring and restructuring of personality through experience of the symbolic systems of culture which, if universalized, would effect the cultural renewal described by Dewey and Frank. Admittedly Peters has more reservations about the possibility of universal education than they had (35). Peters' greater emphasis on language also contrasts with the experimentalist advocacy for formal education of a very wide range of experience and symbolization. But even on this point Peters also refers to the achievement of other forms of thought and awareness through conversation (a reminder of Oakeshott's essay on this subject [36]) rather than through formal modes of teaching. The reference to access to a public world is very similar to Dewey's concern for the public testability and interchange of ideas, and the implicit notion of a child undeveloped until he has gained access to these modes echoes not only the views on the immaturity and incompleteness of the child held by the pre-Hellenistic Greeks but also the experimentalist theory of the formation and education of the self through selected culture experience (37).

We paused in reviewing the different reconstructionist conceptions of education to observe an affinity between Dewey and Peters. Not all experimentalists agreed with Dewey's preference for spelling out procedural principles rather than defined ends of the reconstruction process. Counts and Bode, as we have seen, at times proposed the policy adoption, by schools, of a credal affirmation of American democracy. Rugg's position was even further towards the extreme of an educationally conscious, militant democracy. In the 1930s, he cast the school into the role of

prophetic leader, inspirer, and artificer of the new cultural synthesis. Rugg never quite lost his faith in teachers as a potential cadre of culture-revolutionaries, unifying the industrial technology, the arts, and a variety of creative movements of the American mind in a "mental and emotional synthesis" which was to be embodied in the school curriculum (38). However, like Wells, he looked to adult education as a more direct means of appealing to the more educated of the masses to partake in a truly herculean labor of discussion, debate, policy making, institution building: the creation of a new ideology and a new social infra-structure. In view of his leanings towards socialism, internationalism and a spiritual, in preference to a political, order, it was prudent of Rugg to propose that reform be achieved by largely, although not entirely, by-passing the existing machinery of government, and administration. Like Wells, and later Brameld, Rugg designed and advocated an integrated "core" of knowledge as the heartland of the school programme. I shall discuss this core in greater detail in Chapter XII. His utopia, taking the form of a new mental culture functioning within the social system of a reconstructed capitalism, was, like Wells' utopias, but unlike the modern dystopias, conceived as an educative society. Through education the ordinary man could be brought to a realization of the superiority of the educated over the uneducated life, and would wish to structure his interests and activities, including his leisure and recreation, by educative criteria. Except for Dewey, none of the reconstructionists paid much attention to the difficult and somewhat abstruse problem of justifying the superiority of the educated life, or, in recent parlance, of finding criteria for distinguishing worthwhile from un-worthwhile activities. Rugg exemplified lack of philosophic doubt and optimism about what education

would yield by way of understanding, and he very willingly suspended disbelief concerning the excellence of the new intellectual and artistic frontiers created in America by the heroes of his Foundations for American Education (39). Rugg identified himself with the comfortable educationists' belief, stemming from Plato, that it is inconceivable that anyone really tasting the pleasure and satisfaction of the educated life will wish to do other than strive for the realization on earth of an educational utopia. The difficulty, of course, is to create those conditions in which the experience can take root.

5.5 Mannheim and Clarke

Mannheim, and his chief English educational disciple, Clarke, shared an enthusiasm to create the educative society as a successor to all the non-educative or mis-educative societies we have so far had. But each, in his own way, was acutely conscious of problems of achievement, and both entertained serious doubts about the possibility of suffusing society with educational values. Clarke was very aware of the factors in English traditions and customs which militated against fundamental change in and through education. Furthermore, he argued, we should respect these factors by developing a national policy for education that maintains continuity (40). He thought education could best fulfil its social purpose by recreating the "English tradition" and by transmitting the best of the present:

> "The form of the task is to re-think and re-interpret what we have, rather than to think out something entirely new" (41).

This rethinking and reinterpretation, however, posed educators with great challenges. Essentially, the tasks of education were to assess and criticize the prevailing values of materialism, secularism and scientism, and to seek to substitute for them a Christian view of man.

But this Christian view was to be a reinterpretation of traditional Christianity, in the light of changed social conditions. For his understanding of the latter Clarke turned to Mannheim, and largely accepted his diagnosis. Through the work and planning of educationists, not only in schools but in society at large, Clarke hoped to see develop a common, democratic culture, unifying life and work and binding together past and present (42).

Clarke accepted the doctrine of original sin which he interpreted to mean that no naturalistic devices, including education, could succeed in finally eliminating man's propensities for self and social destruction. Sin, furthermore, calls for a severe discipline. Perfectibility is excluded in principle. This is the only example in reconstructionist thinking, so far as I am aware, of admission that there is an insuperable barrier to progress in and through education. Apart from this limitation, Clarke accepted the thesis that through education it is possible to universalize, although not to equalize, intellectual and moral virtues, and, by degrees, to achieve, or, as he believed, to recreate, a social unity which he termed a "Community of Persuasion". Although his remarks on this subject were extremely sketchy, Clarke seems to have had in mind a fundamental social consensus, or an ongoing debate about policy within the confines of agreed values and agreed rules. This is the educative society, which has no necessary relations with particular political constitutions or social arrangements, although it will be a planned society, built firmly on an evolving English tradition.

Clarke's educative society is an ideal of community within which there are tensions whose force he seems not to have fully appreciated. He wanted a common culture, but not unanimity of values and outlook. This culture, as we have seen, was to be based on a reinterpretation of

Christian values and "the English tradition", but Clarke provided little guidance on the form that this interpretation might take. The educative society was to be free, but also disciplined; in the words of Hocking, the American Idealist philosopher, it was both to "reproduce the type" and to "go beyond the type". There was to be a national policy for education but not a state system. Education was seen as a spiritual enhancement, but also as a process orientated by the demands of work and vocation. A more systematic analysis than Clarke ever engaged upon is required to organize these and other tensions in his thought into a comprehensive cultural ideal. Thus the concept of the educative society provided Clarke's thought with a direction, but he did not adequately discuss the issues arising from the attempt to move in the direction he indicated.

Mannheim's proposals for cultural renewal, as we saw in Chapter VII, involved far more than a reform of education, since he envisaged an elaborate, centralized system of democratically controlled state planning for economic and social affairs. The principal tasks of education were to develop a new kind of consciousness, that which apprehends diverse cultural forces as formative factors in experience, which is sensitive to the deep turbulences, crises and transformations of our time, and has the capacity and will to engage in the democratic planning of the "third way". Clarke shared with Mannheim the Mead-Dewey socio-cultural interpretation of the formation of personality and of fields of human action. Whereas Clarke treated original sin as a factor which limits the effect of environmental change, Mannheim identified the crisis of culture as the major factor limiting what we might hope to achieve through a reformed education. The crisis was a profound movement in culture, expressing powerful but not inexorable

human and social tendencies towards irrationality, totalitarianism and annihilation. The seriousness of the crisis provides the justification for strenuous efforts to rebuild man through his upbringing, but it also provides a warning about the possible limits to what we might expect to achieve in this way. Mannheim's commitment to education, like that of Wells as he grew older, appears as almost an act of desperation: he was prepared to use propagandist, even at times indoctrinating, methods to ensure social control, and to strengthen elites as agencies of control. Formal education should, he argued, provide experience of and training in small group behavior. Through this training, he hoped to avert the tendency of mass society to degenerate into unstable mobocracy. As part of the process of securing social order and control in a period of great upheaval, Mannheim envisaged a new moral-spiritual order. This was to comprise a national community of persuasion, to use Clarke's phrase, or a consensus on norms and values, and it was to be subtly led and organized by a clerisy of socio-spiritual leaders. However, the community was not to be blind and led, like Platonic sheep, by all-seeing shepherds. Mannheim believed it possible through education to suffuse the whole community with awareness of and responsiveness to contemporary cultural situations and trends. Knowledge of the world, and of the self, was to be cultivated in all forms of education by methods appropriate to the wide spread of differences that characterize public schooling:

> "Public education will need to emphasize the experimental nature of all living. It must devise techniques for interpreting fundamental issues to various levels of intelligence and educational background" (43).

The basic intention behind Mannheim's, as behind Clarke's, educational proposals was the restoration of a missing community. No actual past

community could provide an adequate model, because of the enormous changes in modern, industrial societies, but, as we saw in Chapter VII, many specific features of the liberal democratic tradition could be reconstructed to provide a foundation for the new society. Man himself had similarly to be reconstructed, a task which Mannheim believed could be accomplished through an education directed by modern scientific understanding of human behavior. These tasks - the restoration of community and the recreation of man - express the fundamental aims of reconstructionist theory, but they also point to very serious difficulties. The broader tasks of education which Mannheim set are indistinguishable from directed enculturation; thus he had no qualms about recommending full use of efficient techniques of communication and social control, even though these involved propaganda and indoctrination. As I pointed out in Chapter VII, Mannheim's determination to establish a unified social order and his investment of central elites with great power and a decisive leadership role provide too few safeguards in a democracy for the maintenance of plural values and interests, and inadequate provision for the sharing of responsibilities and experiences. On the other hand, Mannheim's conception of education as a set of processes which intimately relate to the institutions, values and aspirations of society has greatly enhanced our understanding of possibilities for directed policy change. He understood better than almost any other commentator of his time that educational processes, content and methods must all be thought out anew in the light of the changes that have occurred in society and of the choices we wish to make for future social and cultural policy. This is an understanding whose full significance has yet to be grasped by the main body of those engaged in English education.

5.6 Later experimentalists

The effort to achieve a new human type, one which is spiritually regenerated, morally strengthened and intellectually trained through education, seems largely to have been replaced, in the post-war period, by a more modest and behavioristic preference for achieving change through manipulative instruments. At least, there has been a move towards a greater concern for instrumental procedures, especially procedures of group decision-taking. Of the writers I have discussed, Frank is an exception to this since his psycho-cultural theory refers to the growth of personality. However, he too showed a preference for group engineering in recommending that personality be directed and self-directed through the continuous appraisal of experience in democratic groups. Education, conceived as the chief deliberate agency and process for shaping growth, is regarded, in this position, as a man-making enterprise. If it succeeds, or "takes", education transforms personality; it becomes, in effect, another name for man's new and growing cognitive perspective. Since society, for Frank, exists only in and through the experiences and inter-relationships of individuals, to succeed in educating all people is to succeed in recreating or remaking society (44). The remaking of the individual and the reconstruction of society are continuous, reciprocal processes. Man remakes himself and society, not by the utopian designs, which Frank thought were one of the false trails of the thirties, but by engaging in a critical scrutiny of laws, customs, institutions, and revising them in the light of his increasing understanding and sensitivity. These are all, for Frank, educative tasks.

As we saw in Chapter VIII, Frank thought of culture in terms of designs, inventions and plans for living. Following Cassirer, he said:

> "Every culture is a product of creative imagination: what the poets, artists, prophets, and, more recently, scientists have formulated artistically and conceptually as patterns for perceiving the world and for transforming nature and organic existence into a symbolic world for human living and purposive striving towards the enduring goals which people cherish" (45).

The processes of renewing and recreating culture in a democracy depend upon the universalizing of the symbolic systems through education. But it is not knowledge in the form of information that is so important as the insights, understandings and skills which enable us to use and develop knowledge. Hence Frank outlined a programme for schooling which gave prominence to: "cognitive self-awareness" in pupils, concept learning, learning to learn; and, for teachers, communication theory and the Dewey-Bentley theory of knowledge as a transaction between the knower and the known, in which concepts serve as "patterns for perceiving and relating to the world" (46).

Frank's treatment of educational processes reflects the debt to Dewey, which he freely acknowledged. There are parallels between his intellectual relationship to Dewey and that between Clarke and Mannheim - both owed much, yet introduced factors to which the more systematic thinkers gave inadequate attention. Frank laid particular emphasis on learning processes in small group situations, thus informing Dewey's more comprehensive and abstract theory with an awareness of the social psychology of interpersonal relationships. But, like Dewey, Frank had a remarkably optimistic confidence in what schools can do to educate all youth. Also following Dewey, he tended to reduce the diverse modes of the symbolic systems to the single mode of natural-science thinking. For education to serve for all children and youth in the way Frank recommended, we should need to extend very considerably the range of classroom procedures to include use of very diverse forms of pupil experience.

The difficulties are not simply those of finding ways of developing cognitive awareness and of communicating the values of discursive thought, but of maintaining a sense of the meaningfulness and worthwhileness of whatever the school stands for.

The school can be an agency of renewal, in the manner Frank describes, for those children and youth who are interested in and able to appreciate the sophisticated modes of understanding which he discusses. It is by no means clear, however, that these modes, at least as we have developed them for educational purposes, provide teachers with means of access to the experiences and aspirations of all who are in school. Thus, although he intended his theory of teaching to be universal in the sense that it could be applied throughout the whole educational system, Frank's thought is more relevant to the education of cultural leaders and innovators than to the education of the average citizen. He would perhaps repudiate this distinction, again on Deweyan lines, as a form of elitism or an unnecessary and mischievous class division. I have argued that reconstructionism is a concept of education which depends for its realization upon the actions of cultural pioneers. It would be better for its exponents to recognize this and to give more attention than they have done to the actual content and form of experience in everyday life, instead of concentrating so heavily on higher order mental processes.

There seems to have been, amongst Frank's reconstructionist contemporaries, a more limited aspiration than that of their predecessors to reconstruct culture through education (47). Not that the basic Deweyan framework of growth as a reconstruction of experience in a democratic society was abandoned: on the contrary, it is implicitly accepted by all of the later experimentalists and quite explicitly by some. Stanley,

for example, acknowledged that his reconstructionist perception of the role of education was derived from Dewey's Democracy and Education. We may also detect the influence of Mannheim on both his content and style:

> "in a transitional era the integrating principle in education must be found, not in the inculcation of an organized body of doctrine, but in an intensive program of study, inquiry, and discussion designed to aid the students, as individuals and as a group, to find their way through the confusion and conflicts of our time to a viable and consistent social philosophy capable of ordering and rationalizing the presently chaotic conditions of modern life ... the school [should] help its students achieve order and clarity through such deliberate and intelligent reconstruction of the values and principles inherent in the democratic tradition as will clarify their meaning and restore their integrative power in the modern world" (47).

The determination of the later experimentalists to reduce the grander and more speculative formulations of their predecessors to operational procedures resulted in proposals to develop manipulative instruments to guide change, or even to reduce the complexity of human personality to a hypothetical model of the group-orientated decision-taker. Thus, democracy as shared experience and participation in decision-taking expresses itself in the ideas of consensus, practical-judgment and a set of basic social-moral norms which serve as a goal for group inquiry. The principal task facing the citizen of a democracy is to learn how to use the instruments of group participation (48).

Brameld's society of the future is an educative society:

> "Education becomes increasingly a term for the co-operative methods and objectives by which the widest majority of the people, young and old, actively unite in behalf of the domestic and world order they can agree on" (49).

The social-moral pattern of norms which Stanley prescribed is to be defined and adopted as part of an educational quest. Raup's practical judgment is to be used in educational policy-making, while the

understanding, knowledge and value preferences which lead to its adoption are all recognized to be the product of education. What is missing, at any rate in Raup, Smith and Stanley, is the earlier exuberant enthusiasm for progress on all fronts at once. Also gone is the relative disdain of earlier reconstructionists for the very powerful anti-educational forces operating in man and his culture. There is no diminution in the faith that a truly universalized education would transform the whole of society, but there is a much more sober appraisal of the limited sphere in which education can extend its influence. This is a gain in realism, which is strengthened by the more detailed exploration of operational procedures.

The search for operational procedures is an extension of the earlier pragmatic theory of the operational definition of ideas. It is, however, more significant than this statement may imply. We have seen that the reconstructionist concept of education has many resemblances to other theories which have no explicit commitment to the wider aims of the reconstructionist movement. We have also seen that many of the reconstructionist proposals for reform through education are highly schematic, partial and neglectful of countervailing forces. More recent advances in the understanding of organizational, institutional, social and cultural change have led to the identifying of problems of priority, strategy, resistance, evaluation, and the reactions of elements within a system to each other. Attempts are now being made, as we saw in Chapter IX, to clarify the roles of change agents, and to analyse other roles in the change process. If reconstructionism is to maintain its vitality its exponents have both to operationalize the differences between their conceptual apparatus and that of other educational theories, and to incorporate and assess the contributions of

the newer change theories.

6. Conclusion: the Quest for Order

I have had perforce to survey a wide range of issues in this chapter. Even so, I have given scant attention to a number of topics which, especially in the more recent development of reconstructionism, are of great significance. I shall have a comment to make on this in a moment. But, first, I shall briefly recapitulate the key elements in the reconstructionist concept of education. The general target of cultural renewal is an expression of five basic ideas:

First, that present culture is in a condition of turmoil and critical discontinuity.

Second, that the vital elements in culture are experienced and expressed in human lives, which are therefore subject to turmoil and stress.

Third, that culture renewal is a form of directed growth or re-organization through reflective inquiry and of experience in social situations.

Fourth, that the reorganization of experience should be directed by criteria of continuity, and order; thus, culture renewal is, or should be, a movement toward some form of unity or coherence of experience.

Fifth, unity and coherence of experience are best achieved through a kind of world consciousness, or seeing oneself as integral with a modern, world-wide culture.

I have suggested that these concepts give rise to certain difficulties: for example, the problem of defining clear criteria for growth; the confusion of education and enculturation; the problem of authority in a democratic system; the overlap of character formation and indoctrination;

and the inter-relationship of educational and other social institutions. It can hardly be said that the reconstructionist theory has grappled successfully with all of these issues. This perhaps is an inevitable consequence of the attempt to embrace within a single thought system many diverse ideas. It is, after all, much easier to solve problems and to achieve consistency when the frame of reference is severely delimited or when some single principle is adopted to which all other principles are reduced or systematically related - e.g., concepts like rationality, or authority, or alienation.

Reconstructionism is not reducible, nor did it attempt to reduce its own ideas to some such single principle. Yet, there have recurred a small number of central themes. Of these, the quest for order, as I have noted in previous chapters, is the positive counterpart to the confusion and breakdown observed in culture. This quest lies at the heart of the conception of education advanced by two of the post-war experimentalists, Stanley and Brameld. For Stanley, it is, in the spirit of Dewey, still a methodological principle:

> "This conception of education in a very vital sense undertakes to make an integrated and integrating social philosophy the goal rather than the foundation of the educational programme of the public school" (50).

Stanley was satisfied that the democratic heritage could provide adequate materials for the new order. I have argued that such a claim is inconsistent with the alleged extent and seriousness of the breakdown. How can we be sure that the attempt to establish a community of outlook through the teaching of a heritage of values will succeed where in the past it has, on the reconstructionists' own analysis, failed? In any case, heritages must be interpreted, and the constant invoking of a heritage, or, as with Clarke, the English tradition, distracts attention

from the actual locus of authority, which is the group of interpreters. Also, it is hardly consistent to adopt the democratic heritage, in the particular range of forms it inevitably takes in a single society, while at the same time advocating a completely critical reflective method.

Brameld appreciated the need to give a coherent account of the new order which he so frequently advocated but, since he sought to combine the consensual quest with the adoption of specific programmes expressing the new synthesis, he was unable to avoid another kind of incoherence. I pointed out that, for Wells and Mannheim, the quest for order became a quasi-religious mission. They looked to religious concepts and experience both for inspiration and for analogies to the secular culture designs they proposed. These religious elements in earlier forms of reconstructionism provide an appropriate setting for Brameld's most recent general statement of his position. Under the banner of "existential humanism", he has proposed a new alliance of educational, religious and philosophical interests:

> "By a philosophy of education or philosophy of religion I mean a philosophy of culture-building and evolution-directing, a philosophy that provides man with symbolic self-expression, that generates confidence in his power to control and renew his life, that impels him to search for, commit himself to, and identify with the most meaningful whole which he is capable of grasping" (51).

Brameld equates religious experience with the quest for wholes, thus bringing to the fore the implicit religious quality of his concept of reconstructionism. This makes of education a religious concept but only in the most general or eclectic sense, since a quest for wholes can be accommodated within any of the great religious systems, and barely distinguishes those religions from any ideological system. This is perhaps another way of saying that the reconstructionist concept of education is an ideological concept, held at times with the intensity of religious

conviction. It expresses a longing for order and unity, not only of outlook but of community and of action. The tensions and strains within the theory are enormous, since it has to accommodate, besides this quest for order, a powerful emotional demand for agreed, committed action (consensus), and a wholly naturalistic and sceptical empiricism. Cassirer remarked of the enlightenment that it replaced the seventeenth century, Cartesian idea of "the spirit of systems" with the more open,scientific and concrete "systematic spirit" (52). Reconstructionism wishes to combine these, but has been unable to show just what form the new, unitary concept of education would take. Despite valiant efforts, no Thomistic synthesis has been achieved. Since the reconstructionists have treated education as the source and method for building a new culture, it follows that there can as yet be no assurance that this hypothetical culture will be unitary, and thus the problem of a fragmented or disunited culture, which they set out to solve, still remains.

CHAPTER XI

CURRICULUM DESIGN I: THE WEBBS, WELLS, DEWEY AND KILPATRICK

Reconstructionist ideas on the design of the curriculum comprise an extremely miscellaneous array of proposals ranging from the more comprehensive and substantial studies of some of the experimentalists to the very fragmentary suggestions of the Fabians. In my attempt to systematize these various proposals I shall be conscious of a risk of concealing this fragmentariness and of implying a greater schematic unity and wholeness than existed. With this reservation in mind I shall consider the reconstructionist ideas on curriculum, with reference to several topics of interest to contemporary curriculum theorists. These topics include:

1. the overall structure of the curriculum, conceived as an arrangement of subjects, topics, themes and activities designed to achieve the broad educational objectives I discussed in Chapter X;

2. processes of curriculum making, or strategies of curriculum change, including the use of a rational design model which proceeds systematically from an analysis of learning situations to the design, implementation and assessment of learning programmes;

3. the problem of determining roles of different participants; e.g., teachers, pupils, parents, subject specialists and others;

4. the relationship of the so-called domains or disciplines of knowledge to teaching and learning programmes.

While I shall have these topics in mind in discussing reconstructionist curriculum thinking, it would be misleading to treat them as foreground considerations. We shall see that the total reconstructionist contribution in these areas is very uneven and that no less important than their positive proposals were the criticisms they made of the existing curriculum. In the present chapter, I shall examine the curriculum

thinking of the earlier reconstructionists, prefacing this with a brief discussion of some of the principal features of recent curriculum theory; in Chapter XII, I shall discuss the curriculum ideas of the later reconstructionists.

1. Some Recent Developments in Curriculum Design

The concept of curriculum design is at least as old as Plato, and all theories of education incorporate design proposals. However, understanding of logical issues and of planning and strategy in curriculum decision-taking has been considerably enhanced by the work of the experimentalists, and especially by the contributions of Rugg and Smith and his associates (1). We should expect a theory such as reconstructionism, which gives primary emphasis to consciously directed change, to seek in the curriculum opportunities for the planning and guidance of learning across very broad areas of human experience.

There are several ways of describing and analysing the overall structure of a curriculum. For example, where chief emphasis is given to the transmission of the concepts and methodologies of the major disciplines of knowledge, or to initiation into subjects, like history and mathematics, the curriculum is commonly referred to as a disciplinary, or a subject curriculum, and curriculum categories reflect the conceptual structures, and the modes of validation of the disciplines (2). Where chief emphasis is given to the ascertainment of children's interests and where learning programmes are constructed to develop these interests, whether through the use of projects, cross or inter-disciplinary themes, or various other arrangements of subject matter, we have what is commonly referred to as an experience or activity curriculum. The conceptual structure of this kind of curriculum is by no means clear, and the key

concepts employed by its advocates (e.g., interest, need and discovery) have often been criticized (3). Obviously, the "subject" and "interest" based curricula are not logically discrete. Transmission of the subject matter of the disciplines is not necessarily an inactive process, as Plato, Whitehead, Bruner and others have demonstrated, although it is often contended by critics of this approach that the child's activity is largely restricted to a limited range of assimilative and regurgitative performances, and that little effort is made to engage the child's wider interests and experience in the learning process. On the other hand, the development of children's interests does not preclude the transmission of logically ordered subject matter, since it is an open question in what manner and by what means the interests ascertained should be developed. As Dewey argued, the concept of interest does not of itself yield adequate criteria for growth. Recognizing the difficulties of distinguishing between "subject" and "interest" as a basis, some of the most recent attempts to develop total curriculum designs have abandoned these older classifications, and the dichotomies (and slogans) to which they have given rise: for example, the knowledge and experience classifications of Phenix, and Broudy, Smith and Burnett (4). Phenix's design involves the schematization of knowledge and experience into six major forms:

symbolics (language, mathematics and non-discursive symbolic forms);

aesthetics;

empirics (human, biological and physical sciences);

synnoetics (personal, intuitively derived knowledge);

ethics;

synoptics (integrative meanings: history, religion, philosophy).

Phenix's attempt to outline a map of knowledge and experience, and his conception of synoptics as a quest for "comprehensively integrative meanings",

express that interest in "coherent wholes" which has characterized much reconstructionist thinking on culture and education. I shall raise this point again in Chapter XIV, where I discuss Phenix's views on teacher education.

Broudy, Smith and Burnett have produced a curriculum design from which they devised a common core programme for all youth in the upper years of secondary education. In their design model these authors convert the traditional subjects into a system which retains the separate identity of processes of inquiry while combining and re-arranging subject matter into new fields:

Symbolic skill studies (in English, foreign languages, mathematics);

Basic concepts from sciences (general science, biology, physics);

Developmental studies (of cosmos, institutions, cultures);

Value exemplars (from art, literature, philosophy, religion);

Molar social problems.

For these areas, separately and in combination as a general education core programme, Broudy and his associates prepared systematic teaching and learning schemes. These schemes involve teachers and pupils in building up cognitive and evaluative "maps", and cognitive operations of interpretation, association, application, and replication, of ideas and skills.

From this brief outline we may see that both Phenix and Broudy and his associates developed general design models which transform the familiar curriculum categories of "subject" and "interest" into comprehensive networks of concepts and fields of knowledge. The processes they identified are not defined exclusively by traditions of inquiry - e.g., history or physics - but by types and relationships of concepts and strategies of knowledge use. Pupil interest is not excluded, as a criterion of choice,

but in the strategy of curriculum designing interest takes second place to conceptual analysis. With their multi-dimensional structure, Broudy and his associates provide a framework within which teachers could plot a wide range of school programmes and rates of individual progression, thus overcoming, in some measure, one of the main objections to a core curriculum; namely, that it prescribes no ways of relating individual differences to a common and carefully pre-structured study programme. Structural complexity and subtlety of analysis, together with the noticeable emphasis on higher levels of cognitive process, give to the Broudy scheme a general character or orientation which distinguishes it from the older core curricula which were directed by the vaguer notions of examining a miscellany of contemporary social problems, or of satisfying expressed child interest. The Broudy scheme does not, of course, achieve the impossible: a common programme which is both the same for all pupils and yet different for all of them, but it does make it possible for curriculum designers to relate their more practical decisions to a common and clear set of variables.

These attempts by Phenix, Broudy and others to build up systematic structures of knowledge and experience, comprised of a variety of interconnected logical operations and modes of experience, are amongst the most constructive features of the intellectualist reaction against both the older progressive idea of an interest-based curriculum and the more recent life-adjustment approach.

In addition to the three approaches I referred to in the preceding paragraphs - i.e., logical operations, child interest, and social functionalism - we should incorporate into the concept of curriculum design an idea that might be termed thematic unity. By this, I mean that curricula, whatever their particular structures, are dominated by some major

motif or set of assumptions which impinge upon all the elements. This thematic unity is more apparent in some curricula designs than others: for example, the Soviet motif of polytechnicization, which characterizes (or so its exponents intended) large parts of the Soviet curriculum. It aims at:

> "giving the younger generation a knowledge of the most important branches and general principles of the techniques, technology and organization of socialist production, and equipping the young with habits of work and experience of socially productive work" (5).

Whatever the practical results, the intention underlying polytechnicizati is the extremely ambitious one of attempting to give a definite ideological coloring to all studies by encouraging pupils to examine any possible links between the content of their school studies and socialist work culture. It is not in the ordinary sense a form of vocational education. By suffusing the whole programme, polytechnicization seeks to affect learning in many different ways, ranging from direct cognition to absorption and unconscious adoption of values. In these respects, it is similar to certain views of religious education, as an all-pervasive atmosphere or ideology and not simply a single subject on a par with all the rest (6).

2. Reconstructionist Curriculum Proposals

The choice of polytechnicization to illustrate the idea of a thematic unity in the curriculum is not fortuitous. There is much in the polytechnical ideal which bears upon reconstructionism: its pronounced ideological quality; the attempt to inter-relate theory with practice; emphasis on the intellectual significance of work experience; the strong social orientation; and the notion of a definite core of values upon which all might agree. Yet, despite these affinities, the reconstructionists have not in their curriculum thinking made use of polytechnicization,

and, apart from Dewey's contributions, have hardly touched upon the whole question of industrial education or the specific relationships that should obtain between school education and work culture. This is a subject to which future reconstructionist thinking needs to give particular attention in view of the rapid changes in conditions and relationships of work.

None of the earlier reconstructionist curriculum proposals reaches the level of analytical clarity and systematic rigor of the Broudy scheme. Only Rugg, and to a lesser degree Brameld, have aspired to design total programmes in any detail, which may seem surprising in view of the general reconstructionist preoccupation with a new cultural synthesis towards which the school is intended to contribute through curriculum design. Since, insofar as the school is concerned, the curriculum is a major device for expressing this synthesis, or of developing in children the intellectual and emotional capacities with which they may later achieve the synthesis, the failure of the majority of the reconstructionists points to a missed opportunity. It should be noted, however, that the Broudy scheme was produced by three members of the social and philosophical foundations division of the University of Illinois College of Education. This division, as we saw in Chapter VIII, has been one of the major centres of reconstructionist thinking and, while Broudy himself is not an experimentalist, both Smith and Burnett are. Thus their study may be regarded as in some senses an extension and development of one of the main lines of reconstructionist thinking.

Most of the earlier reconstructionists gave some sketchy idea of the total design of the curriculum and one or two of them some indication of how a unifying, synthetic curriculum might be built. From a review of these incomplete suggestions we can form an idea of the general

character of the reconstructionist curriculum.

2.1 The Webbs: utilitarian studies for elites and masses

The Webbs said too little on the curriculum to enable us to do much more than associate them with the modern studies movement of whom Spencer and Huxley were leading and influential exponents in the latter half of the nineteenth century (7). The explanation for the brevity of their comments on the content of education is not lack of interest, or any failure to recognize the potential contribution of educational reform to social change, but a regard for the rights and responsibilities of the teaching profession. Education was seen as a focal point of national recovery, in the latter part of the First World War:

> "The subject to which, above all others, we desire to draw attention, is that entitled 'Can We Effect a Revolution in Our System of Education?' We suggest that failure to find an affirmative answer to that question will mean the frustration of the national hope of effective recovery from the war or of building up a civilization worth fighting for" (8).

The teachers were expected to show in detail how an affirmative answer could be given, but Webb and Freeman outlined a programme within which detailed reform might occur:

> "The teachers must tell us how to modify the subjects taught and the methods of teaching so as to facilitate in every way the free, healthy and spontaneous development of the child's personality through its own interests and efforts" (9).

However, Webb was by no means confident that teachers would meet this challenge, and in his Fabian Tract, The Teacher in Politics, he criticized them for their past failure to formulate a policy of reform (10).

The Webbs proposed replacing the classical secondary and tertiary curriculum of ancient languages and literature, and the non-vocationalism

of classical humanist schooling, with a structure of vocationally-directed modern studies: sciences, social sciences, technical and technological studies, and modern European languages. This is, broadly, the so-called realist programme of the post-Renaissance period, filled in with contemporary subject-matter. All pupils were expected to partake of a modern programme, but whether this would be common, or specialized, and at what stage it should be introduced, remains uncertain. The Webb modern studies programme appears to have been intended mainly for the secondary schools, whose separateness from the elementary school system Webb accepted, and for the university and continuation and adult education. For London University, he proposed professional studies and research. He rejected the leisurely Greats and triposes as unsuited to people looking for professional training. The faculty of arts would have to become professional, too, by specializing in languages. He proposed a scheme for teaching some fifty languages and a course in world literature. Webb was not unaware of the professional origins of European universities and he appealed to tradition in support of his argument for a professionalized university which at the same time concerned itself with citizenship training:

> "The London University, like the universities of mediaeval Europe and modern America will ... necessarily take on the character of a technical school for the brain-working professions of its time" (11).

By abandoning the pursuit of "the whole realm of knowledge", and by seeking for practical applications, university teachers would be compelled to push out "into the yet unknown - that is to say, into the region of original investigation and research" (12). Hence the university would come increasingly to specialize in graduate work as well as professional studies. On both points Webb may be regarded as an accurate forecaster

of twentieth century trends in university education.

So much for the elite in the universities. For the masses, the Webbs had two main proposals: first, content embodying ideas of mothercraft, home management and child nurture, as a necessary condition of achieving a national minimum, and, eventually, the socialist commonwealth (13); second, specifically for London since this was Sidney's chief interest, a very comprehensive programme of commercial education intended to overcome the very serious deficiencies in provision with which Webb contrasted the superiority not only of continental capitals but of Manchester as well. His plan for commercial education was conceived not merely as technical instruction, but as "the best possible education" for those whose future lay in commerce and business. Through commercial studies, the two systems of mass and elite education could be drawn together in a single, scholarship-linked system from elementary school to university (14). At all levels, the traditional literary-moralistic programme was to be replaced by subject matter of a more technical, practical and more obviously contemporary character. The Webbs shared Huxley's opposition to the classical humanist tradition in both its older forms and as revived by Matthew Arnold. But, unlike Huxley, they had very few suggestions for throwing bridges from the one to the other. Indeed, their proposals envisaged the submergence of humanistic study in work-orientated programmes, and one could well imagine the disappearance of the valuable as well as the more doubtful elements in traditional culture from universities and secondary schools if their proposals were ever fully implemented (15). On the other hand, the Webbs were not simply elevating the principle of efficient education for a managerial democracy. Sidney Webb, on one of the rare occasions when he was aroused to a passionate denunciation,

criticized "class education" which condemned people to a servile role, and hinted at a curriculum that would unite the classes and eliminate vocational predestination. There is no contradiction between this ideal of social unity as reflected in a common core curriculum and a utilitarian approach to learning. Nor should it be too readily assumed that, because they opposed traditional university culture and advocated an enlightened vocationalism, the Webbs were opposed to any form of liberal education. As Dewey demonstrated, the realist programme refuses to acknowledge that vocational preparation is necessarily illiberal, or, indeed, that the classical curriculum makes no vocational assumptions.

The gradualist theses of Fabianism assume that, through education and the provision of a minimum standard of material comfort, political activists can direct society towards socialism. The equation of education with socialism was not thought to entail a propagandist education. As far as the Webbs were concerned, no propaganda is needed, because the rationality nurtured by a realist education is presumed sufficient to convince people of the rightness of planning, of organization, and of socialism. At least, the Webbs believed that those people who will be in a position to have much influence will inevitably, in an educational programme of the kind they envisaged, accept the rational superiority of socialism. Hence the readiness of the Webbs to leave the London School of Economics free of propagandist pressure.

Few other reconstructionists had this confidence in the results of a modern realist education capped by research training in the methods of the social sciences. Wells was by no means content to leave the curriculum in that condition of relative neutrality which seemed to satisfy the Webbs, although he did share with them the belief that

rationality and socialism are inextricably linked.

2.2 Wells: curriculum design foreshadows new order

Wells never worked out a detailed curriculum structure, but certain general features stand out in his proposals. He condemned the bookishness of conventional schooling; its reliance on ancient knowledge, much of it factually incorrect, for example in the sciences; its neglect of the issues of contemporary life; its parochial nationalism; and its subservience to technical and vocational pressures (16). Building up a common culture meant, for Wells, providing a common core programme, comprising subject matter whose inter-relationships and connections are to be explored in cross-disciplinary topics. Wells wanted not only what he called horizontal integration of topics; he also wanted a pre-planned, sequential programme of school studies. From the adoption of such a programme, it follows that we can map out a totality of topics for school study, year by year from the elementary school onwards, and Wells did in fact sketch out a scope and sequence model for "informational" studies, of a kind which the upsurge of "discovery" methods in primary schools has unfortunately pushed into the background (17). The main features of this model are the predominance of scientific studies - physical, biological, and social; world history and contemporary cultural studies; a workshop method of directed inquiry and research; and individual and group assignments (18). Like all core programmes, it shares with the traditional curriculum the idea of pre-planning of overall structures according to implicit or explicit learning objectives held by the teacher. Ideas about the scope and sequence of learning are accordingly based on the teacher's awareness of known achievements and standards, both of the child and within the subject. The sequence element in Wells' plan extended into adult education, where "world consciousness" was to be

a major objective of cultural studies. He was not, in the narrower sense, a professional educationist, so Wells neither filled in the detail nor, apart from listing descriptive categories, attempted to analyse the conceptual structure of his scope and sequence model. Nevertheless, as a practical adult educator he gave some indication of the possible applications of his ideas. In his highly appreciative intellectual biography of Sanderson, headmaster of Oundle School, and in his re-creation of aspects of Sanderson's life and work in his novel, The Undying Fire, we may see what kind of a school programme, possible in his own day, was acceptable to Wells. The main elements in this programme were: boarding, hence substantial custodial control; a semi-secular religious service designed to create in the boys a common commitment to community service; the replacement of individual competition as a motive by group work and interest in the task at hand; and a broad programme of "modern studies, dominated by science, study of society, and many forms of workshop technology." The school was to achieve through its laboratories, art rooms, library, museum and chapel the atmosphere of a kind of Salomon's house of inquiry, criticism and constructive analysis of contemporary problems. It was to equip the pupils with a capacity to reflect upon, criticize and rebuild society, not merely to become its efficient managers and compliant servants:

> "More and more does he [Sanderson] see the school not as a training ground of smart men for the world that is, but as a preliminary working model of the world that is to be" (19).

This world that is to be is, however, a reformed version of the present model, not something wholly new and different. For Wells, the visionary and utopian, even a drastically reformed school curriculum would be inadequate as a microscopic plan of the future social order. His highest aspirations for cultural change, expressed in his utopian

romances, were accompanied by the sober note that a hundred generations or more of changing education would be required to nurture the emerging "new man". No single concrete curriculum scheme could give more than a faint intimation of what eventually was to come. But for utopian reformers there need be no sharp dichotomy between present and future and Wells' curriculum design for the schools of his own time reflected some of his larger culture ideals: the quest for rationality through science; the communitarian ethos which he hoped group work and community service might achieve; the systematic discussion and study of social policy and reform; the creation of a new spiritual-moral order of inter-related ideals, reflected in the total unity of a common curriculum; and the blending of hand and mind work, in technology, workshop, art and museum activities.

Wells had no confidence in the capacity of the average teacher to design a curriculum of the Sanderson-Wells type. The answer to the question as to who should be responsible for designing the curriculum can be inferred from Wells' criticisms of the conventional apparatus of education. Responsibility for reform could not be vested in the existing education authorities, central or local, nor the bulk of the whole education profession, since these were the agencies responsible for the present system and all its faults. Wells could only point to isolated figures, like Sanderson, hopefully the pioneers of the future, from whom others may eventually learn. His answer, then, to the question of who designs the curriculum is that the elite of socially-conscious, future-minded reformers are the only ones fitted to design anything worthwhile. This answer reminds us of those social reformers in independent progressive schools who abandon the general education system in the hope that a few individual achievements of great merit will diffuse, by their own

excellence, throughout the system. Admittedly, by proposing a very long transitional period, Wells had tried to safeguard himself against the criticism that this is a weak diffusion model for a national system. Its weakness lies not so much in the smallness of the elite, as in the difficulty independent progressive schools have in maintaining continuity and of commanding adequate resources for major experimentation. Wells seemed unaware of these difficulties and showed a remarkable confidence in the willingness and capacity of a shadowy elite to transform the whole of education by the hortatory and exemplary methods of Sanderson. In his biography, he remarked on Sanderson's lack of success in converting others to his views. If, indeed, the school curriculum has the potential significance for cultural renewal ascribed to it by the reconstructionists, then in a mass education system much more organized forms of innovation, diffusion and implementation than Sanderson-Wells charisma and propaganda are needed.

2.3 The experimentalists

2.3.1 A curriculum for the public school system

It is not surprising that the problems of transforming a mass system of education should be best appreciated by the American experimentalists. The United States had already had some hundred years' experience of mass education and of the common public school when, in England, serious efforts were first being made to abandon the parallel streams of elementary and secondary education in favor of an end-on system. What the experimentalists took for granted - namely, the common public school - was by no means accepted as a desideratum of reform by English reconstructionists, even as late as the time of Mannheim and Clarke.

Furthermore, as we saw in Chapter VI, the democratic tradition, its myths, ideals and institutions, had very powerfully taken hold in

the minds of the experimentalists. They professed very little interest in educational ideas or possibilities that were capable of realization only by minorities, whether these minorities were social classes, ability groups, or cultural elites. However, as we have seen, despite their professions of faith in the common man, many of the experimentalists set education tasks which would depend for their realization on minority initiative and leadership. This point aside, they perceived education as an ongoing process in a public school system stretching in a continuous ladder from elementary school to college and into adult education. There were of course recognized drop-out points, but these were a consequence, as far as the experimentalists were concerned, of remediable social and economic inadequacy on the part of individuals and communities. Ideally, all should, and eventually would, be educated through a common curriculum, and in common institutions, under surveillance until young adulthood. Only thus could all be said to have a necessary (if not sufficient) opportunity, to make the best of themselves and be provided with means for responsible democratic participation.

Holding these beliefs firmly as tenets of the democratic faith, the experimentalists approached the question of curriculum design as a total system problem. None of the English reconstructionists ever saw it quite in this light, as none of them, including Clarke, conceived of the system as even potentially a homogenous whole. This is not surprising, as the strength of the Public School tradition in England, the persistence of separate, class-biased education in elementary and secondary schools, and the lack of a coherent structure of tertiary education, made total system thinking extremely artificial until very recently. The present controversy and uncertainty over the status and inter-relationships of the various elements in tertiary education suggest that the idea of the

educational system as a totality of inter-related parts has still not taken hold. There are, of course, many educationists who have argued strenuously against the notion of a homogeneous totality. They have defended the continuance of different structures - for example, in secondary education - and different programmes of study - i.e., directed by the values of mass and minority culture (20). In the United States, by contrast, there is a close and widely acknowledged relationship between total system thinking and the conception of democracy as classless, equalitarian, and nation-binding.

Thus, the general structure of the curriculum has been for long a primary practical consideration in the United States, in view of the continuing move towards a universal system from elementary school to college. Many of the points raised in post-war Britain about general education, specialization, vocational training, "relevance" in the curriculum of the young school leaver, and the preparation of specialist curriculum designers, were being actively debated by the experimentalists and other schools of thought in America in the early decades of this century (21).

It is interesting to see how some of the proposals for designing the curriculum made at that time raise possibilities explored even earlier when the provision of mass elementary education was being discussed by nineteenth century European reformers. Pestalozzi made an extremely detailed analysis of the elements of understanding in the tool subjects of arithmetic and language (22). This work was important for him as a systematic articulation and further development of his pedagogical thinking and for the practical demands made on him as a teacher of young children. But he felt the need to provide a rational basis, not just as a personal consideration, but because he foresaw the possibility of staffing mass

education systems in the first instance with lightly trained teachers. Provided these teachers had satisfactory moral characters, and a sympathetic intuitive understanding of children, he could guarantee to provide them with manuals of instruction based on the most meticulous analysis of the growth of sensory skill: the so-called ABC of Anschauung (23). The quest for teaching schemes free of the dangers arising from the troublesome necessity to use frail humans to teach them has, as we might expect, an even greater ancestry. The production of guaranteed cures for illiteracy almost ranked with the better known arts of alchemy in the seventeenth century, when the more perspicacious curriculum designers were able to make a good living with the promise of one scheme or another to the interested princes of Europe. Even Comenius felt obliged to ask one of the most celebrated of these hawkers, Ratich, to disclose for the public good the secret of his mystery (24). The perennial quality of this quest transcends the scepticism of the scientific era, and as recently as 1959 Bruner, one of the most distinguished of contemporary educational reformers, could write of the teacher as one of the aids to teaching, and of the necessity to design curriculum materials of a power, elegance and structural sophistication sufficient to overcome the inadequacies of the average practitioner (25).

The alternative solution, of training teachers as curriculum designers, or as participant members of curriculum design teams, has been less prominently canvassed. This may mean no more than that the traditional craft of teaching has for a very long time proceeded on the comfortable English assumption that the teacher designs, and designs adequately, his own curriculum or the parts of it for which he is directly responsible. Practice, therefore, might seem to have settled the issue. If this assumption were made, it would of course be very inadequate. It has rightly

been described as one of the myths of the English system (26). Many factors limit the teacher's freedom to design as he might wish, and there is little ground for confidence that his training at present equips him to perform adequately even the more limited function of designing parts of a programme. The American answer to this problem has been not to rely on the teacher's craft, but to develop a new educational speciality, that of curriculum designer or consultant, who is employed by the state and local boards to direct, facilitate, encourage and engage in committee-based curriculum construction. This in effect is the Pestalozzian answer, of structuring the teaching profession by clear role definitions which, at the lowest level, distinguish the mass of practitioners from a much smaller sub-group of specialist innovators or diffusers.

2.3.2 Dewey and Kilpatrick: problem-solving, occupations and scientific culture

The experimentalists quite clearly recognized that designing the curriculum for a universal system of public schooling raises the most difficult problems for democratic reformers. We do not find agreement amongst them as to the best ways of redesigning future curricula. Dewey led the criticism of existing practices by pointing to the unsatisfactory practical results of the methods of curriculum-making by local school boards, by state boards, by national committees and by individual teachers. None of these agencies had succeeded in removing long-standing shortcomings. These included teachers neglecting such important forces in the shaping of American culture as industrialism, population mobility, and the transformation of an open-frontier rural community into an urban-industrial society. Just as they looked to a more distant past to provide curriculum content, so did those responsible for

curriculum-making organize teaching content through methods of adult, logical differentiation, a false psychology of stimulus-response, rote learning, textbook assignment, individual competitiveness, and a discipline of imposed authority (27). A universal system had been created but the necessary differentiation needed to accommodate the enormous variety of individual experience and capacity and sub-cultural inequalities had not occurred. As we saw at the beginning of this chapter, this, too, is the problem to which Broudy and his associates returned, correctly judging that the theoretical solutions so far proposed were inadequate. Traditional methods and the philosophical, psychological and pedagogical assumptions underlying them were the object of sustained attacks by Dewey, who inaugurated perhaps the most comprehensive critical onslaught in the history of educational thought (28). But Dewey was a critic only in order to reconstruct. For the structure he demolished, he offered his own alternative. This alternative reflects his confidence in the goodwill, common sense and potentiality for growth in skills and understanding of the average performers of any task. He did not look to an army of experts to do all that was necessary in the way of redesigning the content of education. In terms of curriculum designing, he proposed that teachers, working in teams in schools and in groups of schools, should engage in the business of curriculum criticism and renewal. Dewey distinguished the right of the public, including parents, to enter into partnership with teachers in defining the broader social concepts and purposes of education, from the professional and expert role of the teacher as curriculum maker. This is a distinction which some of his later followers blurred, in the programmes of curriculum making by public participation - for example, the Illinois state curriculum programme (29). From the operational standpoint it

cannot be a sharp conceptual distinction because, according to operationalism, the meaning and significance of ideas, including the concept of education, can only become clear, and therefore ideas can only be validated, in the course of the practical operations they specify. The public policy-makers could justly complain that they could not meaningfully discuss the general ends of policy unless they could see what these wider purposes might mean in teaching programmes. This may be so, but there are nevertheless various ways of acquiring more detailed understanding. While Dewey wished to separate the two processes for institutional purposes he had no desire to restrict the outcomes of discussion, inquiry and design to the particular group responsible.

Dewey's work as director of an experimental elementary school, the Laboratory School at the University of Chicago, from 1894 to 1904, when he was head of the departments of philosophy, psychology and education, reveals his own general style of curriculum making. Detailed descriptions of the work of teachers as curriculum designers are given in Mayhew and Edwards, The Dewey School, and in the nine issues of the Elementary School Record which appeared under Dewey's editorship, in 1900.

Later developments of the Deweyan idea of the teacher as curriculum designer cannot be adequately summarized, but two influential and more recent exponents of the idea that design involves pre-planning according to either some unifying theme (the "organizing centre") or defined objectives are Herrick and Tyler. In their thinking we may detect methods of curriculum design which have evolved from Dewey's emphasis on studying the psychology of children's learning and his stage-by-stage model of problem solving, or reflective thinking. Dewey's more general commitment to the idea of curriculum planning which is both flexibly responsive

to children's interests yet directed by clear intentions about learning outcomes is reduced, by Tyler, to a sequential model in curriculum design. This model is divided into four major stages:

> "the educational objectives;
>
> "the learning experiences that enable pupils to attain these;
>
> "the organization of these learning experiences to facilitate consequential development and enlightenment and enlightening relationships with other concurrent experiences;
>
> "the means of appraising student learning" (30).

This schematization, for all its value as a more precise methodological device than Dewey ever produced, subtly diminishes the importance and oversimplifies the social complexity of the initial <u>situation</u> of learning. Dewey's criticism of the traditional school was, as we have seen, concentrated on its failure to adopt the Rousseau imperative to study the individual child and its neglect of what we might term the Marxist-Mannheim maxim of studying the social and cultural context of the child's thought and behavior. If we combine these two, and identify children and their teachers in the setting of particular schools, we have in outline the learning situation, a nexus of psychological, cultural, social and institutional forces. Dewey grasped the fundamental fact of planned change in education, that the starting point in any inquiry or enterprise is not some set of objectives or ends in view, but an awareness of a problem or a difficulty, something which unsettles the pattern of habitual response. We must first elaborate this awareness into a concrete perception of the context of action, before we can define objectives. Dewey made several criticisms of the approach which is now known as management by objectives, arguing that we do not enter problematic situations with a clear goal but begin to think about objectives as we work towards a mode of resolving the problem before us. Aims are

in, or arise out of, situations; they should not be imposed upon them (31). This concept of aims as immanent is traceable to the influence of Idealist philosophy on Dewey's thought. It implies that we do not become fully aware of all the objectives in enterprises (e.g., a teaching sequence) until we have moved on to something else: the owl of Minerva takes flight when the shades of night have drawn. The situation is, initially, a problem situation; in education, the child is problematic: we don't know in advance just what is best for him, and the task is to find out. This finding out is the unified process of designing the curriculum, teaching, and assessing one's teaching; that is, we don't and can't for educational purposes adequately understand the child outside the context of teaching, any more than we can decide what and how to teach him until we have begun to study and think about him as an individual. For this purpose, the data of psychology are a useful resource, but they require interpretation through the reflective analysis of specific practical problems. They cannot be directly translated into practical contexts but require the mediation of concrete, problem-directed thinking (32).

The teacher is an agent of the child's growth; he discovers to himself and to the child what his educational needs are. To do this, he has to begin to make and to go on making in his teaching an imaginative construction out of the following:

> the impulses, interests and learning capacities of the individual child;
>
> the child's life history of experience - his cultural self;
>
> a generalized, scientific method of inquiry, the method of reflective thought;
>
> the traditions of inquiry and experience - the subjects;
>
> the major issues, and problems of and challenges to, contemporary

society;

the democratic ethic, which provides a stable context.

For each of these elements, there is a relevant if incomplete body of scientific data which the teacher is expected to mediate or interpret in his analysis of the situation.

Dewey denied that fully prepared kits of materials, schemes of work, syllabuses, textbooks and so forth, could ever adequately express this imaginative construction. The curriculum is an ongoing creation of forethought, shared teacher-pupil experience, plans of action, reflection on achievement, modification of tasks and of direction. It is a succession of unique situations, reflected upon, and reconstructed. To design a curriculum in this style, the teacher needed the opportunity, facilities and relevant knowledge and skill to decide for given groups of children what is most appropriate for them. Dewey took this idea from Rousseau, in whose Emile it is exhaustively documented, but he gave to it a wider reference: the sources of the curriculum are inevitably social, its major bearings are social, and it should be experienced in social groups, never in the isolation of Emile's upbringing (33).

The more general formal content of Dewey's curriculum design may be brought out by considering his remarks on the educational value of the major occupations of mankind, and his contribution to what became, in Kilpatrick's hands, the project method. Dewey's use of the occupations in the curriculum is a reminder of his claim that American culture has been most powerfully and profoundly modified by the impact of industrialization. To study the evolutionary history of human occupations is to study the history of at least the main features of this transformation as they have been experienced in everyday work life. While at the Laboratory School, when he did his most sustained thinking on curriculum

matters, Dewey built a three-stage elementary curriculum using a project approach to: (1) a selection of the fundamental occupations or socio-industrial arts of mankind - e.g., carpentry, cooking, textile-making; (2) the early history of man and the origins of society; (3) reflective inquiry into social forces and processes in history (34). He looked upon the arts or occupations as entire sub-cultures or rounded forms of human experience, whose values, skills, interpersonal relationship patterns and ethos could be imaginatively recreated, talked about and assessed. Thus the re-creation of the sub-culture of the occupations much more closely resembles the imaginative emphasis to be found in idealist theories of history and in Mannheim's perspectivism than it does industrial or vocational training. Through the study of occupations, children's experience could be systematically connected with the history of their culture, with social change, and with the present occupational enterprises of mankind. Dewey's aspirations in this respect were very similar to those of the defenders of polytechnical education in the Soviet Union, and there is much in common in the ancestry of the polytechnical theory and Dewey's.

Dewey did not restrict his efforts in developing appreciative understanding of work culture to the elementary curriculum. He objected strenuously to those exponents of classical Greek culture who associated menial toil and illiberality of mind with manual work. He opposed all educational schemes which appeared to be restoring the aristocratic theory of liberal education. This theory equates true and worthwhile leisure with critical thought, contemplation and the study of classical works (scientific as well as humanistic), and thereby opposes those studies of an applicative kind which make no sharp distinction between work and

leisure, or vocational and general education (35). Dewey advocated a new humanism in place of classical learning:

> "The humanism of today can be expressed only in a vision of the social possibilities and the intelligence and learning embodied in the great modern enterprises of business, law, medicine, farming, engineering, etc. ... The emancipation of intellectual power which would result from an open and above board identification of motives for study with the main social interests of the day would secure an infinitely better preparation for a later unhurried enjoyment of leisure than results from an attempt to cultivate secluded plots which few care to enter" (36).

This sounds like a possibly hazardous intellectual programme, with its assimilation of study to social interest - whatever that interest happens to be. However, from his own work at the Laboratory School, it appears that Dewey in practice was highly selective about the "social interests of the day". He was still heavily under the influence of the Froebelian and Herbartian tradition and of the historical, developmental models then popular in psychology and sociology, so the curriculum sequence he proposed was broadly chronological as it was intended to mirror and draw sustenance from the "stages" of the child's life: the so-called recapitulation theory. The earliest life of man yields materials for younger children to study, and so on through the social and industrial history of civilization. In their study of occupations, the younger children at the Laboratory School examined textiles, their history, the practical skills of dyeing, spinning, weaving, the science of textile production, and aesthetic, geographical and economic aspects of this and other crafts. According to Dewey's psychology of learning, children's activity isboth a quality of the organism, hence no stimulus is needed to make the child active, and it is indivisible - i.e., cognitive learning is affected by and affects the emotions, motor performances, etc. The children did not, then, merely observe, read, and write, as was the common

practice even in those classrooms affected by reformed pedagogy; for example, the transformation of Pestalozzian thought into highly contrived "object lessons" in which teachers performed while children watched and answered questions. Opportunities were provided at the Laboratory School for experimentation, practical work in groups, out-of-school activities, and for imaginative work in the arts. Later in their schooling, children undertook more systematic work in the symbolic domains: sciences, mathematics, literature, history.

Dewey never subsequently gave to secondary education the attention he devoted to the elementary curriculum while at Chicago. His approach was more orthodox, and in the second part of Democracy and Education, where he discussed most fully the secondary curriculum, he did not attempt to dismantle and reconstruct the traditional subject domains into a unified core curriculum as did several of his followers. However, three points in his treatment stand out. All three features are reminders of the reconstructionist quest for culture order, for a coherent structure of understandings and a unified method of thinking into which children should by degrees be initiated, thus coming to share the meanings of pre-existing cultures and,in the very process, learning the ways of renewing these cultures.

The first of these three features of Dewey's thought on the secondary curriculum is his confidence that a single, generalized method, that of open, reflective inquiry, may suitably be employed in all subjects as a means of converting otherwise inert ideas, or adult structures, into a flow of ideas related to children's interests, questions and puzzlements. Dewey was careful to point out that method is not strictly separable from subject matter, but he nevertheless believed that there is a "method of knowing"which is relevant to all subjects, and this is the method of

reflective inquiry. For Dewey and all the experimentalists, this generalized method was both scientific and democratic in character. Childs summarized the connection, in arguing for the consistency between teaching children how to think for themselves and the values of science and democracy. Teaching children how to think is:

> "wholly compatible with the deliberate effort to cultivate in them the habits, the attitudes, the techniques, the knowledge, and the perspectives that are the correlative of the scientific way of thinking and of the democratic way of living" (37).

The second feature of Dewey's analysis of the secondary school curriculum is his search for some dominant, typical social purpose or theme about which subject teaching could be organized. This approach was neither dependent upon nor was it intended to disclose the logical structure of the disciplines of knowledge. On the contrary, as with polytechnical education, a unified structure of social purposes or themes was expected to emerge, by degrees, from the teachers' search within their separate disciplines for common themes and modes of inquiry. Thus, the problem of curriculum sequence is to be resolved through a scheme which progressively yields understandings of social processes and, at the highest level, of the symbolic systems of thought and experience.

The third general point about Dewey's scheme for secondary education is his relative neglect of mathematics and languages, in favor of the sciences, history and geography, the social sciences and vocational education. This does not imply a lack of awareness of the theoretical significance of the symbolic systems of mathematics, language and humanities. But there can be no doubt that, pedagogically, Dewey had relatively little interest in the logical and symbolic structure of separate subjects. He wished to direct pedagogical thinking towards the world of social action, for which, leaving aside the humanities,

neither mathematics nor foreign languages seemed to have much direct relevance. Even in these limited terms, however, Dewey's assumptions were mistaken, since mathematical thinking underlies many of the most rapidly developing branches of modern technology and industrial practice. Of course, from this fact it does not follow that theoretical sciences and mathematics should feature prominently in common core curriculum. It is conceivable that the mathematics of ordinary life could be taught relatively quickly, in practical situations without occupying a lot of curriculum time. This would not, however, be true of the development in pupils of mathematical thinking and understanding, which call for more sustained study. Since Dewey wished to create a mature democracy of active participants, based on the widespread understanding of the major social and industrial processes, his treatment of theoretical sciences and mathematics was quite inadequate. The critical problem for the reconstructionists in defining the general content of science and mathematics is no longer that of indicating a content of applied arithmetic and geometry; it is instead the much more difficult problem of universalizing awareness and understanding of those mathematical processes at work in industrial civilization. Neither the older utilitarian approach nor the more recent attempt to spell out key mathematical concepts free of any cultural associations provides an answer to this problem. Those who support the latter approach on the grounds that children will generalize their mathematical thinking have an unsubstantiated confidence in children's skills of transfer, interpretation and application.

Despite Dewey's ingenious attempt to create, through the school curriculum, a historically-conditioned understanding of key forces or motifs in social life, his own analysis of culture, and hence his

curriculum prescriptions, are fundamentally defective. This is not, as is sometimes alleged, because he provided no scope for individuality. His account of the interaction of the self with society makes it clear that no theory of individual experience is adequate which fails to recognize the social dimension of self; furthermore, the interactive-theory does not deny impulse, private experience and contemplation, three considerations critics have raised. The problem is, rather, that the Dewey diagnosis does not in fact get at some of the factors and forces in culture which precipitate fundamental change, and as a consequence his curriculum proposals minimize the importance of large areas of symbolic thought. In Chapter VI, I pointed to a difference of emphasis between Dewey and other experimentalists, such that Dewey gave prominence to shifts in scientific thought underlying social change, whereas Rugg, for example, neglected these and concentrated on technology. Despite the difference of emphasis, Dewey tended, in Democracy and Education, and in other of his educational writings, to assimilate changes in the particular sciences to a single model of "science". It would be quite possible to make a social-historical study of sciences in this sense without acquiring an understanding of the experimental procedures for testing hypotheses in the particular sciences. These are distinct and different intellectual processes and, while Dewey gave due attention to the former, he neglected the latter, thus giving to his curriculum proposals a character which must appear in some respects hostile to science, a paradoxical outcome for one so ardent in defence of scientific method.

We turn from Dewey's view on occupations and social problem-solving to the project method and reflective inquiry. The project approach, which Kilpatrick popularized in The Project Method and Foundations of

Method, has been widely misunderstood and so debased as to refer to the most trivial exercises in producing scrap books of miscellaneous magazine cut-outs. The reduction of projects to miscellanies of information on broad topics is not at all what Dewey intended; he used the idea of the project as a way of organizing the elementary school study of occupations, and as a means of vitalizing study of conventional subjects in secondary schools. The project is initiated by some point of interest, whether an expressed individual child interest, or something of more general concern which provokes comment and questioning and may be used as a starting point for organized inquiry. A skilful teacher could thereby considerably reduce instructional approaches to subjects while still retaining the virtues of disciplined inquiry, sequential study, and conceptual understanding which characterize sound teaching of the subjects as separate disciplines. Unfortunately, the antithesis between subject-centred and project teaching, while not an explicit part of Dewey's thinking, was given great impetus by Kilpatrick, who persistently challenged and discounted the educative value of disciplined knowledge.

The germs of this antithesis are to be found in Dewey's confidence that he had discovered, in the method of reflective inquiry, a concept far more important than the distinctive logical structures of individual subjects. What mattered, in his view, was that the child's impulsive life might be directed by the teacher finding interests upon which the child could be encouraged to reflect. It was of less consequence whether the pupil acquired specialist expertise in one field or another than that these reflections led him into a consideration of social issues.

Society has need of specialized skills and knowledge, and it must make provision for them in higher education, but this, for Dewey and

Kilpatrick, was no reason for making the school curriculum a narrow funnel:

> "The scheme of a curriculum must take account of the adaptation of studies to the needs of the existing community life; it must select with the intention of improving the life we live in common so that the future shall be better than the past. Moreover, the curriculum must be planned with reference to placing essentials first, and refinements second. The things which are socially most fundamental, that is, which have to do with the experiences in which the widest groups share, are the essentials. The things which represent the needs of specialized groups and technical pursuits are secondary" (38).

For Dewey, content is educationally meaningful, and becomes an "object of study" as it is brought into a perceived relationship with "a course of events in which one is engaged and by whose outcome one is affected". Furthermore, he wished so to direct this "course of events" as to produce two outcomes: increased awareness of and participation in social activities; and increased reflectiveness (39). Thus we may see how he treated logically organized subject matter as an educational resource - akin to the findings of psychology and sociology in this respect, to be drawn upon and interpreted by the teacher in mapping out activities - but not to be taught as such, except at the levels of specialization and technical training. Kilpatrick formulated this approach as the project method, but it was Dewey who provided the fundamental theory.

As we have seen, Dewey thought it possible and useful to give a liberal quality to vocational training by drawing out its social bearings, and exploring its relationships with other forms of human enterprise. Although he favored a common curriculum in elementary and lower secondary education, he was not an advocate of an indefinitely extended general, non-vocational programme. What he proposed was that vocationalism should be incorporated, by degrees, into a curriculum

directed at exploration of the social world, and that all inquiries should be structured by the procedures of reflective thought. The project method was a particular expression of Dewey's more general theory of inquiry. According to this theory, thinking may be analysed into five steps or stages, which link the "pre-reflective" doubt situation with that of "post-reflective" satisfaction. The stages are:

suggestion;

problem;

hypothesis;

reasoning;

testing (40).

By building this model of thought into the curriculum as the normal pattern for structuring inquiry, Dewey hoped to achieve not just a revitalized subject-matter learning, but the emergence of a new type of thinking being: the critical, experimentally-minded thinker, alert to practical and theoretical problems in his environment. His argument for this model is that man commonly responds to the shifting pattern of his environment either habitually, or, where the shifts disrupt habit sequence, by a more conscious, directed response. Both individuals and societies may respond by retreating into more primitive, or defensive or irrelevant patterns of behavior, or they may embark upon the more risky but also potentially more rewarding business of reflective inquiry. Risky, because reflection involves the insecurity which arises from discarding or modifying existing beliefs, assumptions, institutions, and modes of action which under scrutiny are found to be inadequate for one reason or another. Rewarding, because through reflective inquiry it is possible to reconstruct problematic situations

and ideas into something more closely corresponding with expectations, values and ideals.

In reflection, the individual or group becomes aware, or is brought to awareness, of a problem. The source of disturbance or disruption is identified and compared with previous similar problems and other relevant experiences. Next comes an imaginative leap into the unknown, the formulation of an idea, an action programme, that could bring about a solution to the problem as it has been identified and contextually located. This leap is then formalized into a hypothesis; deducations are made, and projections and predictions carry the mind forward to the likely consequences of one course of action or another. In this projective stage, the hypothesis may be re-formulated, before action is taken to test it critically. The problem may be resolved in this phase of concrete action; or it may persist, and the whole reflective cycle be re-enacted.

Thus reflective thinking, while it involves conceptualizing, contemplation, and imaginative speculations, is primarily a change process, a means of transforming an indeterminate, troublesome situation into a determinate, satisfying situation. Many forms of action are included, apart from abstract thought: materials may be handled, improvised, made; there may be discussions, observations to make, data to collect, and so forth. If the development of thinking, as Dewey analysed it, were to be made the basic objective and methodology of all education, then education would itself become a change process. Children would be brought up, not as spectators, witnesses, and institution-fodder, but as self and social change agents. Thus, in the theory of reflective thought, Dewey espoused the basic tenet of reconstructionism in the sphere of educational method. A successful education, according to this theory, is one which

effectively builds rationality into the habits and dispositions, not just of a minority, but of a whole society.

Kilpatrick's popularization of Dewey's stages of reflective thought, in his book, The Project Method, made no material addition to the methodology, but showed how different types of projects might embody the steps of the reflective act. However, Kilpatrick's skill in popularizing Dewey led him into sloganizing. When, in The Foundations of Method, he attempted to combine Dewey's thought with Thorndike's "laws of learning", with which Dewey's more purposive psychology ill accords, there emerged a frail doctrine which lent itself to very crude applications. In The Foundations of Method, Kilpatrick distinguished narrow from broad method: the former is primarily a matter of empirical psychological inquiry into effective means, while the latter is a fusion of empirical, conceptual and moral elements, a prescriptive procedure. Into this prescription Kilpatrick poured Thorndike's stimulus-response psychology (laws of readiness, exercise and effect); the idea of "wholehearted purposeful activity"; the idea that in schools important concomitant or unanticipated learning occurs in subject teaching, especially the formation of attitudes; the notion of S→R bonds aggregating into "centres of interest"; the value of shared experience in groups; and the complete act of thought (Dewey's reflective inquiry). From these ingredients, Kilpatrick built a composite, broad method - the project, and reduced curriculum design to the devising of a series of projects built on interests and vaguely related to social affairs.

Kilpatrick's definition of the project unifies these ingredients:

> "As the desired unification lay specifically in the field of method, might not some typical unit of concrete procedure supply the need - some unit of conduct that should be, as it were, a sample of life, a fair sample of the worthy life and consequently of education?

> "... the unifying idea I sought was to be found in the conception of wholehearted purposeful activity proceeding in a social environment, or more briefly, in the unit element of such activity, the hearty purposeful act.
>
> "It is to this purposeful act with the emphasis on the word purpose that I myself apply the term 'project'" (41).

The main business of curriculum making, he said, was (1) to know what interests the child has and (2) to know how these interests may be stimulated, guided and directed to bring growth (42). He suggested four major types of project for this purpose:

> producer project (where the purpose is to make something);
>
> consumer project (where the purpose is aesthetic enjoyment);
>
> problem project (to clear up some intellectual difficulty);
>
> drill, or specific learning project.

Under the teacher's guidance, children in groups or as individuals develop projects from their own interests, and education becomes "exactly a succession of interest, new practice, new interest, still further practice, still new interest" (43). The formal division of ubjects, too remote from "life", was abandoned in favor of interest-based projects.

As we saw in Chapter VI, Kilpatrick in the 1930s became very conscious of the difficulties of a society which relies on an automatic economic regulator and on an undirected assimilation of new to old ideas and institutions. He proposed a role for education which demands exercise of the highest qualities of intellect. Education was to function as "the strategic support and maker of a better civilization" (44). Yet his thinking in The Project Method and The Foundation of Method was innocent of all concern for the possible intellectual shortcomings of the interest doctrine. While undoubtedly a valuable critical argument, when directed against schooling which ignores or suppresses children's interests, purposes and problems of understanding, his doctrine was

scarcely adequate as the basis of curriculum and method for universal education. Nothing in the project method as Kilpatrick developed it specifically directed the attention of teachers to higher order cognitive processes (45). By equating education with "life", Kilpatrick reminded teachers of the inadequacy of the traditional curriculum for the education of many children, and this was salutary. However, he did not appreciate that, in order to make the curriculum realistic and challenging for children of all levels of ability, attainment and background, it is neither necessary nor desirable to equate it with "worthy life". Kilpatrick recognized that choices must be made, although he was, it seems, less sensitive to this issue than were Bode and Childs, but he did not face the implication, that much that is "worthy" in life may have to be provided for outside schools, which have limited resources. The expansionist ideal thus overlooks the basic problem of priorities in educational decision-taking, a problem that perhaps may be overlooked in making criticisms of existing practice, but not in recommending alternatives.

Dewey's model of reflective thinking did not guarantee or even encourage acts of intellectual supererogation, which it has been one of the virtues of the classical curriculum to encourage and reward. The simplest and most comfortable method of solving a problem can well bring satisfaction, where teachers make no attempt to draw attention to the idea of standards or levels of performance. Indeed, the concepts of a standard of performance and of raising expectations form no part of the reflective process. Similarly, to abandon subject teaching, as Kilpatrick proposed in the project method, is to deny oneself access to one of the main sources of criteria of performance - e.g., elegant proofs, inferential reasoning, structured associations of ideas, the marshalling of evidence,

and clarity of exposition. By its deliberate emphasis on interest as a starting point, on pupil initiative, on cross-disciplinary inquiries and on group participation, the project method subtly discouraged teachers from taking up these more challenging tasks of searching for and redefining standards. The Dewey-Kilpatrick arguments for the central importance, in education, of developing problem-solving procedures are sound, insofar as methods of thinking are needed that are flexible and widely adaptive in rapidly changing social conditions. However, necessary as these methods are, they are not sufficient, and the weakness of the curriculum thinking of Dewey and Kilpatrick is essentially their failure to consider the full-range of cognitive, as well as the non-cognitive,processes which should be provided for and actively promoted in schooling.

A further point to note is that those who defended the teaching of organized bodies of subject matter,by methods which included the discovery of the pupil's interests, his motivations, his learning difficulties, and his aspirations, might well point to Dewey's and Kilpatrick's advocacy of a more drastic reform as evidence of misplaced confidence in the willingness and capacity of the teacher to make the very strenuous efforts required to achieve high performance standards of project work. It was partly because of the extraordinary triviality and superficiality achieved by many teachers in the life adjustment era that the reaction favoring predefined, "teacher-proof" materials set in. I shall return to this point in Chapter XIV, in discussing the preparation of teachers.

The last point I wish to make about Dewey's curriculum design is the very considerable emphasis he gave to science. What emerges from his treatment is not so much the separate teaching of physical, biological, and social sciences as Dewey's wish to communicate the values and basic

strategies of a scientific culture. The new culture towards whose realization he sought to direct the school's efforts was to be a culture marked by open-mindedness, love of truth, co-operation, respect for skill, orderliness, confidence in rationality, the quest for knowledge and understanding, and so forth. These he found to be the qualities of scientific culture; not any particular scientific culture we have known, but an idealized coalescence of qualities thrown up and exemplified by the scientific thinkers of the last three centuries. Thus to characterize his general curriculum design by the term scientific is to refer to its mode of construction (experimental), to subjects or theories taught, and to an atmosphere or ethos which Dewey wished might pervade the total school enterprise. We must be careful here to distinguish between that ethos and the study of particular bodies of subject matter. While, obviously, the sciences well taught will communicate it, badly taught they will not. No less important, any subject matter at all is susceptible to the treatment Dewey designates scientific. It is somewhat misleading to use the term scientific so lavishly, and some confusion has arisen thereby. Dewey has been criticized for his neglect of the arts, and the humanities; for turning all that is private, idiosyncratic, perverse,personal and unique in experience into the language and thought of the public domains. Undoubtedly, Dewey gave more attention to the limitations of private experience than to its values. The function of science in the curriculum was to be the same as that which it has performed for humanity at large:

> "emancipation from local and temporary incidents of experience, and the opening of intellectual vistas unobscured by the accidents of personal habits and predilections" (46).

This is disconcerting to those who, so far from seeking this form of emancipation, seek deliverance from the massification of culture into

large public categories of belief, expectation and value. Dewey gave relatively little attention to this issue despite his interest in art as a means of personal understanding and awareness, as well as in its communal, sharing aspects. His theory of experience, as we have seen, does treat "secondary" apprehension of the public, cognitive domains as instrumental to a purely private realm of feeling-states, from which no emancipation can be satisfactory because it is only in "primary" experiences that there is any satisfaction at all. Nevertheless, there is very little in Dewey's ideas on curriculum design to suggest that there are valuable tensions between the public and private domains of experience.

CHAPTER XII

CURRICULUM DESIGN II: RUGG, MANNHEIM, BRAMELD AND LATER EXPERIMENTALISTS

Dewey was the most original and systematic thinker of all the experimentalists, yet there are strands in the emerging experimentalist curriculum which he hardly touched upon. Apart from Dewey, the most fertile curriculum theorist amongst the experimentalists was Rugg, who was one of the leaders in the American curriculum reform movement from the 1920s until the 1950s. In Rugg's prophetic delineation of the emerging "great technology", the content of school and adult education, and hence the curriculum designers, are invested with major responsibility for effecting change.

1. Rugg: Curriculum as Cultural Synthesis

The curriculum, according to Rugg, is not so much a content outline as a form of anticipatory experience; to live through the activities it prescribes and to experience its total ethos is both to apprehend the possibilities of a reformed society and to learn how to precipitate those possibilities out of the flux of a turbulent present. This makes the designer of the curriculum, at the most exalted level, the designer of the future; on a somewhat lower plane he is the designer of a possible future to which children will be encouraged to aspire. The life-making functions of the curriculum are outlined in a list of imperatives for educators:

> "Education should:
>
> 1. Make people aware of the general interest and develop a strong desire to promote it, regardless of the special interests that may have to be sacrificed for it.

2. Develop a strong faith in democratic institutions and a realistic understanding of how they operate through political pressure groups, as well as an understanding of the machinery of democratic government.

3. Convince people of the essential need of consensus in democracy, arrived at through a free discussion.

4. Develop a healthy sentiment in favour of national and community order and unity.

5. Promote the assimilation of minority groups and a belief in justice to minorities.

6. Train people actively in the actual day-to-day practices of citizenship.

7. Foster a vigorous and abiding interest in the discussion of public affairs.

8. Develop a sense of the general interest among the members of groups that are strongly organized to promote their special interests (e.g., business men, farmers, organized workers, and their children).

9. Train and select democratic leaders. Education for leadership generally.

10. Train for educational followership. Develop a sense of the degree to which followership is or is not democratic.

11. Train for the vocations of politics and the civil service. Encourage the entry of people of high calibre into these fields" (1).

In his more prophetic, historicist passages, Rugg saw the reformed curriculum as an actual foretaste of the future (2). His basic argument for attempting to plan the future in this way, like those of Wells and Mannheim, was that we either plan rationally or experience total collapse. Since no one can envisage total collapse with equanimity, we are left with the need to embark on large scale, rational planning. These three reconstructionists were not, on the whole, fond of more limited measures, like the improvement of particular items in existing educational arrangements.

To apprehend the structure of a rationally planned culture, we are enjoined to take the school curriculum and make it into a total culture model in miniature, a pattern of "expressive living", fusing "mental and emotional" life and creating new "cultural groups" (3). To ensure that those best fitted to plan the future - the creative cultural leaders - have the necessary impact, they are to be brought into curriculum design teams. These are not primarily the politicians, applied economists and administrators - although there will be a sprinkling of them - they are literary intellectuals, artists, jurists, community leaders, scientists, philosophers, and so forth - the makers of the emerging American mind, the creative minority who alone are capable of grasping the extent and complexity of the task (4). Admittedly, this is an extrapolation and an interpretation of Rugg's more prophetic passages, rather than a summary of his total position. But it hardly distorts the importance he attached to the curriculum as a design of the future and the desirability of securing the engagement of the most creative thinkers and practitioners in society. He very frequently referred to a reconstructionist curriculum as a possible model of the future, and, however exaggerated this may seem,it is a quite consistent development of the reconstructionist claims that education should become more "life-like" and that through education culture can remake itself.

Rugg took Dewey's and Kilpatrick's arguments a long step further, both in envisaging curriculum making as a fabrication of possible future cultural states,and in adopting and expanding their reflective and project methods through the addition of "the artist's way of knowing". But he seems not to have realized that, in taking this further step, he would be contradicting,or at least severely qualifying,two other planks of his platform. These are, first, the critical, problem-solving

method of inquiry, and, second, the principle of consensus, or policy-making by general discussion and agreement. Leaving aside Dewey's objections to the pre-planning of detailed programmes by the "objectives" method, it is difficult to see how Rugg can reconcile the holistic commitment required in order to make a detailed total design, with his commitment to the critical, problem-solving method of inquiry. This method addresses itself to specific problems and takes the form of a continuous modification of practice. Rugg's own design could not, consistently with this view of the method of change, be offered as a blueprint, but as material for critical analysis and, perhaps, inspiration. His justification of holistic curriculum reform is in this respect quite revealing. In Culture and Education in America, he condemned the schools for always acting, primarily as the "great conservative agency ... the halo of the past has orientated those who have made the content of our school curriculum" (5). Much later, in Foundations for American Education, he wrote that the schools, lacking a basic and consistent creed, preached democracy and practised authoritarianism.

In Culture and Education in America, Rugg postulated two tasks for the school which were required if it were to perform its "true function": the encouragement of child growth, and the remaking of culture. The school, he asserted, "must assume prophetic leadership" via its curriculum design, to capture the youth, who will be the leaders of the movement to create a new synthetic culture in America. Why the school? Because "it is the only organized agency at all competent to cope with the problem of developing in our youth an understanding of this complicated order" (6). But the school programme as it exists is incapable of achieving the level of understanding, just because its

teachers are inadequate. He asked rhetorically:

> "Lacking a half-a-million artist teachers, are we not forced to put into our schools a dynamic curriculum" (7).

There were plenty of sceptics who, disregarding this kind of appeal, looked elsewhere than the schools for materials with which to build the new order, or merely to prop up the existing one. Rugg developed two approaches to the problems of enlisting indifferent or, in his terms, incompetent teachers to the support of processes of culture renewal. The first of these approaches was methodological: an appeal to like-minded culture analysts and synthesists to join in a colossal planning enterprise, or, rather, a vast network of nation-wide planning enterprises, of which curriculum planning would be of necessity an integral part. The weakness of this proposal, in terms of his own theory, is that, given the size and diffuseness of such a procedure, there could be no guarantee that it would result in educative solutions or, indeed, in the identification of the school as a key agency of renewal. Advocates of consensus cannot have it both ways: prescribing substantive programmes, and invoking the principle of policy-making by universal agreement. Rugg's second proposal was that creative leaders should draw an outline of the contours and major features of the new cultural synthesis; he showed the way by drawing up his own outlines. This proposal, by giving the school curriculum a centrally recreative role, meets the objection I raised to his first proposal but encounters two further difficulties: first, the reconciliation of predefined models with consensus methods and, second, the artificiality and incompleteness of any conceivable model of the future. If we eliminate the more grandiose and prophetic elements in Rugg's theory, which would be no great loss, what remains is simply his personal sketch of a possible

design for an integrated, culture-orientated curriculum. This sketch has considerable value, giving as it does an indication of the re-orientation which curriculum thinking is required to undergo if the reconstructionist theory is to have any practical impact.

This is rather less than Rugg appears to have thought he had achieved. However, as a total curriculum design it has some features which are unique in reconstructionist writings, and form a definite contribution to the development of the theory. These features tend to counterbalance the very heavy emphasis given by most reconstructionists to self-conscious, rational modes of experience. The first of these features is the point noted above: Rugg's call for multi-disciplinary teams of curriculum makers, including artists, research workers and others, to replace the existing power blocs: the administrators, the highly conservative college entrance boards, and the textbook publishers. In the 1926 Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education, Rugg deplored the curriculum consequences of their dominating influence: an atomistic, fact-dominated, mental-disciplinary, standardized programme had been the result. Such reform as had occurred was a piecemeal tinkering under the dominance of subject specialists who lacked a wider cultural vision (8). The idea of the creatively-minded team he proposed to take responsibility for national curriculum making was, as we have seen, an essential part of his culture theory. The Woods Hole conference in the United States in 1959, which crystallized a highly significant movement to involve scholars and research workers from many disciplines in curriculum making, illustrates this idea (9).

Rugg's second main contribution points to another essential element in his culture design. The new curriculum should be no less emphatic in

its emphasis on the arts and humanistic study than on technical, scientific and utilitarian studies. Its ethos should intermingle æsthetic with scientific values, and the experiences it predicated in schools would be those of the art and design studios no less than the laboratories and workshops. This aspiration, which marks a conspicuous advance over all previous reconstructionist thinking, was not, however, very well realized in his own massive series of social studies texts. These texts, despite Rugg's claim that they were uniquely based on substantial research, are highly descriptive and verbal, largely relying in conventional textbook style on informative text and questions. The texts were, nevertheless, regarded as a landmark, by friends and foes alike (10).

Of all the reconstructionists, only Rugg took seriously the curriculum issues arising from the attempt to incorporate into a predominantly technical and scientific culture the values and experiences of the aesthetic domain. Imaginativeness, critical insights and the quest for new paradigms for ordering experience, were qualities he associated with the artist. These, he said, were the qualities needed to provide experimentalism with a dynamic (11). Unfortunately Rugg, in his curriculum proposals, did not distinguish the particularity of the artist's creativeness and his distinctive way of knowing (12). Thus, when he outlined a structured, sequential, inter-related core curriculum, such was the hold Dewey had on reconstructionist thinking that the dominating motif was provided by Dewey's problem-solving methods employed on predominantly social studies materials. Rugg's own set of social studies texts and his interpretative studies of American culture emphasized the familiar experimentalist themes, although he did argue for a threefold classification of activity methods into problem-solving, creative, and

appreciative, with more attention being given than in Dewey's thought to the latter two.

In his later works, Foundations for American Education and Social Foundations of Education, Rugg made more ambitious proposals for a unified core which should do justice to different forms of experience and knowledge, arguing (inconsistently as it may seem with his view of the educator as the primary innovator) that:

> "educators are especially called upon to integrate man's knowledge of his world, for their primary function is to teach others what the scholars have learned" (13).

Rugg's core programme in these later books had grown into a conceptual map of modern biopsychology, sociology, aesthetics and industrial-democratic ethics. Not surprisingly, his views on the arts were an eclectic distillation of ideas from Whitman, James and Peirce, Dewey, Isadora Duncan, Sullivan and others who had from their different standpoints contributed, in Rugg's judgment, to an emerging, American expressionist movement. Rugg himself took the next step, of converting this movement into a "consensus". This synthetic achievement may be regarded as an illustration of perspectivism: the creation of a new unity through the labors of scholarly interpretation (14).

Rugg made his last attempt to construe the curriculum significance of the evolution of American culture in the volume he wrote with Withers, Social Foundations of Education, where, after a prolonged discussion of key concepts, he outlined a high school core curriculum comprising: American and world civilization both contemporary and historical; scientific study of personality and behavior; creative and appreciative arts; physical education; and general mathematics. All of the major symbolic systems were to be deployed in wide-ranging inquiries within and across these subject fields (15).

Unlike most reconstructionist curriculum models, Rugg's included the arts and gave them a prominent place. But the inclusiveness of the scheme discloses yet again the tendency of the more holistic reconstructionists to produce schemes which exuberantly and indefinitely ramify backwards through history and outwards through the major domains of human experience. Flinging outline schemes of key concepts across these constantly expanding territories provides no solution to the problem of producing workable teaching schemes. This is because of the essential vagueness and descriptiveness of the all-inclusive and synthetic forms of thinking which these schemes are intended to encourage. We are never shown how such grandiose structures, the product of Rugg's fertile, eclectic and esemplastic imagination, might be related to existing and more mundane forms of thought. This is a variant of the problem of the new man in utopia: it is not too difficult to specify that he shall think synthetically and take a comprehensive view of all situations; what is difficult is to trace the logical and psychological connections between these thought processes and the ones we are familiar with in our present experience. This difficulty is, in the logical and psychological spheres, analogous to the problem of transforming existing institutions, customs and traditions into those which by definition are more attractive and yet are rooted in another and unfamiliar dimension.

Rugg's ideas could have been made more intelligible and practical had he reduced them to an outline sketch of the whole curriculum. He might have shown how, for example, historical and scientific thinking could be brought to bear on various intellectual and practical problems to which they have a common relevance while yet retaining their recognizable conceptual distinctiveness. This is one of the unexplored possibilities in Dewey's problem-solving method, and in his thematic approach

to the secondary curriculum. Since it would not, however, point to any particular reorganization of knowledge or necessarily anticipate any future culture "wholes", its very modesty makes it unacceptable to the more flamboyant reconstructionists.

2. Mannheim: Core, Practical Studies, and Perspectivism

Mannheim criticized the traditional curriculum as scholastic, bookish, formalistic and ossified, and he condemned conventional methods of teaching as intellectually deadening. They displayed a "restrictive aspect of learning" which should give way to a new approach. The new approach was needed both for mass and elite education if schools were to perform the various tasks of individual and social reconstruction that Mannheim assigned to them. The new approach was to be characterized by: inventiveness, trial and error processes, problem-solving, and a workshop and communitarian atmosphere. Further, Mannheim proposed a programme built around (a) practical pursuits, such as family living, rearing children, transacting business, spending leisure, etc., (b) a core of political, social and economic studies of change in contemporary civilization, particularly the goals, processes and problems of the democracies, and, (c) more orthodox bodies of subject matter, including the disciplines of knowledge (16).

Mannheim nowhere gave a systematic account of the structure of the curriculum. It is uncertain just how far he would advocate a Wells- or Rugg-type single unifying core of social science knowledge and understanding, which all children should study in order to become culturally aware and available for socio-political participation. It could be inferred from his concern to achieve a new cultural unity, enriched by

spiritual values, that there would be a common core for all. But Mannheim also advocated separate specialist training for elites, and the continuance in modified form of traditional selection and training procedures. The common core would of necessity comprise only part of the education of future elite members, and it would only be common in the sense that some common subject matter was being studied by all children, in different types of institutions. The future leaders would continue, in school and university, to receive more specialist training in what Mannheim called an esoteric world view, or theoretical knowledge. The importance of this theoretical knowledge was partly that it would help maintain some of the traditional standards whose survival Mannheim considered to be of fundamental importance in protecting society from the tendency of democracy to dilute and dissipate the achievements of minority culture. This esoteric knowledge was no longer, as it had been in the past, to be provided through the classics, but through the social sciences, including the theory of perspectivism, which, Mannheim suggested, it was appropriate to include as a methodological principle.

Another qualification to the common core approach which Mannheim introduced is that individual differences of intelligence, attainment, social background, and vocational aspiration pose problems that can be resolved only by some form of separate provision. Although he did not examine the problem of relating common core programmes involving mixed groups of children with what are now known to be highly complex questions of the nature and sources of individual difference in learning, we may infer that no curriculum proposal would be satisfactory to Mannheim which did not provide for some form of individually differentiated learning. Provision for individual learning was not to be confined to

individual treatment of common core topics, for Mannheim's belief in the culturally creative role of individual innovators led him to advocate opportunities in school for new and individual departures: new topics, discovery methods, and abandonment of the constraints and the partiality of external examinations.

What is most significant in Mannheim's curriculum thinking is not, then, any contribution he made to resolving the very difficult problem of differentiating and relating common core and individual study programmes. There are, however, two points of particular interest in his proposals. The first is that the common elements in the curriculum should be comprised not of formal subject matter but of a series of topics, themes, workshop projects, assignments and discussion issues in the social studies, selected for their relevance to social issues, and so designed as to encourage an inquiring, experimental outlook in children, together with the ability to work in teams and small groups. In discussing this so-called "romantic" form of learning, Mannheim acknowledged his debt to the experimentalists (17). The second feature of his curriculum thought that I wish to emphasize is that Mannheim distinguished between his own methods of sociology of knowledge, and of perspectivist interpretation, and the methods of study appropriate to the capacities and needs of the average child in school.

There are many examples of the core approach in the "life adjustment" curriculum in the U.S.A. in the forties and fifties and in British secondary schools in the post-Newsom era. These programmes are commonly distinguished by:

1. the requirement that all pupils should engage in some common learning experiences;

2. the abandonment of teaching based directly on the structures of the disciplines, as being irrelevant to ordinary children's needs;

3. attempts to develop new, integrated conceptual structures, with concepts and materials taken from several social science disciplines and variously inter-related;

4. adoption of individual pupil interest and capacity, and of social relevance as major criteria for selecting materials and organizing teaching;

5. emphasis on practical problems of living: personal relations, work, leisure, democratic citizenship, etc.;

6. partial and sometimes complete abandonment of homogeneous instructional groups, of textbooks,and sometimes of books and reading materials altogether in favor of a wide variety of procedures: mixed ability discussion and manual work groups, surveys, projects, discovery and inquiry methods;

7. pupil participation both in the planning of curriculum processes and through self and group assessment;

8. replacement of teacher-dominance models of classroom interaction by looser, more fluid, more informal relationships, for which the classroom provides only one and not necessarily the most stimulating setting;

9. flexible workshop-type buildings and the treatment of the wider environment as a "space for learning" in place of traditional classrooms;

10. the attempt, in the interest of a unified culture, to ensure some form of educationally significant interaction between children of widely different abilities, attainments and backgrounds;

11. the adoption of large and flexible timetable blocks.

We cannot be sure how far Mannheim was prepared to substitute core programmes for more traditional forms of organization and how far he would treat them as minority-time additions: nor can we be sure that his recommendations on core curricula refer to the whole range of abilities. He may well have accepted the implicit Crowther-Newsom distinction of an improved traditional academic programme for the minority, and "life adjustment" education for the masses (18). He did not live to complete the educational section of Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning, and

much of his more positive and systematic thinking on these matters has to be inferred and extrapolated from partial discussion and from criticism of existing arrangements.

Mannheim's educational proposals are by no means, in all details, entailed by his culture reconstruction proposals. For example, there are several different ways of providing elites with the understanding of mass interests which Mannheim felt to be needed if unity and stability of culture were to be achieved. The common core and the common school were, as we have seen, adopted by American reconstructionists, but Mannheim was never an unequivocal supporter of either; instead, he sought for ways of reformulating and renewing the English tradition, and this meant finding new directions for existing institutions and modifications of the existing content of education, rather than the imposing of something quite alien. When he discussed the reform of the Public Schools, it is clear that Mannheim had in mind the continuance of a separate system of elite-preparing institutions, and these would certainly not provide opportunities for the kind of mixing which a more extreme form of the common core doctrine requires. However, even within the state sector of education, a common core is only one way of developing common understanding. Again, selection of themes to illustrate problems and trends of contemporary social life is not the only way of organizing social science knowledge so as to bring out themes and methods which characterize different sciences, or to discuss questions of practical interpretation and application. Interdisciplinary discussion groups, linked with separate subject teaching, is one possibility; the teaching of separate subjects with an eye to the wider social and intellectual problems they raise is another. It is an indication of his belief that English institutions are not easily

modified that Mannheim was prepared to work within the existing institutional framework, injecting into it not a new curriculum form (the classics, after all, have long acted as a common core), but a new content, that provided by social science knowledge.

The psychological restructuring that Mannheim called for, in order to produce new elite and new mass mentality, was itself by no means unambiguous, and could have predicated any of the following: more competitive or more co-operative methods, or both; a more pliable or a more determined individual; a Jamesian tough-minded person, or one who is tender-minded; planning-mindedness or self-distantiation, or both. Mannheim's essay on "Economic ambition", and his remarks on ecstatic experience and on the self that lies behind experience, illustrate his own uncertainty as to the general character of the proposed new man. Thus a wide variety of possibilities for the content and methods of education suggest themselves. Mannheim vacillated in his treatment of these questions but was nevertheless firm in his advocacy of a limited common core of practical and social knowledge.

It is difficult to see how experience of this core, together with the other curriculum experience he proposed, could achieve all that Mannheim hoped for by way of unity of basic value orientations, commitment to common social policy objectives, change-mindedness, and availability for democratic participation. Recent evidence on political learning shows just how ineffective most school programmes are in contributing to the development of the democratic attitudes Mannheim wished to encourage. This research suggests that,in a society whose way of life is in many respects hostile to rational and democratic outlooks, we need to begin to exercise educational control at a much earlier age than Mannheim appears to have envisaged (19).

The second main point of interest about Mannheim's proposals for the reorganization of the content and method of school learning is how widely they differ from the methodology of the sociology of knowledge and perspectivism. It seems that,for the mass of school learners, not even simple analogues of these esoteric knowledge forms were needed. Following Scheler, he distinguished two streams of knowledge: first, the understanding which arises in the continuum of everyday experience, where the individual is forced to solve practical problems as they arise, without reference, necessarily, to conscious methods; second, esoteric world views, which require effort, cultivation, etc. (20). Perhaps it is just as well that he did not incorporate perspectivist methods into everyday education,as the following imaginary encounter between Dewey and Mannheim indicates:

> John met Karl on the way out of the staff club and fell into conversation with him. They discovered that they were both bound for the library, which was half a mile away, on the other side of the campus. It had been raining heavily and the short route, which lay across some marshy ground, seemed inadvisable; however, since Karl was in a hurry they decided to risk a damp passage. As they hurried along, John remarked that his hens were not laying well because they were moulting. Karl looked blankly at his companion: a distinguished professor of the university keeping hens! John asked politely whether Karl might care for some fresh eggs. A look of frightened bewilderment momentarily flitted across Karl's face; he stuttered something incoherent and looked away in embarrassment. However, he made the hasty mental note that this was further evidence in favor of the weltanschauung theory on which he was just now working. John, poor fellow, was just talking into the air because his background in homely Vermont had left a legacy of chickens and such like while he, Karl, had derived from another social setting altogether. Hens, and homely farmsteads, were a world removed from cafes, anarchists and Marxist activists in revolutionary Hungary. Alas, the cultural disunities of our time, and how to mend them when even he and the esteemed Dewey could only mumble at each other!
>
> Karl was roused from his reverie by stepping into a very large puddle. He caught John's arm, and together they looked ahead at the path, which dipped into a flooded hollow before rising again to the library. There seemed no way across, except by taking a very long detour. "The stream seems to have

flooded," said John, "and we shall have to go back." He paused, then added, "perhaps there is some way across through those bushes higher up." John moved up to the bushes and stumbled over a pile of planksand ladders near an outhouse. "Let's see if we can't throw these planks across," he said, "and get over that way." But again he was talking to himself, for Karl had moved up on to a mound and was gazing intently in turn at the stream, the library, and the outhouse, at John, the trees, and back towards the distant staff club. Karl looked on with an abstracted gaze while John threw the planks across the stream. These hasty new worlders,he thought; even the finest of them lack the elements of awareness, and as for vision! Taking up what he supposed to be the appropriate stance, he looked fixedly about him and began to relate the various phenomena he observed to one another. How wide was the stream? A difficult matter to establish from this distance. He ruminated over some of the more celebrated streams and rivers of his native Hungary and of the contiguous nations of Europe. Ah, those ancient beauties of city and country! No, this one was a mere trickle compared with them and very muddy; but, as compared with how he remembered it the last time he came this way, it was a gusher; perhaps it would get even larger, if those rain clouds building up again in the south continued this way. The lay-out of the land interested him, too. Had anyone realized, he wondered, that the path could have been driven straight through that clump of elms, thereby avoiding the marsh?

Karl's reflections were interrupted by loud voices behind him. Several of his own students were approaching. He thought to inquire of their views about these matters and asked the foremost of them to stand a little way to the right, look at the stream, and report on what he saw. Was it indeed a stream that was overflowing, or perhaps, now, a small river; or was it a saturated swamp, or what? If they could spare a few minutes he would be able to form a correct perspective of the situation and then consider ways of reaching a decision about what to do next. With luck they might all be able to reach a unified view, transcending the one-sidedness of their particular viewpoints.

Since the students were good natured, tolerant of their professor, and in no hurry, this dialectical quest for consensus went on for some minutes. Meanwhile, John had tried several planks until he found one that was wide enough for a safe passage and just the right length. Laying it in position, he looked back for Karl. Finding his erstwhile companion earnestly engaged in a conversation that had the little party grouped about him inexplicably turning in all directions, he looked puzzled for a moment, then set out to test his makeshift bridge. He stepped gingerly across, and strolled up to the library, reflecting that he had done well not to give in to his first impulse to turn back.

Karl remained in intense conversation with his students for

some time, feeling both a growing sense of communion with them, and the sense of mastery that comes from creatively re-interpreting total situations. By degrees, he achieved insight into the inter-relationships of all that lay about him, so manifesting that flexibility and readiness to shift intentions to suit changing circumstances which, as he noted to himself, not without feeling that this was a trifle immodest, is just what our disintegrated culture needs of its future leaders, the socially unattached intelligentsia. Unfortunately, by this time John's plank had floated away, as the stream rose even higher and the whole perspective changed.

During his long walk back to the staff club, Karl appeared to be in a state of great emotional excitation. An acute observer sufficiently aware of the subtle relationships between situations of social confusion and the individual discovery of new spiritual truth might have supposed that Karl had had a vision. At any rate, keen students of his work noted that,soon after this experience had occurred, his proposals for educational policy came to incorporate a new element. Some of the historians amongst them traced this to John's literary and practical influence, for Karl was writing about mass education in terms such as a more practical form of schooling, and discussions of current social issues; and he was enthusiastically advocating problem-solving methods of thinking, even for the elite. Others, however, in an attempt to sustain the methodological unity of the master's thought, pointed out that it was from Dilthey, Scheler and Heidegger that he learned about problem solving, his only debt to Dewey being the discovery that the elites, too, should be educated to solve the practical problems of everyday life.

3. Brameld: Study of World Cultures

Brameld maintained continuity with the Rugg tradition of a common core curriculum by proposing, as a common core for the seventeen to twenty-year age group, a comprehensive study of world cultures. This study was intended to be primarily critical of the past and directed by the ideals of a better future for all mankind, through the universalizing of democracy and material well-being. The task was to give direct expression to the reconstructionist concept of education as "normatively creative and recreative rather than primarily reflective or reproductive" (21). Brameld gave history a rather less prominent place than it

typically occupies in world culture courses, substituting for the idea of long-term historical development the anthropological concepts of order and process in contemporary cultural settings. We should, he argued, apply to a selection of the economic, political, social and personal problems of contemporary life the analytical structures of culture in process, and encourage youth to think about the world they can have and would want. Thus, "the hub of every curriculum", according to Brameld, should be "the problems and prospects of reorganizing democracy itself" (22).

For this "problems of democracy" curriculum, Brameld proposed the use of a variety of methods, including general assemblies, discussion groups, work experience, and community activity. The methods should be those of public problem-solving: experiential, evidence-amassing, public discourse and debate, clear communication and the quest for consensus, conceived as a "defensible partiality" in the common, agreed policies of a particular group (23).

While Brameld incorporated into his curriculum recommendations concepts from anthropological and social-psychological theory which were not available to Rugg, neither the shape he gave to a common cultural core nor his advocacy of activity methods represents a significant step forward in curriculum thought. But, instead of continuing with the Rugg idea of a crusade to enlist a like-minded elite to design a national core curriculum, Brameld has accepted for himself the more modest role of designer and promoter of experimental programmes. Like Rugg, however, he sees curriculum experience as a possible model for future social behavior. Learning patterns and interpersonal relationships are intended to express a pattern for future relationships; the general holistic, integrative character of the curriculum is intended to

provide a model for strategies of culture and policy-making, and the invitation to students to outline the world they want is intended as an incitement to them to act to achieve that world. Thus Brameld's curriculum theory confirms the reconstructionist aspirations to re-create culture through education.

4. Stanley, Raup et al: Practical Judgment and a Moral Core

Without departing from this aspiration, Frank, Stanley, and Raup and his associates largely abandoned the quest for a core embracing very extensive tracts of cultural experience. They returned to the more manageable Deweyan strategy of devising a methodology of inquiry and of consent which could perhaps in time yield a new order of values and convictions. Stanley reverted to a still older tradition in American educational thought, that of Herbartianism, in a quest for a content of historico-moral-procedural rules which could form a unifying core for the education of all American children. With Smith and Shores, he explored the possibilities of such a core very fully, and contrasted the strengths and weaknesses of the core approach with other more general curriculum orientations (24). However, Stanley's main intention in Education and Social Integration was, as we have seen, to provide a supporting argument for the method of practical judgment worked out by Raup and his associates.

I have already discussed this method, in Chapter VIII, and the only point I wish to make here is to contrast the concept of practical judgment with Frank's psycho-culturism. Practical judgment is an essentially consensus-seeking group exercise in policy formation. Its advocates intended that the ideology and the techniques of practical judgment should permeate personality, producing a community of skilled

democratic deliberaters, in whom, so far as social affairs are concerned, individualistic aggression and the impulsive life are firmly sublimated to the requirements of Dewey's reflective discipline.

5. Frank: Scientific Humanism

In his 1950 paper, "Culture and personality", Frank, too, treated education at all levels as the key to directed culture change, and, like Raup and his associates, he examined ways of replacing the hierarchical principle of leadership by that of group decision-taking. Furthermore, his psychological approach was manifest in his arguments for supporting individual expression through the therapy provided by group experience. In 1959, in The School as Agent for Cultural Renewal, Frank had shifted the emphasis of his inquiry a little, towards the public procedures of scientific thought and the processes of cognitive learning. He criticized the more direct approach to culture change which Counts had preached in Dare the School Build a New Social Order? and, in a more Deweyan spirit, commended schools to the iconoclastic tradition of western scientific thought: criticism, and - a crucial task - "the renewal of our culture in the light of contemporary scientific thinking" (25). Frank did not take this to mean the construction of science-dominated utopias, or the saturation of the curriculum by scientific subject matter. Like Whitehead, he foresaw the emergence of a new scientific humanism, whose success depended upon the schools providing children with an initial reorientation away from the unreconstructed assumptions of common, naive experience, towards what Einstein has called the scientifically conceived universe. His theme was receptivity to modern scientific world views. Frank did not make the Rugg-Brameld mistake of trying to encapsulate this in an impossibly elaborate and ultimately vague common core

curriculum. The meaning of modern science is better communicated, in his view, by teaching procedures intended to promote cognitive self-awareness, communication awareness, the transactionalist method of knowing (a Dewey-Bentley development of Dewey's theory of interactionism [26]), concept learning, and other strategies which have only in recent years begun to be systematically studied. There is much in Frank that anticipates Bruner, who in all other respects, too, belongs to the experimentalist tradition, although not explicitly a reconstructionist (27).

I remarked in Chapter VIII that Frank's outline of a programme of cultural study was open to the same criticism I have made of Mannheim's perspectivism and the broad culture outlines that Rugg and Brameld incorporated into their curriculum designs. This criticism does not apply to his views on teaching procedures, which are both consistent with his methodological reconstructionism and capable of being tested empirically. Yet Frank proposed a profoundly challenging,and many would think,an intellectually over-ambitious, programme for the elementary school. He argued that it should induct children into the contemporary conceptual world,not merely by arranging experiences from which glimmerings of awareness might develop, but by having children unlearn their false concepts of the physical world and then consciously and individually orientating towards the new conceptual frames of modern science. While this proposal provides a direction in which studies at this stage should be moving, the cognitive demands it makes on children and teachers alike limit its practical applications. Nevertheless, the continuing tendency of reconstructionist thinkers to set teachers and pupils the most ambitious and demanding cognitive tasks is a reminder that, despite their emphasis on the loose ideas of social

relevance and individual creativity, they have always regarded the universal cultivation of rationality as a primary curriculum objective.

6. Overview and Assessment

From this review of reconstructionist ideas on the curriculum, a few themes may be extracted to serve as a summary and to raise further issues:

6.1 Curriculum and the strategy of change

First, most of the reconstructionists set themselves the very difficult task of more or less systematically exploring relationships between educational content and methods of teaching and learning, and their more general proposals for culture renewal. Almost all of them perceived that curriculum and teaching procedures are the most important factors in a strategy of directed change to be achieved through education, and none of them restricted the definition of curriculum to conventional lists of subjects to be taught in schools. Those who, like Rugg and Brameld, wished both to involve the community in educational policy-making and to prepare substantial curriculum schemes of their own, did not fully investigate the problems of professional authority and shared responsibility that are thereby raised. On the other hand, those who, like Dewey, Kilpatrick and Frank, invested teachers with major responsibility for curriculum making, did not adequately justify the very heavy intellectual demands thereby made of large and not always very sophisticated teaching forces in mass education systems. The danger of both sets of proposals is that of abandoning traditional standards without achieving new ones. This could easily result in contempt for and trivialization of the very procedures they advocated. The reconstructioni

intentions were highly demanding, intellectually and in many other respects, but the expression of these intentions in curriculum outlines was often disappointing, and it underlines the need for more detailed and systematic curriculum analysis than any of the reconstructionists engaged in. Of course, this need is always present, as conditions and possibilities change, an idea which the reconstructionists themselves were largely responsible for introducing into curriculum theory. Despite the transformation of the content of education in post-war years we still do not possess adequate institutions or procedures for ensuring that curriculum development is ongoing and comprehensive rather than saltatory and partial.

The fact that the reconstructionists treated the curriculum as the major educational instrumentality for effecting culture development does not mean that they necessarily treated curriculum design as equivalent to culture design. There was a tendency towards this in Rugg and Brameld. However, even they recognized that the chief potential contribution of an effective educational programme in a democratic and pluralistic society is to make pupils aware of possibilities for directed change and to provide them with some of the relevant skills and understandings. Even so, these and other reconstructionists made little direct acknowledgement of the problems of power, resources and alternative sources of influence. Schools might, under the most favorable circumstances, work toward the achievement of universal rationality, in the manner recommended by Dewey, or Russell. But educationists typically (and, as cultural pluralists would add, fortunately) lack effective power to mobilize scarce resources to this end and to control alternative sources of influence - e.g., mass media, and family nurture. Nor did the reconstructionists succeed in showing

how they might achieve this power. We can detect both vacillation and ambiguity in reconstructionist thinking on the question of the cultural significance and impact of major curriculum change. Even those reconstructionists, like Dewey, who were more modest in what they expected schools to achieve, contributed to the expansive definition, as it might be termed, of the curriculum. According to this definition the curriculum includes all those activities and experiences, which the school seeks to provide in pursuit of its educational objectives. These activities and experiences, as we have seen, were sometimes equated with life, or at least with a worthy or good life. Thus, in designing the curriculum the reconstructionist is doing all in his power to design or to shape the good life. It is inconsistent with the principle of plural influence in an open society to wish to centralize in any one institution or process, such as the curriculum of the schools, the power required for the more ambitious versions of reconstructionism to work. As defenders of democratic pluralism, the reconstructionists, who by implication, if not more boldly, claimed this power as a right, were involved in a contradiction: nor could they be rescued from this contradiction by their argument in favor of joint community action, since this action was to be governed by their own criteria, and, or so they thought, directed by their purposes. The resolution of this difficulty is perhaps to be found in the recognition that other agencies than schools educate, and in the attempt to involve in educational policy-making very wide sections of the community. Blueprints and models for the curriculum, produced by creative minorities and individuals, could function to stimulate debate about possibilities. A scheme of this kind is what many of the later reconstructionists, and Dewey, were seeking to implement.

In large urbanized societies which are changing rapidly, it is very difficult to organize and stabilize community involvement and decision-taking, and it could not be expected that the solutions proposed by one generation would adequately serve the next. Unfortunately, there is little evidence in contemporary educational thought of awareness of the political, social and technical complexity of curriculum development in societies which aspire to be both efficient and democratic.

6.2 Common core of social studies

A second general comment that I have on reconstructionist curriculum thinking is that, whilst it covers a wide spectrum of possible structures, it tends to focus on the idea of a common, integrated core of social studies subject matter (28). This is very obvious in American thought, but it is a clear, if only partially developed, trend in British thinking. None of the reconstructionists grappled very seriously with the conceptual problems raised by the now popular concept of integration, and various bases or key concepts were proposed, from interest, to culture evolution, to contemporary world problems. Those who recommended integrated, sequential programmes were satisfied, on the whole, with descriptive outlines of topics, concepts and fields and with themes which were grouped according to subjective ideas based on historical overviews, feelings of the urgency of this or that issue (e.g., international relations) or a semi-socialistic interpretation of the industrial substructure and ideological superstructures of society. Brameld's use of the anthropological concept of process is an exception, although even Brameld made little use of the concept in listing topics for study. Different forms of the "core" idea give rise to quite different problems. The attempt to work from and to develop children's interests, as Dewey

remarked, requires a further set of criteria to determine how the interests will be elicited and in which direction they might be encouraged to move. The assertion of social need as a curriculum determiner is open to the objection that it presupposes certain ideas about what is good for society and frequently begs the question of who should adjudicate in cases of disagreement. The reconstructionists all believed they knew what society "needs" in this sense, but inevitably their own interpretations were highly partial and subjective. Thus, to build a curriculum core upon the hypothesized need to achieve a new synthesis, or a scientific quality in life, or to universalize critical thinking, raises many of the problems I discussed in Chapters IX and X. In effect, the core proposals of the reconstructionists are built upon an unexamined, nineteenth century view of culture evolution, and the studies that emerge repeatedly are historical and sociological. These studies carry what might be termed the Herbartian load of moral principles, with the difference that the morality is a largely assumed heritage of democratic values, sympathies and practices. Although the reconstructionists preferred to take a "world view", their historico-socio-ethical core is peculiarly a phenomenon of nineteenth century western civilization. This gives to the curriculum, as a design for future living, a definite quality but it is a quality which is much less dynamic and much more parochial than that which the reconstructionists themselves claimed to be seeking. Their criticisms of traditional, subject-centred teaching were, on the whole, sound, but only quite recently - for example, in the work of Broudy and his associates - has it come to be appreciated that it is possible to meet these criticisms by a new, unified structure of subjects which satisfies many of the reconstructionist aspirations, without

diminishing the importance of systematic study within well defined fields and subject areas.

6.3 Curriculum and culture lag

My third general observation on the curriculum arises from one of the issues I mentioned in the previous paragraph. The reconstructionists, as we saw in Part I, were very impressed and troubled by the idea of culture lag. They found that the traditional curriculum neglected issues and problems of contemporary culture. They criticized its disciplinary assumptions which, if they were valid, might in fact warrant such neglect. By this I mean that there may be grounds for supposing that analytic and interpretative thinking powers, at least in some pupils, are more economically developed on, say, the subject matter of mediaeval history, or Euclid, than on the less orderly subject matter of contemporary social issues. At least, there are complex and educationally significant relationships between conceptual powers in individuals and the conceptual structure of subjects to which the reconstructionists paid too little attention. Having too hastily disposed of the transfer of training argument, they tried to build into the core of the curriculum topics and themes from recent and contemporary social affairs, economics, technology and other scientific and social scientific fields. Their intention, we should note, was not primarily to provide an informational programme,but it was strangely similar to that of the mental disciplinarians, namely, to develop thinking capacities and attitudes which might yield a generation of socially-minded critics and reformers. This worthy intention was, however, often defeated by the difficulty of developing organizing concepts for the analysis of contemporary affairs. The lack of such concepts leads either to a dismal jumble of miscellaneous topics,reflecting the passing interests

of all who can be persuaded to contribute to the melange, or the dominance of one subject or another. As we have seen, dominance was frequently achieved by history and one or other of the social sciences. Curriculum integration is still an ill-understood concept and the common tendency to substitute exhortations to integrate and synthesize for analysis of the task have not advanced our understanding of it.

6.4 Problem-solving and projects

My fourth general comment on reconstructionist curriculum thinking refers to Dewey's pursuit of a substitute for the discredited faculty psychology. It was through the repudiation of nineteenth century educational psychology that Dewey developed his theory of original mind activity and his problem-solving method for developing the capacity to think. His and Kilpatrick's discussions of teaching and learning processes in small groups saved them from the difficulties encountered to some extent by Wells, and Mannheim, and more obviously by Rugg and Brameld, of trying to schematize large tracts of cultural experience and human knowledge, for which there are no adequate conceptual structures. The Dewey-Kilpatrick pedagogy is also less exposed to a criticism which could be made of the grand designers, that many of the learnings they proposed could in practice very easily become highly abstract, atomistic and informational. But problem-solving and the project method are ill-suited, or only with great difficulty adaptable, to some subjects and forms of thinking and practical activity which have values of their own. Attempts to reduce the diversity of the pedagogically-valuable forms of knowledge and modes of experience to these methodologies would be better abandoned, and in their place an effort made to find other appropriate procedures. To

persist with attempts to reduce subject matter to a common mode is in practice impossible and leads to self-deception, uneconomic learning and a serious trivialization of learning. These outcomes are quite inconsistent with the scientific temper reconstructionism wishes to promote.

6.5 Teachers as curriculum designers

My fifth general observation is that the reconstructionists were not agreed about the best ways of developing and promoting their curriculum designs. Some, notably Rugg, tended to pre-judge the issue by producing their own elaborate structures. With characteristic optimism, Dewey by contrast supposed that a mass education system could ultimately come under the control of a fully professionalized teaching force and this meant, for him, a wide diffusion of the skills of curriculum making. As a teacher training and re-training target, this has much to commend it. Provided it is not assumed that the target is achieved when all that has happened is that, as in the English system, teachers are vested with this responsibility, it seems better to pursue it,and modify it in practical situations, than to abandon it for curriculum-making by experts. The arguments supporting this view are complex, but may be stated very briefly: curriculum design is not a distinct process, but is integrally related with teaching: some form of designing or adaptation takes place even with imposed curricula, so teachers need skill at least at this level; there are good arguments to support pupil participation in some aspects of curriculum making; there are reasons of professional status and teacher motivation; teacher participation in curriculum design is more likely than even the most expert of imposed systems to incorporate awareness of local conditions and possibilities - i.e., identification of the learning

situation.

6.6 Political socialization, and teacher attitudes

My sixth general point refers to the understanding of the processes of political socialization, which has only recently begun to be strengthened by empirical inquiry. In the next chapter, I shall mention the problem of anti-democratic attitudes amongst teachers. This clearly raises a problem for a theory of directed change whose success depends so intimately on teacher involvement. But, as we should expect, anti-democratic attitudes exist also amongst pupils. The research of Remmers and others has revealed a disturbing pattern in American high school youth:

> "A significant proportion of the nation's high school seniors does not agree with the freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights" (29).

The reconstructionists never assumed that children entered school with minds ready to receive the ideals and values they wished to promote. But they did tend to overlook the educationally restricting effect of what has recently been described as the "hidden curriculum", that is, the constricting effect of impoverished language, and of certain forms of neighborhood, family and peer group culture (30). It is not that they were unaware of some of these issues. The Webbs, for example, were very conscious that there are severe limitations imposed on school learning by deprivation - hence, in part, their advocacy of state-supported child nurture. However, the optimistic temper of reconstructionism, especially Dewey's idea of the continuous reconstruction of experience, led to the underestimating of patterns of resistance, in children themselves, to curriculum reform. It has been argued that children lack the cynicism and distrust of their elders in political matters (31). It was the innocence (in this sense) of childhood, and

its receptivity to new ideas, that struck Dewey. Amongst the reconstructionists, it was generally assumed that, although there are problems of learning, there are not problems of unlearning. Frank is an important exception to this, and there are others, but I am speaking now of the overall impression conveyed by a wide assortment of writings. Recent research has shown amongst American high school youth, who on the whole receive a greater saturation of political teaching in schools than do Soviet youth, the persistence of deeply seated hostility to minority groups (32). These are irrational phenomena, resistant to benevolent, rational argumentation. I cannot pursue the question of educational possibilities for dealing with prejudice of this type, but it is clear that the curriculum proposals we have reviewed barely touched upon the problem of what pupils might have to <u>unlearn</u> in order to develop the rational, tolerant, critical outlook the reconstructionists prescribed.

6.7 <u>Reconstructionist contributions</u>

Finally, these criticisms notwithstanding, the reconstructionists have made significant contributions to the understanding of curriculum development issues. Their persistent emphasis on relationships between school, community, society and culture has contributed to the marked decline of the isolationism that is signified by the instruction to parents not to proceed "beyond the notice", and by the disregard in subject teaching of contexts of social use. They played a major part in promoting awareness of the possibility of systematic re-direction of the school's purposes through curriculum design. Although they did not resolve its difficulties, they have contributed to our appreciation of the core curriculum and to fresh thought about relationships between subjects. Thus, they have encouraged thought about cognitive maps,

key concepts, directed inquiry procedures, needs, interests, relevance, and other of the leading ideas about which controversy and discussion in contemporary curriculum theory is centred. These contributions should be set against the weaknesses and extravagances of some of the proposals we have considered in these two chapters.

CHAPTER XIII

SCHOOLS: INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES FOR RECONSTRUCTION

In the three preceding chapters I have endeavored to show how far the reconstructionists conceived education as a force for cultural renewal. We have seen that, while it was by no means intended that through education alone the crisis culture of our time should be regenerated, education was treated as the chief agency in this process of renewal. This conception of education places a peculiarly heavy burden on teachers and schools, even though the reconstructionists did not regard teachers as the only educators or schools as the only suitable institutions in which to conduct the educational enterprise. In this, and the succeeding chapter, we shall see that they were very often severely critical of those who normally perform teaching roles, and that they advocated a variety of institutional developments to supplement the work of the school. Nevertheless, schools and teachers remain for reconstructionism the principal instrumental means for introducing and sustaining the kind of educational changes they proposed.

In this chapter, I shall discuss some of the more typical reconstructionist conceptions of the school as an institution, or set of institutions, for culture renewal. As in previous chapters, I shall consider the different groups of reconstructionists separately, bringing out their ideas on teaching in relationship to selected themes. It is evident that a great deal of detail will have to be omitted, in an effort to sort out the major issues the reconstructionists identified, and to identify the problems and difficulties to which their proposals give rise.

1. The Webbs: Administrative Infrastructure

As we should expect, the Fabians gave more detailed consideration to the topic of administrative structures in education than to teacher characteristics and tasks or to teacher education. Indeed, their contributions to these latter topics are so slight that I shall incorporate the main part of them into my discussion of Webb thinking on institutional structures in education.

The proposals Sidney Webb made in 1903 for the reform of London education are a more carefully worked out scheme of administrative infrastructure than any other reconstructionist theorist produced. We shall not enter into the details of his proposals except insofar as they illustrate wider issues. The issues that seem to me most significant in the Fabian administrative platform are:

proposals for national unity and a national minimum or provision;

the search for a balance between national and local control;

increased public finance, including scholarships;

a unified or inter-related structure of provision, from pre-school to adult education.

1.1 Public provision and control

Sidney Webb argued that, by the turn of the nineteenth century, it had become accepted that public education was not a charitable provision for the poor, but "a matter of national concern undertaken in the interest of the community as a whole" (1). This was a collectivist and utilitarian ideal of democratic provision which Webb upheld against notions of charitable provision and an elitist system of education only for scholarship holders. The interest of the community could best be served, he maintained, by the design of a national system for the education of all children. Following the passage of the 1902 and

1903 Education Acts, he characteristically announced his intention to produce for London a workable plan according to the requirements of the new legislation, quickly, pragmatically and without regard for party politics:

> "We cannot afford to let London education mark time this year, ... pending the possible transfer of political power from one party to another. Whoever may be chosen to administer London's thousands of schools, and to direct its millions of scholars, must necessarily work out some plan of educational organization, under the law as it is for the time being, and shape that organization according to some administrative policy" (2).

There is in this a touch of disingenuousness, since Webb had played no small part in shaping the 1902 Act, and the reference to "some administrative policy" should be set against the fact of his chairmanship of the very powerful London Technical Education Board from 1892 to 1902 (he was vice-chairman in 1899 and 1900). Furthermore, his proposals and those of other Fabians were not simply for an organizational scheme and an administrative policy whose objectives had been politically and socially determined elsewhere; they were themselves a very definite policy and programme. The Fabian aim was to strengthen public control and direction of a universal system of schooling and to give that system a definite and distinct character. This character was to be determined by several objectives: the creation of a national system of publicly provided schooling, headed by a strong minister of education; state registration and inspection of private and denominational schools; the integration of the then separate stages and components of education (e.g., of pre-school, secondary, and tertiary stages, and of academic and technical programmes) within a national system of administrative units like the London County Council; the development of a substantial aid and support programme for schools and pupils (scholarships); and the dominance

of the content and methodology of teaching by modern, technical and practical studies. These objectives may be illustrated from the mass of proposals Sidney Webb made for the London County Council, foreshadowing the development of public administrative systems which should have a controlling, or, at least, a major, role in all forms of education, not least university education (3). They express the totalistic educative mentality to be observed in The Prevention of Destitution, where the Webbs urged local education authorities to take charge of the total well-being of school age children not by custodial control, but by increasing provision, laying down standards, and intervening directly where these were not met.

The Webbs proposed their elaborate structure of public provision and control only thirty years after the state in Britain had effectively embarked upon the development of a national system (4). Their most notable achievement was to support and contribute to the development of an infrastructure for the emerging system. From the reconstructionist standpoint, their work and ideas on this subject are of interest for several reasons: first, in their adoption of the ideal of universalism, implicitly or explicitly propounded by all the reconstructionists. This took the form in the Webbs' thought of universal schooling, but not, it should be noted, of a common school. Education for all was to be made effectively available, through physical provision of schools, materials, equipment, etc.; scholarship support; and practical, modern courses likely to attract children and youth uninterested in typical academic programmes. Since universal schooling, in western societies at any rate, has now been achieved, it is easy to underestimate the significance of this outlook at an earlier period. A rough analogy today is the movement towards, and the debate about, universal tertiary

education. The universalist quality in reconstructionist thought would tend to support the indefinite extension of education, not necessarily through institutionalized means of the type now familiar, but perhaps, following the Webbs, through the extension of part-time and continuation education in a wide variety of institutions. This extension, or something like it, is necessary if the democratic society is to become a reality, and sets distant targets for contemporary reconstructionist thinking.

Second, Webb identified two stages of formal provision which we know now are of crucial importance in the education of a mature, participating democracy. They are the related stages of pre-school provision, not just of public nursery classes,but of nurture and physical facilities; and young adult education in parenthood and in socio-political awareness. No society, with the possible exception of the Soviet Union, has developed adequate provision at these critical stages. The Webbs were more appreciative than most reconstructionists of the strategic importance in attitude formation of these two forms of educational provision, and it was the Soviet achievement in these spheres that they wrote of so enthusiastically in their Soviet Communism.

Third, Webb, with considerably more prescience than many professional educationists have displayed, identified the problem of institutional provision for adolescents who, not compelled to stay at school, must be persuaded through experimental courses, continuation classes, and new kinds of institutions, that education is a good which is worth pursuing. Fourth, he recognized the need, in a pluralistic society, to co-operate with other agencies, e.g., churches, trade unions, co-operatives, business firms, in developing universal education. Fifth, as an experienced administrator, he accepted the strengths and limitations of

existing institutions, and saw the need to work in large measure through these in order to reform an ongoing system (5).

1.2 Assessment

These are practical merits in the Fabian concept of a reformed and enlarged infrastructure of schooling which certain other reconstructionists would regard as capitulation. For example, the implied acceptance of the existing socio-political system provoked Wells' hostile criticisms. We saw in Chapter IV that the Webbs themselves in the twenties and thirties came to recognize that the forces with whom they had been ready to compromise at an earlier stage had effectively forestalled the full realization of their more radical and holistic ideals. Thus, the education programme they advocated early in the twentieth century, while it was never repudiated by them, was submerged in their enthusiasm for the higher bureaucracy of the Soviet system. I noted in Chapter IV the irony of their abandoning gradualism at about the time when its successes had begun to accumulate. There is a further irony in the Webbs' position. Their London programme of provision, while recognizing the need for schools to recognize and respond to the socio-cultural context, nevertheless affirmed the autonomy of teaching and learning. At this earlier stage, the Webbs had no apparent wish to absorb education into a monolithic state structure. A critical, socially reconstructive programme along Webb lines could have emerged, had the teachers accepted the full challenge which the Webbs and others offered to them. This was not entirely the fault of the teachers, as the Webbs and the whole Fabian movement did too little to stimulate forms of teacher education that might equip teachers to rise to this challenge. They seemed to assume that all their designs, schemes and proposals, if accepted by politicians and administrators, would be put into effect in

the same spirit by teachers. Greater familiarity with the background, education and conditions of employment of teachers might have indicated to them the gulf between administrative structure, and teaching and learning. A further point is that other movements in social and educational thought, of which T.P. Nunn's Education: its Data and First Principles is one example, encouraged teachers to adopt a far more individualistic outlook than that represented by the Webb form of collectivism (6). Greater awareness of ideological alternatives available to teachers and influential in their thinking might have led the Webbs to take a more serious view of the problem of gaining teacher, as distinct from administrative, acceptance of their ideas.

The Webbs in the 1930s came to accept the Soviet system of effectively subserving educational institutions, the education of teachers, and the exercise of the teacher's role, to the political requirements of the central organs of the state. This may be thought to provide something of a counterbalance to their previous neglect of the problems of securing teacher acceptance and implementation of their ideas, but the consequence is that it could no longer be claimed that they conceived education as an autonomous reconstructive force in a plural society.

2. Wells: Experimental Institutions

2.1 Criticism of existing institutions

I discussed some of Wells' criticism of existing educational practice in Chapters X and XI. He was impatient of the impoverishment of mass education and of the traditional elitist institutions, the Public Schools and Oxford and Cambridge. The great majority of Public Schools he looked upon as invincible obstacles to change, which could not be reformed;

they had to be by-passed, by the creation of new institutions. Most Public Schools, and their "world unrelated" curriculum go on because they have begun and because they represent powerful social interests (7). The ancient universities, like the Public Schools, were in Wells' judgment out of touch with modern industrial life; he condemned their products for being unable to preach, write and explain. Wells produced several characters in his novels to match his stereotype of the university teacher as pompous, patronizing, prosy, timid, out of touch with the common man. He dismissed the older universities by likening them to a "beautiful sunset over a battle-field" (8).

In view of Wells' distaste for Fabian compromise and detail, we should not expect to find any very precise proposals for the reform of existing institutions. We may perhaps infer from scattered references, and particularly from his criticism of existing arrangements, that he would support a universal, free, structurally integrated system of public schooling. But since he was intransigently hostile to very well entrenched non-public institutions - denominational schools in addition to those already mentioned - it is impossible to visualize just what form his proposed alternative system might take in Britain, where a national system of education has involved both fully publicly provided and denominational institutions (9). The Webbs' compromise at least enabled them to work in partnership with institutions, which, while they embodied views and ideals the Fabians rejected, were fundamental factors in the situation they wished to change. Like Clarke and Mannheim, the Webbs recognized not only the validity but also the power of a complex cultural tradition. Wells denied the one and frequently disregarded the other. His grudging recognition of the strength of the forces sustaining the particular private or semi-private institutions

he condemned prevented him from proposing a national system fully under public control. On the other hand, his opposition was so intense and his desire for tidy solutions so passionate that he felt unable to make any constructive proposals for partnership. Thus, his vague ideas about a universal system are incoherent, except in utopia, where people will have outgrown the need for compromise and makeshift arrangements, and even the idea of organized institutions will have been replaced by a direct contact of minds with one another.

2.2 Proposals for pioneering institutions: Oundle and "world brain"

While Wells had no coherent ideas for a universal system of education, he looked to certain kinds of minority institutions for a lead in educational reform. This is as we should expect from the pronounced elitist strain in his reconstructionism: the common man and his ordinary experience are rotten almost beyond retrieval, at least for the foreseeable future. The best to be hoped is that a few pioneering spirits will begin to think out ways of redesigning a better life for future ages. These pioneers may expect little success or reward initially, but they can increase the likelihood of their insights being accepted by wider audiences if they create experimental institutions. Wells made two such proposals: first, a remodelled boarding school, in which some of the future leaders in industry, politics and the professions can be properly educated; second, and much bolder, the idea of a universal adult intelligence service. This latter proposal reflects the eighteenth century idea of a universal encyclopaedia, transformed into a world-wide research and information retrieval service.

Wells was fortunate to find in the reformed Public School, Oundle, under the headmastership of Sanderson, a prototype for his new secondary

level boarding institution. He subsequently described it as "not so much a public school as a happy and all too brief lapse of a public school into education" (10). Sanderson, for whom Wells had a deep admiration, had a sufficiently similar outlook to Wells for the latter to invest his school, his thought and his work with many of the Wellsian educational prescriptions. Perhaps the chief effect of Oundle on Wells' thought was to give his grander and vaguer educational ideals a focus and clarity they would never otherwise have achieved. Despite his recognition of the strength of the existing institutions which he despised, Wells supposed that the Sanderson model might be widely adopted, and Sanderson himself actively campaigned to this end. It is just as well, however, that Wells provided a three thousand year transition period, from the present to the ideal future, and that he assigned to the wars and depressions with which he interspersed the earlier stages of the transition the function of forcing awareness of the need for drastic reform. To depend upon isolated Public Schools to transform a total system, whose complexities, diversities, traditions, and power blocs the more cautious Webb had appreciated very well, is to adopt an extremely weak diffusion model. Wells had nothing to say about the problems of recruiting like-minded people to these isolated institutions to ensure continuity, or about the problems of relating their expectations to those of other institutions with which, inevitably, they had and continue to have close associations - e.g., the universities which he criticized so contemptuously.

A school like Oundle - or the idealization of it in Wells' biography of Sanderson and in The Undying Fire - may be useful as an exemplar and as a stimulus to critical thought about existing institutions;

its very uniqueness, which delighted Wells, makes it a far too limited model for the reform of a national school system. To propose, as Wells did, that we should look upon Oundle as, in Sanderson's words, a "microcosm of the new world" is to conceive that new world in the very narrowest of terms, as the sub-culture of a particular group. Sanderson intended his pupils to treat this maxim as a guide to their own future conduct, but Wells interpreted it to mean that the life of the school could somehow provide a pattern for the future society. Whatever one may feel about the quality of this life, it is absurd to suppose that in a complex society such a highly particularized school model could indicate even the very general features of this society.

Wells' second proposal, for a world brain, may sound at first no more realistic than the hopes he entertained of Oundle. Yet several of the ideas expressed in the world brain proposal are quite practical, given modern technology and the rapid development of international scholarship since the second world war. There is also in Wells' world brain proposal a concern for universal adult education which goes some way to meet the objection that schools and teachers, as he perceived them, lacked the skills, resources and ideals to perform the reconstructive role he admonished them to adopt.

On the one hand, Wells observed the Northcliffe-Harmsworth Press empire mis-educating a gullible public by exploiting their newly won literacy through narrow, nationalistic, emotionally-trite journalism: "a roaring factory of hasty printing", as he called it in The Dream. On the other hand, he held out a prospect of rational, enlightened world consciousness, with the thought systems and discoveries of modern science and scholarship universally disseminated and assimilated. An encyclopaedia of a new type was to achieve this. Like Diderot's encyclopaedia,

his was to aim at an interpretative unity of knowledge and not be a mere assemblage of facts: the "world brain" was, in the best eighteenth century manner, to usher in the rule of science. Unlike Diderot's scheme, Wells' encyclopaedia was to remain in continuous creation; not so much a set of books (although there would be books) as an international communication system of classification, analysis and rapid dissemination in several media. The service would be provided by an international federation of research institutions and universities:

> "a sort of mental clearing house for the mind, a depot where knowledge and ideas are received, sorted, summarized, digested, clarified and compared" (11).

We have begun to be familiar with at least the beginnings of what Wells outlined, for example, through the work of national and international clearing-house systems in the physical and social sciences; through the growth in abstracting and digest services, also on an international scale; and through information retrieval systems in libraries. But these systems and services are highly specialist; they are not operationally inter-related in the manner advocated by Wells, and they have not succeeded in creating the "world intelligence" amongst the masses (or the leaders, for that matter) that he hoped for. The explanation is in part that the more holistic and universalist of Wells' objectives do not characterize these newer services and systems. For Wells, they were an essential feature. Yet, despite his criticism of previous utopian theories on the grounds that they had failed to consider relevant details, he failed either to establish any theoretical principles for the integration of knowledge, or to show just how the average citizen might be encouraged to substitute for his present cultural interests and enthusiasms the highly esoteric, conceptual concerns of international scientific culture. The latter depends in part on the former, for,

lacking any unifying and simplifying principle, the total culture of science cannot be popularized in the way Wells envisaged. No programme of multi-media adult education alone could achieve this, and the answer, if there is one, must include the early and continuing education of children, a point that Frank appreciated, as we saw in Chapter XII. Wells, by contrast, had no coherent proposals for universal schooling, although he was an enthusiastic advocate of popular, mass education. Despite this enthusiasm, he failed to show just how we might build the foundation of disposition, habit and mental growth without which "world brain" as a universal phenomenon would be ineffective. His institutional schemes could not, therefore, meet the universalistic demands he made upon them, but they would in all probability reinforce the elitist and separatist aspects of his culture theory, without rehabilitating mass culture. So far, then, from producing an intellectually sophisticated democracy, they would in all probability increase elite-mass differences, thus itensifying one of the cultural disunities which Wells sought to eliminate.

3. Experimentalism and the Democratization of Public Education

A very different set of questions from those we have been considering was posed by the experimentalists in their criticisms of traditional schools and their proposals for creating a truly democratic structure of schooling. These differences arise largely from the fact that universal, publicly provided and controlled schooling was, when they wrote, already well established in the United States. The basic structures were certainly faulty, in the judgment of all the experimentalists, but these faults were not so grave that they could not be remedied. Thus the major institutional objectives were not

to create a public system, as with the Webbs, nor to by-pass it, as Wells at times proposed, but to enlarge, clarify and refine an existing public system. This is pre-eminently a reconstructionist system-objective, and it parallels, at the level of systems, what Dewey proposed for individual experience and for cultural renewal; namely, a re-making or a reconstruction of what was already there. Of course, the reconstructionists were not all agreed about how best to do this. Suggestions ranged from Dewey's and Kilpatrick's reconstruction of the existing forms of public schooling to the more sweeping proposal by Rugg, and by Brameld - the latter's a more modest suggestion - for universal adult education (12). However, the seeds of these later, more ambitious, schemes were planted by Dewey at the beginning of this century when, in The School and Society, he attempted to enlist active adult support for the experimental work of the Laboratory School at the University of Chicago (13).

Much of what I have discussed in preceding chapters bears both directly and indirectly on experimentalist ideas about the reform of the school and of schooling conceived as social institutions. I shall not attempt to recapitulate these earlier discussions, but instead shall raise what I take to be the two major issues on this theme explored by the experimentalists:

1. Criticisms of traditional and progressive schools.
2. Proposals for the democratization of public education, and for building new patterns of school-community relations.

3.1 Criticisms of traditional and progressive schools

The traditional school, or rather the stereotype which became familiar through a barrage of criticism lasting from Dewey's earliest writings to the present day, was condemned on many different counts. So far as the

institutional life of the school is concerned, Dewey concentrated his attack on the authoritarian direction of educational policies, the remoteness of schools from other social institutions, and the failure of schools to co-ordinate the different aspects of their work. These criticisms were taken up by Dewey's followers. Kilpatrick, for example, held that the determination of curriculum policy and selection of teaching materials by school boards, administrators and university specialists prevented the teacher from exercising the freedom of choice and flexibility which were an essential part of the experimentalist position which he outlined in The Foundations of Method (14). Bode, arguing that the remoteness of the school from other social institutions was not so much a matter of clear commitment to older and now obsolete purposes as evidence of uncertainty and confusion about the social role of schooling, proposed that the school should undertake to clarify the meaning of democracy (15). Dewey had argued for this conception of the school's task in his earlier works; he wrote more forcibly in the 1930s, when, in Experience and Education, he condemned the aimlessness and triviality of much that was called progressive education. In his earlier criticism, he had been more concerned about the persistence of what he described as traditional models of schooling, which were based on a false psychology of learning and on a view of society deriving from a pre-industrial era. I have already discussed Dewey's criticisms of the neglect in traditional schooling of children's impulsive life and of the practical and co-operative enterprises which he believed the emerging industrial democracy required. His argument about the older perception of the social role of the school is closely related to his theory of social change. In a fairly stable, or slowly changing, society, of which small, and relatively homogeneous, communities are a leading feature,

educational responsibilities are widely distributed amongst several different and responsible institutions: family, neighborhood group, church, occupational group, etc. The impact of rapid industrialization upon these institutions is highly disruptive: commerce and trade supplant self-sufficiency and convert inward-looking groups into complex societies; populations move; extended family units are split and separated; the transmission of traditional occupational skills through apprenticeship is replaced by large scale and accelerated training schemes; and newer ideological viewpoints arise to challenge traditional religion and the older community ethos. In these kinds of unstable situations, the commonly accepted role of the school as an institution for establishing literacy, transmitting settled bodies of knowledge, and training for a determinate character, is challenged in many different ways. Its settled assumptions about the educative role of other institutions are no longer valid; its stable perception of its own role is replaced by uncertainty, misgivings and doubt (16). This is typically a "problem situation" in Dewey's language, and we must not be surprised to find in schools the characteristic responses of retreat into the older orientations, and condemnation of the "mis-educative" changes taking place in society at large. For Dewey, by contrast, reconstruction, or problem-solving, should in this situation take the form of a determination to come to grips with changing social realities. This will require concentrated study by educationists, and in schools, of the dynamic social forces, an assessment of the extent to which other institutions have abandoned or lost control of their educational purpose, and a commitment to develop a new institutional purpose and form to define a new educational role in the changing circumstances.

In assuming a new purpose and character, the school undergoes vast

changes, but these changes, while they impose severe strain on all concerned, provide an opportunity for the school to assume a far greater responsibility for directed cultural change than has previously been possible. This is because the emerging industrial society requires a more universal, a more intensive education, than has ever before been demanded, and an education qualitatively different from previous forms. Only the school can contribute the intelligently directed, scientifically grounded type of education which Dewey recommended, but he and his followers made it very plain that the school could not do this alone. The impetus to change comes very largely from changes in other institutions, particularly those of economic life. Furthermore, only by working with other social forces and institutions can the school expect eventually to give to industrial society the stamp of an educative society (17).

An educative society, for Dewey, is a democratic society in which reflective thinking has been thoroughly institutionalized. The school must therefore become an institution which is structured according to the values of democracy and rationality and organized so as effectively to initiate all its members into the cultures of scientific rationality and democracy. As Hardie, in his criticism of Dewey, pointed out, there is no logical entailment here, but this is a criticism which has never affected the experimentalist convictions about the desirability of a reconstructed democratic school (18).

The fundamental weakness of the traditional, as, indeed, of the child-centred progressive, schools was, on this argument, their failure to accept the challenge to define a new social role for the school in the light of rapid industrial change. For Counts, who in this matter was influenced as much by the economist and social critic, Veblen, as

by Dewey, this failure was a consequence of teacher commitment to middle-class, individualistic, values, and of the dominance of school boards and educational programmes by middle-class and business interests (19). The middle classes, according to Counts, assumed that family prosperity and culture, together with the wider social opportunities their money could purchase, provided what was in their terms an adequate cultural background to schooling. Counts challenged both their beliefs about its adequacy, and their disregard of the cultural conditions affecting the education of the mass of children. He felt that all the classes, though for different reasons, needed a school system more consciously directed by the ends of social sensitivity, awareness, and the skills needed in a rapidly changing order. Like Dewey and Kilpatrick, however, Counts cautioned the schools to recognize their limitations as change agents, and to identify social forces and institutions with which they could ally themselves in forming a spearhead of social change (20). Chief among the institutions with which Counts recommended the schools to associate themselves were those of organized labor and, for a time, he and Childs departed from the main body of experimentalist thought by advocating a vaguely defined class-war role for teachers (21).

3.2 Democratization of public institutions

In a variety of ways, the public school system was being admonished to achieve awareness of its historic mission to educate a democracy. But one great difficulty was that the public schools were themselves very undemocratic in their internal teaching and organization, and were harnessed into systems which were undemocratically administered. The experimentalists, and especially Dewey and Kilpatrick, were amongst the leading American critics of the "cult of efficiency" in school administration,

arguing for the priority of democratic criteria over those imported into education from cost-conscious business (22). But, given these pressures, how was the school to become a rationalistic, democratic institution, acquiring a structure and an atmosphere conducive to the newer kind of education and, hence, expressive of the best aspirations of the society of the future? Dewey at Chicago and other experimentalists in experimental schools attached to university departments of education tried to show what the new democratic institutions would be like (23). However, they did not, as Wells had done, restrict their hopes for reform to these minority institutions. Through their writings and the substantial programme of teacher education they built up at universities, including Columbia, Chicago, Illinois, Ohio State, Florida and many others, they explored ways of achieving the democratization of the total educational system. This effort to operationalize the concept of democracy may be summarized as a composite model. This model has these key elements:

> total school participation in policy making, and curriculum design, but not to the detriment of individual role performance, e.g., by the expert and experienced teacher;
>
> direction of the school's interests and work towards wider social issues and community concern in the form of clarification of issues and analysis of cultural trends;
>
> creation within the school of a community-living atmosphere distinguished by ease of relationships, and co-operation;
>
> treatment of all children as individuals worthy of respect and in need of individual treatment as well as group-solidarity experience;
>
> encouragement of pupil initiative, activity and freedom.

Of course, at this level of generality, there is a danger that recommendations will degenerate into slogans and it has been one of the unfortunate consequences of the popularization of experimentalism that

generalized slogans were adopted in place of the reflective, critical analysis of purposes and procedures so strongly emphasized by Dewey and Bode.

It will be apparent that even at the level of generality the experimentalists proposed a marked shift in the locus of school authority and power. To democratize a public school system meant affirming the rights and increasing the responsibility of the mass of those involved - teachers and pupils, parents and the wider community - for the construction of the norms and procedures of the schools. This meant challenging not only very powerful forces within the educational system, the hierarchy of administration, school boards, state departments of education, and universities, but also the attitudes, beliefs and institutional strength of many extra-school agencies, particularly social pressure groups like business, labor and agriculture lobbies. It was rash in the extreme to suppose that these groups might acquiesce in the view that schools are "maintained by society for its own progressive reconstruction" (24).

Instead of advocating a direct confrontation, which would have been ineffective and in any case antithetical to the spirit of co-operation and community-wide policy making, the experimentalists proposed to develop a network of active school-community relationships from which new policies might emerge. Rugg's advocacy of massive universal adult education programmes to develop understanding and enlist support for the school's new conception of its task was one such proposal. A second move in procuring widespread support for educational change was the effort to increase direct community participation in policy making. This was an extremely risky procedure, given the anti-educational character of some of the pressure groups, but it was necessary if the

teachers were not to appear to arrogate to themselves the right of determining the new, wider role for education as remaker of society. We shall see, when discussing Brameld's ideas on consensus later in this chapter, that other difficulties arise from the attempt to secure wide community participation in the redefinition of the ends of social policy. A third proposal of the experimentalists was to make the school itself a kind of community centre, outward-looking so far as its programme of study was concerned, ready to provide a multitude of community services, and to bring individuals and groups from the wider community into the ambit of the school (25).

The experimentalist campaign to democratize the public school system represents a fuller appreciation of the extent of the problem of systematically relating educational institutions to the tasks of cultural development than do the proposals of earlier writers. The existence in the United States of something approaching a universal public school system provided the experimentalists with an institution which was capable of reaching and influencing the entire population. Their analysis of the breakdown of community enabled them to ascribe to the school educative functions previously exercised, or thought to be exercised, by more diverse, less easily controlled, social institutions. By outlining and frequently reiterating a detailed programme for the democratization of schools and the whole school system, they sought to give them the character they thought was necessary to precipitate out of present social uncertainties the rational democracy of the future.

Each of their major proposals, however, raises difficulties which they have not adequately analysed. The notion of reaching an entire population is more intelligible in a totalitarian or a highly centralized

system of educational control than it is in a system which, at the time the experimentalists wrote, comprised literally thousands of local systems. These local systems were all autonomous in certain respects; each was linked up into some wider system, but never into an articulated national system which was, in the fashion recommended by the Webbs, controlled, and energized from some single source. Thus, against the fact, utilized by the experimentalists, that all children pass through the system of schooling, must be placed the less frequently acknowledged fact of the enormous diversity of the sub-units of this system. There is some self-deception involved in thinking that all children can be "reached" through this kind of system. It might well be that some other system of influence would be more amenable to change, on experimentalist lines, or that some strategic sub-section of the school system could be more easily reached and be more influential than the totality of public schools: for example, the mass media, nor associations of school superintendents, or colleges of education. None of these latter institutions was in fact ignored by the experimentalists. Indeed, they have been attacked for "indoctrinating" the future staff of colleges of education from the great centres of educational power such as Teachers' College, Columbia (26). However, the main force of experimentalist argument and exhortation was directed at the total school system, with the apparent expectation that not some part of it might change to lead the way, but that the whole of it would be transformed. This is another form of the characteristic enthusiasm of the reconstructionists for "wholes", their relative neglect of problems of priority and effective use of resources, and their general optimism that progress, in their terms, could be achieved on all fronts. The experimentalists were not unaware of obstacles; they

perceived many barriers to change, within the educational system and in other sectors of society. It was not ignorance of effective change mechanisms, but their very commitment to the democratic creed,which dictated this undifferentiated progression on all fronts. Thus, if an idea or a pedagogical procedure could be shown to have value, either by demonstration in an experimental school or by argumentation, then a very powerful motive impelled the experimentalists to seek to universalize this idea with all speed. Their concern for equality of consideration, for the claim of all children to individual treatment, for the equal worth of all children, and their confidence in the capacity of science and technology to satisfy wants, including educational wants, encouraged them to seek universal, rapid applications. Anything less would be discrimination and timidity. While this does not mean that they naively expected quick results, it does point to a dilemma in the reconstructionist theory. To the extent that it conceives democracy as the universalization of values and procedures in schooling, it is likely to underestimate problems of implementation. To the extent that such problems are given priority of treatment, the universalist aspirations of the democratic creed must be held in abeyance. These are issues which have become increasingly important in contemporary developing societies where scarce resources and European academic traditions combine to frustrate the socialist idealism of advocates of mass, popular education (27).

A problem of quite a different order arises when we consider what it is the school is required to do in its efforts to institutionalize democratic and scientific values. The experimentalists conceived education as a process directed by these values. Their discussions of how schooling might become more democratic and more scientific led

them at times very nearly to the point where all distinctions between education and other worthwhile activities evaporated. This tendency is already apparent in Dewey's early criticisms of the "formalism" of the traditional school and its neglect of contemporary life. It was Kilpatrick, however, by directing the school to attend to "life", to equate its instructional programme with living, and to conceive of education as synonymous with the quest for the good life, who brought to the fore all the inherent expansionist possibilities of the experimentalist theory.

Dewey had rightly argued that, with the breakdown of traditional communities, the school was faced with new tasks. These tasks could be tackled by the school assuming a "residual" role, taking up those educative functions which other institutions were abandoning. However, this role expanded to become almost an all-inclusive, nurturing role. In addition to clouding distinctions between any and all processes of human development and education, the equation of education with growth and the commitment of schools to an enlarged educational role, raise very serious institutional difficulties. It becomes virtually impossible to distinguish admissible from inadmissible roles for the school, since almost anything it does can be given an educational character, or turned to educational use. But as a distinguishable, if not always very distinct, social institution, with enormous possibilities, but limited human and material resources, and with a role to define in relation to other institutions, some of them educational, the school needs clearer and more limited criteria than those provided by experimentalism. It would not be unjust to say that the experimentalists rescued the school from the traditional and progressivist misconceptions, but,by liberating and, as it were, socializing, it, they lost sight of distinctions

which are both conceptually and institutionally highly important. They recognized the need for a fresh definition of the role of the school, but their own contributions have created further problems and uncertainties.

4. Mannheim and Clarke: the School as a Transitional Society

In Mannheim's ideal of a democratically planned society, the school was cast into the role of the chief, but by no means the sole, agency for universalizing the new kind of planning mentality while preserving vital elements in the elitist tradition. Clarke, although influenced by Mannheim's diagnosis of crisis, was less interested in the departures schools might make in achieving the new planning mentality than in treating them as one agency amongst many in the slow but steady evolution towards an educative society. Both regarded education as a force in society whose full effect could be felt only if it entered into alliance with other agencies:

> "No educational system is able to maintain emotional stability and mental integrity in the new generation, unless it has a kind of common strategy with the social agencies outside the school" (28).

While neither Clarke nor Mannheim expounded very precise structural ideas concerning the school system, both used transitional and evolutionary models which depended on initial acceptance of the system as it was. By "transitional" I have in mind two ideas. First, "transitional" refers in Mannheim's and Clarke's thought to the movement which is required from the institutions and thinking of the more or less chaotic, unplanned past to a planned future, with the school conceived as one of the chief transitional agencies, or an institution in which society experiments and learns about new possibilities. This was an idea that appealed

very much to Mannheim (29). Second, Mannheim and Clarke intended by "transitional" the more familiar idea of the school as a transitional society through which the child learns to clarify his experience and to come to terms with the impersonal, secondary groups of the adult world (30). By "evolutionary" I mean Clarke's and Mannheim's acceptance of the value of a steady, continuous modification of existing institutions and the development of new ones within the overall framework of the "English system" (31). I shall disregard any historicist tendency in Mannheim's thinking, since, in discussing educational institutions, he never invoked the doctrine of necessary and inevitable change, nor suggested that the system was moving inexorably toward some clear and definite ends.

4.1 Modifying and extending public education

Clarke and Mannheim greatly admired what they took to be the flexibility and adaptability of the English system. They were equally impressed by its long term stability and continuity. However, they proposed two kinds of change, one of which comprised modifications of elements within the system, while the other involved a much vaguer notion of the overall directions of the system.

4.1.1 Modifications of the system

Taking modifications of elements within the system first, we find a variety of proposals. These proposals may be reviewed very briefly. They took the form both of modifying and extending the existing system. Modifying meant reducing the class bias of the tripartite system and increasing the public accessibility of the Public Schools and grammar schools, through scholarships, improved selection procedures, and the development of various links of the type proposed in the McNair Report. Clarke went beyond this to advocate an extended structure of public

education very similar to that recommended by the Plowden Committee and now in operation in some parts of the country: junior, middle and senior schools linked in a continuity of stages. He also recommended, as did Mannheim, the development of a universal system of continuation and adult education to follow on an enlarged secondary system (32).

Both Clarke and Mannheim treated the specialist preparation of the elites as one of the elements in the tradition which should be sustained and strengthened. They divided education into "preparatory" and "advanced" in the Platonic-Aristotelian fashion, a reminder not only of classical but also Jesuitical influences on their thinking. Thus, public education was, despite the reformed pedagogy Mannheim in particular stressed, to be in a subtle sense assimilative, in that the child was to absorb the values, patterns of behavior and knowledge structure relevant to the "planning era":

> "You cannot create a new moral world mainly based upon rational value appreciation, i.e., values whose social and psychological function is intelligible, and at the same time maintain an educational system which in its essential techniques works through the creation of inhibitions and tries to prevent the growth of judgment" (33).

However, Mannheim was careful to point out that the new moral world would enter the consciousness first of a minority and only gradually, and in a simplified form,would it spread to the masses. Only a minority of adults could be expected to act with intelligence and a wider sense of social responsibility, since the exercise of these qualities depends upon a highly disciplined, lengthy training combining intellectual excellence with sustained submission to moral standards. The relationship between elite-orientated secondary schools and universities on the one hand, and the mass systems of primary, secondary,

and adult education on the other were never made clear. Both Mannheim and Clarke wanted a reform of the Public and grammar schools and of the universities, together with the enlargement of adult education programmes, to encourage them not only to become more conscious of their place as elements in a wider system but also to substitute a modern for a traditional curriculum. However, it is possible to make such changes without making any basic alteration in the relationships between different kinds of institutions - for example, the mechanisms of selection, transfer, and progression through the system. Mannheim made many inconclusive suggestions, signifying mistrust of the existing techniques and suspicion that they expressed inequalities of cultural background, including wealth, rather than the more objective factors of ability and attainment (34). From these observations and criticisms we might infer a purely meritocratic intent, but, as I argued in Chapter VII, Mannheim hoped to fuse meritocratic principles with those less tangible considerations of birth, position and tradition which determine aristocratic elite selection. The lack of any very definite scheme for this process of elite recruitment also characterized his thought on the relationships between mass and elite institutions within the educational system.

Mannheim was more precise in discussing the pattern of life which he hoped might come to govern individual schools. Both he and Clarke wanted schools that were more "life-like" in the experimentalist manner, and more closely related in their programmes of study to the world outside the school, preparing:

> "a groundwork for social life by providing a focus for otherwise unrelated educational activities ... The school may thus perform its special task by intensifying and systematizing social experience" (35).

This remark of Mannheim's echoes not only Dewey and Kilpatrick, but also Clarke, who, in his early volume Essays in the Politics of Education, written when he was professor of education at Cape Town, proposed bringing children "into their inheritance in the common life of their kind", through the study of social institutions and forms of common cultural experience (36).

In the previous section of this chapter we saw that this kind of proposal may indefinitely extend the role of the school. Clarke in particular, and Mannheim to a lesser extent, were, however, anxious to avoid this. Thus Clarke criticized Tawney and the Labour Party for directing their policy of secondary education exclusively at the school, instead of doing more to strengthen the family and to build up - what was to become a favorite term of Clarke's - the "educative society" (37).

4.1.2 Overall system objectives

Clarke was never very clear just how society was to become educative, nor as to how a common culture could be developed and communicated, without a profound transformation of the schools. Apart from any more positive role they might perform, schools could, unless greatly changed, provide obstacles to the more idealistic conception of education which Clarke hoped to see permeate society. Clarke's opposition to an all-inclusive educative role for schools was based on a consideration which sharply separates his thought from Mannheim's. This is his fear of a state monopoly of education (38). He conceived the state not as a universal provider and determiner of educational policy, but as a co-ordinator of effort, almost as a Platonic kind of guardian of the ideal of an educative society. Thus he called for "unification" without "uniformity" (39). The state, however, was to be the unifier, so it

is difficult to see how this proposal avoids the state direction which Clarke feared. It is unfortunate that Clarke did not develop his thought on this subject, for it raises one of the most profound of the issues of state-school relationships. In discussing the report of the Kothari committee, I pointed to the difficulty of maintaining the freedom and autonomy of educational institutions and processes when it is a major objective of national policy to enlist education in a programme of modernization for which there is a desperate need. In less pressing circumstances, it is a duty of educationists to find ways of relating educational policy to other elements in national policy without losing sight of the peculiar importance of education as a critical and creative force. Clarke's remarks on avoiding a state monopoly show an awareness of the problem and serve as a reminder that this relationship constantly needs to be reviewed and redefined.

Mannheim was prepared to concede to the school a more powerful educational role by comparison with other institutions than was Clarke. He was also very much less perturbed at the thought of a state monopoly of education - at least a monopoly in overall educational planning, if not in institutional provision. This overall planning strategy meant co-ordinating the efforts of schools and other social institutions which do or might perform an educational role.

The common strategy involving schools and other agencies, as we saw in Chapters VII and X, is one which seeks to build new personalities through the transformation of existing institutions and the manipulation of group controls. Thus, in his comments on the overall direction of the educational system, Mannheim was more rigorous and consistent than Clarke, who on the one hand wanted the co-ordination of state control, but on the other balked at the consequence in the form

of greatly enhanced state power. Yet Clarke's unease on this point underlines a very serious deficiency in Mannheim's proposals. If the schools can come to acquire the determinate role in shaping personality that Mannheim supposed, and if the exercise of this role is determined by an overall, state-controlled strategy which relates all educational agencies within a common personality-shaping policy, we have a system which may be effective, but only by being totalitarian. The school becomes part of the man-making apparatus of the modern state, as the Webbs were pleased to find it in Soviet Russia; and man-making, to the extent that it is equated with the shaping of human material, ceases to be an educational process (40). There are perhaps self-consistent arguments for totalitarianism, but I have tried to show that these arguments must proceed by disregarding any claims that might be made for education as a fundamentally critical process. Mannheim accepted this critical conception of education and he also maintained that the "third way" of democratic rational planning avoids the totalitarian tendencies of state communism and fascism. However, I should argue that the centralization of an educational policy-making apparatus in homogeneous elites of state officials, and the fusing of educational policy with centralized political-economic-social policy, effectively inhibits or destroys the diverse and democratic qualities which Mannheim recommended schools to adopt. Against Mannheim's quest for culture unity we may set a profound split in his theory between the totalistic elements in the creation and implementation of national educational policy and his recommendation, following Dewey and Counts, that schools should assume as their special function the interpretation of "all phases of life in terms of democratic experience" (41). Given the power which Mannheim himself noted is accruing to central institutions

and "key positions" in the industrial society, it is most unlikely, therefore, that the schools would become the sources and agencies of cultural renewal. Instead, the strategic territory of culture growth would be monopolized by the policy-making elites. Dewey rightly remarked on the difficulty of developing a school into a participatory, sharing democratic community when its goals, materials, resources, etc., are all externally determined. Despite the slightness of his analysis of state-school relationships, Clarke seemed to have had a better appreciation than Mannheim of this problem of relating school autonomy, experimentation and innovativeness, to the targets set by a national development plan.

5. Later Experimentalists: the Schools and Consensus

Reconstructionism has meant for the later experimentalists not so much new kinds of educational institutions as experimental uses of public schooling, and the redefining of power and authority relationships between schools and the hierarchy of educational control (42). If their proposals are far-ranging, the post-war reconstructionists have nevertheless accepted that the ideal of the reconstruction of culture through education depends for its realization very largely upon the public school system.

5.1 Raup and associates: participation

In previous chapters I drew attention to a problem in Rugg's and Brameld's thought which arises from their advocacy both of a consensus-seeking procedure of policy-making, and of determinate schemes based on some model of an ideal future state of culture. In Chapter XII we considered some of the issues associated with a content of cultural studies directed by the ideal of a unified world civilization. Since

the schools were expected to teach their pupils the arts of democratic deliberation, we should also examine their role in relation to the consensus proposal. Raup and his associates made a succinct statement of the doctrine:

> "Whoever may be affected by a decision or policy shall in some way have a part in shaping it" (43).

They specified three levels on which this principle should become effective: making decisions, making policies, and reconstructing the basic norms of conduct. It is interesting to see how far, through the recent use of the "charette" principle in formulating school-building policy, their argument has been acted upon in the upsurge of participatory politics in the United States (44).

5.2 Brameld: consensus

Brameld examined the problems arising at the different levels of control, on each of which he wished to see the consensus principle introduced in order to convert reconstructionism from a utopian to a power-orientated theory. He argued first for the determination of educational policy through the increased exercise of federal control. Second, in the spirit of Counts, he suggested the reorganization of school boards to make them more representative, especially of the working class. Third, he wanted to see a more responsible and democratic exercise of local and regional educational leadership. Fourth, he raised the question of control conceived as "majority-determined order for attainment of majority-desired goals" within schools (45).

Unfortunately, his analysis failed to distinguish two different sets of activities, both relevant to a democratic theory of consensus, control and authority. The first of these consists of individuals of roughly equal standing in face-to-face relationships, seeking agreement

on some decision they need to make or policy they need to determine. The second refers to decisions taken and policies made, by representatives or delegates who in some sense can claim to speak for the wishes or the interests of larger groups of whom they form a part. Democratic societies and perhaps all others provide occasions for both types of decision and to this extent schools engaged in educating children for active membership of democratic society should attend to both types of decision, whether by teaching, which involves direct experience, or by a more indirect preparation. It is not at all clear, from an undifferentiated democratic standpoint, that in the determination of the procedures governing relationships amongst pupils and teachers, greater emphasis should be given to one or the other of these two types of decision. Should we be giving children more experience of "direct democracy", or teaching them about the workings of representative and impersonal systems of government? The "democratic criterion", frequently invoked by reconstructionists, is too crude to serve as the clear guide which they sometimes assumed it to be. The difference between the direct and representative approaches may be illustrated by reference to two types of school.

The first approach is represented by Neill's Summerhill, where a weekly school meeting to discuss policy is conducted by pupils. In this meeting, pupils and teachers, at least superficially, are put on to an equal footing in the discussion and voting; there are a few matters settled by fiat, e.g., physical safely and health, and some by state law and acquiescence in public opinion, but virtually all other matters may be decided by majority vote. These include Brameld's "majority-determined order", since discipline is frequently debated (46). I do not wish to embark upon a discussion of the more subtle constraints

affecting children's opinions and votes in this kind of situation, beyond noting that the idea of consensus as a higher order of agreement, or a reconstruction of all existing, divergent beliefs into a new idea, is not a necessary feature of this scheme. It may even be largely lost to view in a rapid succession of "complaint, argument, vote, next item". At any rate, behind consensus lies a form of awareness which, as Raup and his associates and Stanley saw, requires careful preparation, training and self-discipline; it cannot be expected to arise spontaneously in children's discussion groups, although, occasionally, insightful individuals may light upon it.

The second and much more familiar approach to the question of consensus in schools is for those vested with authority, the teachers, and especially senior staff, to claim to speak for the agreed aims of the community whom they represent, which is not simply the community of children but that of a vaguely defined society. Decisions are taken by teachers which may or may not satisfy the wishes of children, but which are intended to express a judgment about what society at large, which includes children as one of the set groups, either wants or needs. The difference between want and need is of course highly significant, for in the former case the school is directed by a notion of adjustment to society, whereas in the latter it is directed by the notion of educating society to an awareness of what is best for it. The former is not the reconstructionist approach, whereas the latter is, however unclear and uncertain reconstructionists may be about the concept of need and the most effective way of translating the need concept into a school action programme.

Returning to Brameld's consideration of the question of levels on which the consensus principle might operate, we may now see several

difficulties arising from his argument. First, the increased exercise of federal control implies consensus of the type where representatives claim to speak for "the people" and to express majority wishes. I need not enter into the details of this claim, for it is obvious that it gives rise to a mass of problems about majority wishes, how they are ascertained, the rights of legislators to determine policies against majority wishes, and so forth. Second, the reorganization of local units, e.g, school boards, to increase the representation of the working classes, raises the question of "local option" and the extent to which local units might opt out of a federally determined policy. Desegregation of schools is a case in point. The stronger and more fully representative of local opinion these units become, the greater the possibility of conflict between the national "consensus" and the local "consensus". Third, the responsible exercise of educational leadership in a situation of potential, and perhaps actual, conflict between local and national policy groups becomes a matter of great tact and delicacy. The need for these qualities is intensified by the requirement that the teachers and, indeed, the pupils be involved in planning many of the decisions that affect them. It is unclear just how these educational leaders are to exercise the "consensus" authority with which Brameld seeks to invest them and yet satisfy possibly conflicting sets of requirements from schools, local units and national centres. Fourth, majority rule and agreement by mutual adjustment of beliefs in discussion within schools are not the same, as we have seen, and should not be assimilated the one to the other in the single concept of "consensus". The problem for the public school system, as distinct from island-communities like Summerhill, is that there is not simply one majority or one community,

that of the immediate members of the school. Brameld rightly identified several levels at which the problems of control and consensus must be considered. But what at first glance appears as a fairly straightforward issue of distribution of authority, on closer scrutiny emerges as a tangled and obscure network of responsibility and control problems.

It appears, then, that the proposal so to structure schools as to make them a_encies of the emerging social consensus is not, as Brameld has discussed it, a manageable proposal at all: or, rather, schools which conceived themselves as reconstructive agencies by virtue of their practice and teaching of the art of consensus would have to perform an intricate set of roles, some of which would clearly be contradictory. This, it may be countered, is the consequence of trying to drive a principle too hard. It would be possible, and from the reconstructionist standpoint highly desirable, to find practical ways of increasing pupil involvement in certain kinds of decisions. Again, parents and other members of the wider community could be encouraged to take a more informed and a more active part in school affairs, through the provision of adult education programmes and the development of kinds of meetings in which they felt free to comment and suggest and argue. Similarly, it would be desirable to pay more attention, in the curriculum, to the problems, such as those indicated, which arise when in a democratic society attempts are made to distribute authority and decision-making responsibility while still maintaining the framework of national policy. The exponents of consensus have not succeeded in showing how schools and educational systems might harmonize the various roles ascribed to them. Nevertheless, they have shown that there is a great deal that might usefully be done by

schools and school systems, both to enhance motiviation and to increase understanding of the problem of harmonizing policies and decision, which inevitably in a plural society arise from different and often competing sources of control and authority.

6. Conclusion

6.1 The school as institutional agency of change

I have not attempted to examine the full range of reconstructionist proposals on schools conceived as institutions for culture renewal. However, I have selected what I take to be some of the more significant issues and problems arising from their proposals. Even in the most comprehensive reviews of the task of the school, those of the experimentalists, there is no really detailed and adequate account of how the complex, living institution of the school can be brought to the degree of awareness, self-control and technical sophistication required by the more ambitious tenets of reconstructionism. This may perhaps be explained by the slow development of empirical study of the school as a social institution, a form of inquiry which has become a major sociological interest only very recently. Further progress in reconstructionist thinking will in part depend upon critical assimilation of the results of these and related types of inquiry.

6.2 Education and the apparatus of state

Behind the various proposals and problems we have considered in this chapter lies a fundamental dichotomy, between the Webbs and Mannheim, on the one hand, and all the other reconstructionists, on the other hand. The Webbs and Mannheim were ultimately prepared to see the school system and the processes of education absorbed into the centralized apparatus of state-planning. In this respect their thinking is similar to that

of the Soviet educationists, at least of an earlier period, and that of many of the policy-makers in developing countries - for example, the signatories of the Kothari report. The arguments for this absorption have to do with the critical problems which, it is suggested, confront society. These arguments invoke or assume ideas deriving from the views of Plato and Aristotle about the relationship of education and politics, and express a more abstract preference for a monolithic model of planned change. The arguments against it are those indicated by Clarke's misgivings about state absolutism, and Dewey's confidence in the capacity of the ordinary man to think for himself and to co-operate with others without being directed to do so, subtly or in other ways. Reconstructionism is a movement which identifies education as an autonomous cultural ideal, or social process, and its institutional agencies (e.g., schools) as in some sense autonomous, while yet being interdependent with other culture processes and social institutions. On this definition of reconstructionism, are the Webbs and Mannheim reconstructionists at all? Were they consistent in their advocacy of a politically subservient role for the school, the answer would be no. Their character as reconstructionists, paradoxically, emerges out of their inconsistency. Thus the Webbs thought of socialism as an idea which rationally and politically educated individuals will naturally hit upon, and schools as places where critical inquiry into current social problems and deeply-seated social, political and religious beliefs should be carried on. Mannheim likewise equated the "planning mentality" with socially-orientated, critical education, and thought of schools, not just as agencies of an all-powerful central bureaucracy, but as centres for critical argument and debate on contemporary issues.

6.3 Democratic organization of schooling

The particular forms of the experimentalist argument for a democratically organized school system are in many respects unsatisfactory. Confusion arises when we probe the issues of authority and responsibility. The universalistic aspiration to proceed on all fronts minimizes very real problems of priority in the allocation of scarce resources, both mental and material. Yet, if schools are to be effective in contributing to the initiation of children into the modes of life and the forms of understanding of a democratic society, then the questions raised by the experimentalists are highly pertinent. While granting the difficulty of distributing educational roles amongst various institutions in a changing society, we need to keep this before us as an objective. To ignore it is to impose impossible burdens on the school, or to overlook failures in overall institutional provision which fall especially hard on certain sectors of the population. Yet to restrict the consciously defined role of the school to purely cognitive and academic enterprises is not only to fail to understand the problem of pupil motivation in a mass system; it is also to ignore a point Kilpatrick emphasized. Many different kinds of learning apart from those intended occur in schools; some of these relate to social experience, and attitude formation. It is better to be more explicit about these learnings, to relate them to clearer objectives for personality development and social participation, and to take more definite steps to assess their achievement, than to treat them as peripheral to the school's performance of its role.

CHAPTER XIV

THE TEACHER AS AGENT OF CULTURE RECONSTRUCTION

Teaching is an enterprise upon whose successful performance the reconstructionists ultimately based their aspirations to transform culture through education. The criteria of successful teaching include, to use Dewey's term, children's growth; but the reconstructionists, unlike some of the child-centred progressives, neither believed in growth as an unfoldment of latent powers, nor did they abandon the concept of teaching in favor of a concept of learning (1). Rugg outlined the three great tasks which the teacher should perform as remaker of culture:

> "First, inspiration. The youth of America must be set on fire with a deep and abiding belief in the ability of the people to build a world of peace and of physical and democratic abundance ... Second, a generation of young Americans must be informed. To enable growing youth to understand our problems and to help resolve our conflicts by a steady reintegration of the culture, our teachers must assemble and organize in a curriculum the world's best knowledge and man's most sensitive statements ... Third, our youth must become persons of disciplined initiative ... There is no other profession but that of teachers to take the leadership in satisfying these needs. To do this, the teacher must have a range and depth of understanding that would have been incredible to earlier generations" (2).

This plea for understanding would be not only incredible to earlier generations but it is, I shall argue, at least as Rugg conceived it, extremely difficult to visualize in the form of concrete proposals for teacher education. Yet it expresses, in a more extreme form, the typical reconstructionist conception of the teacher, his task and his education. Despite their criticisms of teacher dominance in traditional schooling, it is apparent that virtually all reconstructionists viewed the teaching act and the personality and education of teachers

as of central importance for the reconstructive process. Teachers were not, in the manner of the more laissez-faire versions of progressivism, or as in the Plowden Report, at least as perceived by some of its critics, relegated to the ancillary role of providers of learning opportunities (3); nor were they ascribed the role of instruments of policy and implementers of designs for learning devised by administrators and experts. On the contrary, the tendency towards the bureaucratization of the teacher by reducing him to a functionary in a hierarchical system was vigorously criticized by Dewey, Kilpatrick and Childs.

Technological development had not, when the main body of reconstructionists was most active, reached the point where it might be conjectured that teachers could be replaced, or even substantially supported, by machines and programmes. The reconstructionists did not envisage the possibility of large-scale, non-school learning programmes for children and adolescents, as suitable substitutes for the improvement and extension of existing institutions. Thus their concept of the teacher's role took a great deal for granted which has more recently begun to be questioned, especially in large urban centres where problems of motivation and discipline are acute. I do not wish to imply by these comments on what the reconstructionists assumed about teaching that their model of a highly skilled, culturally aware teacher, designing and modifying his own schemes of work, should be treated as unsatisfactory, in the light of these newer developments. On the contrary, there is much to be learned from their concept of the teacher in heightening our understanding of the teacher's task and the best ways of preparing him to perform it. While I shall make specific criticisms of different reconstructionists' concepts of teaching, I shall also suggest some ways in which their views might be moderated

and developed (4). Instead of treating individual reconstructionists separately, I shall consider and compare their views under the separate headings of:

1. the qualities sought in teachers;
2. perceptions of the teaching task; and
3. the education of teachers.

1. The Qualities Sought in Teachers

1.1 The teachers: data and criticisms

The reconstructionists gave relatively little consideration to a number of important empirical questions: who are the teachers, what are their social and personal attributes, what perceptions have they of the teaching task and what has been the nature of their preparation? Except for isolated inquiries these are questions which only in recent years have been systematically explored (5). Thus the reconstructionists were at a very serious disadvantage in spelling out desirable teacher qualities, in not being able to relate these specifications in any very concrete manner to the kinds of people being attracted into teaching. There were exceptions, but on the whole they did too little to overcome this disadvantage, by drawing upon such research as had been conducted, or by asking themselves about the practicability of their specification of the model of the "good teacher". Critics have pointed out that during the 1930s the experimentalists, notably Counts and Bode, prescribed a role of radical political activism for teachers, which paid scant attention to the social background, training and political attitudes of those already in the teaching profession and those likely to enter:

> "It was found that the task envisaged was the discouraging

> one of trying to achieve radical social change with a profession that was largely politically conservative and socially indifferent" (6).

Has this situation changed significantly? There is recent evidence of the persistence of anti-democratic attitudes among teachers, and resistance to the idea of a change-agent role; but there is evidence also of increasing professional unity, militancy, and political radicalism. It is the latter which led Burnett to suppose that teachers might, after a long period of quiescence, once more take up the reconstructionist challenge to enlist the schools in a campaign for a new social order (7). Nash's criticism of Counts and Bode, quoted above, is just, but it should not be inferred from it that reconstructionists were unaware of qualities in teachers which might seriously jeopardize the achievement of the reconstructionist ends. There is evidence that they felt keenly the inadequacies of teachers in relation to reconstructionist objectives. Also, since many of the educationists whose thinking I have discussed were deeply involved in large-scale teacher education programmes, such an inference would be a strange commentary on their professional competence (8).

Dewey, with Kilpatrick the most persistently optimistic of the experimentalists, qualified what often appears as a bland confidence in the capacity of the teaching profession to achieve reconstructionist objectives:

> "In the main the most docile among the young are the ones who become teachers when they are adults. Consequently they still listen docilely to the voice of authority" (9).

Dewey also, at the very end of his life, remarked sadly on the tendency in colleges of education to teach experimentalist theory by non-experimentalist procedures, thus splitting the teacher into a being who perhaps cognitively accepts certain ideas, but teaches in the manner he was taught (10)

This comment indicated no great confidence that teachers of the right combination of qualities were emerging from training institutions. It is a comment for which many parallels can be found in Dewey's life-long attacks on the practice of teaching in American schools: the teacher has been submitted to a narrow training, or is subject to authoritarian direction, or is ignorant of the constraining effects upon his work of certain social and political forces, or is the victim of a false psychology of learning, or is dominated by pedagogical stereotypes, whether ancient or modern. Dewey contrasted with the American teacher the teacher in the Soviet Union. (This was in 1929, immediately following his educational tour.) The latter, he thought, had attained professional dignity, by being taken into confidence and partnership in social and economic planning (11). Other experimentalists, notably Childs and Kilpatrick, called for teachers who could share in the reconstructive process, as partners,not slaves of existing institutions or minions of the administration (12). It was assumed that "autocratic" treatment of teachers by administrators "naturally" leads teachers to treat children autocratically. This is not, perhaps, an unreasonable assumption if we accept the cyclic argument: pupils in schools were denied responsibility for their own learning; they progressed to college where they were still treated primarily as recipients of knowledge and were denied effective control over their communal lives; they then entered schools where primary decisions about policy, curriculum, and so forth, were taken for them. Apart from their own individual efforts to imagine, read and think about alternatives, there was nothing in this cycle to disturb assumptions about adult-, child, or leader-follower, authority relationships. This cyclic account of course is an over-simplification of which some of

the reconstructionists made effective polemical use. Their criticisms were directed at the so-called progressive teacher as well as at the more typical public school practitioner. One of the most severe critics of teacher perception and performance of role was Counts, who, in his onslaught in Dare the School Build a New Social Order?, castigated the pedagogical reformers of the Progressive Education Association as a group who were, amongst other failings, oblivious of social trends and issues, professionally unorganized, and hence politically naive, untrained in a serious intellectual sense, and unintelligent in their dedication to slogans like "the natural goodness of the child". This a-political enthusiasm for the child was not, in Counts' judgment, or in Dewey's, a characteristic suitable for the teaching profession in America. The lack of interest in social affairs and the preoccupation with the immediate concerns of small groups of middle-class children unfitted these teachers to act as social change agents.

However, it should be noted that even the most severe of the experimentalist criticisms were seldom directed at the person of the teacher. Instead, they focussed on characteristics produced or reinforced by the institutional framework within which the teacher was educated and required to teach. Despite their emphasis on the force of environment on individual behavior, the experimentalists sometimes leave the impression that teachers could rise above these institutional limitations and, by an act of the rational will, achieve a new awareness of their task. This new awareness was needed if they were to reconstruct the very order of which they were a functioning part, or if, in Russell's terms, they were only to act as "the guardians of civilization". The experimentalists provided some grounds for optimism about future changes, by avoiding extended criticism of the personal qualities of teachers, and by treating

their faults as the consequence of a regrettable but remediable impingement of unfavorable aspects of the environment upon their better selves. Institutional changes, particularly the education of teachers and the breaking of the bureaucratic grip of the administration, could produce a new type of teacher. The experimentalists did not show in detail how a very large, relatively unorganized, politically quiescent, and inadequately educated profession employed in thousands of separate school districts, could achieve the stature required by the exalted expectations held of them. But they said nothing about the present deficiencies of teachers which would make this an impossible expectation.

1.2 Experimentalist behavioristic model

Optimism about the possibilities of re-educating teachers reflects the experimentalist perception of the person which, while it recognizes an enduring "nature" of feelings, experience, dispositions and habits, always leaves open the possibility of significant change and further growth. The organism, while it is still alive, is engaged in continuous interaction with its environment. Its transactions with the world of thought are open-ended, to the extent that new ideas can be received and acted upon. The teacher, therefore, is always capable of further growth and development in understanding. His attitudes and habits have been shaped by environmental interaction, but they are never fully and finally formed, and what one environment has shaped another environment can modify. Hence continuing, inservice education opens up great possibilities for system reform. Mannheim and the later reconstructionists, Brameld, Stanley, Raup, Benne, Frank and others, shared this more optimistic view. They all treated personality, character and role perception as susceptible to modification by deliberate social

effort which can be extended well into adult life and certainly beyond the stage of initial preparation and induction into a profession. The work of McClelland at Harvard on enhancing achievement motivation in management training courses for executives is an illustration of one of the many uses now being made of this general model of institutional formation and reformation, not only of rule but of more basic drives in personality. His objective for inservice education closely parallels that which all the reconstructionists set the teacher: the "development of personal motives and values that will make the individual an effective change agent" (13). More extreme uses of this model are to be found in the utopian and dystopian romances - e.g., Skinner's Walden Two and Huxley's Brave New World.

The behavioristic model is open to many objections, including its reduction of complex factors in personality to overt behavior and its neglect of unconscious aggression and deeply-seated resistance to change. But, because it is a model which encourages people to think that they can improve behavior, it is of great strategic significance for reconstructionism. The optimistic pedagogy to which writers as diverse as Webb, Mannheim and Kilpatrick subscribed has as one of its central tenets the enlargement of personality attendant on the assumption of responsibility and exercise of the will to reform existing situations and arrangements. Unless teachers could be encouraged to look upon their existing performance as only a hint of what was possible, they could have little confidence in the more grandiose claim that education could serve as a reconstructive agency in society. Inspiring confidence in the group is one of the tasks of ideological thinking: confidence in the secure possession of a worthwhile set of experiences and institutions, where the ideology is primarily conservative; confidence

in the group's capacity, through its own efforts, to achieve better things in the future, where the ideology is primarily radical and optimistic. Thus, whatever deficiencies might be revealed in teachers and patterns of teacher recruitment and education in the present state of society, the strategy of reconstructionism requires that these deficiencies be qualified in the ways I have suggested. They do not imply moral fault or stupidity in teachers - but they may well imply these defects in others, especially administrators, policy makers, and pressure groups like business associations. Even here, however, the experimentalists, who wished to see a combined community effort, had to be careful not to reduce these other groups to incorrigibility. The deficiencies they found in teachers are serious - or why else should significant change be proposed? But, primarily through teacher-education programmes, these deficiencies, it was felt, could be overcome. The experimentalists adopted the strategy of change through teacher education and were successful in attracting a large and enthusiastic teacher following in the United States.

1.3 Clarke and Wells: assessments of teacher potential

Neither Clarke, who was Mannheim's most influential English popularizer, nor Wells, thought along experimentalist lines when defining desirable qualities in teachers. The traditions were quite different, since in America teachers were more under the direct control of local boards and administrators, whereas the English tradition of centralized charitable provision set up different lines of authority and relationship (14). Clarke's writings soberly remind the teacher that he, like the whole of humanity, is a victim of original sin, and thus not capable of a steady improvement or of reconstructing his own experience in the unbounded manner envisaged by the experimentalists. Furthermore, Clarke circumscribed the

teacher's role in a manner seldom proposed by the experimentalists: the teacher was to be something less than a free, responsible and independent critic. Clarke valued the freedom of the English tradition but, like the Webbs and like Rugg in his more exuberant phases, treated the teacher as the implementer of policies evolved by more expert and specialized educationists (15).

Wells' thinking on this subject was characterized by the sharp dichotomy he so frequently introduced, splitting the muddle of the present from the perfect order of the future. He vehemently attacked teachers in all kinds of institutions from elementary schools ("shockingly illiterate and ignorant") to universities ("the theorising recluse") for their snobbishness, pettiness, narrowness of outlook, inadequate education, and failure truly to educate:

> "The last human beings in the world in whom you are likely to find a spark of creative energy or a touch of imaginative vigour are the masters and mistresses of upper middle-class schools ... quiet, inaggressive but obstinate champions of the old order against his bolder contemporaries" (16).

This is the stereotype of the old style teacher which Washington Irving memorably exploited in The Legend of Sleepy Hollow. Yet Wells also had Job Huss, who is modelled upon Sanderson of Oundle, say that man is born a beast, lustful, egotistical and fearful: "it is we teachers alone who can lift him out of that self-preoccupation ... into a wider circle of ideas beyond himself" (17). The expectation that the same teaching force which has all the vices and deficiencies Wells attributed to them is to produce in increasing numbers from its own ranks luminaries capable of lifting their pupils into this wider world typifies one of the confusions into which reconstructionist thinking lapses, and from which it is rescued by invoking an elite of self-conscious critic-reformers who will lead the majority into better ways.

Wells' stinging criticism and hortatory appeals are a poor substitute for a precise analysis of the concept of teaching and of present conditions and factors in the teaching situation. Expositions of the teaching process which issue in an imposing list of moral and intellectual virtues and an implied mastery of all conceivable practical problems, so far from encouraging and inspiring, can have a very deflating effect on teachers caught up in the difficulties of early professional adaptation and rapid changes in school organization and curriculum.

1.4 Exalted expectations of teachers of the future

There is of course nothing new in these exalted expectations: the shahmanical, brahminical and priestly elements in the ancestry of the craft of teaching have set a persisting standard for teachers, of a more cosseted and exclusive moral excellence than can be expected of the wider community. Those elements in the craft which have descended from the Greek and Roman use of slaves as pedagogues have ensured that the teacher should be looked upon as somewhat less worldly, practical and business-minded than his employers, who might enjoy pleasures from which the teacher is expected to protect his charges. Furthermore, the slave or dependent servant element in the tradition complicates role expectations by making the teacher uncertain whether he is a "free" or a "kept" guardian of social norms. These considerations leave the teacher in the peculiarly difficult position of having to safeguard virtues which other members of society may more or less discreetly flaunt.

The distinctive contribution of the reconstructionists to this picture of an excessively virtuous,and somewhat less than fully human,teacher was to exalt many of the qualities which might in other circumstances provoke a mild contempt. They did this by skilfully reversing

conventional and traditional assessments of certain qualities. The lack of a vaguely defined practicality is reversed by demonstrating that an industrialized, science-based, rapidly changing society needs more of the intellectual skills, and of imaginativeness, and less of the older practical skills and qualities of the craftsman, though one need not exclude the other. The old practical craftsman must take second place to the knowledge worker and social evaluator of whom the teacher is - or rather can become - the type. A society undergoing a deep moral crisis as traditional values are rapidly dissolved needs the skills of moral analysis and a visionary determination to recreate a new order out of the chaos. The traditional moral codes and a worldly utilitarianism must yield to moral inquiry. This, too, is what the teacher,by virtue of his role as critic, interpreter, and synthesizer, is well fitted to practise and to stimulate in others. In performing this creative role, the teacher will inevitably encounter opposition and he may expect to be attacked for, amongst other things, his "immorality" and his "corrupting" influence on the young.

2. The Teaching Task

2.1 A calling

The qualities expected of the teacher by the reconstructionists are drawn from their perception of his task; they then serve to color this task with a missionary fervor. The most general task teachers are set is so to educate the community as to convert it from its old form of worship to new gods. The use of religious metaphors is not rhetorical exaggeration; they are quite consistent with the overall reconstructionist objectives of building a new cultural order upon a core of values and perceptions, and of making a new man. Teaching becomes not simply a job,

or the performance of a professional role, but a calling:

> "The most creative profession of all ... that great calling which with each generation renews the world's 'circle of ideas', the Teachers'" (18).

In his preface to Gentile's The Reform of Education, the Italian Idealist historian, Croce, gave to the wider circle of thinkers, with whom teachers should ally themselves, an even more explicitly religious task - which Gentile elaborated in his addresses to the teachers of Triest, one of Italy's victory prizes after the first world war. It was, said Croce, "the duty of thinkers" to:

> "form the new faith of humanity - a new Christianity or a new Humanism, as we may wish to call it. Such a faith will certainly not be spared the conflicts from which ancient Christianity itself was not free; but it may reasonably be hoped that it will rescue us from intellectual anarchy, from unbridled individualism, from sensualism, from scepticism, from pessimism, from every aberration which for a century and a half has been harassing the soul of man and the society of mankind under the name of Romanticism" (19).

The "rescue" came through fascism: Gentile was himself a minister of education under Mussolini, and Croce was,for a time,an active supporter. Fascism is sometimes treated as a romantic "aberration", which rather complicates Croce's position (20). However, neither these complications, nor the tangled roots of fascism, are at issue here. The items in Croce's list of aberrations are the familiar echoes of the reconstructionist diagnosis of a culture crisis. His and Gentile's educational proposals were different from theirs, yet he brought out very sharply the religious quality of the role of the thinker and the teacher. These religious qualities are rather more those of the argumentative, theologically-equipped Pauline reformer, willing and able to inform the world of the rules of the new procedures, and rather less those of a Christ figure understanding and forgiving all. The difference is important, for in educational terms it signifies a shift from the fully receptive, child-centred position

to one which defines for the teacher more determinate roles as organizer, interpreter and judge of children's experiences.

2.2 Counts and Brameld: organized, collective action

A more prosaic expectation for teachers than that of a quasi-religious calling underlies the argument for organized teacher militancy. Counts called to the teachers to become conscious of their economic status and political powerlessness and join with organized labor. This argument, also used by the radical economist, Veblen, and the muck-raking novelist, Sinclair, has been revived recently by Burnett and Brubacher, who think that teachers have at last begun to recognize the value of organized collective strength (21). Counts also urged teachers to perceive their role in the light of powerful anti-democratic forces. Teachers should shake themselves free of the misty belief that "the school is an all-powerful educational agency" and recognize that to achieve their ends they must form associations with other agencies, in opposition if necessary to the vested interests of capitalism. Hence Counts' recommendation to the teacher that he become an agency of class war, which, as we saw in Chapter XIII, prompted a rebuke from Dewey, who preferred an alignment with "social forces" to a major political front between workers and teachers (22). Counts also advised teachers to demonstrate their commitment to democratic thinking by becoming active indoctrinators. This advice, too, prompted Dewey's criticism that indoctrination for any cause was inconsistent with the critical, scientific-democratic canons of experimentalism. Dewey's criticisms of indoctrination were sound but, as Childs pointed out, to substitute "social forces" for "class war" is to confuse the issue of the exact relationship between teachers and organized interest groups in society. Counts' proposal is both socially divisive and possibly

self-defeating, since in western societies political power has not lain with the exponents of class war so much as with their entrenched enemies. Yet for teachers to seek to ally themselves with the dominant interest groups, in the hope of significantly influencing them, is to run the risk of compromise and assimilation. Counts' proposals were unsatisfactory but they had the merit of expressing a very sensitive and difficult issue in reconstructionist theory. Teachers must seek ways of influencing and co-operating with other social institutions than the school, if only to secure an adequate resource allocation and the freedom from arbitrary interference that they require to perform their work as constructive critics. But, as religious reformers have so often found, it is but a short step from developing social consciousness to acquiescence in the values of the institution whose reform is sought.

The argument that teachers should be brought to recognize the social and political interests that impinge upon the schools has been reiterated by Brameld. This kind of awareness, he argued, was necessary, together with affiliation with the American Federation of Labour, in order to counteract the traditional tendency of the profession to accept external control and to ally itself with more conservative movements in society (23). All of the reconstructionists have insisted that adequate performance of the teacher's task involves greatly increased socio-political awareness. This of course follows from their treatment of education as a major cultural force, capable of transforming the conditions of socio-political life. But they have, with the exception of Counts and Brameld and, for a time, Childs, denied that enhanced socio-political awareness should be expressed in partisan political activity outside the school. In several respects, this denial is hardly consistent, since the intimate relationships Dewey, for example, posited between school

and other social institutions make it very difficult to define the limits of political activity, the more so as membership of politically conscious professional associations was actively encouraged by the reconstructionists. Dewey proposed a spectrum of political activity extending from indirect political participation through the critical analysis of political issues within the school, to more direct action through politically conscious professional associations. What he could not accept was partisan uses of schooling in the interests of organized labor, the working class, or some self-proclaimed partisan movement. His criticism of Counts reveals the reason for his objections: the experimentalist method is essentially one of critical probing, inquiry and discussion - it always seeks to delay implementation; democracy requires the tolerant acceptance of a plurality of interests and viewpoints, and the effort to reconcile these. Presumably, also, acceptance of an active political role in a period of great social and industrial upheaval increased the likelihood of violence, and this Dewey always resisted as a political weapon. He thought that three basic forces controlled society: habit; coercive and violent force; and intelligence. His preference was always for the third:

> "The feeling that social change of any basic character can be brought about only by violent force is the product of lack of faith in intelligence as a method, and this loss of faith is in large measure the product of a schooling that, because of its comparatively unfree condition, has not enabled youth to face intelligently the realities of our social life, political and economic" (24).

2.3 The teacher as democratic engineer and leader of inquiry

Raup and his associates, Stanley, and Brameld, all developed Dewey's argument by seeking a method of collaborative deliberation, and converting the teacher into an engineer of democratic change through the organized pursuit of consensus. Benne outlined the requirements: a collaborative

methodology built on the "core convictions" of democracy. Teachers were to become leaders of task-orientated groups, comprised of actively participating, experimentally-minded inquirers. In this way, and not through the more stridently partisan and militant methods of direct political action, should the informed and experimental collective judgment be elevated over unchecked private judgment. It is a development of experimentalism which has now become an integral part of an empirically-orientated school of thought which identifies the teacher as a group organizer, technician and change agent (25).

Brameld criticized Dewey's and Kilpatrick's treatment of teachers as organizers and leaders of open inquiry - forever guiding pupil inquiries and stimulating reflection, but never committing themselves on the pressing issues of the day. He advocated, in place of what he described as a spurious neutrality, the adoption by teachers of definite socio-political positions, for which they could offer argument and evidence in public discussion. This "defensible partiality" of the teacher was to be a concrete expression of the ideals and values of a democratic society, committed to certain major policy objectives. This commitment, Brameld felt, could be taught without resort to indoctrination as a way of life open to critical scrutiny and modification, but closed to nihilism, scepticism and complete detachment (26). Brameld's criticism of Dewey missed the point that the reflective method is not in fact politically neutral in the wider sense. Dewey's expectation of reflective inquiry was that it disposes those who use it to adopt process objectives which have definite implications for the conduct of political decision-taking and for the exercise of political power. It seemed to Brameld that this was a process which was too slow and uncertain for a rapidly disintegrating social order: a more definite avowal of the goals

of reconstructionism was needed, when so many forces in society threatened the potentially educative work of the school.

Brameld's role proposals for the reconstructionist teacher, in spite of his criticism of Dewey's failure to acknowledge clear social targets, are nonetheless similar to Dewey's. The teacher should seek to counteract the subtler, persuasive uses of propaganda by showing how propagandists operate; he should eschew indoctrination, should seek out evidence, find ways of establishing clear communication, promote a respect for disagreement and encourage a wider community of action (27). Thus the consensus procedures Brameld so often advocated are not intended to discourage criticism and disagreement, although he did expect that these divisive characteristics of dialogue would yield to a higher agreement on action. Also, his doctrine of defensible partiality encourages the teacher both to take a more definite stand on great public issues and to present arguments for his viewpoint. Provided these arguments are fair, and that they do not inhibit pupils and colleagues from expressing alternatives, Brameld argued, quite reasonably, that the teacher would be performing his function as a non-indoctrinating educator.

2.4 Russell: the teacher as guardian of civilization

Of the English reconstructionists, only Russell conceived the task of the teacher as Dewey had: the leader of dispassionate inquiry directed by the assumption that this would in time produce a truly scientific civilization. In his essay, "The functions of a teacher", Russell objected to the obscurantist and irrational means used to induce loyalty to the state and urged teachers to instill habits of impartial inquiry, and to lead the young to judge issues "on their merits". This would almost inevitably mean criticism of existing

social arrangements. To this end, the teacher needs to feel intellectually independent and to have a sense of an ideal, or of standards, to which pupils could be encouraged to aspire. Russell did not say just what these standards might be, but he suggested that we become aware of them or learn to think about them through the study of culture and history, as a "vast panorama", "which enlarges the mind that contemplates it" (28). Similarly, on the emotional side, the teacher should seek ways of taking children out of themselves, to witness and examine diverse human achievements. In this way, pupils would be drawn from merely dispassionate inquiry to feel a warmth of interest, and a passionate concern for the possibility of human achievement. For these more imaginative enterprises to be possible, teachers would have to develop a warmth of affection towards their pupils, and to practise and cultivate a wide tolerance. They could not undertake these tasks adequately unless they were assured of freedom from petty interference and inhibition. By implication, then, Russell proposed a state apparatus guaranteeing and supporting the free exercise of the teacher's educative role, even if this should involve severe teacher criticism of that very supportive apparatus. This is an ideal of a free, plural society, with education conceived as a semi-independent, but vitally important, public estate. Hence Russell's reference to the teacher as a guardian of civilization.

The difficulties of sustaining this position in practice are considerable. There is always a temptation, as I noted in discussing the Kothari Report, to enlist education as an instrumentality of state policy, to conceive of the teacher as a functionary of the state apparatus, and to evade the difficult, but vitally important, issue of the separate realms of the nation, the polity and education in a genuinely plural and open society

In a critical situation involving physical survival, it is justifiable to mobilize education to determinate political ends, provided other purposes and roles for teachers are also fostered. Where a powerful set of overriding objectives or interests - such as military ascendancy, or a fixed view of public morality - assert themselves, the threat to independent educational action may be severe, as in Germany and Japan in the 1930s. Since there are very important issues of community freedom and development at stake, to seek to ensure a critical and creative role for teachers, even in the most adverse conditions, is no less vital a task for a public providing agency than are the more obvious tasks of material provision and organization.

Russell's conception of the teacher's task, while very close to Dewey's, was different in one important respect. This emerges from Russell's attitude toward the community. For him, the community, so far as the school is concerned, was a possible source of threat. For Dewey, who very actively campaigned for professional freedom for teachers, awareness of a possible threat was counterbalanced by a sense of the wider purposes and possibilities of teaching. The teacher has the task both of educating the community and of finding ways of working with community interests in the formation of educational policy. This is a corollary of the argument that teachers should share in policy-making. The extremes of exclusive control, either by teachers or by other community interests, were both rejected (29).

2.5 Kilpatrick: participation in the organization of learning

The theme of participation by teachers and by pupils was given particular emphasis by Kilpatrick. As we saw in Chapter XI, the project method was intended to involve pupils and teachers in a common planning enterprise. In the first section of the present chapter, I referred

to Kilpatrick's and Dewey's condemnation of the autocratic treatment of teachers by administrators. Kilpatrick regarded school administration as "the factory system applied in a field where its evils are peculiarly aggravated" (30). If the teacher were to be a "self-determining person", or, as Childs put it, "an end in himself", then ways must be found to enable him to co-operate in the "joint work" of preparing curriculum materials and taking teaching decisions (31). Kilpatrick gave no clear indication of the way in which the different roles of administrator, curriculum-maker and teacher might be combined. This has become a pressing problem when rapid changes in the structure and content of education are disrupting older role definitions and expectations in many countries. Kilpatrick's preferences were clear, but he neglected the implications and consequences of these for the whole system. He did not envisage the devolution of power and authority entirely to schools, but appears to have had in mind a loosening of bureaucratic and centralized routines through consultation, joint working parties, and more informal networks of communication.

Kilpatrick's discussions of the project method make this matter a little clearer. The project method, as Kilpatrick conceived it, meant the abandonment of predefined courses of study, set text books and formal and external examinations (32). Dewey had not proposed the abandonment of predefined courses of study, but his work at the Laboratory School assumed that the major curriculum decisions would be taken within the school, by teachers, in consultation at least with the older pupils over matters of detail. For Kilpatrick, the teacher, or rather the school staff, was to become the single most powerful determinant of the processes, content and materials of schooling, within the very broad limits imposed by buildings, resources, their own competence and

similar constraints. He set no theoretical limits, and it is characteristic of experimentalism that it should constantly seek to push back the practical boundaries without specifying priorities: increased resources, better facilities, indefinite improvement of teacher skill, and so forth. For Kilpatrick, the teacher's task as an organizer of learning was not to "purvey knowledge" but to study the individual child, to develop a live and growing "map of values", to work out with children learning objectives, to stimulate and guide, to mediate ideas, and so forth. These expectations pose many problems for teachers, which I shall discuss in the following paragraphs. They introduce a possibly acute conflict into his role expectations, by requiring him to repudiate traditional subject orientations while yet remaining ready to draw on demand upon wide bodies of subject matter. Another tension set up is that between the teacher's traditional authority expectations with respect to the administration and external experts and his own growing sense of autonomy. Again, the attempt to build learning programmes upon expressed child interest and a cultural perspective may leave the teacher uneasily poised between two sets of requirements which at times can he harmonized only with the utmost difficulty. These are examples of possible conflict in role performance to which the experimentalists gave too little attention. They pose issues for teacher education programmes which only in the past few years have begun to be systematically studied (33).

The chief difficulty in the reconstructionist perception of the task of the teacher arises from the implication of an indefinite extension of performance possibilities. The teacher's task is indefinitely extended by the kinds of understanding the reconstructionists expected

of him: there are no limits that can be set for the type of inquiry that is necessary to establish a child's interests, background, motivation, and so forth. The apparently simple exhortation to study the child is an invitation to ramify one's inquiries into the depths of personality and the ever-shifting patterns of interpersonal relationships. Similarly, the advice to study culture or study contemporary society - to become aware of one's membership in an ongoing civilization - poses truly daunting tasks of cognition and sociability. There is yet a third kind of study required by reconstructionist theory, and that is mastery of the subject matter of teaching to the point where it can be segmented, re-arranged, integrated and reconstructed to suit the shifting and unpredictable requirements of the project, or of reflective inquiry, or of workshop learning. Apart from the emotional demands of this kind of teaching, great mental alertness and flexibility are required to leap, for example, from a child's immediate interest to world problems. Rugg unconsciously highlights this difficulty in discussing just one aspect of the teacher's task, developing an awareness in the child of social change:

> "The teacher must understand and apply the theory [i.e., Rugg's theory] of social and individual change to the students before her in relationship to the social and cultural milieu in which they are growing up ... She must understand the thought patterns and their social context; the forces that are generated; the likely points of conflict; and the ways in which these conflicts may result in frustration and irrational behaviour on the one hand, and in useful and rational integrative change and activity on the other. What goes on inside the child, inside his school, inside his family, and inside his recreational groups is largely cultural integration, disintegration, and reintegration, due to physical, emotional, and mental changes. This means that important to her task is an understanding of these processes at work in her community, her state, her nation and her world. She must know of integration, disintegration and reintegration at large, since it is in these larger contexts that the grown man will function in conflict and co-operation with others" (34).

Lurking behind the invitation to the teacher to learn all she can is the notorious Hegelian dilemma that to know and to do anything one must know and do everything. Russell's criticism of the failure of Dewey's theory of inquiry to set any definite limits to the scope of an inquiry, rejected by Dewey, touched upon one of the most serious weaknesses in experimentalism (35). This weakness, as I have noted in several other places, affected their discussion of many other topics than the logic of inquiry.

Of course, teachers have not been encouraged by reconstructionists to continue indefinitely in inquiry conceived as an intellectual exercise. There has been, however, a marked tendency to encourage them to believe that the problems posed by this new model of expansive teaching, while acute, are manageable. Kilpatrick, for example, implied that, once secondary teachers had been liberated from subject specialization, they could expect success in their more legitimate tasks of character and personality formation. Brameld, too, thought that, if teachers felt intimidated by the prospect of synthesizing knowledge, this may be a result of their having been conditioned by specialization. The implication is that liberation from specialization will be accompanied by an access of creative energy sufficient for the more heroic task of creating a new curriculum synthesis which should presage a new unification of culture.

There is an oppressive unreality about these proposals to lift teachers from the sub-culture of subject specialization, or the school and child-centred sub-culture of Froebel and Montessori, and set them free in an expanding cultural universe. In periods of rapid system expansion and change, for example, the growth and reorganization of schooling in the post-war period, the demands made upon teachers often proved

exhausting and a source of serious stress in a profession which normally operates with a high degree of altruism in emotionally exposed situations.

Criticism of the dominance of the teaching models of the classic and romantic sub-cultures (namely, "transmission" and "discovery") was undoubtedly needed. The first, transmission, confuses the issue of what it is that is transmitted by neglecting the modifications and transformations of meaning involved in the transfer of an idea from one context, the teacher's thinking, to another, the child's thinking. Herbart was well aware of this problem, and Dewey, in his criticisms of traditional pedagogy, was influenced by Herbart's theory of "apperceptive masses". Yet, for all their misgivings, the experimentalists have not done so muchby way of systematic criticism of transmission doctrines as, for example, Cassirer has done (36). "Discovery", too, was ripe for criticism, in that its exponents paid too little attention to the distinctions between different forms of discovery and tended to neglect both the hidden structures in their own discovery methods, and the arguments in favor of teaching structured knowledge. Again, these and related criticisms have also been more fully developed by writers other than the experimentalists (37).

In place of the limitations of the criticized models, we are presented by the reconstructionists with a conception of task which lacks a clear structure and any definite priority, both for the work of individual teachers and for the teaching profession as a whole. The initial stimulus to thought and encouragement to action that this wider definition of task yields can, unless we articulate appropriate action programmes, lead to a paralysis of action or a cynical distinctionbetween the theorists' expectations and the "real world" of the classroom. These are possible consequences which are inconsistent with the idea of education as a

constructive and progressive force in society. This should have made them unacceptable to the reconstructionists, as indeed they are to any rational theory of the teaching process.

3. Teacher Education

In Shaw's play Man and Superman, the liberated heroine, Ann Whitfield, disgusted with the existing race of men, proposes to found a new dynasty, and calls for a father for the superman. The father to the new teacher is teacher education, and it was to a new design for teacher education that several of the reconstructionists looked for the inspiration, if not the source, of the new movement. This expectation narrows our inquiry to a relatively small group of people and institutions.

3.1 Kilpatrick and Rugg: the educational foundations approach

The prototype of the new design for teacher education is the educational foundations programme, which first appeared in the 1920s at Teachers' College, Columbia University, in two programmes under the leadership respectively of Kilpatrick and Rugg. From there, during and after the second world war, the "foundations" idea spread to a number of highly influential teacher training institutions in the United States, and, by virtue of the drawing power of these institutions for graduate students from other countries, it has come to exert an influence on teacher education in many different parts of the world. Rugg described the original foundations approach at Teachers' College, Columbia, as comprising three steps: first, the interdisciplinary study group which met under Kilpatrick's chairmanship in bi-weekly dinner round tables from 1928 to 1941 to discuss "the problems and trends in modern society and the revolutions in the natural and physical sciences and the expressive arts"; second, the design, in Columbia and elsewhere,

of "unified and organic divisions of 'Educational Foundations'" (these were courses for teacher education in a wide range of theoretical disciplines variously combined and integrated within single, interdisciplinary departments in colleges of education; third, the group teaching and assessment of these programmes (38).

Brauner, in a hostile criticism of the superficiality which he claims resulted from the literary, visionary and futuristic elements in the foundations approach, gave a more detailed account, emphasizing these points:

1. foundations were a reaction to extreme specialization;
2. they aspired to wholeness, and unity of concepts drawn from philosophy, history, social and behavioral sciences;
3. they incorporated the study of current social issues and problems;
4. they were part of the same movement which produced liberal arts courses in contemporary civilization at Columbia College and elsewhere;
5. they were a "literary combination of the scientific and the poetic";
6. they pictured the teacher as an "artist-statesman", not a technician (39).

We have seen how the reconstructionists in their analysis of change eliminated various other possible sources of planned change in favor of education. This was done by a method of pre-emption. Crisis in culture and change in culture were so defined as virtually to exclude or to minimize the significance of all forces and factors for constructive changes other than education. Acquiescence in the basic institutional forms given to education, through the public school system, led the reconstructionists to focus their attention almost entirely on the school, especially the public school. The process of education was so defined as to emphasize the role of the teacher as a designer of new types of

learning situations and a leader of wide-ranging study enterprises. Teachers as they exist in society are not able to rise to the challenge to lead in the renewal of culture, but this is not because the task is impossible, or because of irremediable faults and deficiencies in their own make-up. They suffer, as does the whole culture, from their own inadequate education. If the vicious circle which perpetuates crisis, confusion and disintegration is to be broken, then it shall be through the education and re-education of teachers into a new theoretical awareness. However, it was specifically teachers of teachers and not the whole profession of educationists whom Rugg singled out for the new creative role:

> "Ideally all the leaders of education, among them superintendents, principals, teachers, and the teachers of teachers, should take part in the task of building a theory of education. But conditions have developed that have barred all but the teachers of teachers from sufficient study of the foundations of education to make that possible" (40).

My remarks in the preceding paragraph are a simplified reduction of the terms of many separate arguments, which so far as I am aware no single reconstructionist made, but they seem reasonable, if unduly simple, inferences from the mass of ideas we have considered. Emphasis on teacher education as an ultimate source of change raises the further problem, which troubled Mannheim, as it has troubled generations of ideational reformers, of who educates the educator of teachers. This problem, we may suspect, points to a flaw in the whole argument, that a continuous regression back to some supposedly more fundamental point is indeed a continuous regression. Those reconstructionists who rejected the idea of a campaign to reintegrate culture exclusively through education were guided more by social than by logical considerations: the school is but one amongst many institutions; it has or can have

the power conferred by knowledge and ideas, but this is not the only form of power, and it is liable to be abridged or directed by other forms of social power (e.g., economic and political). The quest for an ultimate, single source of directed change leads us to absurdities. There is a multiplicity of forces and institutions at work in society, and culture emerges, only partly by deliberate effort, from the interactions of these forces and institutions. It is impossible for any one or set of institutions to take control of the process of designing culture. Indeed, the idea of overall design itself misses the significance of the non-deliberate, tacit, accidental aspects of culture. For example, designing produces unexpected as well as expected outcomes.

Some of the limitations as well as the potentialities of education as a culturally re-creative force were recognized by the reconstructionists. Yet some at least of their proposals for teacher education display their characteristic preference for an all-inclusive holism and for total change. Change is certainly needed in teacher education and the reconstructionists have indicated some of the major possibilities open to us in the organization of the theoretical disciplines of knowledge. Just as teaching in schools can no longer assume the validity of traditional knowledge and understanding, so, in a rapidly changing society, teacher education must become more than an initiation into a settled and established craft, or into predefined disciplines of knowledge.

3.2 Clarke: the scientific study of education

A modest outline of the role of the university in teacher education was given by Clarke in the 1920s. Clarke, like Dewey before him, and Bode afterwards, urged university departments of education to concentrate their energies on the scientific study of education, of which teachers' education should form part, but not the whole (41). This

scientific study should attempt to build an inclusive theory or a science of education, about whose structure Clarke was none too clear. We may assume that it was to be some kind of synthesis combining "historical determinants", the findings of scientific study of the educational process in demonstration schools, and Clarke's own theory comprising Platonic Idealism, Rousseau's views on moral effort, and Mannheim's sociological approach. In fairness to Clarke it must be added that he gave only a very sketchy outline of possibilities, and never, so far as I am aware, attempted a serious analysis of the nature and scope of educational theory. But it should also be remembered that Clarke, as a highly influential director of the London Institute, and chairman of the Central Advisory Council on Education, had a world-wide influence on educational thinking. His inchoate thoughts on synthesis might well have contributed to the extremely loose and confused combinations of subject matter which in many colleges have been offered to teachers as educational theory. Following the criticisms of Peters and others, in many institutions these eclectic combinations of educational study have been replaced by a formal division of subject matter which appears to have been determined more by an academic reaction to loose thinking and to a faulty synthesis than by a fresh analysis of the structure of educational theory.

Both in Clarke's concept of educational study,and those more recently proposed, the reference to a science of education is a reminder that a new subject matter for study was to be continuously created. Emphasis perceptibly shifted from the results to the methods of inquiry. Childs summed this up by grounding expert authority not in status, or tradition, or esoteric knowledge, but in method:

"The authority of the expert is an authority that rests,

> in the last analysis, on the empirical and public character of the methods by which he works and produces his results" (42).

3.3 Proposed framework for teacher education

Teachers were to be prepared for their new role by experiencing and practising the method of reflective inquiry. But this was only one part of a very comprehensive, if never clearly articulated, programme. I can do no more than piece together elements from various sources, which do not yield a complete programme of teacher education, but indicate its major foci of attention. The major fields and themes of study proposed were as follows:

1. the methods and procedures of science as encapsulated in "reflective inquiry", or "practical judgment";
2. behavioral sciences;
3. culture sciences, including history and surveys of "social issues";
4. the arts;
5. individual - or grouped - subject specialization;
6. the structure of the school curriculum;
7. teaching methods;
8. a "philosophy of living" (43).

However, it is not so much the fields of study that distinguish reconstructionist thinking on teacher education as the two features of wholeness or inclusiveness, and unity or integration. Kilpatrick criticized the typical programme of secondary teacher preparation, based on student specialization within a research-orientated subject department (44). We might perhaps expect this specialization to meet with approval, in the light of the experimentalist preoccupation with methods of inquiry, but Kilpatrick in fact denounced it on the grounds that it produces young teachers whose chief teaching interest is to

organize their work in high schools as a pale imitation of the research department in the university. This, he concluded, was inadequate for the majority since only a tiny proportion would ever become research specialists. Lest it be replied that other benefits than research-mindedness might accrue from this kind of teaching, Kilpatrick argued for a programme of teacher education which did not depend on incidental outcomes and advantages accruing from specialization but focussed directly on the principal objectives of secondary education. These, he said, are the formation of "character" and "personality", or, more generally, as we saw in Chapter XI, the cultivation of the "good life". The tendency of this line of argument is away from a precise study of a clearly defined subject field towards an indefinite and, indeed, limitless "whole" of knowledge and understanding. Since the whole in practice would need to be severely limited, and since Kilpatrick, in 1950, was advocating a form of life-adjustment education, it is evident that the particular form teacher education would take is very much limited by the expectations and aspirations of the American culture of that time. Kilpatrick made it clear that it was a "world outlook" which he wished to promote, but this can very easily become the "world outlook" of a given society at a particular point in history. In rejecting what he called the Alexandrian concept of subject specialization, and substituting an ill-defined study of "character formation", Kilpatrick begged the question of the relation of character to scholarship. Yet scholarship is a sphere of activity which transcends parochial considerations, and challenges basic assumptions. What appears, then, as an attempt to develop a broader outlook, by breaking with a narrow specialization, might well become, in practice, intellectually stultifying and emotionally narrowing.

Another expression of the reconstructionist determination to develop

"wholes" in place of traditional specializations in teacher education is the advocacy by Rugg and Brameld of the inclusion of culture sciences in teacher education programmes. Brameld has argued for the pursuit of standards in teacher education as high as those in medicine and for a radical lengthening of the teacher education programme to nine years (including two years normally taken in high school) (45). Students would commence a general education programme in a four-year, non-specialist college, at the age of sixteen. The programme would be based on interdisciplinary themes within and between: science, the arts, social sciences, religion, politics, and education. From the anthropological concept of order Brameld derived various patterns, themes, and configurations for inter-relating this material. The point was to see them as patterned elements in culture conceived as an organic whole and not, as in the past, distinct academic specializations. However, in view of the requirement for specialized knowledge in secondary teaching, this thematic study was to be accompanied by single discipline study. Brameld's approach in certain respects is reminiscent of Hutchins' proposal for the "great books programme" of tertiary education, which combined themes with disciplines, although neither would care to acknowledge a debt (46).

In the second four years of Brameld's programme, future teachers were to undertake four kinds of study:

cultural and behavioral sciences;

specialized study in a teaching subject;

practice and work experience (not only in schools);

integrated philosophy of education.

After a one or two year internship, they would commence teaching at about the age of twenty-five. Clearly, this proposal is directed at the teacher

education institutions of a very wealthy society which already has a substantial base in secondary and tertiary education upon which to build expensive experimental programmes. However, Brameld's apparently extravagant scheme embodies several ideas worthy of consideration in less affluent societies: for example, the combining of specialist, discipline-based study with the attempt to establish a synoptic overview of culture through the use of the conceptual tools of culture science. Although these tools are still in a condition of relative infancy, the exploratory use of them in avowedly experimental situations could help to introduce a purpose and coherence which is frequently lacking in the multiplicity of short courses introducing students to this or that aspect of education and society. A second point worthy of much more consideration than it has received is Brameld's reference to integrated philosophy of education. This typical invocation of the value of synthesis is a reminder that the legitimate and important academic task of carefully circumscribed theoretical analysis is not sufficient for the development of firm teaching objectives and clear outlooks. The explanation for this lies more in what such analysis excludes than in what it includes. As I pointed out in the Introduction, the usefulness of the concept of ideology is that it directs attention to intellectual structures which combine the ingredients necessary for action, including value preferences and implementation models. Brameld's "integrated philosophy of education" is a similar enterprise to ideological thinking - and it displays some of the weaknesses as well as the strengths of ideology.

Rugg, too, prepared comprehensive and detailed schemes of study, which direct the student toward the history of civilization, rather in the manner of Wells' histories. However, history is only part of the

quest for a totality of cultural studies. These are also to embrace key concepts from the social sciences, major issues and problems in contemporary culture, and theories of social change, especially Rugg's own formulation, which draws upon several of the well known theories (47). Rugg referred to his own social science textbook series for schools, to indicate the range and scope of studies expected of the future teachers. In discussing these texts in Chapter XI, I said that in treatment and presentation they are synoptic and descriptive. This is perhaps an inevitable outcome of an eclectic, survey approach, and it results in materials whose level of analysis, explanation and interpretation falls below that appropriate for any teacher, let alone the future leaders of culture. Of course, Rugg did not mean that all of these books would be used in college, although some of the later ones in the series were prepared with this in mind. Also, in his own adult surveys of the development of technology and other branches of civilization in America, he adopted a more critical approach than in the textbook series. But it was still an approach which essentially involved the assembly and organization of information, interpreted by the grand overview method which Wells and Brameld also practised. Apart from the risk of superficiality in these kinds of surveys, they have the disadvantage of imposing interpretative frameworks upon students instead of encouraging them to make their own estimations of data and their significance. These outcomes of the survey approach are not inevitable, but they are to be expected, except in the very rare instances when a powerful scholar creates a mature work of synthesis, interpretation and wide-ranging reflection. It is unreasonable to suppose that, when there is an acute scarcity of synthesizing intellectuals in society, teacher education institutions will be staffed by such scholars or by those

able to handle their works with the subtlety and critical acumen needed to keep them alive. Rugg's own writings, despite their superficiality, are impressive feats of synthesis and organization, and they display an alert, imaginative mind. It is very much to be doubted whether these qualities would be promoted by the widespread adoption of courses mapping out and integrating some hypothetical totality of culture.

To overcome the vague drift in teacher education towards the total study of man and culture, various attempts have been made to define some integrating themes. I have already mentioned Rugg's interest in key concepts. These might at first glance seem promising, but when as part of the recent movement to reform the content of education scholars have been asked to identify the key concepts of their disciplines, they have sometimes produced very long lists, like the lists of life tasks around which Bobbitt and others proposed to build the school curriculum in the 1920s. Alternatively, the scholars have not agreed, and have produced different sets of key concepts, or different organizations of them: hence the three different American biology curricula of the 1960s. Such disagreement is not necessarily a disadvantage in curriculum thinking, but it does give rise to questions about the meaning of "key" concepts, and the possibility of other, more inclusive, sets of concepts lurking in the background. A third response to the key concepts proposal is that some scholars have argued that the notions of key concepts and structures of concepts is barely relevant for their subjects. These responses all refer to the structuring of separate subjects, but Rugg's proposal was for nothing as simple as this. He wished to build a structure of key concepts embracing the cultural and the social sciences and, lacking any scholarly

models, he had to devise his own. Rugg had both the self assurance and the eclectic range of interests and understandings upon which an enterprise of that kind depends, but to expect teacher educators to build up and modify their own sets of key concepts is to invite cynicism and superficiality. By contrast, separate subject teaching in colleges of education has the great advantage that accrues to accretive activities. By this I mean that changes in subjects, although at times cataclysmic and profoundly re-orientating, are, for long periods in between these upheavals, steady and accumulative. They do not require a complete re-orientation in perspective and understanding but rather a continuous process of adjustment and modification of outlook. This, however, is not at all the case with proposals for synthetic overviews, such as Rugg's. It is characteristic of these that every new one demands a fresh appraisal of the totality of all that it embraces. Each has to be learned and applied afresh, a task which, in a period of rapid system expansion, is appropriate and perhaps possible for academics, but quite unrealistic in what has become the normal atmosphere of teacher education institutions.

Another approach to the problem of promoting some coherence and structure for the very comprehensive sets of cultural studies proposed by the later experimentalists is Phenix's idea of "integrative studies" (48). Phenix argued very much as Mannheim, Rugg and Brameld did that contemporary culture is out of balance by virtue of an excess of differentiation, multiplicity and plurality over unity. Like Frank, and other of the later experimentalists, he thought that the school could best undertake the task of "insuring the needed integration". But, for the school to do this work well, its teachers had to be more adequately prepared than at present. He proposed three kinds of studies:

1. studies in the major skills and fields of knowledge

(every skill area and field in some measure, and "some field or fields in depth");

2. professional studies, comprising the "essential areas" of psychological foundations of education, social sciences of education, history of education, special curricular studies, some special professional discipline (e.g., guidance) and supervised teaching;

3. integrative studies.

It was to the latter that Phenix looked for the cultivation of unity, namely, "more or less comprehensive and coherent schemes of life and thought". Phenix listed six "fundamental integrative studies important for all professional educators and relevant to all special fields of learning":

a. human nature - a synoptic study of ideas from relevant disciplines;

b. teaching students to think - as in logic and scientific method;

c. creativity - sample studies;

d. values - e.g., "a synoptic study of the substantial values in American civilization and how they might be taught";

e. realms of knowledge - comparing and contrasting methods, fundamental concepts, and root metaphors;

f. general curriculum - i.e., the philosophy of general education.

There are many similarities between this scheme and those of Rugg and Brameld. As in the others we have considered, it is noteworthy that Phenix's proposal assumes there is nothing in existing thought or scholarship which quite provides the framework and the tools it is urged that teachers need. Thus teacher education cannot take the form of an initiation into established ways of knowing. The creative task set for teacher education follows from the reconstructionist determination to treat education as a mode of experience or a sub-cultural system

whose practitioners themselves set out to redefine the structures of knowledge, the values of the culture and the scope of action. These tasks could not be achieved unless those guiding the enterprise, the teachers of teachers, were actively engaged in the process of cultural redefinition. Brauner, in his hostile assessment of the "foundations of education" approach to educational study, described the ambition to create an "artist-statesman":

> "Picturing the teacher as an artist-statesman, the foundations program had to concentrate on cultivating temperament on top of technical skill. Technical competence had to be capped with the feelings, beliefs, attitudes, and emotional commitment which enabled specialized ability to rise above itself and to reach for a new integration of understanding and performance that is more than the sum total of what has come before - that is, creative" (49).

Brauner did not refer to Phenix, but it is this striving to reach for a new integration of understanding which lies behind Phenix's proposal to treat the education of teachers as the key to cultural unity. It is highly significant that it is a new elite or clerisy of education professors who thereby become the prophets of a new culture.

It is not only the reconstructionist, however, who treats education as a creative and recreative process. All those who hope for some amelioration of the social consequences of ignorance, stupidity, superstition, prejudice, and ineptness, through the work of the school, have these expectations or hopes, muted though they may be. Nor are the reconstructionists alone in looking upon the teacher as a custodian or an authority on culture, in the value-laden sense. This has always been the outlook of educators in the classical tradition. It has been reaffirmed by Peters, in a manner that reminds us of the strong religious associations of this whole way of thinking:

> "In a pluralistic society, when there is no unified

ideal that can be handed on by the priests, who else is there to stand between the generations and to initiate others into the various aspects of a culture within which the individual has eventually to determine where he stands? If the teachers are not thought of as, to varying degrees, authorities on this culture how effective are they likely to be in a society in which most of the pressures on young people are not in the direction of education?" (50).

To treat the teacher as both a guardian of culture and a creative factor in society raises questions about the adequacy of those teacher education programmes which never give thought to the possibilities these ideas suggest. I have argued that the more ambitious reconstructionist ideas on the content of teacher education, even as sketches, are in many respects unsatisfactory. Yet they represent in educational thinking an awareness of the serious inadequacy of fragmented, inward-looking teacher education programmes and a recognition of possibilities which should be seriously explored and tested in experimental institutions, of which, in teacher education, we have very few. Rugg and Brameld themselves insisted that their own ideas are only first hints and outlines of the more detailed and systematic work that is needed,by future generations of teacher educators. Thus, criticism should be tempered by the recognition that some at any rate of the reconstructionists appreciated the profound challenge to teacher education arising from their conceptions of the possible relationships of education to culture.

CHAPTER XV

OVERVIEW AND CRITIQUE OF PART TWO

The essential feature of reconstructionism is the treatment of human thought, dispositions, attitudes and behavior as the focus of efforts by change agents to influence the directions of cultural development. As educational theorists, reconstructionists have attempted to invest with distinctive qualities these efforts to influence thought and modify behavior. Thus they have, by and large, adopted criteria of rationality and the well-being of the person, rather than those of propaganda, manipulation, indoctrination, instrumental efficiency, and so forth; and they have looked to schools and similar institutions to provide educational and cultural leadership.

The basic objectives of reconstructionism conceived as an educational theory of cultural renewal is to create, in and through educational enterprises, what Clarke called the "educative society". In reviewing this theory, we might profitably ask questions of three kinds: first, about the concept of education held by the reconstructionists; second, about their contribution to the understanding of practical educational processes and institutions; and, third, about their awareness of the difficulties confronting utopian reformers. I shall summarize and assess the reconstructionist contributions to educational thinking under these three broad headings:

1. Education: Concepts and Objectives

1.1 Tensions between rationality and functional adaptation

Despite lapses into language appropriate to the educationally indiscriminate processes of socialization and enculturation, the reconstructionist

generally held to what I called value laden concepts of education. To be educated, according to their definitions, is to become a different kind of person - a new intellectual and moral being. But no sudden change, as in some religious conversions, was anticipated; rather, in Dewey's terms, educative growth is continuous and steady, not saltatory and dramatic. In defining educative growth, Dewey invoked the criteria not only of continuity but also of communication, of reflectiveness and rationality. The moral quality of education as a form of the good life was brought out by Kilpatrick but, while his account of amiable, well adjusted, socially-minded hedonists is easier to apprehend than Dewey's less concrete list of criteria of growth, it has the disadvantage of tending to subserve educational processes to whatever happen to be the dominant social and political interests of the day.

Such a possibility is inherent in the experimentalist assertions that the basic purposes and functions of education will vary in different societies. They all maintained this cultural relativism, even Dewey, despite the difficulties it presents for a general, formal definition of education. Some aspects of education will, and should, vary, but to make the definition of education rest entirely on specific social conditions, as in places Dewey says it should, raises at least two problems. First, the problem of understanding how a more general definition and theory of education (such as Dewey's own) could be used to assess practice in a wide variety of cultural situations. There must be some common, and even universal, features in a theory that can provide a frame of reference for the analysis of education in many different societies and at different periods of time. Second, if the social context determines the aims and methods of education, it becomes only too easy for the dominant interests in any given society to exploit educational

processes for their own advantage. The tendency in experimentalist thought to treat education as relative to specific cultural contexts is valuable insofar as it reminds us that education performs social functions which need to be frequently assessed and redefined. But we need to be on guard lest the recognition of a function and the definition of a context merge into acquiescence in whatever social assumptions and purposes are uppermost at any given time. There is, thus, an unresolved tension in the reconstructionist concept of education, between the critical, rational and universal qualities of growth on the one hand, and, on the other, the social relativity and functionalism of the aims of education, and the adaptive processes which those aims prescribe.

In previous chapters, I have argued that reconstructionist ideas about the relationship of education to other social processes may be divided into two main groups. In the first of these groups, education may readily be shown to have a definite social function because the major objectives which are set for educational institutions are provided by other social systems, for example, by the polity or the economy. Ideas of this type are welcome to functional rationalists - e.g., social planners - and all those who, more or less in the Aristotelian tradition, look upon schools primarily as institutions designed to achieve or to move towards pre-arranged and unfolding social ends. This view of the social function of education has the advantage of being easily understood and of conferring upon the school a set of very definite and valuable social roles, as an instrument of national policy (1). But, since it begs the question of the function of education as a socially and individually recreating process - fundamentally as a form of criticism - these ideas are of limited value, and, as I have indicated, they may give rise to certain dangers.

The second set of ideas concerning the relationship of education to other social processes brings us to the principal contribution of reconstructionist thought to education. In this second position, education is regarded as a way of life, or a set of qualitative criteria, setting a standard and pointing directions for social and cultural development. Thus, the concept of the cultural context is of central, but not of over-riding, importance. The cultural context conditions and qualifies purposes; it does not completely determine them. Education is said to have its own aims, to set standards and ideals for the growth of individuals and of society, and educationists seek aid and support from society at large in their endeavor to realize these aims in practical situations. This is how I interpret the main tendency of Dewey's theory of educative growth, although, as I have indicated, Dewey vacillated between this conception of education and the one I outlined in the preceding paragraph. When stressing the creative role of education in the formation of personality, the reconstructionists have shown that the conventional treatment of education as essentially a process of transmitting pre-determined ideas and values, and thereby inducting children into the cultural and social systems, is quite misleading. Given the extensive and profound changes in culture whose diagnosis, as I tried to show in Part One, comprised the major objective of reconstructionist strategy, very serious problems arise for the "selection and transmission" school of thought. If culture is in a condition of flux, signified by the breakdown of tacit agreement on basic norms, the disruption of customary ways of living, new paradigms and metaphors and accelerating change in the key sectors of thought and practice, then what is to be transmitted, and the appropriate modes of transmission themselves become problematic. Those who have the task

of selecting patterns of culture to transmit have to make qualitative judgments about what in culture is worthwhile, and what is needed in future living to compensate for present inadequacies. These are educational decisions taken in specific cultural situations, but they are fundamentally assessments of, or commentaries upon, the prevailing condition of culture and the institutions of society.

Qualitative judgments concerning a broad and vague concept such as culture must always be partial and limited. The reconstructionists have consistently emphasized the value of rationality in human affairs, but they have given too little attention to the conditions in personal and social life which support or inhibit rationality. For example, the persistence of prejudice and violence in human affairs reminds us of the power of irrational beliefs and of the impact of the impulses, and of the unconscious, on experience and behavior. A concept of education which defines the conditions of rationality needs to go beyond an analysis of rational thought to the personal-social context of fantasy, feelings, the will, and institutional constraints and opportunities. Furthermore, it is arguable that the attempt to reduce to rationality the totality of worthwhile elements in experience runs the risk of neglecting less clearly definable values, such as fellowship, imaginative associations of ideas, sympathy, compassion, playfulness, group identity, and so forth. The reconstructionists acknowledged other values than rationality, but tended to reduce them to a single common mode of experience, instead of making a radical appraisal of the qualify of diverse experience in contemporary society. This more radical appraisal is needed in any further development of the theory (2).

1.2 <u>Choosing worthwhile elements in culture</u>

Problems of selection and judgment in relationship to cultural ends

and means have of course always existed. Reconstructionists have shared with classical theorists a determination to select for encouragement and development those particular ways of life which they apprehend to be worthwhile and significant and these, as we have seen, they built into a model of democratic-rational action. One important contribution of the reconstructionists was to emphasize the urgency, seriousness and novelty of the situations in which choice has to be made - e.g., in the determining of curriculum content. They sought for new criteria to guide selection in a period when total breakdown of western culture appeared - even if in fact it were not - imminent. But various difficulties arose in their efforts to indicate the form which these choices should take. Dewey's process criteria for growth in and through reflectiveness and inquiry appeared to many to lack a definite character, to be too indirect and long term in their effect on society and to leave too much to the chance circumstance that highly motivated and capable teachers, well supported by their communities, would have the necessary insights and skills of judgment and the opportunities to perform the difficult roles of culture critics and interpreters. Seeking to lend a more definite appearance to these criteria, and to give teachers clearer guidance on practice than Dewey ever did, other reconstructionists (notably Rugg, Counts, Childs, Brameld, and, to a lesser extent, Mannheim) encouraged teachers to adapt a militant social stance and to advocate by the various means at their disposal the doctrines of democracy. In this way, they hoped the school would act more directly as a vanguard of social change. I argued that these doctrines, upon inspection, proved to be very much vaguer than their advocates supposed. Nevertheless, in combination they suggest a programme of social action: large-scale social planning, greatly increased

governmental intervention to produce an "economy of abundance", the equalizing of opportunity, substantially increased educational provision, and the development of a common culture dominated by rational thinking. Teachers were encouraged to find ways of embodying these and other doctrines in their teaching. The reconstructionists successfully created an atmosphere, or a climate of opinion, of a broadly democratic character, but were less successful in producing more definite action programmes (for example, curriculum proposals) except in the social studies. These programmes in the social studies were intended to convey to children an awareness of the contemporary social and cultural world, and to persuade them to accept a firm commitment to democratic and rational values. The particular cultural designs offered by the reconstructionists in many ways lent themselves to being promulgated through indoctrination, but, on the whole, because they all included critical thinking in their list of desirable qualities for teachers to encourage, the reconstructionists, even Counts and Mannheim, could be considered as indoctrinators only in a very weak and trivial sense of that term.

However, I pointed to other difficulties which arise in the effort to depict the school as a primary agent of cultural renewal. Apart from objections such as the limitations of teachers, and the force of other social institutions not seeking cultural renewal, the reconstructionists were faced with the dilemma of espousing both a common, shared culture which reflects majority interests and aspirations, and elite leadership. It is clear that reconstructionism, in all of the forms I have considered, sets educational tasks which require dedicated and highly skilled leaders. The leaders constitute a corps of change agents who perceive their role as members of a culturally transforming elite with a mission to reform society along broadly democratic lines.

Whether, as with the Webbs and Mannheim, and the authors of the Kothari Report, this elite acts within the framework of a socio-political plan which educationists have not themselves devised, or whether, as with Rugg and Brameld, it is the educators who claim ultimate authority for determining the directions of social policy, self-conscious elite enterprise forms a necessary, if not always acknowledged, condition of successful change in the reconstructionist theories I have examined. But, since reconstructionism also incorporates the values and ideals of classless democracy, its exponents have had to relate their ideas on creative leadership to considerations which express the aspirations of mass culture, and they have had to avoid sharply separating mass & elite sub-cultures.

1.3 Tensions in reconstructionist thinking and the quest for order

Efforts to reconcile what may be briefly stated as the principles of leadership and of participation produced a variety of educational proposals, none of which seems to me wholly successful. Perhaps reconstructionist ideas on this subject can be most usefully conceived as sets of tensions, which need not be resolved, but which it would be foolish of educationists to ignore or, as so often happens, to polarize into two sets of mutually exclusive principles. These tensions may be defined as:

1. Leaders defining targets and processes of change; and masses affirming the right to disagree, to pose alternatives and even to oppose change.

2. Leadership from cultural centres; and also from the cultural periphery.

3. The provision of common and approximately equal educational experiences, in the form of subject-matter, class groupings and common institutions (e.g., the comprehensive school); and special and privileged provision for

particular talents, including intellectual talents, and for deficiency in children (e.g., severe emotional difficulties and materially impoverished environments).

4. Qualitative distinctions which represent as worthwhile those activities within the symbolic system which are effectively available only to minorities; and recognition that mass culture expresses values and aspirations which, while qualitatively different, are not necessarily inferior to what minority definitions establish as worthwhile.

5. Assimilation of a common core of values and expectations (ideological commitment); and the maintenance of cultural alternatives, disunities and of the right of fundamental disagreement.

6. Rationality and uniformity of policy in the public domain; and private experiences which are much more idiosyncratic, diverse and emotional.

Reconstructionism has not succeeded in reconciling these and similar tensions. But the intention to do so - through the synthetic, unified schemes of Rugg and Brameld, or even through the Raup-Stanley normative core - may itself be a mistaken one. I argued that pervading the whole of reconstructionist thinking is a more or less conscious quest for cultural order and integration. It is not difficult to understand this quest in view of the heightened awareness the reconstructionists themselves brought to processes of cultural change, especially the breakdown of traditional social and intellectual communities. Further, as an ideological theory of a highly moralistic kind, reconstructionism echoes older religious themes, especially those expressing a sense of spiritual disunity and deprivation. The notion of a unitary principle of order is in reconstructionist thought a secular version of traditional concepts of God. I gave examples to support this interpretation from Wells, Mannheim and Brameld, in particular - all of whom drew upon the language and mythology of religion in trying to express their deepest feelings

about culture disunity. Their versions of reconstructionism express some of the aspirations of traditional theology - Thomistic theology, perhaps, or at least those forms of pre-twentieth century theology which attempt to organize all thought and experience within a single system of thought and action, all of whose parts inter-relate. To achieve both totality and consistency is a theoretical ideal whose realization is constantly defied by the complexity and extensiveness of the data, the variability of human action, and the genuine novelty of fresh thought and new experience. Dewey understood this, but his utter openness to new experience and his radical affirmation that all the order we need would be provided by universalizing the method of reflection were in practice less congenial to his followers than is apparent from their repetitive use of his leading ideas. They repeated his ideas but they also tried to produce more specific culture patterns and models of behavior than Dewey's ideas predicate. Rugg, Brameld and Stanley pleaded for a new cultural synthesis - a modified set of social-moral procedures. Bode insisted that more definite statements of educational ends and purposes were needed, Counts committed the schools to a democratic ideology, and Kilpatrick urged reforms leading to the "good life". These later formulations of the more radical experimentalist doctrine of the unity yielded by the adoption of a single method of inquiry express a characteristic reconstructionist unease over the likely outcome of the trends towards disintegration in contemporary culture. To avert these trends, more was needed, they felt, than the essentially sceptical and critical intelligence which would be developed through the procedures of reflective inquiry. More definite sets of ideas on social and cultural organization should be presented for discussion by educational institutions and pupils should

be encouraged to develop a central, unifying core of socio-moral principles. Thus, unity of culture and unity of experience, however vaguely expressed in the writings of later reconstructionists, were conceived as goals which it was proper for education to pursue, not only through the use of a common method but also through the propagation of specific principles of action and a general democratic framework of interpretation.

The pursuit of order may be regarded as expressing no more than the theorist's determination to comprehend and unify the phenomena with which he is dealing. For the reconstructionists, however, it was always more than this; they were action theorists, more interested in guiding conduct than in explaining social movement. In Mannheim, and perhaps also in the later experimentalists, the search for a total unified system of social thought and action runs the risk of assimilating diversity and novelty and imposing orthodoxy. The tensions I referred to earlier may be reconciled in social action by arranging the positions they express in a hierarchy of policy objectives and by excluding some of them altogether. The conversion of ideology into political orthodoxy is usually accompanied by attempts to construct such hierarchies.

To maintain freedom of thought and to encourage experimentation in the social sphere it may be better to forego the advantages of consensus and united action beyond that minimum agreement necessary for the co-existence of diverse institutions. Total co-ordination of effort seems to imply a clear hierarchy of decision-taking, the exact delineation of roles, and high concentration of power in central bureaux. For education, as for other elements in the social system, we should consider, as an alternative to the more extreme versions of the "quest

for order", a dispersal of authority, involving a looser definition of roles and, most important, the diffusion of responsibility and decision-taking as widely as possible throughout whatever system we have in mind - whether the national policy system, the local authority, the school, or the class. This approach, inefficient and slow as it may appear, from the educational standpoint has the great merits of facilitating treatment of members of systems as ends in themselves and of seeking roles and responsibilities which are educative for individuals.

2. Educational Processes and Institutions, and the Teacher's Role

I shall review under this heading reconstructionist contributions to curriculum theory, to the understanding of the school as an educational institution, and to the distinctive role of the teacher as a culture change agent. I shall not attempt to summarize the subject matter of Chapters XI to XIV, but shall emphasize what I take to be the major issues.

2.1 Curriculum

Curriculum thinking has changed rapidly in the past ten years, as a consequence, first, of the great expansion and modification of the structures of public education, in response to social, political and economic pressures; second, of the relatively large investment of private and public funds in specific projects to redesign studies in different areas of the curriculum; and, third, of the attention given to curriculum theory by writers like Broudy, Bruner, Herrick, Phenix, Smith, Tyler and others (3). These sets of contributions have advanced our understanding of curriculum issues to such a degree that the work of the reconstructionists has been superseded in several respects.

However, the more recent developments themselves incorporate many of the ideas advanced by the reconstructionists. I shall review these ideas in relation to the following topics:

curriculum design as a foreshadowing of the new order;

curriculum requirements of universal, public education;

problem solving, occupations and projects;

scientific culture;

practical judgment, and a core of agreed moral values;

tasks of curriculum designing.

2.1.1 Curriculum design foreshadows a new cultural order

Those reconstructionists who have conceived education as an agency of renewal in the most ambitious terms are also those who have discussed the curriculum as if the design of school experiences could somehow intimate or foreshadow patterns of future cultural experience. These writers are Wells, Rugg and Brameld. They attempted to organize the subject matter and experiences of the curriculum into a programme of integrated studies, in place of the familiar groupings of separately taught subjects and activities. The curriculum was intended by these writers to serve as an introduction to, or even as a kind of model of, the unity of life in the new age. Whereas most educationists are satisfied if children can themselves progressively inter-relate those parts of their studies which have things in common, most of the reconstructionists wanted to introduce a structure or a grid into which teachers could incorporate descriptions of their teaching tasks and of the subjects of study with a view to co-ordinating or integrating them. This intention requires the adoption of rational design models, including clearly defined objectives and detailed learning structures (4). These are difficult processes to visualize and only after considerable experience

of curriculum planning, team teaching, the "integrated day", combined courses in, for example, humanities and so forth, will it be possible for us to gain a clear understanding of what is common or similar in the various enterprises thus brought together, and of how they may be integrated into core programmes. The vagueness and tentativeness of reconstructionist proposals on this topic are partly a consequence of the relative lack of experience of the integrated approach in schools. This deficiency partly at least accounts for the over-generalized and highly speculative character of their arguments in favor of "unity" and "synthesis" in the curriculum.

Two major difficulties which the reconstructionists failed to resolve in discussing the curriculum are, first, the tendency of supporters of integration to exclude or minimize the value of whatever does not readily fit the grid; and, second, the obscurity of the claim that a curriculum design can be a model of future culture experience. I maintained in discussing the aspiration for a unitary culture that this can be achieved only by excluding highly valuable elements of diversity and novelty, and that, accordingly, a cultural model comprising tensions is preferable to one which achieves a totalitarian, or even a substantial, unity. This argument is also relevant to the claims advanced on behalf of total, unified curriculum design, granting that these claims were usually qualified or moderated by reference to items that were accepted as worthwhile even though not incorporated into the grid. For these reasons, it would be preferable to embark on simpler outlines of the "total" curriculum, building these in part on statements of desired learning outcomes prepared and agreed by participating teachers (and pupils), and seeking specific ways of relating one area - science, for example - to another - for example, language -

within the experience of the learners. There may be very few opportunities for joint teaching available in given situations, but those that suggest themselves to the participants are more meaningful than a general directive to produce a total "synthesis", which of necessity would ignore relevant aspects of pupil and teacher experience. For example, there are many opportunities in the secondary school for language teachers to participate in and draw upon the work of other teachers when preparing ideas for written work (5). Similarly, history is always the history of something, and it frequently touches upon other curricular subjects - for example, science and religion. Attempts to develop teams of teachers who contribute from their specialist standpoint to a single set of themes might demonstrate the bearing of specialized knowledge upon issues of pressing, common concern. In the primary school, the search for mathematical properties and relations in the familiar and undifferentiated environment of the child's experience may furnish opportunities for demonstrating the universal character of mathematical analysis, but this need not lead to the total absorption of particular activities into a single master-plan grounded in a hypothetical totality of experience (6).

Despite these objections, it must be conceded that the reconstructionists who sought to replace conventional teaching of the subjects by schemes which pointed to relationships amongst them performed a valuable service. This they did not so much by their own frequently unworkable schemes as by arguing that the content of school education should be constantly under surveillance and criticized from definite standpoints (7). They correctly argued that, if the school is to perform a creative role in society, it must look to the design of the curriculum, its central intentional activity, as the source of ideas and suggestions for future

living. It is in this sense that the curriculum may properly be said to foreshadow the future cultural order.

While we may propose a general relationship between the intentional activities which comprise the curriculum and future social living, we cannot in any precise way forecast relationships between what schools do now and how life is or may be ordered in the future. "Life" and "culture" are highly generalized, but the school is a single, particularized institution. Intentional curriculum activities are a major part of the life of the school, but by no means the only part; for some educationists they are, in any case, subsidiary to less calculable transactions between children and adults, in the form of warm and spontaneous personal relationships and so-called "encounter" teaching, which is unpremeditated and intuitive. Furthermore, apart from teacher-child relationships, planned or unplanned, other influences, especially that of the peer group culture, bear upon children while in school. Influences other than the school also bear upon them, and these are influences which educationists frequently underestimate, especially when they are not in harmony with those exerted by the school (8). Except in a society where custodial control of children is complete, as in Plutarch's semi-mythical account of Sparta, there is no possibility of the curriculum serving as an actual model of future living, and even in this hypothetical society one would need to assume completely static conditions, if factors subsequent to school experience were not to intervene and upset the predicated curriculum-life relationship. Plainly, the reconstructionists had no such hypothetical society in mind, and what they appear to have meant by the claim that the curriculum might serve as a model of the future is that educationists should so design the curriculum that they do their utmost to make it an effective,

worthwhile and highly influential set of experiences in a child's life. This reformulation of the more sweeping reconstructionist aspirations draws attention to a serious problem - that for many children it is still true that parts of school experience are scarcely meaningful or even intelligible. If education is to exercise any powerful influence on social development, then the reconstructionists were right to claim that the curriculum is of central importance as a lever of change. The curriculum must be considered as a whole; it should be so designed as to engage and develop children's experiences of contemporary life, of each other and of their teachers; and it must be treated as one of the major control systems in any system of planned change. But it does not follow that education should be conceived simply in terms of the planning of experience. On the contrary, careful curriculum planning, by helping to reduce the incidence of impoverished and ineffective teaching, provides teachers with better opportunities than hitherto for the exploration of the many different situations and patterns of relationship within which educative growth might occur.

2.1.2 Curriculum for universal public schooling

Realization that through universal, public education a whole nation's children may be influenced has led those reconstructionists in societies where the common school is a reality to propose measures for reaching and influencing whole populations. Of these measures the most notable is the common core curriculum. The existence of a common school system makes it possible to conceive of a common programme of studies, or at least of common elements in diverse programmes of schooling, but it does not of itself explain the appearance of these common programmes. Two major aspirations lay behind the thinking of those reconstructionists,

namely the American experimentalists and Mannheim, who advocated a common core. The first of these was the intention to use schools to sustain and develop a socially-binding democratic heritage in which consciousness of membership of a common culture, basic agreement on policy objectives, and the sharing of experience feature prominently. The second aspiration of the core theorists was to seek ways to stabilize and direct change in society which, if left undirected, threatened to destroy the traditional fundamental unities of values, beliefs and behavior. Thus the universal, public school was assigned the task of stabilizing change by forming an integrated, democratic character in the youth. The curriculum was to be the principal means to this end, and it was to serve a symbolic function, as exemplar of the new democratic order. Hence the distinctively moralistic tone of reconstructionist curriculum theorizing, the emphasis on a set of basic values, the prominence given to historical and social subject matter, and the recommendations concerning pupil participation and activity.

In American thought, the public school was very largely taken for granted. Despite its weaknesses, the public school system satisfied certain basic democratic requirements. In principle, it was open to all, free of charge, non-discriminating, and no special advantages were conferred by opting out, into the tiny independent system. Of course, in practice, these democratic considerations were sharply limited - for example, by the wide economic disparities between neighborhoods and regions. These and other failures in practice were heartily condemned by Dewey, Counts, Childs, Kilpatrick and other of the experimentalists, and by the Webbs, Mannheim and Clarke in England. Nevertheless, the Americans were fundamentally satisfied that the basis of an adequate structure of universal education existed - there was no

need to create it. By contrast, reconstructionist thinking in England has been circumscribed by the existence of a powerful and quite substantial system of independent schools and by deeply rooted status distinctions among the various sectors of the maintained system. In the light of these considerations, it would have made no sense to proclaim a universal, common school as the necessary vehicle of reform. However, none of the English reconstructionists took sufficiently seriously the problem of redesignihg a core curriculum for a society where, in both independent and grammar schools, which were sharply divided from higher elementary and secondary schools, the traditional practice of subject specialization in well-defended fields was very firmly established.

Mannheim made relevant suggestions for practical, workshop-based activities and for a heavy emphasis in the curriculum on social science and on issues arising from social change. However, these suggestions were, at the time, so far removed from the formal system of separate subject teaching, by traditional literary or laboratory means, that it is difficult to imagine that they could have any significant impact on that system. One unfortunate consequence of the deep divisions between academically orientated and other forms of education is that, in the secondary schools, proposals for radical curriculum reform, of the practical and social character recommended by the reconstructionists, have been accepted as appropriate for children of "average and lower than average" ability (9). Thus, the leaders to whom reconstructionists looked as future reformers have continued to receive a different education from the masses who attend different types of schools and undertake a different programme of studies. This programme of studies, furthermore, has traditionally looked to the culture expressed in the disciplines

of knowledge and to the social system of the professions, business management and the universities for inspiration and direction. Thus, English reconstructionist thinking in the past has been severely circumscribed by a structure of education that explicitly and implicitly repudiates the concepts of the common school and a common curriculum.

Two changes are transforming this situation: first, the post-war success of maintained primary schools, which are widely regarded as the leaders of innovation in education and are becoming increasingly acceptable as alternatives to preparatory schools, even for those children who subsequently move into the independent sector. The success of the maintained primary school means that there is now the possibility of a universal public school system acceptable to a very large proportion of the population. However, the emphasis in the ideology of primary education upon individualistic, child-centred concepts, to some extent militates against acceptance, or even serious consideration, of the kind of curriculum recommended by reconstructionists.

The second change which marks the emergence of a universal public school in England is the development of the comprehensive system in secondary education. The various reappraisals now being made in these schools of the traditional content of the secondary curriculum are creating a situation in which receptivity to reconstructionist thinking is a definite possibility. This suggests that future development of the reconstructionist theory in England could be very profitably related to the curriculum of the secondary and the middle schools where new structures require new programmes, and there are grounds for supposing that teachers are ready to consider the kinds of curriculum ideas

reconstructionists have typically advanced; a core of socially-related studies; identification for study purposes of critical issues and problems in contemporary society; broad areas of related subject-matter in place of exclusive emphasis on single disciplines; the use of workshop teaching, case studies, discussion groups; and the encouragement of socially reconstructive thinking within a broadly democratic framework of values and aspirations.

2.1.3 Problem-solving, occupations and projects

I contrasted the teaching and learning methods which Dewey and Kilpatrick recommended with the approach to education which they stigmatized as "formal" and "traditional". All of the reconstructionists were critical, in some measure, of existing practice and sought to undermine and to supplant it. Their objections ranged from the belief that most conventional teaching was ineffective even in relation to its own objectives, to the more sweeping condemnation of objectives which were devised with scant regard to the great social changes which the reconstructionists themselves diagnosed. Kilpatrick's project method was not simply a new way of teaching old materials, by making them more intelligible and interesting to children: it was intended to designate a new form of subject matter. This new content was derived from the curriculum that Dewey had introduced at the Laboratory School and its focus was the industrial life of man, in particular the evolution of industrial processes and the emergence of modern industrial-urban culture. Other subject matter was included, and it is possible to use project methods in many different subjects, but in Kilpatrick's hands the project was largely a method for social studies teaching. Similarly, Dewey's concept of problem-solving, and Mannheim's designation of a "romantic" approach to teaching, while

they were by no means restricted in principle to certain areas of the curriculum, nevertheless they lend themselves most readily to application in fields whose conceptual structures are looser and less well demarcated than the subjects of the traditional curriculum.

The exhortations to teachers to adopt the unfamiliar and reformist approaches of reflective thought, problem-solving, the study of industrial culture, projects and so forth, is perhaps comparable to the wider challenge the reconstructionists issued to society at large and it is open to similar objections. These newer approaches were not merely different from the older ones; they implied a deep dissatisfaction with the older approaches and all that they stood for. But the prevailing curriculum and methods of teaching, the life of the school, and wider social expectations all exercise a powerful influence on teachers, just as the existing institutions and tendencies of society enter into the emotional life and the basic orientations of citizens. Furthermore, existing educational arrangements, like existing economic, political and industrial arrangements, serve very powerful interests, a point well documented by Counts and Stanley. To change a curriculum, as Benne and Muntyan remarked, is to change a social system, not merely to substitute one device or body of subject matter for another (10). Thus the plea for a new orientation to the content and methods of education was akin to a plea for a new way of life.

The reconstructionists have exposed a very important problem in educational change, but their exhortation to teachers,to embark upon change, now needs to be replaced by a careful analysis of effective and defensible measures for transforming systems, many of whose most influential members may be indifferent, reluctant, or even opposed to the changes in question (11).

2.1.4 Scientific culture

The scientific culture which Wells, Russell, Dewey and Frank amongst others sought to insinuate into society through education was not in their judgment to be achieved simply by teaching the sciences. Rather, "scientific culture" was shorthand for a way of life or a set of dispositions and attitudes which would affect very large areas of a person's behavior, and pervade the whole society. It would be more precise to refer to this culture as that of reflective thought, or rationality, rather than "science", since it extends far beyond the sciences and in fact may be achieved without systematic study of the natural sciences. The explanation for the loose use of the expression "scientific culture" lies perhaps in the channelling of a great deal of reflective, critical and rational thought over the past three centuries into the expanding natural sciences. The thought structures and methodologies of the sciences have come, over this period, to represent for many thinkers the highest or most perfect forms of rationality. Since the reconstructionists have been, on the whole, sceptical rationalists in outlook, and since they have all treated the direct or indirect impact of science on culture as the main single source of radical change, it is not surprising that they have equated rational with scientific thought and have laid so much stress on the desirability of harnessing technology, and industrial and social change by the very methods which have been so successful in the sciences.

The reconstructionist emphasis on scientific culture, while it has served well to challenge the assumptions and the subtle authoritarianism of the traditional curriculum, has had the unfortunate consequence of directing attention away from spheres of thought and experience no less

significant than scientific thinking. Even if we accept that, by scientific culture, the reconstructionists generally meant a perspective and a set of procedures which could be applied to a very wide range of studies, their chief concern was undoubtedly the sceptical, reflective intellect. With the exception of Wells and Rugg, they gave too little attention to other mental processes: contemplation, reverie, imaginative association of ideas, fantasy, and to the routinization of experience into customary and traditional modes - the mainstay of traditional and popular culture. Preoccupation with the self-conscious and reflective processes of scientific culture leads to the distortion and the reduction of other forms of experience even if, as with Dewey, acknowledgement is made of the value of those other forms. In curriculum terms, what is needed is a design of studies which discloses the diversity of valid experience and invites participation in the major modes of experience which have become articulated in the life history of culture. The concept of scientific culture is peculiarly western and modern, and in a truly critical programme it should be subjected to observation and interpretation from quite different standpoints (for example, religious and aesthetic). Only through sustained experience of alternative standpoints could we expect children to begin to make these observations and interpretations.

2.1.5 Practical judgment and a moral core

The more prophetic and hortatory tendencies in reconstructionism have been supplanted, in the post-war period, by greater attention to the details of contemporary crisis culture and by interest in designing instruments of decision-taking. Consensus-seeking and the arts of practical judgment have come to the fore, in a response to the disintegration which Mannheim, Brameld, Raup, Smith, Stanley and others

have detected in the "moral core" of culture. I argued that the quest for an ever-widening consensus is not consistent with cultural pluralism and diversity, and raised a query about the nature and extent of agreement needed in fundamental norms and values of society. While policy decisions of the most general and far-reaching kind require, in a democracy, the widest measure of understanding and agreement procurable through discussion and interchange of ideas, it is not clear why we should seek indefinitely to extend this area of policy agreement. The quest for consensus, as Brameld rightly points out, is a quest for the resolution of differences through creative acts of synthesis. This is essentially a dialectical process, in which the synthesis transcends the particular viewpoints about which there is disagreement. There are many spheres of action where it would be better if one could achieve such higher order agreements rather than persist in irreconcilable differences or grudgingly accept compromise situations. However, the very process of consensus-seeking depends upon the formation of different outlooks and these, in turn, issue from and express the values of diverse sub-cultures. For the dialectical process of consensus to continue we thus need, not only an instrument for reaching agreement, such as the techniques of practical judgment, but also the vitality and energy of sub-cultural diversity. This was better appreciated by Stanley than by Wells, Rugg and Brameld, who envisaged ever-widening circles of agreement. Stanley followed Linton in dividing "core" values, which are, or rather should be, universal and commonly shared, from the life styles of particular sub-groups.

Can we talk meaningfully about <u>creating</u> a common core of values when it is in and through experience of life problems that values arise?

The reconstructionist emphasis on making and renewing suggests that conscious and deliberate decisions are taken about values, whereas our common experience is that of expressing and sensing values in conduct. It is perhaps only through a common life that common values will emerge. This raises a difficulty for the pluralist, who wishes for a diversity of life styles. The relationship between common values, diverse life styles, and the school curriculum was touched upon by the reconstructionists, but there are many issues which would repay fuller discussion, especially in the light of the current move in England and Wales to establish common courses of study, taught in mixed ability groups, in neighborhood comprehensive schools. Many choices are being made in the development of these courses without due consideration being given to the wider social and cultural issues of the relationship of a common value system to individual and sub-cultural differences. The democratic ideal, as interpreted by the reconstructionists, is a common life ideal, and the public school provides the institutional framework for common experiences. However, I suggested that in practice the common school is not a homogeneous institution but embodies the diversity of neighborhoods, regions and social classes. This diversity affects the realization of common ideals and, as with the curriculum, we need a better appreciation of the relationship of actual conditions to the value systems which education and social reforms are seeking to establish.

The effort to establish the procedures of practical judgment represent awareness of some of the difficulties of procuring awareness of norms and agreement on objectives. Thus, it is accepted that consensus does not in fact exist in large areas of social life and that to create it requires skill in organized decision-taking. It is further

recognized that distinctions need to be made between those issues on which agreement would be valuable and those for which it would be better to encourage diversity of outlook, although the advocates of practical judgment offered no means of distinguishing between these two sets of issues. However, the exponents of consensus and practical judgment did not seriously consider the problem raised above; namely, that a common core of values requires and, indeed, presupposes a common life - an expectation which is extremely artificial in large scale urbanized societies characterized by the division of labor, by wide economic and class differences, and by vocational mobility. The relentless pursuit of the ideals of scientific culture could, in principle at least, achieve something approximating to a common life, although only, perhaps, in a distant Wellsian utopia. But, as I indicated in the previous section, it is very difficult to see how we could, in a diverse and fallible society, achieve a substantial core of common values which permeates experience.

So far as the curriculum is concerned, it is possible to move some distance in several directions without creating either massive contradictions or that high degree of abstractness, which is signified by the contrast between talk about a common moral core and the reality of substantial inequality of life conditions which remains a feature of all technically advanced societies. A range of common subject matter might be so presented as to emphasize universal qualities in human experience and possibilities of change and growth, and to provide children with a grounding in techniques of inquiry of wide applicability. Ideally, in a democracy, decisions about this "core" would involve very wide community participation, since these decisions should express the basic values and objectives of the society. At any rate, efforts should be made to enlarge participation beyond the relatively narrow range of experts and specialists who

at present take these decisions. For this purpose, the instrument of practical judgment and the ideal of consensus are extremely important. Beyond this minimum common core there should be opportunity for diversity and variety and for the expression of many different viewpoints. For these activities, there is no need for - and, indeed, there would be harm in constantly seeking - higher order agreements. Teachers and children should be free to explore many different possibilities or forms of excellence. Although there would be value in seeking the extensions of consensus and in using the ends of practical judgment within these diverse forms of activity, their very diversity would set limits to the quest for indefinite extension of agreement throughout the system.

2.1.6 Curriculum designing

The idea that the curriculum may be designed by teachers to satisfy certain criteria,and that it need not be the product either of inspired intuition or of impersonal and authoritative committees of experts, is perhaps the most significant of the reconstructionist contributions to curriculum theory. They were not of course the first to analyse this idea but, by giving it prominence and by discussing design processes, they very powerfully reinforced a growing movement towards increased teacher freedom, responsibility and rationality. I suggested that the chief intellectual impetus to this movement was provided by Dewey and that the experimentalists have done more than any other group to advance understanding of the processes of curriculum design. Thus, the concept of operational definitions of teaching objectives, explored by writers like Tyler, Herrick, Smith and associates, and now of major interest to curriculum theorists and developers, sprang from the pragmatic theory of meanings, which requires the specification of relevant operations

or processes in the discussion of action concepts. The idea of the teacher as a curriculum designer also expresses the Deweyan determination to improve the standing of the profession by investing it with a greater responsibility for decisions concerning learning and assessment. This was needed, it was argued, to free teaching situations and to encourage experimentation and the development of courses of study directly related to individual capabilities and interests.

Rugg, more than any other of the reconstructionists, abstracted the concept of curriculum design from the broader issues of teacher freedom, individual learnings, and rational decision-taking. His editorship of the 1926 yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education was one of the most important contributions to a way of thinking about curriculum decisions which is only now receiving wide recognition. Even in contemporary discussions of the curriculum, and particularly in the curriculum reform movement which is centred on national and regional project teams, there is a danger that the concept of the classroom teacher as a designer of learning programmes will be overlooked in the enthusiasm for new, expert-produced kits of materials and learning models. The proliferation of these kits in fact puts greater demands on teachers to develop skills of selection, trial and assessment, so the two approaches should be seen as complementary to each other: materials produced, reviewed and provisionally organized into units of study by expert teams; individual judgments about suitability, sequence reorganization, and effectiveness by classroom teachers.

The design criteria which have emerged as a result of reconstructionist thought are numerous. I have given some account of these in Chapters XI and XII. They include the conception of the curriculum as

as a learning system of interacting parts, with ascertainable inputs and outputs; the importance of participant involvement in decision-taking; the specification of behavioral objectives and of relevant assessment procedures; and the relevance of broader cultural and social perspectives to specific decisions. The last point, as we have seen, is very distinctive of reconstructionist thought, since the contribution of the school to cultural renewal, limited though it may be by cultural and social restraints and deficiencies, can be most effectively made through the curriculum.

By drawing attention to the role of the teacher as curriculum designer, the reconstructionists were in effect opposing a very powerful bureaucratic movement towards the concentration of curriculum responsibility in expert teams and centralized units. On the other hand, by emphasizing the value of the design of learning situations, they directly challenged the popular belief of progressive educationists that personal transactions between adults and children, from which growth can be expected to proceed, are unpredictable, ineffable, and in no way contingent on organized teaching schemes. We have become more aware of problems such as those concerning the pre-planning of curriculum objectives, the distinctive contribution to educative growth of organized knowledge, and the public verifiability of significant assessments of growth, since the reconstructionists developed their ideas on curriculum design. One of the most important tasks now facing educational reformers is to analyse the relationships amongst these various considerations, in an endeavor to realize, in new forms and through the design of the curriculum, these values, which, at present, are inadequately expressed by the concepts of growth, personal transactions, and intuitive teaching. The curriculum, conceived as the totality of education experiences for which the school

makes provision, cannot be wholly pre-planned, but,without the attempt through flexible planning to achieve desired outcomes, we are likely to find that the very values for which the progressives set up new institutions either succumb under pressure from external factors like public examinations, or are confined to a tiny minority of the population.

2.2 The school

Although the reconstructionists did not suppose that schooling and education are co-extensive, they tended to elevate the school into the chief instrument of educational policy in the modern state. This reflects the long historical tradition of schooling in western societies, and the fact of enormous and rapidly increasing investment, in the twentieth century, in public school systems throughout the world. Some of the reconstructionists, notably Wells, Mannheim and Brameld, have emphasized the potentially educative role of other institutions in society, especially those intended for adult education. By equating education with qualitatively controlled growth, Dewey gave to life itself an educative dimension which transcended all particular institutions. Clarke, too, with his concept of the educative society, clearly regarded schools as but one agency amongst many of education. The basic concepts of reconstructionism, so far from encouraging exclusive concentration on the school, pose educative tasks and functions for the whole society and these we have barely begun to explore. For example, we might begin to inform the common conceptions of industrial life (e.g., work relationships, productivity, the social organization of enterprises, managerial efficiency, and so forth) with the values of the growth and culture of those in employment. The formative effects of industrial life upon the worker operate for a large part of the day and over a period of some fifty

years. To ascertain and to enhance the educative quality of these cumulative, long-term effects is a necessary requirement if we are ever to make a significant step towards the ideal of the educative society. We know that, in fact, social experience is often miseducative and that modern institutional life is designed with ends in view other than the education of its members. The next phase of reconstructionist thought should be extended from the notion of the school as an agency of renewal to the education, so to speak, of the major social instrumentalities of change. This is difficult perhaps to visualize, but it is required by our understanding of growth as lifelong and as susceptible at all times to qualitative improvement. In a democratic society, it is indefensible to maintain institutions which limit the opportunity for continuing educative growth to a minority comparable to Aristotle's leisure class. To identify some of the critical sources of change in society, and to find ways of introducing an educational ethos into the major institutions of society, sounds utopian; and so it may be, but it would overcome one of the major objections to reconstructionism that, by concentrating on schools and teachers, it has underestimated the power of other social institutions and actors, and has overlooked their indifference or opposition to using schools as fundamentally critical and socially creative agencies.

2.2.1 Public provision and control of educational infrastructure

One thread which runs right through reconstructionist thinking identifies the public school as the chief agency of cultural renewal. I have just argued that this is no longer an adequate conception, but it only becomes possible seriously to develop this argument following the universal provision of public schooling. That is to say, the

limitations of the school in relation to other institutions become apparent only after the possibilities of schooling have been explored in practical terms. Universal provision is needed because, in a democratic theory, the attempt must be made to universalize opportunity and to facilitate the education of all. This provision must be public because only thus can sectionalism and various other forms of particularism be overcome, and something even faintly resembling a common experience be provided for. However, we should not equate public provision and support with state control. Although they did not argue along these lines, all of the reconstructionists were aware of these issues, and sought the enlargement and extension of the common, public school. This is true even of Wells, Clarke and Mannheim, who, while they recognized the strength, and, in the case of Clarke and Mannheim, the legitimacy, of the independent sector, sought rapid and widespread development of the public sector.

The existence of private and independent schools does not necessarily inhibit the growth of reconstructionist thought, and it may be that some of them provide unique opportunities for free experimentation. However, where independent schools are powerful and confer privilege regardless of merit, and where they emphasize exclusiveness and separatist virtues, they are in danger of intensifying the division between elites and masses which, as Mannheim pointed out, is a particular threat to democratic society and to the enlargement of personality. It should be possible, as in some of the independent progressive schools, to achieve the advantages of innovativeness whilst at the same time these schools are building up and strengthening patterns of relationship with publicly provided institutions. Yet this would not satisfy the more utopian aspirations of the reconstructionists, which require that the state should establish

and actively sustain experimental institutions to promote criticism of the assumptions and values of the state itself. In practical terms, this means inviting the powerful sectional interests who are active in politics - notably business groups and labor unions - to underwrite institutions specifically designed to criticize their conception of the fitness of things. Commenting on the "liberal educational reformers like James and Dewey and Whitehead" who asked American businessmen to do this, Laski wrote:

> "They ask co-operation in changing the whole character of one of the key institutions by which the dominance of the business man is maintained. They ask him to permit the inducement of the sceptical mind, instead of the mind trained to accept authority ... They suggest to him, in a word, that he should co-operate with them in making possible social adjustments the outcome of which can only be the destruction of the supremacy he has enjoyed for so long. The possible worlds they offer him in exchange are all of them built upon a fundamental denial of one or another of the vital articles of his faith ...
>
> "I frankly think that historic experience since 1914 makes the liberal educationists' philosophy a simple optimism of which the outcome,in the end, is catastrophic. Its real result is not to convince the business man of its validity but to warn him against its dangers. He then seeks for a defence of his symbolism" (12).

Laski may be right about "historic experience", but,from the polarization he makes of social interests, we can expect little more than a suspicious hostility and mutual impugnment of motives. What, we may ask, is the alternative to the "liberal reformers" proposals, since co-operative effort for change is dismissed as "catastrophic"? Laski asserted that major reforms of this kind in education are impossible without major reforms in society. This, of course, begs the very question and issue between him and the educational reformers, and expresses a basic difference of institutional awareness between educational and political reformers. The argument is more complex than perhaps

either side is ready to admit, but we should ask whether diplomatic and skilled educational reformers need be unsuccessful, in what is not after all a monolithic or a rigidly class-divided society, in enlisting support for institutions which are innovative and critical. This idea is not necessarily alien to the business community, which is probably more change conscious than are most educationists. Much depends on a distinction being maintained between, on the one hand, a confrontation (Laski-style) of monolithic and privileged business and radical education and, on the other, the effort to get the agreement of all parties to monitored experiment. In the English system, opportunities for the latter approach undoubtedly exist, and, for the further development of reconstructionist thinking within the limits of publicly provided education, we should be engaged in building experimental programmes, for example, in teacher education. This would mean the diversification and the development in depth of the public system; possibilities which, like the invention of the new educational departures I mentioned in the previous section, are dependent on the prior provision of a quantitatively adequate general system of public schooling.

2.2.2 Experimental institutions

I have already made some reference to experimental institutions, so I shall restrict my remarks to a comment on some of the institutions proposed by the reconstructionists. I discussed, mainly in Chapter XIII, three types of new institutions: the reformed independent school (Oundle); world brain; and university-attached experimental schools (Dewey's Laboratory School). For reconstructionism to capture the imagination and gain the practical support of teachers, experimental institutions were perhaps essential. Yet none of them has endured and what we now know of them is largely through written records. The

virtual disappearance of the experimental and practice schools which at one time were regarded as an indispensable adjunct of a progressive teachers' college has meant the loss of many opportunities for controlled educational change. I do not wish to examine the causes of their disappearance, but simply to mention the significance of the idea of experimental institutions for a comprehensive, reformist educational theory. It is tempting to argue that models of teacher behavior are preferable for purposes of innovation to the use of ostensive definitions in practice situations. However, the reconstructionist incitement to teachers to redesign schools carried greater conviction and overcame some of the objections to the "impracticability" of the reform, when it could be expressed in the concrete terms of even an imaginary new institution. The decline of experimental schools associated with teacher education programmes might be compensated by the participation of groups of schools in experimental programmes of teacher education and re-education and curriculum development. Such schemes would not require separate financing, nor would their success depend upon the zeal of a few pioneers. Indeed, part of their purpose would be to ascertain difficulties, in fairly ordinary teaching situations, in seeking to implement the more ambitious of the reconstructionist proposals (13). At the back of such schemes, lies a conception of the university and the college as cultural innovators, a conception which has been proclaimed by a committee of the Harvard Graduate School of Education:

> "We cannot ... think of the School of Education as simply training functionaries for an ongoing system. We need rather to relate the School boldly to the strangenesses and opportunities of the new world - to encourage it to create new patterns and roles of endeavor, to educate the public and raise the standards of the profession, while holding fast to the tried values of critical humanism that form the core

of the University's life" (14).

2.2.3 The school as a democratic, transitional society

One of the principal achievements of the reconstructionists was to show how, in the conditions of change and instability of the modern industrial state, the school has tasks thrust upon it which differ significantly from the tasks it had to perform in more stable circumstances. These new tasks are a consequence of the great expansion of the public sector of education; the move towards increased democratization through the establishment of a common school and the lengthening of the period of formal education; the changing character of the population in a technical society; the growth of knowledge; and several other major, long-term social trend movements. Thus the larger social and cultural context and many of the basic purposes of the school are determined by changes beyond its control. However, it does not follow that the school is,or should attempt to be, simply an agency which indiscriminately reflects and responds to these grosser changes. We may understand the role set for it by the reconstructionists by referring to the views of Clarke and Mannheim on the school as a transitional community, and to the experimentalist conception of the school as itself in some senses a democratic community. By combining their various ideas we may perceive the school as an institution possessing a definite character, with two principal tasks to perform. These tasks are, first, to examine ways of stabilizing and orientating a diffuse and rapidly changing culture; and, second, to guide children from the levels of awareness and action of primary groups into the emerging cultural orientations provided by diverse secondary groups.

It is commonly asserted that the task of the school, in these respects, is to initiate children into worthwhile activities, on the one

hand, and, on the other, to effect a transition from primary to secondary group functioning. The reconstructionist position, because of its emphasis on the recreation of culture, or on directed individual and social change, is more definite as to the direction of these transitions. As a consequence, a whole set of implications and directives for action emerge. Out of the flux of contemporary culture particular features and directions for development are selected for emphasis and reinforcement. The curriculum, in this sense, as Rugg and Brameld have argued, becomes a plan or model of desirable primary and secondary group action. It cannot provide, as it were, a summary overview of the totality of culture; however, in the dispositions, habits, attitudes and outlooks it fosters, in the form of inquiry it employs, in the pattern of understanding it cultivates, the curriculum can help to guide the transition both of the individual and of society. This argument applies equally to teaching and learning procedures and to the institutional life of the school. Indeed, it is the totality of its actual and possible impact, as a living cultural system, that should be considered when assessing the claim that the school might serve as a remaker of culture. By perceiving these possibilities, and reviewing the difficulties that might arise in attempting to realize them, teachers can begin to define and to exercise their professional skills as democratic change agents.

In my discussion of the later experimentalists, I concentrated on the theories of consensus and practical judgment. I suggested that these theories are not in all respects satisfactory. Consensus may in practice take the form of a subtle imposition of authority by expert group manipulators - a reminder that even in democratic and educated Athens the skilled orator could very easily sway opinion and achieve demagogic

leadership. No less serious than the problem of possible manipulation is the question of determining proper spheres for different types of consensus operations and for setting practical limits to mass participation in decision-taking in large-scale, urban societies. One difficulty to which I referred in discussing the procedures of practical judgment is that they too readily assume the existence of the skills and dispositions needed to engage in a highly sophisticated form of decision-taking. Furthermore, in emphasizing this particular technique, Raup and his associates gave too little attention to more formal institutional and legislative safeguards. All of these difficulties may be seen as the consequence of experimentalist optimism concerning human nature and its plasticity. Dewey's confidence that human intelligence will normally be used to further humane and constructive ends is an incomplete political doctrine in a world where powerful organized interests are either intent on, or helplessly caught up in, policies which do not have the universal sharing of the good life as their outcome.

However, insofar as the school can make a contribution, however indirect it may be, to the formation of more rational and democratic social policies, the instrument of consensus and practical judgment, and the various procedures the reconstructionists recommended for making school experience more involving and intelligible for all pupils, deserve serious study. Schools, on the whole, have yet to take seriously the proposal that they should perform the dual transitional role I outlined at the beginning of this section, although there have been many individual efforts to create communities which are directed by rational and democratic criteria. The reform of twentieth century education has been, generally speaking, a reform in individual learning tasks and

small-group relationships. The arguments for local studies and of the educative value of the immediate environment have been challenged by Bruner (15), but it is still upon the child's view of the world that reform proposals are most often centred. Where there have been significant changes in the content of education and in the social pattern of the school, these have tended to express the child's view, or the logical structures of knowledge, or the principle of friendly, equitable relationships between children and adults. Profound and valuable changes in educational style have resulted, but they are nevertheless partial and limited reforms. We have yet to undertake the task of developing those cultural perspectives which would provide educational policies, at all levels, with an awareness of possibilities and some guidance on how these might be realized.

2.3 The teacher and his task

Reconstructionist thinking on the role of the teacher has been hampered by lack of substantial empirical data on membership of the teaching profession and on the various considerations affecting role perception and performance. It is only in recent years that significant knowledge has been available. Together with this new knowledge there have emerged new theories of teaching, incorporating analysis of role performance, which are more complex, subtle and heuristically significant than the reconstructionist arguments. However, it is easy to forget that these theories have emerged within a context of educational thought and practice which the reconstructionists helped to shape. There are continuities between the older and the newer theories, and between many of the issues in teaching and teacher education now being widely discussed, and those which the reconstructionists debated earlier in the century.

2.3.1 Behavioristic models

In outlining the experimentalist theory of experience and growth, I drew attention to features which were to prove useful when Dewey and his followers elevated the classroom teacher into the principal agent of the proposed new education. These features included the responsiveness of the organism to its changing environment, the central role of intelligence in directing experience, and the human capacity to continue growing and changing throughout life. While they did not deny the effect upon personality of inherited factors and early childhood experience, the experimentalists - as did most, but not quite all, of the reconstructionists - regarded change and development throughout life as basic human traits. This belief in human changeability, together with their confidence that change could be regulated and guided by environmental controls, led the experimentalists to suppose that even a very inadequate teaching force could be re-educated so as to perform their reconstructive role as culture change agents. They did not underestimate the difficulties in the form of settled habits and persuasions in individuals, institutional constraints, the force of miseducative pressures, scarcity of resources, and so forth. But these difficulties are all perhaps, in principle, remediable, either through action within the educational system or, more important, in other social spheres. Those who, like Counts, Childs and Brameld, have actively supported teacher militancy and teacher involvement in local and national politics appreciated this latter point.

The significance of what I have termed the behavioristic model of the teacher is that, without ignoring the strength of social and individual resistance, it poses a series of manageable tasks for teachers and for the educators of teachers which, if successfully performed,

would mobilize teachers for action as change agents. Thus, research demonstrating anti-democratic attitudes amongst teachers, or apathy, indifference, ignorance, and a firm repudiation of the role of change agent would sharpen the focus on changes needed in programmes of teacher re-education, but it would by no means demonstrate the futility of the task. Of course, it might well be that in any given situation the difficulties of educating and re-educating and supporting teachers in the change agent role were insurmountable. The theory does not deny this: what it does is to affirm in principle that there are certain possibilities which make the hope of reform a reasonable one in the hypothetical average conditions of technically advanced societies.

These possibilities for change in teacher behavior were not denied by reconstructionists other than the experimentalists, but they mostly tended to give more prominence to a change model which distinguishes an elite of change agents from the bulk of the teaching profession. This elite might consist of teacher educators, or specialist curriculum designers, or the hierarchy of office within the school. The primary instrument of social control in the reconstructionist theory is rational persuasion and not coercion or violence or custom. Rational persuasion is essentially a process of voluntary and, ultimately, self-directed change. However, we cannot reasonably expect such changes to operate universally and at a uniform rate throughout a total educational system. Even amongst those teachers who are interested in and sympathetic towards reconstructionist objectives there will be an unequal distribution of commitment, skill and opportunities for change. It seems inevitable, therefore, that reconstructionism should become, in practice, an elitist movement, in the sense that communities of teachers will emerge, who see and prepare themselves as innovators and reformers. They need not be

elitist in the pejorative sense, of seeking to split themselves from the mass of the teachers, by institutional and by more informal devices. But Mannheim was right to stress the role of elites as culture change agents and he, more clearly than any other reconstructionist, perceived the nature of the problem of procuring elite leadership in a democratic society. Reconstructionism requires not only that teachers as a whole should constitute an elite group in society, but that within the teaching profession there should emerge cadres of leaders, innovators, change agents, and self-conscious reformers, and that there should be a clearer analysis than heretofore of role differentiation relating to competence and opportunity to perform specified tasks.

The traditional concepts and language of elitism are unsatisfactory in an industrial society which reformers are, amongst other things, attempting to democratize. But, if we adopt those features of the behavioristic model which indicate the possibility of modifying adult behavior at many different levels of ability and status, we should not overlook the leadership function which cadres of democratic change agents in education have to perform. It would be better to accept the challenge to define democratic leadership roles, to find new ways of educating teachers to perform them, and systematically to deploy diffusion procedures to universalize reform, than to submerge this whole issue in the confusions and self-deceptions that would inevitably result from supposing that all teachers can and might achieve the new levels of awareness and skill.

2.3.2 Teaching as a calling

I have been arguing for a more open recognition that, in a mass system of education, we should acknowledge the creative, innovatory and leadership tasks that a reforming minority might perform, and that we should be prepared to make special educational provision for these

leaders. However, the reconstructionists themselves have rightly maintained other perceptions of teaching than this one, which is closely related to modern managerial thinking. These other perceptions disclose a unity of purpose and task, together with the basic homogeneity of the teaching profession. Russell expressed this viewpoint in his designation of teaching as a calling, and of the teacher as a guardian of civilization. I have in several places suggested affinities between reconstructionism and religious thought: the sense of crisis, a quest for unity and order, concern for the totality and the quality of experience, a moralistic mission to convert natural man into the new man, and so forth. The view of teaching as a calling is consistent with this broadly religious outlook. To give exclusive emphasis to performance of leadership functions by a minority would be to introduce a serious schism into the more universalistic tendencies of the whole theory. Furthermore, the importance of relationship between individual teachers and their classes and groups of pupils is such that no democratic theory could ignore the problem of the quality of education in those schools and classes where there are no leaders to be found.

These difficulties may perhaps be resolved by a closer study of the relationship of leadership to average or ordinary performance. Traditional elitism vests small minorities with esoteric knowledge, high status and commanding authority, and it treats masses as followers and as less worthy in certain respects than the elite members themselves. By contrast, reconstructionist elitism emphasizes the importance of all teaching acts, the unity of the whole teaching profession, and continuity of leadership activities and ordinary role performance in an articulated scheme of performance roles and responsibilities. I have in various

sections of this study touched upon issues which are relevant to the redefinition of leadership roles in education: shared decision-taking, the specific roles of experts in curriculum-making, the function of the teacher of teachers, and others. What is needed, in this area of reconstructionist thought, is systematic analysis of a wide range of issues, instead of the concentration common in organizational and management theory, on empirical questions and the tacit acceptance of efficiency criteria.

Teaching is deeply involving of the self; it calls into play a wide range of personal qualities, and its success very often depends upon complex patterns of relationship with pupils. The strength of the concept of teaching as a calling is that it appeals to deeper levels of the self, and to a wider spectrum of the profession, than does the concept of the teacher as leader and organizer of change. In the reconstructionist theory, these represent two facets of teaching which have not been sufficiently related to each other. This is a consequence of the fact that different writers have tended to emphasize either the more elitist or the more universal features of teaching.

2.3.3 The teacher as democratic engineer and organizer of group learning, and leader of inquiry

What formally differentiates reconstructionism from other systematic educational theories is the attention given to the wider social and cultural context of education and the exploration of ways in which schooling might interact with other social institutions to effect change. However, in addition to these wider viewpoints, reconstructionism includes a more specific appraisal of the teacher as an organizer of classroom learning. It is, indeed, through his work as a designer of learning situations that the teacher can best make an impact, even if this impact is, on

the whole, indirect and long term. This point was well understood by Dewey and Kilpatrick although, as I pointed out, diagnosis of an urgent social crisis seems to require more decisive and faster-acting measures than those available to the classroom teacher.

There has been in recent years a considerable growth in the use of the techniques of discovery and inquiry learning, much of it ill-informed, and inadequately analysed (16). The specific reconstructionist contribution to thinking on these subjects has been the identification of a wider context of issues and sources for learning than has been provided in the normal classroom. Inquiry, in their sense, has meant the analysis, through the use of procedures like reflective thinking, of problems and issues in the wider society; and discovery has been guided discovery, directed towards the realization of the complex structures of modern thought and society, and of the relationship of individual states of mind and feeling to those larger structures.

As engineer, the teacher has been expected, by the reconstructionists, to design school learning situations within which children could actively participate in the development, or, in Dewey's term, the reconstruction, of their own experience, becoming in the process members of ever-widening social groups. This participation was intended to lead to the sharing and acceptance of responsibility, tasks which require careful preparation and substantial and varied experiences of decision-taking, for teacher and pupils alike.

The tasks proposed under the rubric of the democratic engineering of group learning are not easily circumscribed. The reconstructionists tended to place heavy burdens on teachers, by their broad definition of their role. This is because more thought and preparation are required to perform these wider tasks than in more conventional teaching. The

strains attendant on flexibility, adaptability and mobility of role performance are multiplied where it is a substantially new general role for the teacher that is being proposed. The uncertainty and confusion of the normative system of society, which was treated by Dewey, Mannheim and the later experimentalists as a critical problem area in modern society, affects teachers and teaching. Lacking adequate training in the techniques of democratic group leadership, teachers were expected through a great effort of the will to set up, in their classrooms, models of social relationship and group consensus for which there existed few parallels in society at large. It is not surprising that critics pointed to a wide gulf between the exalted demands of organized consensus, practical judgment, universalized reflective inquiry, and workshop models of teaching - and classrooms where small group democracy and courses in social living produced boredom and disgust.

A more rigorous analysis than the reconstructionists undertook is needed, to produce models of classroom learning which satisfy the criteria of intelligibility, sequential organization of study, and cognitive significance, as well as those emanating from the democratic creed. This analysis should not be expected of teachers unless they are very much better supported than at present, through ancillary staff, lighter timetables and opportunities to visit and discuss their work with colleagues. It should be part of the work of bodies such as the Schools Council to promote this type of analysis and to stimulate the development of models of teacher-pupil interaction which are not restricted to single subjects. It is not sufficient to produce new materials, which, in any case, teachers need to learn to select and to use; what is no less important is that the acts of teaching and learning should be analysed, both within and across subjects. For this purpose, the production of

new materials is a necessary,but by no means a sufficient, condition.

The reconstructionists outlined general models of teaching and learning that are different from, and much more demanding than, the traditional model of controlled transmission - reception - assimilation - regurgitation. But their contribution was more inspirational and schematic than analytic. Even the device of practical judgment, intended to replace by an operational model the earlier exhortations to behave democratically, needs to be translated into specific procedures relative to the changed outlook of youth and the new conditions in schools and colleges. Efforts to build up new models of teaching, grounded in ideological theories and subjected to monitoring control, might help to overcome the serious splits, not simply between "theory" and "practice" but between three sub-cultures: those of the classroom, the research centre, and the teacher training establishments. A bridging theory is needed to bring these sub-cultures into active inter-relationship with one another. Because it conceives education as the wider setting of cultural development, reconstructionism has an advantage over other theories, which may quite effectively relate one of these three sub-cultures to the others, but thereby reinforces the isolation of all three from other systems of social thought and action.

2.3.4 Teacher education

Rugg, Brameld and others amongst the later experimentalists have rightly pointed out that the key institution in reconstructionist thinking is not the school, but the teacher education establishments. If one includes in the latter the whole system of re-educative and inservice agencies, then it is obvious that a significant change in the teacher's perception of his task, and the development of relevant skills

and understandings and dispositions, can only occur if teacher education is significantly different in character from the processes of education to be observed in other institutions. Without a significantly different programme of teacher education, old habits and practices will be repeated, and modified, not always intelligently, under pressure from other social institutions.

The emergence of the social foundation movement signifies the reconstructionist awareness of the critical importance of a new form of teacher education. I suggested that this movement was directed, in part at least, by the characteristic cultural goals of the reconstructionists: wholeness and inclusiveness, and the unity of parts. Thus teacher education itself was to be an embodiment and an expression of the new order. It was also to provide skills-training relevant to the organization of problem-solving situations, projects, and so forth, and thus to demonstrate the transformation required of the sciences of education to render them into usable resources for teaching.

Only very occasionally, if ever, have concrete programmes of teacher education arisen to satisfy the extremely ambitious demands made of them by reconstructionists. Clarke's and Bode's ideal, of university departments primarily advancing educational knowledge,and only as a secondary matter conducting apprenticeship-type teacher education programmes, has been, on the whole, reversed. Rugg's requirement that programmes of teacher education should represent a living synthesis of knowledge and experience may be contrasted with the increasing tendency to split educational knowledge into separate disciplines and to offer students introductory courses in them and, except occasionally, to leave virtually untouched the systematic study of contemporary culture. Dewey's arguments that the educational sciences need to be translated through the

development of middle-range action-orientated courses of study may be contrasted with research-centred pursuit of these sciences in universities, which commonly achieves such a level of abstruseness and specialization as to justify the assertion that they have no relevance to education.

These characteristics of teacher education are not easily reversed. They represent the universal tendency towards the specialization of knowledge, the enhanced status of research in tertiary institutions of all kinds, and the plurality and diversity of culture in free societies. The latter point raises a difficulty which the reconstructionists only rarely acknowledged. To achieve widespread harmony of interests and agreement over purposes, when these are formulated as programmes of action, is extremely difficult where a plurality of values and of outlook is encouraged. For reconstructionist thinking to dominate even a single teacher education institution would require the submergence of the separate qualities and character of the subject departments, and the acceptance of higher order objectives. Because reconstructionism challenges and condemns a great deal of existing institutional life it would also be necessary to reverse many of the habits and assumptions of these institutions - a task which, as Dewey recognized, is more difficult than modifying human nature in the formative stages. However, it is only through such changes that the more exalted requirements of reconstructionism would be satisfied.

Thus substantial institutional change is required in the reconstructionist theory; it is to be peaceful, and a consequence of rational discussion, not of coercion. Such change, except when institutions are under great stress, seem unlikely. Even within teacher education, more modest changes should be envisaged by those interested in developing

reconstructionist thought. These changes might occur within single departments, or they may be expressed in the development of a new programme - for example, in the redesigning of the so-called "curriculum studies" courses - or, perhaps, in the formation of a small number of experimental institutions. Such changes are often the responsibility of small groups of people, amongst whom might develop a strong community of aspirations and expectations, and it is from these communities in the first instance, rather than from the larger institutions of society, that we might reasonably expect creative change.

3. Barriers to Change

Although in the social sciences theories of resistance to change have not reached a high level of sophistication, no conception of the school which treats it as a potential cultural innovator should overlook those barriers which might be reasonably anticipated. I have already in this chapter suggested that further progress in reconstructionist thinking depends upon the analysis and clarification of issues which to date have been given scant attention. To these I would add the importance of appraising the strength and movements of those factors and interests in culture which may be adversely affected by the realization of reconstructionist aspirations. Beyond this, there is need for examination of the strategies and techniques of influence, persuasion and controlled social change, since it is not only resistance which defeats reform but also the technical incompetence of reformers to design appropriate action programmes and to mobilize resources as needed.

Definition of the skills needed by educational change agents is

made easier by developments in recent years in many related fields of inquiry and practical application (17). But educational theory cannot remain parasitical on this knowledge and practical experience; it must develop its own constructs, and this is only possible through the formation of theories of educational change. There is a reciprocal relationship between empirical knowledge and adequate general theories. We have seen that reconstructionism is one such general theory, which could be integrally related with research and teacher education programmes. The barrier to the realization of the objectives sought by reconstructionists, which is a consequence of ignorance of techniques, might be best overcome by the initial agreement to reconstruct. This basic agreement could lead to efforts being made to illuminate those topics for which information and skill are needed. Thus knowledge and insights would be yielded through a form of operational research that embodies definite policy objectives.

However, there are barriers to planned change no less serious than ignorance: for example, the impulsive life of the individual and his pattern of habits; the institutions in society which perceive their interests to be best served by active or covert antagonism to the democratic aspiration of reconstructionism; the tendency of institutions not to learn from new experience but to conserve their old identity through elaborate routinization of task, bureaucratization of function and other protective devices; and the impact upon children's learning of various agencies other than the school. On this latter point, I need mention only the mass communication media, pop culture, the peer group, and work culture. However, instead of attempting to resist these other agencies, or to build up defences against them, reconstructionist educators should, as Mannheim advised, learn from them and seek ways of co-operating

with them. There is nothing inherently anti-educational in the operations of any of these other agencies. Instead, consciously or otherwise, they use whatever means of effective contact and persuasion they are able to procure. For example, television and newspapers use the visual appeal of color; pop culture draws upon expressed interests and builds them into communities of interest; the peer group feeds upon informality of relationships and physical contact in self- or group-determined activities; work culture arises from a common interest, a shared status, and co-operative enterprise. Educationists unwisely ignore the learning opportunities presented by these influence systems. Each has much to teach about motivation, interest, and continuity of experience, and each presents opportunities for the more informal, society-wide educational work which, it may be predicted, will be the next great phase in the attempt to create the educative society.

There are, of course, serious problems that should be anticipated and examined if educationists are to embark on these wider tasks. I have raised the problem, both moral and social-political, of legitimizing the teacher's role as culture change agent. This problem will become more acute as sensitive zones of community life are touched upon - for example, race prejudice, religious interests, patriotism, sexual ethics, commercial life under capitalism, and freedom of inquiry in general. Reconstructionism inevitably broaches these issues, but should not do so unintelligently, by stridently proclaiming missionary ideals. Further progress lies in the direction of more detailed appraisals of the learning tasks facing pupils, teachers, the community and social institutions, to help them achieve the rational and humane aims to whose definition the earlier reconstructionists contributed.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

Introduction

1. E.g. Bowers, C.A. The Progressive Educator and the Depression. New York, Random House, 1969; Cremin, L.A. The Transformation of the School. New York, Knopf, 1961; Graham, P.A. Progressive Education: from Arcady to Academe. New York, Teachers College Press, 1967; Rugg, H. Foundations for American Education. Yonkers-on-Hudson, (N.Y.), World Book Co., 1947; See also Selleck, R.J.W. The New Education, 1870-1914. London, Pitman, 1968; and Stewart, W.A.C. The Educational Innovators, 11: Progressive Schools, 1881-1967. London, Macmillan, 1968.

2. Eastman, G. "The ideologizing of theories: John Dewey's educational theory, a case in point". Educational Theory, 17, 2, April 1967, pp. 103-119; Hutchins, R.M. The Conflict in Education. New York, Harper and Bros., 1953, pp. 48-54; Lilge, F. "The politicizing of educational theory". Ethics, LXVI, 3, 1956, pp. 188-197.

3. Hardie, C.D. Truth and Fallacy in Educational Theory. Cambridge University Press, 1942; Hirst, P. "The nature of educational theory" in Tibble, J.W. (ed.) The Study of Education. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966; O'Connor, D.J. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957.

4. Oakeshott, M. Rationalism and Politics. London, Methuen, 1962, p. 207.

5. But cp. Scheffler, I. The Language of Education. Springfield, (Ill.), C.C. Thomas, 1960.

6. Lovejoy, A.O. The Great Chain of Being. Cambridge, (Mass.), Harvard University Press, 1936, ch. 1; Cassirer, E. The Philosophy of the Enlightenment. Boston, Beacon Press, 1955, ch. 1.

7. Reid, L.A. Philosophy and Education. London, Heinemann, 1962.

8. Dewey, J. Democracy and Education. New York, Macmillan, 1916, p. 378.

9. Scheffler, I. "Introduction" to Philosophical Analysis and Education. Boston, Allyn and Bacon Inc., 1958, p. 4.

10. Reid, L.A., op. cit., p.26.

11. Popper, K. The Open Society and its Enemies. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962. 4th ed., Vol. 2, ch. 11 et pass.

12. Lichtheim, G. "The concept of ideology". History and Theory, IV, 1965, pp. 164-195.

13. See Bendix, R. "The age of ideology: persistent and changing" in Apter, D.E. (ed.). Ideology and Discontent. New York, The

Free Press of Glencoe, 1964, pp. 294-327; Berger, P. and Pullberg, S. "Reification and the sociological critique of consciousness". History and Theory, IV, 1965, pp. 196-211; Birnbaum, N. "The sociological study of ideology (1940-1960): a trend report and bibliography". Current Sociology, IX, 2, 1960, pp. 91-172; Lichtheim, G., art. cit.

14. See Bendix, R., art. cit., and Berger, P. and Pullberg, S., art. cit. The process of disclosing motives for beliefs can lead to disconcerting results. For example, the "primal murder" theory advanced by Freud in Totem and Taboo, in which the sons kill and eat their father in a totemic meal has been attributed to Freud's ambivalent attitude towards his own father: Freeman, D. "Totem and Taboo: a reappraisal" in Muensterberger, W. and Axelrod, S. (eds.). The Psychoanalytic Study of Society, 4. New York, International University Press, 1967. The next step in this type of argument is to disclose Freeman's motives in thus explaining away the totemic theory.

15. Mannheim, K. Ideology and Utopia. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1936, p. 36.

16. See Apter, D. (ed.), op. cit., "Introduction", pp. 18-19; Cassirer, E. The Myth of the State. Yale University Press, 1961, chs. iv and xviii; Sorel, G.E. Reflections on Violence. London, Allen and Unwin, 1925, ch. iv et pass.

17. King, P. "An ideological fallacy" in King, P. and Parekh, B.C. (eds.). Politics and Experience. Cambridge University Press, 1968, p. 392.

18. Bergman, G. "Ideology". Ethics, LXI, April 1951, pp. 205-218. Reprinted in Brodbeck, M. (ed.) Readings in the Philosophy of Social Science. New York, Macmillan, 1968.

19. Ryan, A. The Philosophy of the Social Sciences. London, Macmillan, 1970, p. 221 f.

20. Edel, A. "Education and the concept of ideology". Proceedings of the twenty-fourth annual meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society (U.S.A.), 1968, pp. 70-87.

21. Corbett, P. Ideologies. London, Hutchinson, 1965.

22. Williams, B. "Democracy and ideology". Political Quarterly, 32, 1961, pp. 374-384.

23. Corbett, P., op. cit., p. 12.

24. For examples of this translation of scientific theories into ideologies, see Becker, C.L. The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Philosophers. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1932, ch. 2; Buchdahl, G. The Image of Newton and Locke in the Age of Reason. London, Sheed and Ward, 1961, pt. 1; Farrington, B.

Francis Bacon: Philosopher of Industrial Science. New York, Collier Books, 1961, ch. 1; Hofstadter, R. Social Darwinism in American Thought. Boston, Beacon Press, 1955, ch. 1.

25. Russell, B. "Is science superstitious?" in Sceptical Essays. London, Allen and Unwin, 1928, p. 36.

26. Kuhn, T.S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. University of Chicago Press, 1962.

27. Polanyi, M. Personal Knowledge. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958, ch. 6 et pass.

28. Cited in Letwin, S.R. The Pursuit of Certainty. Cambridge University Press, 1965, p. 36.

Chapter I

1. Znaniecki, F. Cultural Sciences: their Origin and Development. Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1952. For an interpretation of educational theory in the light of modern culture science concepts, see Brameld, T. Cultural Foundations of Education. New York, Harper, 1957.

2. In addition to Brameld and Znaniecki, the following, which I draw upon in ch. III, illustrate the diversity of approaches: Alsberg, P. In Quest of Man. Oxford, Pergamon, 1970; Benedict, R. Patterns of Culture. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1935; Bidney, D. Theoretical Anthropology. New York, Schocken Books, 1967. 2nd ed.; Cassirer, E. The Logic of the Humanities. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1960; Geertz, C. "The transition to humanity" in Tax, S. (ed.) Horizons of Anthropology. London, Allen and Unwin, 1965; Kroeber, A.L. and Kluckhohn, C. Culture: a Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions. Cambridge, (Mass.), Peabody Museum, 1952; Saran, A.K. "Theoretical anthropology and the cult of man". Ethics, LXVI, 3, 1956, pp. 198-208. (An acute criticism of Bidney); Weintraub, K.J. Visions of Culture. University of Chicago Press, 1966; Williams, R. Culture and Society, 1780-1950. London, Chatto and Windus, 1958.

3. Peters himself argues that the processes of education are inseparable from judgments of value in his paper "What is an educational process?" in Peters, R.S. (ed.) The Concept of Education. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967.

4. For example, the interplay of value spare and value laden uses in the writings of Eliot and Bantock, who are able through this interplay to introduce marked preferences for certain types of culture experience (those of selected minorities) while apparently presenting descriptions of how culture is "in fact" transmitted: Eliot, T.S. Notes Towards the Definition of Culture. London, Faber, 1965 (new ed.); Bantock, G.H. Education in an Industrial Society. London, Faber, 1963, ch. 5 et pass.; Bantock, G.H. Eliot and Education. London, Faber, 1970.

5. On paideia, or Greek concepts of excellence or of worthwhile forms of life, see Werner Jaeger's 3 volume study: Paideia: the Ideals of Greek Culture. (trans. G. Highet). Oxford, Blackwell, 1943-1945. On changing content during the Renaissance, see Woodward, W.H. Studies in Education During the Age of the Renaissance. New York, Columbia University, Teachers College Press, 1967 (1st ed. 1906). On changing views of the transmission process, contrast Plato in The Laws with M. Arnold Culture and Anarchy. In the latter work, critical activity of mind in the learner is contrasted with acceptance of "stock notions". Yet, overall, Arnold's book forms part of the classical humanist tradition.

6. See notes 4 and 5. The diversity and complexity of the classical

humanist position in education is brought out in the following sample of expositions and discussions: Babbitt, I. "Humanistic versus humanitarian ideals in American education" in Schilpp, P.A. (ed.) Higher Education Faces the Future. New York, Horace Liveright, 1930; Babbitt, I. On Being Creative and Other Essays. Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1932; Bolgar, R.R. The Classical Heritage and its Beneficiaries. Cambridge University Press, 1954; Campbell, F. "Latin and the elite tradition". British Journal of Sociology, 19, 1968, pp. 308-325; Clarke, M.L. Classical Education in Britain, 1500-1900. Cambridge University Press, 1959; Findlay, J.J. "Three theories of the curriculum: classical, modern, Herbartian". Journal of Education, XXIV (new series), 391 and 392, Feb. and Mar. 1902, pp. 106-109, 174-176. Hutchins, R.M. The Higher Learning in America. New Haven, (Conn.), Yale University Press, 1936; Livingstone, R. A Defence of Classical Education. London, Macmillan, 1916; Norwood, C. The English Tradition of Education. London, John Murray, 1929; Sidgwick, H. "Theory of classical education" in Miscellaneous Essays and Addresses. New York, Macmillan, 1904; and Whitehead, A.N. The Aims of Education and Other Essays. London, Ernest Benn, Ltd., 1959 (especially ch. 5).

7. Marrou, H.I. A History of Education in Antiquity. London, Sheed and Ward,1956, p. 217. See also Lovejoy, A.O. A Documentary History of Primitivism and Related Ideas. Vol. 1. Primitivism and Related Ideas in Antiquity, by A.O. Lovejoy and G. Boas. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1935.

8. Rousseau, J.-J. Emile (trans. B. Foxley). London, Dent, 1911.

9. On romanticism and education, see Barzun, J. Classic, Romantic and Modern. London, Secker and Warburg, 1962; Boas, G. The Cult of Childhood. London, Warburg Institute, 1966; Coveney, P. The Image of Childhood. Harmondsworth (Middlesex), Penguin Books, 1967 (rev. ed.); Judges, A.V. "Educational ideas, practices and institutions". New Cambridge Modern History, Vol. VIII. Cambridge University Press, 1965; Pollard, H.M. Pioneers of Popular Education. London, John Murray, 1956; Schenk, H.G. The Mind of the European Romantics. London, Constable, 1966; Thorlby, A.K. The Romantic Movement. London, Longmans, 1966.

10. Rousseau, J.-J. "A discourse on the arts and sciences" in Rousseau's Social Contract, Etc. (trans. G.D.H. Cole). London, Dent, 1913, pp. 125-154.

11. See note 9. There is no comprehensive study of the vicissitudes and developments of romantic thought in education from the eighteenth century onwards, but see Cremin, L.A., op. cit.; Pollard, H.M., op. cit. and Stewart, W.A.C., op. cit. The infiltration of Idealism may be observed in Froebel's Autobiography. I refer again to communitarian socialism in chs. V, section 1.2.2; VI, section 2.3; and VIII, section 2.

12. A socio-historical study of the pursuit of similar objectives in one of the best known of these schools has been made by M. Punch:

"École Paradis": a Short History of Dartington Hall School, 1926-1969. Mimeo. 1970.

13. Neill, A.S. Summerhill. New York, Hart, 1960; Goodman, P. Compulsory Mis-Education. New York, Horizon Press, 1964.

14. Harrison, J.F.C. Robert Owen and the Owenites in Britain and America. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969, p. 92 f.

15. But none of the reconstructionists supposes that education can or should attempt these changes in isolation from other social agencies. Those who gave greatest prominence to the school as a change agency are Wells, Rugg, Mannheim and Brameld. See chs. X and XV.

16. It should be noted that even the more limited claims for the possible social effects of certain forms of education are still largely a matter of conjecture. There is considerable difference of opinion, for example, about the relationship between educational provision and economic growth and political development. See Bowman, M.J. and Anderson, C.A. "Concerning the role of education in development" in Geertz, C. (ed.) Old Societies and New States. New York, The Free Press, 1963; and Coleman, J.S. (ed.) Education and Political Development. Princeton, (N.J.), Princeton University Press, 1965; Curle, A. Educational Problems of Developing Societies. New York, Praeger, 1969.

17. This is most noticeable in Mannheim and Brameld. See chs. VII, section 3, and VIII, section 1.1.

18. Popper, K. op. cit., vol. 1. Introduction and ch. 9.

19. See chs. IV, section 1.2; V, section 1.3; VI, section 3; and VII, section 1.

20. The best philosophical treatment of the western tradition of perfectibilism is Passmore, J. The Perfectibility of Man. London, Duckworth, 1970. On the argument about the origins of progress thinking (whether in pre-Socratic Greece or in the seventeenth century), see Bury, J.B. The Idea of Progress. London, Macmillan, 1920; Nisbet, R.A. Social Change and History: Aspects of the Western Theory of Development. New York, Oxford University Press, 1969; and Sklair, L. The Sociology of Progress. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970, Chs. 1 and 2.

21. Owen R. A New View of Society and Other Writings (ed. G.D.H. Cole) London, Dent, 1927, p. 72 f.; Godwin, W. An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice. London, 1796. 3rd ed., ch. IV: The characters of men originate in their external circumstances; ch. VIII: On natural education; and Summary of principles. See also Pollin, R.B. Education and Enlightenment in the Works of William Godwin. New York, Las Americas Pub. Co., 1962.

22. This possibility worried Mannheim and Counts especially. See ch. VI, section 1.3, and ch. VII, sections 3 and 4.

23. See ch. X, section 4.2, where I argue that despite these tendencies reconstructionism is on the whole a theory firmly opposed to indoctrination.

24. The difference is discussed in the wider context of historical change theories by Sklair, L., op. cit., ch. VII "Two concepts of progress". Sklair distinguishes between innovatory and non-innovatory change. This distinction should not be drawn sharply as the reconstructionists, while primarily innovators, did not by any means exclude non-innovatory change - i.e., "the maintenance and spread of familiar things for the solution of problems" (ib. p. 117).

25. On the social core curriculum see chs. XI, section 2.3.1, and XII, sections 3 and 4; and Smith, B.O., Stanley, W.O. and Shores, J.H. Fundamentals of Curriculum Development. (rev. ed.). New York, Harcourt, Brace and World, 1957, chs. 14 and 15.

Chapter II

1. It should be noted that it is only the first chapter of the report which I discuss. This chapter provides a rationale for and a legitimation of the report as a whole; it is a public statement of a very definite viewpoint about the proper relationship of educational thinking and institutions to national policy objectives in a country undergoing rapid, unsettling changes. Thus, for my purposes, it is a highly significant reconstructionist document, although, of course, it may be treated in different ways for other purposes, particularly political and administrative purposes within India itself.

2. A comparison of the membership of the Plowden and Kothari committees, together with the subdivision of topics in their respective reports, would bring out these differences very strikingly. The Central Advisory Council for Education (Chairman: Lady Plowden) The Children and their Primary Schools. London, H.M.S.O., 1966.

3. I discuss the reconstructionist quest for culture order in chs. V, section 1.2; VI, section 2.1; VII, sections 1.6 and 4; VIII, section 2; IX, section 1.

4. See below, chs. X and XIV.

5. This has become the common approach in so-called developing societies. See, for example, Gardiner, R.K.A. (Executive Secretary, U.N. Economic Commission for Africa): speech to Commonwealth Conference on Rural Education; University of Ghana, 1970, reproduced in Intercultural Education, 1, 8, Aug.-Sept. 1970; and Nyerere, J.K. Education for Self-Reliance. Dar Es Salaam, Government Printer, 1967. It has long been practised in the Soviet Union: Pinkevitch, P. The New Education in the Soviet Union. (trans. N. Perlmutter, ed. G.S. Counts). New York, John Day, 1929, ch. 7 "The school and society".

6. See below, ch. VI, section 2.1; and VIII, section 2.

7. Kothari Report, p. 22.

8. See Fox, R.G. "Varna schemes and ideological integration in Indian society". Comparative Studies in Society and History, 11, 1969, pp. 27-45. Fox describes varna categories as ideological models which provide culturally stereotyped standards to be absorbed by local caste groups (p. 43) - hence they would be effective barriers to the realization of some of the Kothari objectives. Educational difficulties arising over ideological differances, and ways of overcoming them, are discussed in Kabir, Humayun "National integration in India" in Brembeck, C.S., and Hansen, J.W. (eds.): Education and the Development of Nations. New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966; and in a lively

piece of reconstructionist writing by Saiyidain, K.G. Education, Culture and the Social Order. Bombay, Asia Pub. House, 1958. (2nd ed.).

9. Quoted in Moddie, A.D. Brahmanical Culture and Modernity. Bombay, Asia Pub. House, 1968.

10. See Polanyi, M., op. cit., pp. 53-54 on tacit elements in a tradition.

11. For example, D.H. Lawrence who savagely criticized the "man-making" aspirations of an earlier reconstructionist, Benjamin Franklin. Studies in Classic American Literature. London, Heinemann, 1964.

12. Nozhko, K., et al. Educational Planning in the U.S.S.R. Paris, Unesco, International Institute for Educational Planning, 1968. See especially the observations of the I.I.E.P. mission to the U.S.S.R., pp. 227-238. Compare Dewey's views (in 1929) on the dignity of the Soviet teacher, a consequence of his direct involvement in major socio-economic decisions. See p.554.

13. Aron, R. The Industrial Society. London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967.

14. Committee on Higher Education. (Chairman: Lord Robbins) Higher Education. London, H.M.S.O., 1963, vol. 1, p. 48 f. and pp. 70-74.

15. Beeby, C.E. The Quality of Education in Developing Countries. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1966, ch. 2.

16. ib., p. 1. However, in chs. IX and XV I argue that by no means all of the earlier reconstructionist thinking has been superseded.

17. See below, ch. XIII, section 3.

18. See below, ch. XII, section 6.6.

19. See below, chs. XIII and XIV.

20. Central Advisory Council for Education (Chairman: John Newsom) Half Our Future. London, H.M.S.O., 1963.

21. Scheffler, I. "Educational relevance". Journal of Philosophy, Nov. 1969: "Relevant to what, how, and why? - that is the question".

22. See Cassirer, E. The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. New Haven, (Conn.), Yale University Press, 1953-1957. 3 vols.; Phenix, P. Realms of Meaning. New York, McGraw-Hill, 1964; Reid, L.A. Ways of Knowledge and Experience. London, Allen and Unwin, 1961. The Kothari Committee did not of course propose an exclusive emphasis on science, but pressed for a substantial increase in the scientific components of the curriculum, and for the cultivation of a scientific mentality.

23. Dewey, J. The School and Society. Chicago University Press, 1915 (rev. ed.); The Schools Council. Closer Links Between Teachers and Industry and Commerce. London, H.M.S.O., 1963 (Working paper, No. 7); Shapovalenko, S.G. (ed.) Polytechnical Education in the U.S.S.R. Paris, Unesco, 1963; Simons, D. George Kerschensteiner. London, Methuen, 1966, chs. 2, 4, 8.

24. Fichte, J.G. Addresses to the German Nation (trans. R.F. Jones and G.H. Turnbull). Chicago, Open Court Pub. Co., 1922. (Fichte combined a thoroughgoing nationalistic enthusiasm for the revival of the German nation through education with a great admiration for Pestalozzian methods); Gentile, G. The Reform of Education (trans. D. Bigongiari, intro. by B. Croce). London, Benn Bros., 1923, p. 22 et pass.; Nietzsche, F. On the Future of Our Educational Institutions (trans. and intro. by J.M. Kennedy). Edinburgh, T.N. Foulis, 1909, lecture II.

25. Pareto, V. Sociological Writings. Selected and introduced by S.E. Finer. London, Pall Mall Press, 1966, p. 51 f. and 247 ff.

26. Beeby, C., op. cit., ch. 4.

27. See below, ch. XIV.

28. "Reformed" schools are not necessarily successful either in this respect. See Heintz, P. "Education as an instrument of social integration in underdeveloped countries". International Social Science Journal, 19, 3, 1967, pp. 378-386.

Chapter III

1. The range of positions is illustrated by: Green, M. and Wilding, M. Cultural Policy in Great Britain. Paris, Unesco, 1970 ("culture" used to refer to "high arts"); Nietzsche, F., op. cit. (culture as the submission to models of excellence); Jaeger, W., op. cit. (culture as a quest for definite standards); Wollheim, R. Socialism and Culture. London, The Fabian Society, 1961 (culture as socialist ideals of knowledge, values, work, social relationships, etc.); Williams, R. The Long Revolution. London, Chatto and Windus, 1961 (culture as an ideal, as particular ways of life, and as documentary records of human thought and expression); Hoggart, R. Speaking to Each Other. London, Chatto and Windus, 1970. Vol. 1. About Society; Vol. 2. About Literature (a distinction between "living" and "dead" culture is substituted for the conventional "high", "low" distinction, Vol. 1, pp. 131-134).

2. Kroeber, A.L. and Kluckhohn, C., op. cit., p. 308.

3. Bidney, D. Theoretical Anthropology. New York, Schocken Books, 1967, p. xv.

4. Court, E.W. "The biological basis of human sociality". American Anthropologist, 60, 1958, pp. 1049-85. Reprinted in Montagu, M.F.A. (ed) Culture, Man's Adaptive Dimension. New York, Oxford University Press, 1968, pp. 135-136.

5. Jensen, A.R. "How much can we boost IQ and scholastic achievement?" Harvard Educational Review, 39, 1, Winter 1969, pp. 1-123.

6. Kagan, J.S. et al. "Discussion. How much can we boost IQ and scholastic achievement?" Harvard Educational Review, 39, 2, Spring 1969, pp. 273-356.

7. Alsberg, P., op. cit. For the argument that man has acquired a somatic dependence on culture, see Geertz, C., art. cit., "without men there would be no cultural forms. But ... without cultural forms there would be no men" (p. 46). Geertz extended the argument from the articulation of knowledge to the articulation of feelings, through culture.

8. Alsberg was aware of the danger of creating a spirit-body dualism, but by his elevation of public symbolization, especially language, he minimized the significance both of gesture, movement and various other forms of bodily expression, and of impulsive behavior.

9. I have necessarily drawn on a limited range of sources: Durkheim, E. The Rules of Sociological Method. 8th ed. (trans. S.A. Solovay and J.H. Mueller ...). Glencoe (Ill.), The Free Press, 1938; Education and Sociology (trans. and intro. by S.D. Fox). New York, The Free Press, 1956; The Division of Labour in Society (trans. G. Simpson). New York, The Free Press, 1964; "Individualism and the intellectuals" ("L'Individualisme et les intellectuels", Revue bleue, ser. 4, 1898);

Bidney, D., op. cit.; Parsons, T. The Structure of Social Action. New York, The Free Press, 1968, Vol. 1 (especially for the development of Durkheim's thought, and his conception of the social dimension "as consisting essentially in a common system of rules of moral obligation, of institutions, governing the actions of men in a community", p. 463). On this latter point, see also Neyer, J. "Individualism and socialism in Durkheim" in Wolff, K.H. (ed.) Emile Durkheim. Columbus. Ohio State University Press, 1960.

10. Durkheim, E. The Rules of Sociological Method, pp. 5-7. Durkheim distinguished "social" from "individual" facts, leaving the latter to psychologists and others. It is his treatment of education as a social fact, and as essentially a moulding process, which I emphasize in this discussion.

11. This is a debatable point. See the discussion of Durkheim and Marx below, Ch. IX, section 2.4.1., and The Rules of Sociological Method. Conclusion.

12. Durkheim's views on the perception of social phenomena give primacy to processes of reception and assimilation: these phenomena impress themselves, or are impressed upon individuals, e.g., through education. Piaget has been one of Durkheim's most acute critics. His theory of psychic equilibrium gives far more emphasis than does Durkheim to the activities of the subject, the person, in accommodating the schemata (the hereditary basis of representations) to actual situations. This is a continuing task of individual development, of great significance both for the theory of culture conceived as process, and for education conceived as an interactive process of progressive environmental mastery. See Piaget, J. The Moral Judgment of the Child. Glencoe (Ill.), The Free Press of Glencoe, 1948, ch. IV; and Piaget, J. Six Psychological Studies (trans. Anita Tenzer, ed. D. Elkind) University of London Press, 1968. Editor's introduction, pp. 7-8.

13. See Coser, L.A. "Durkheim's conservatism and its implications for his sociological theory" in Wolff, K.H. (ed.), op. cit. This point is a matter of emphasis. Durkheim did of course acknowledge social change and a critical role for individuals.
There is nevertheless in his theory a hiatus between the two realms of social coercion and individual freedom; see Education and Sociology, pp. 71-2.

14. On ideational and non-ideational theories of social change, see Cohen, P.S. Modern Social Theory. London, Heinemann, 1968, ch. 7. It should be noted that the theory of organic solidarity represented an attempt on Durkheim's part to counterbalance the constraints on individual action implied by the notion of mechanical solidarity. In the latter condition, the person as a unique entity vanishes and action is totally dominated by "the collective life". The Division of Labour in Society, Book 1 and Conclusion.

15. The Rules of Sociological Method, p. 3.

16. ib., p. 10.

17. ib., pp. 4-7.

18. On this point, see Parsons' defence of the later Durkheim, op. cit., ch. X.

19. See Note 12, and Education and Sociology, passim.

20. Individualism and the Intellectuals, op. cit.

21. ib. See also Education and Sociology, pp. 89-90, where Durkheim argues that, although, through education, adults can "transform the young and permeate them with the religious and moral practices, the national traditions, and the group consciousness which are the essential heritage of social being", within this same process man is endowed with the freedom provided by self-mastery, rationality and a sense of duty.

22. These theories may be based on a distortion or a false interpretation of Durkheim, as Parsons alleges that Piaget's critique is, but it should be remembered that Durkheim's own account of educational processes incorporated definitions and outlooks reminiscent of the Plato of The Laws. The coercive, moulding, reproductive and assimilative role of social tradition, exercised through educational institutions, is central in his Education and Sociology.

23. Aron, R. Progress and Disillusion. London, Pall Mall Press, 1968, p. 120. Aron also makes his conservative educational preferences clear in his sardonic analysis of the French student uprisings of 1968: The Elusive Revolution (trans. G. Clough). London, Pall Mall Press, 1969, ch. 5.

24. Sumner, W.G. "Sociology" (1881), and "The Absurd Effort to Make The World Over" (1884) reprinted in Miller, P. (ed.). American Thought. Civil War to World War I. New York, Rinehart and Co., 1954.

25. Education and Sociology. See Note 21.

26. Bidney, D., op. cit., p. 195.

27. Gough, K. "World revolution and the science of man" in Roszak, T. (ed.). The Dissenting Academy. Harmondsworth (Middlesex), Penguin Books, 1969. Gough asks for a statement from anthropologists of the "human goals" of their science, and for the abandonment of "spurious neutrality".

28. Jaeger, W., op. cit.

29. Whitehead illustrates how close, through a common interest in perfectibility, theorists in the Greek classical tradition, including Whitehead himself, are to the reconstructionists: "life is an offensive, directed against the repetitious mechanism of the Universe ... a policy of sociological defence is doomed to failure. We are analysing those types of social functioning which provide that expansion and novelty which life demands. Life can only be understood as an aim at that perfection which the conditions of its

environment allow. But the aim is always beyond the attained fact. The goal is always some type of perfected things, however lowly and basically sensual." Adventures of Ideas. Harmondsworth (Middlesex), Penguin Books, 1948 (1933), p. 101. Similar views on life as purposive striving were expressed by the pragmatist William James and the creative evolutionists, Bergson and Shaw. The historical quest for human perfectibility is analysed in Passmore, J., op. cit.

30. Hallowell, A.I. "Self, society, and culture in phylogenetic perspective" in Tax, S. (ed.) The Evolution of Man. University of Chicago Press, 1960 (reprinted in Montagu, M.F.A.(ed) Culture, Man's Adaptive Dimension. New York, Oxford University Press, 1968.)

31. Montagu, M.F.A. "Brains, culture, gestation" in Montagu, M.F.A. (ed.), op. cit.

32. Kroeber, A.L. and Kluckhohn, C., op. cit., p. 182 f.

33. J. Huizinga, quoted in Weintraub, K.J., op. cit., p. 219.

34. W. Jaeger, quoted in Kroeber, A.L. and Kluckhohn, C., op. cit., p. 60.

35. This tradition is amply documented in Kroeber, A.L. and Kluckhohn, C., op. cit.

Chapter IV

1. McBriar, A.M. Fabian Socialism and English Politics, 1884-1918. Cambridge University Press, 1962, chs. 2 and 3. McBriar outlines Fabian political doctrines and contrasts them with rival movements. See also Cole, Margaret "The Webbs and social theory". British Journal of Sociology, XII, 2, June 1961, pp. 93-101 for the contrast with Marxism; and Pease, E.R. The History of the Fabian Society. London, A.G. Fifield, 1916, ch. 1 "The sources of Fabian socialism". R.H. Tawney in The Webbs in Perspective. London, The Athlone Press, 1953, describes the Webbs as the intellectual leaders of British socialism whose greatest contributions lay in political theory and in shaping the climate of political and social thought.

2. Letwin, S.R. The Pursuit of Certainty. Cambridge University Press, 1965. Less hostile appraisals of her contribution to the scientific study of society are, Cole, M., art. cit.; and "Labour research" in Cole, Margaret (ed.) The Webbs and Their Work. London, Frederick Muller, 1950; and Simey, T.S. "The contribution of Sidney and Beatrice Webb to sociology". British Journal of Sociology, XII, 2, June 1961, pp. 106-123.

3. Simey, T.S., art. cit., p. 109.

4. Shaw, G.B. The Fabian Society, its Early History. London, Fabian Society, Tract 41, 1892 (1914 reprint).

5. Shaw's appraisal of Sidney Webb sums this up: "A few weeks after I joined the Zetetical Society I was much struck by a speaker... He knew all about the subject of the debate; knew more than the lecturer; knew more than anybody present; had read everything that had ever been written; and remembered all the facts that bore on the subject." Shaw,G.B. Sixteen Self Sketches: XI "Fruitful Friendships." London, Constable, 1949, p. 65. See also Beatrice on Sidney (1926) "he is, in fact, not a public personage at all, he is a private citizen with public aims and expert knowledge". Webb, Beatrice Our Partnership (ed. B. Drake and M. Cole). London, Longmans, Green, 1948, p. 6.

6. Webb, S. The Difficulties of Individualism. London, Fabian Society, Tract 69, 1896, p. 3. On the Webbs' utilitarianism, see McBriar, A.M., op. cit., p. 149 f., and Webb, Beatrice. Ms. diary, Dec. 8 and 9, 1903, Our Partnership, p. 39.

7. Webb, B. My Apprenticeship. London, Longmans, Green, 1926, p. 27.

8. Webb, B. Our Partnership, op. cit., pp. 43-44. But she learned from Spencer to think about society as a total system, and to cultivate detachment from her material, a task which, as her diaries reveal, she never found wholly congenial.

9. Webb, B. My Apprenticeship, op. cit., p. 173.

10. Webb, B. ib., p. 430. Leonard Woolf emphasized this in paying tribute to their influence on methods of political study: "the Webbs taught us to regard all social institutions as the natural genera and species of communal life, to study their dynamic history, and to classify them according to the functions which they performed," in Cole, M. (ed.), op. cit., "Political thought at the Webbs", p. 50 f. For a discussion of the distinctive qualities of this method in relation to traditional economic analysis and social survey procedures, see McBriar, A.M., op. cit., p. 50 f.

11. Cassirer, E. The Logic of the Humanities, p. 189.

12. Beatrice's continuing interest in this personal world is revealed in My Apprenticeship and Our Partnership. She has been frequently criticized for neglecting it. Margaret Cole, for example, criticized the Webbs' proposals for social reorganization on the grounds that they "seemed only to be interested in 'institutional devices' to the neglect of people": Cole, M. "The Webbs and social theory", art. cit., p. 102. More powerfully, Shirley Letwin, op. cit., identified Beatrice's impersonal basis for social reform: "Her own feelings were all against a concern with personality or individuals as the basis of reforming society," (p. 356), and "Peace and salvation lay not in anything connected with passion, emotion, or personality, but in the supremacy of reason, conscience, and self-abnegation" (p. 350). Both criticisms, relevant to the Webbs' polemical works, overlook the revelation of a concerned and passionate personality in Beatrice's autobiographical writings, and her explicit repudiation of Spencer and of science itself in attempting "to realize the cause or the aim of human existence" Ms. diary, Dec. 8, 9, 1903, My Apprenticeship, op. cit., p. 39.

13. The obvious reference is to the first part of Capital, a detailed empirical inquiry into the documents of British industrial capitalism. Engels' attack on the Fabians as dominated by money, intrigue and careerism, etc., is characteristic, yet the difference between Marx and Webb can be exaggerated. Marx's last published work was "A Worker's Inquiry", a Booth-influenced, questionnaire-based study of the facts of social conditions under capitalism, in the hope of securing remedial legislation. See Feuer, L.S. (ed.) Marx and Engels: Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy. London, Collins (Fontana Library) 1969. Introduction, p. 33, and p. 484. Shaw acknowledged Marx's contribution to the fact-finding tradition in his Sixteen Self Sketches. London, Constable, 1949, p. 67, but was a critic of Marxian economics. See McBriar, A.M., op. cit., p. 30 f.

14. Ms. diary, Sept. 21, 1894, Our Partnership, p. 86. I have singled out the London School of Economics and Political Science to illustrate the Webbs' determination to institutionalize empirical inquiry. Their zeal for institutionalizing is seen in the programme and researches of the Fabian Society; Sidney's work on the Technical Education Board; his work with R.B. Haldane, to establish a new constitution for the University of London, and for the Imperial College of Science and Technology; the founding of the New Statesman; the reorganization of Labour Party policy after 1917;

and the work in producing minority reports (Commission on Labour and the Eight Hour Day, on the Aged Poor, on the Poor Law). See Beveridge's "Introduction" to Cole, M. (ed.) Beatrice Webb's Diaries, 1912-1924. London, Longmans, Green, 1952; and McBriar, A.M., op. cit.

15. Beveridge, W. "The London School of Economics and the University of London" in Cole, M. (ed.) The Webbs and Their Work. London, Frederick Muller, 1950.

16. But Shaw in Tract 116, Fabianism and the Fiscal Question. London, Fabian Society, 1904, advocated "more technical instruction in industrial and political science" - new universities, comprised of technical schools, to supplement Oxford and Cambridge.

17. Beveridge, W., art. cit., p. 51.

18. See Fremantle, Anne. This Little Band of Prophets. New York, Mentor, 1959, p. 126 f.

19. Ms. diary, Feb. 20, 1900, Our Partnership, pp. 195-196.

20. Early signs of this relationship between scientific study and social reform are to be found in Beatrice's reflections on Herbert Spencer: "It was after Mother's death - in the first years of mental vigour - that I read First Principles and followed his generalizations through Biology, Psychology and Sociology. This generalization illuminated my mind; the importance of functional adaption was, for instance, at the basis of a good deal of the faith in collective regulation that I afterwards developed. Once engaged in the application of the scientific method to the facts of social organization, in my observation of East End life, of co-operation, of Factory Acts, of Trade Unionism, I shook myself completely free from laissez-faire bias - in fact I suffered from a somewhat violent reaction from it." My Apprenticeship, p. 38.

21. Feuer, L.S. (ed.) op. cit., "Introduction". The role of knowledge in social change is stressed more by certain contemporary Marxists than it was by Marx himself: Marek, F. Philosophy of World Revolution (trans. Daphne Simon). London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1969 (1966, Vienna).

22. Popper, K. The Open Society and its Enemies, op. cit., Vol. 1, Ch. 9.

23. Ms. diary, Whitsun, 1896, Our Partnership, pp. 132-133.

24. ibid., p. 145. There are numerous references in Our Partnership to the permeation tactics of the Webbs themselves, especially in relation to the 1902 and 1903 (London) Education Acts, L.S.E., and the University of London. In view of Beatrice's open acknowledgement of hers and Sidney's "wire-pulling" it is surprising to find Tawney arguing that this was a tactic they rarely used. (The Webbs in Perspective. pp. 4-5). The difficulty of establishing the effectiveness of even one exercise in permeation may be illustrated by the variety of interpretations historians have given to Sidney's part

24. in the 1902 bill. This is partly a result of his preference for "multitudinous anonymous activities" (Our Partnership, p. 214). It is no part of the present study to assess the practical effectiveness of Fabian ideas, a problem whose complexity may be illustrated as follows: In education perhaps the greatest Fabian legislative success was the 1902 Education Act. H.C. Dent refers to Sidney Webb's "important part" in bringing about the Act, (Change in English Education. University of London Press, 1952, p. 40) and comments that Webb "did more than anyone else to convince the public that educational reform was necessary" (ib. p. 34). Just how significant Webb's part in the 1902 Act was is not clear. Some historians have ignored him when discussing the Act (e.g., J. Leese Personalities and Power in English Education. London, Arnold, 1950, and Eaglesham, E.J.R. The Foundations of Twentieth Century Education in England. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967. Eaglesham is the leading exponent of the view that Morant was the decisive force - indeed, his book is virtually a study of Morant as the "foundation" of modern education). J.W. Adamson (English Education, 1789-1902. Cambridge University Press, 1930), failed to appreciate that not all representatives of "the Radical tradition" would oppose the Bill, and made no reference to the Radical Webb's work on behalf of the Bill. B. Simon (Education and the Labour Movement, 1870-1920. London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1965), a Marxist critic of Webb's "pragmatic opportunism", cautiously if somewhat misleadingly evades the issue by affirming that Webb and the Fabian Society "took up a position fully in accord with the policy advocated by Gorst and Morant, the Church of England and the Tory Party"(p207). At the other extreme, there appears to be some confusion. Mary Agnes Hamilton (Sidney and Beatrice Webb. London, Simpson, Long Marston and Co., 1932) makes a number of extravagant claims for the Webbs (some of which have been repeated by later writers), including the view that Sidney Webb was the "onlie begetter of the 1902, 1903 Acts": "Politically, of course, the Balfour Government is the author of the Acts of 1902 and 1903; but their 'onlie begetter' is the author of Fabian Tract No. 106 - The Education Muddle and the Way Out. On its title page, this Tract bears no name. In its first form, it was not drafted by Sidney Webb: indeed, he objected to the original draft. Thereupon it was remitted to him to redraft; as published in 1901 it was his handiwork. Before it actually appeared in this form, Sir John Gorst, then President [sic. He was Vice-President] of the Board of Education sent down to the Fabian Offices, and asked to be supplied with fifteen galley proofs of Webb's Tract No. 106 for the instruction of the Cabinet. So far as Gorst himself went, and so far as Mr. Balfour, the Prime Minister, went, their instruction had been carried through some time before this, at 41 Grosvenor Road". (pp. 127-128). Beatrice Webb, however, makes it very clear that, by 1902, Gorst was finished, both for the Cabinet and for the Webbs, who had turned Gorst over, working instead through the rising star Robert Morant. (Our Partnership, pp. 239-240). G.A.N. Lowndes (The Silent Social Revolution. London, Oxford University Press, 1937) claims that the pamphlet Gorst saw was the original, not Webb's revision, and that Morant guided Balfour in the passage of the Bill, but that Webb's contribution, nonetheless, "had been no mean one" (p. 92) (repeated in the second edition, 1968, p. 73, footnote). R.H. Tawney, in The Attack and Other Papers. London, G. Allen and

24. Unwin, 1953, simply says that "Webb's tract on The Education Muddle and the Way Out ... helped to supply the ideas for the Education Act of 1902" (p. 139); while Élie Halévy in his History of the English People: Epilogue (1895-1905). Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1939, avoids this complication but holds that the suggestion for the Bill emanated from the Education Department, "which found a valuable ally in the person of Sidney Webb. It was Sidney Webb whose propaganda had rendered the Liberal experts powerless, and who had managed to create through the press a public opinion favourable to the Bill ... At their [the Fabians] instigation Tory politicians had introduced into the law of Great Britain without intending, or even being aware of it, an important measure of educational Socialism" (book 2, pp. 123-124) R.C.K. Ensor, in the chapter entitled "Permeation" in The Webbs and Their Work, ed. Margaret Cole, suggests that Morant was the "parent" of the Bills, while Webb's role was that of midwife, influential with the Bryce Commission and with Balfour, and called on to campaign strenuously on behalf of the 1903 proposals for London. E.R. Pease, in his propagandist History of the Fabian Society. London, A.G. Fifield, 1916, claimed that the 1902 Act "followed almost precisely the lines laid down in our tract" (Tract 106, p. 145), and that the educational scheme of the society "was entirely the work of Sidney Webb" (p. 142). On this argument, Webb sired the 1902 Act. Lord Haldane in his An Autobiography. London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1929, casts Webb into a subsidiary role. This is significant, since Haldane, though a Liberal at that time, worked in close conjunction with Webb in educational matters in London. Even Beatrice Webb, who lost no opportunity to record Sidney's achievements, did not make the claim that the 1902 and 1903 Acts were basically Fabian in inspiration; and she showed that the Webbs' ends were not those of Morant, the "aristocrat" (Beatrice Webb's Diaries, 1912-1924, ed. Margaret Cole, London, Longmans, Green and Co., 1952, pp. 97-98). However, A.V. Judges ("The educational influence of the Webbs", British Journal of Educational Studies, XI, 1, Nov. 1961, pp. 33-48) claims that through Tract 106 Sidney "greatly influenced the drafting of the Education Bill", and refers to "a conspiracy of modesty about Sidney's real claim to be the father of the Bill of 1902"(p.44). The final word must be with E.J. Brennan, who has made the most detailed - if also a very uncritical - study of Webb's work as an educational administrator: "Sidney Webb and the Technical Education Board", The Vocational Aspect, XI, 23; XII, 24; XIII, 27; XIV, 28; 1959-1962. Brennan follows Ensor in analysing Webb's evidence to the Bryce Commission on Secondary Education, and, a point generally overlooked, shows how Webb's chairmanship of the London Technical Education Board provided the Unionists with evidence that a successful county-council based education system could supplant that based on the school boards. Brennan's conclusion is that Webb played "a part at least as important as that of Sir Robert Morant". No conclusive answer to the question of Webb's influence on the 1902 and 1903 Acts can be given, but it is clear that his role involved the shaping of opinion, through his writings and, perhaps more important, through conversations, and that his work at the London Technical Education Board was a practical demonstration of some of the ways in which the new local authorities might work. Thus, studies seeking to establish the influence of the Fabians should attend both to the intangible but

24. important questions of the determinants of climates of opinion, and to the detailed working of institutions in which the Fabians played a leading part.

25. Details in McBriar, A.M., op. cit., Chs. 8-9.

26. Phillips, W.L. Why are the Many Poor? London, Fabian Society, Tract 1, 1884, p. 3.

27. Wilson, Mrs. C.M., et al. What Socialism Is. London, Fabian Society, Tract 13, 1886.

28. Webb, S. Socialism True and False. London, Fabian Society, Tract 51, 1894, p. 10.

29. Morris, W. Communism (intro. by G.B. Shaw). London, Fabian Society, Tract 113, 1903 (reprint), p. 3.

30. Shaw, G.B. Basis of the Fabian Society. London, Fabian Society, 5th ed. rev., 1896.

31. "Basis of the Fabian Society, 1919" reprinted in Fremantle, A. This Little Band of Prophets. New York, Mentor, 1959, p. 263.

32. Notably B. Webb Our Partnership, ch. 11 "Municipal and university administration, 1892-1898"; McBriar, A.M., op. cit., ch. 8; Brennan, B.J., arts. cit.

33. See Webb S. London Education. London, Longmans Green and Co., 1903; also, see Ch. XIII, section 1. McBriar, A.M., op. cit., discusses this point, together with other arguments the Fabians directed against Marxism, p. 65 f.

34. Clarke, J.S. "The break-up of the Poor Law" in Cole, M. (ed.) The Webbs and Their Work; McBriar, A.M., op. cit., pp. 330-331.

35. Regimentation: "The social system they stand for has largely been realized by one State. Germany has gone further along the Webb route than any other nation. In the rebound against all German things it is natural, even if unreasonable, that all apostles of regimentation should incur some degree of depreciation" (Raymond, E.T., Uncensored Celebrities. London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1918).
Anti-democratic: Section 2.3
Humourless: "He was somewhat earnest, and did not like jokes on sacred subjects such as political theory. On one occasion I remarked to him that democracy has at least one merit, namely, that a member of parliament cannot be stupider than his constituents, for the more stupid he is, the more stupid they were to elect him. Webb was seriously annoyed and said bitingly, 'that is the sort of argument I don't like'" (ib. Russell, B. Portraits from Memory and Other Essays. London, G. Allen and Unwin, 1956, p. 99).
Narrow: "Their ruthless concentration upon a limited field of human life and a curious habit of open-minded dogmatism gave to their thought a dangerous narrowness" L. Woolf in M. Cole (ed.), op. cit., p. 267.

36. Passmore, J., op. cit., passim.

37. Webb, S. The Difficulties of Individualism. London, Fabian Society, Tract 69, 1896, p. 3. For an analysis of differences between social discoveries and inventions, see Sklair, L., op. cit., p. 119 f.

38. Webb, S. Towards Social Democracy? London, Fabian Society, 1916, p. 34.

39. Webb, S. The Difficulties of Individualism, p. 15.

40. Thus, on the grounds that the Webbs proposed gradual constitutional changes, Margaret Cole said they believed in democracy of consent. ("The Webbs and social theory", art. cit.). Gradualness in the 1890s, however, did not mean popular consent to Sidney, but the working out of an inevitable trend. Some other Fabians explicitly rejected popular consent, notably G.B. Shaw.

41. Webb, S. Labour in the Longest Reign. London, Fabian Society, Tract 75, 1897, p. 18.

42. Webb, S. and B. The Prevention of Destitution. London, Longmans, Green, 1911, p. 294.

43. ib., p. 22.

44. Webb, S. and B. The Decay of Capitalist Civilization. London, Fabian Society and G. Allen and Unwin, 1923 (3rd ed.), p. 6.

45. ib., p. 62.

46. McBriar, A.M., op. cit., pp. 159-160; Letwin, S., op. cit., p. 368.

47. Hoggart, R. The Uses of Literacy. London, Chatto and Windus, 1957. But Matthew Arnold, in Culture and Anarchy, had drawn attention to the deficiencies in middle class life and the Webbs' close friend, G.B. Shaw, devoted most of his plays to denouncing them.

48. This criticism is very apparent in The Apple Cart. London, Constable, 1930, Preface, and in Everybody's Political What's What. London, Constable, 1944.

49. Wells' position is discussed in Ch. V. Tawney's position, which I have only alluded to, was a form of Christian Socialism with a strong equalitarian bias: See Equality. London, Allen and Unwin, 1931.

50. Repeated by A.M. McBriar, op. cit.; "The Webbs were the main advocates (amongst socialists) of 'piecemeal social engineering'" (p. 56).

51. "determinedly bureaucratic right through ... practically no reference to the individual life or personality; it is all Committees, Boards, Departments, Councils, kept in order by perpetual audit and examination - by endless Measurement and Publicity" "The Webbs and social

theory", art. cit., p. 102. "Measurement and Publicity" is an allusion to the argument in The Socialist Commonwealth, that every enterprise should be made to account to the community accurately and publicly and that therefore a vast increase in social science research is needed.

52. Letwin, S., op. cit.

53. Sidney defended Committee management in industry in Tract 196 The Root of Labour Unrest, 1920. In The Consumers' Co-operative Movement, ch. 6 "The future of consumers' co-operation", a network of co-operatives, local government agencies, trade unions andprofessional associations is proposed as a democratic substitute for capitalism. Sidney defended grants in aid, as a means of strengthening local government and stabilizing relations with nation and government, in Grants in Aid. London, Longmans, Green and Co., 1911.

54. "The General Will of the community, which Democracy seeks to discover, is not and cannot be found by attempting to represent, for all purposes, the whole varied complex of emotions and desires that are joined together in the individual elector" The Socialist Commonwealth, p. 102. The Webbs had nothing to contribute to reducing the confusions of general will theory. They reduced its complexities to an unanalysed and uncertain relationship between the expressed wants of the electorate and the divinations, by duly constituted groups of experts, of community "needs". These needs in certain respects resemble Durkheim's social facts: they are not reducible to individual expressions of want or intention. On the confusions in "general will" theorizing, see Carritt, E.F. Morals and Politics. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1935, p. 202 f.

55. "with Socialists, it is not a question of 'socializing' at one blow or in any one way, the whole of industry, and all services,but of providing the most advantageous form of administration for each ..." The Socialist Commonwealth, p. 147.

56. Shaw, G.B., The Intelligent Woman's Guide to Socialism and Capitalism. London, Constable, 1928, pp. 68-70 et pass.

57. "Introduction" to M. Cole (ed.) Beatrice Webb's Diaries, p. v.

58. My Apprenticeship, pp. 338-339.

59. See McMillan, Margaret. The Life of Rachel McMillan. London, Dent, 1927, and Mansbridge, A. Margaret McMillan, Prophet and Pioneer: Her Life and Work. London, Dent, 1932.

60. Webb, S. "Twentieth century politics" in The Basis and Policy of Socialism. London, Fabian Society, A.C. Fifield, 1909.

61. Webb, S. Towards Social Democracy?, p. 34.

62. ib., p. 35.

63. "For the right moment you must wait, as Fabius did most patiently when warring against Hannibal, though many censured his delays; but when the time comes you must strike hard, as Fabius did, or your waiting will be in vain and fruitless." Motto of the Fabian Society. See Fabian Tract 7, Capital and Land, 1888, title page.

64. Shaw, G.B. Preface (1930) Fabian Essays in Socialism. London, Allen and Unwin, 1948, p. xi .

65. Webb, S. "The basis of Socialism, Historic", in Shaw, G.B. (ed.) Fabian Essays in Socialism, London, Fabian Society, 1889, p. 32.

66. Everybody's Political What's What, op. cit., pp. 46, 352.

67. Wells, H.G. The New Machiavelli. Works, Atlantic Ed., Vol. XIV. London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1925 (1911).

68. Ms. diary, Dec. 29, 1884, Our Partnership, p. 120.

69. See Fremantle, A., op. cit., p. 191.

70. Russell, B. Portraits from Memory and Other Essays, p. 101.

71. Tawney, R.H. The Webbs in Perspective, p. 6.

72. McBriar, A.M., op. cit., p. 126.

73. Halévy, E. A History of the English People: Epilogue, (1895-1905) Bk. 1 Imperialism. Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1939; Haldane, R.B. An Autobiography. London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1929.

74. Webb, S. The Labour Party on the Threshold. London, Fabian Society, Tract 207, 1923.

75. Middleton, J.S. "Webb and the Labour Party" in Cole M. (ed.), op. cit.; McBriar, A.M., op. cit., ch. XI, especially pp. 336-345.

Chapter V

1. Wells, H.G. Experiment in Autobiography. London, V. Gollancz and Cressett Press, Vol. 1, 1934, chs. 1-5. The struggle is also documented in many of Wells' earlier novels, e.g. The History of Mr. Polly, Love and Mr. Lewisham, Kipps, and The Wheels of Chance, whose heroes were all, in Wells' words, "personalities thwarted and crippled by the defects of our contemporary civilization": Preface, Works, Atlantic Edition, Vol. VII. London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1925.

2. Locomotion and Administration. Works, Atlantic Ed., Vol. IV. London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1924 (1902). Wells did at times commend Fabian fact gathering, for example, on population trends, (Mr. Britling, Works, Atlantic Edition, vol. XXII. London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1926 (1916), p. 385.); and, occasionally, he used the Fabian technique of amassing factual data to demolish some current misconception - e.g., the mythology of healthy contented homes under capitalism is rebutted in New Worlds for Old. London, Archibald Constable, 1908. See also his own curious foray into the fecundity of the episcopacy: Mankind in the Making. London, Chapman and Hall, 1904. 4th ed., pp. 90, and 418-420.

3. Satires on Wells scarcely do him justice. His playfulness with ideas is unbounded. See, for example, his delightful children's book, Floor Games. London, Frank Palmer, 1911.

4. Works, Atlantic Edition, vol. XVI. London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1926, p. 505.

5. ib., p. 518.

6. In the Days of the Comet. London, Macmillan, 1906, p. 144.

7. However, Wells was an extremely complex figure, and despite his repugnance for squalor some of his most vivid writing has for its subject the impoverished lives of the upper working classes. Most of his utopian romances are, by contrast, rather flat. Significantly, they spring to life when the conditions of utopia are contrasted with the old order, for example, the life of the Smith family in lodgings in Pimlico, in The Dream, Works, Atlantic Edition, vol. XXVIII. London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1927 (1924).

8. The World of William Clissold. 3 vols. London, E. Benn, 1926, vol. 1, p. 166.

9. New Worlds for Old, p. 28.

10. The New Machiavelli, Works, Atlantic Edition, vol. XIV. London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1925 (1911), p. 48.

11. ib., p. 154.

12. There is also a suggestion of a satire of the Webbs in the characters of the Goopes in Wells' Shavian novel, Ann Veronica, Works, Atlantic Edition, vol. XIII, London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1925 (1909-1910), p. 148. The relations between Wells, the Webbs and other Fabians were extremely ambivalent. Wells could never leave Fabianism alone, being both attracted to its leaders and their energy and skills, but also repelled by their propensity, as he saw it, for narrow schemes and undemocratic methods: "the Fabian psychology is the psychology of a very small group of pedants who believe that fair ends may be reached by foul means" (Democracy, Works, Atlantic Edition, vol. XXI. London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1926 (c. 1917), p. 424; "The petty industry in research of these Fabians affected to be prodigious, but in general inquiry their inertias were astounding. They were all for municipalising and nationalizing, and yet they would never consider with any patience or care the constitution, the methods of election, the areas of control of the municipalities and parliamentary governments to which with the utmost recklessness they proposed to entrust the land, the natural resources, the public services of the community. So long as it was an elected body and not an assembly of private persons they did not seem to care. The community was just to elect somebody, somehow, anyhow, and the clever little official would tell that somebody what to do. Gross energetic men, it seems, were to wait and plan and spend and fight vehemently for power - and then, whichever of them won it, would hand over meekly and trustfully to the wise, good, quiet "experts" waiting in their bureaus." The World of William Clissold, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 198. Beatrice Webb referred to the "hot and exaggerated arguments" with Wells and rather loftily condemned him for failing to accept Fabian views on tolerance and variety - a neat reversal of roles: Our Partnership, Ms. diary, May 11, 1905, pp. 307-308.

13. This first appeared as Mr. Britling Sees it Through, and as Mr. Britling in Works, Atlantic Edition, vol. XXII. London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1926 (1916), Preface.

14. ib., p. 249.

15. Wells' The Future in America was much admired by the German, Professor Johann Plenge, an anti-Marxist socialist and advocate of the German concept of a heroic life which was threatened by the English commercial idea of individual freedom. According to Hayek, it was an aspiration of Plenge and other socialists in Germany at the time to organize Europe, and they appreciated Wells' intellectual contributions in this direction: Hayek, F.A. The Road to Serfdom. London, Routledge, 1944, ch. XII. On this interpretation, we may observe a dilemma in Wells' treatment of Mr. Britling. Wells had to turn him from an exponent of outmoded British liberalism into an advocate of international, socialist order. This could not mean "Germanizing" him, since Wells had for patriotic and other reasons to retain Mr. Britling's Britishness. However, the problem of reconciling individual liberty with schemes for international order persisted throughout his social writings.

The thought that purification could come only through strife lingered on. Thus, in Men Like Gods, it was only after and through a series of great wars that men realized the need for drastic reform.

16. Joan and Peter, Works, Atlantic Edition, vols. XXIII, XXIV. London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1927 (1918), p. 53.

17. ib., pp. 304 and 333.

18. The World of William Clissold, op. cit. In the first volume, William Clissold proclaims the distance between elites and masses: "Realization of a new stage of civilized society will be the work of an intellectual minority; it will be effected without the support of the crowd and possibly in spite of its dissent". p. 199.

19. Mrs. Warren's daughter, Vivie, repudiated her mother's argument that wretched circumstances had led her into prostitution, but Shaw, in his 1931 Preface to Mrs. Warren's Profession, made it plain that Mrs. Warren's life was intended as a criticism of society. Similarly, the wealthy rackrenter, Sartorious, in Widower's Houses was treated, no less than were paupers, as a victim of circumstances, and the medical profession, in The Doctor's Dilemma, was cleared of evil intent. In each situation, individuals could be expected to perform more adequately only when sustained by a socialist structure of society, and on this the Webbs, Shaw and Wells were all in agreement.

20. The Dream, Works, Atlantic Edition, vol. XXVIII. London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1927 (1924), pp. 392-393.

21. ib., p. 397.

22. The criticisms are scattered throughout his works, but an overall perspective may be gained from the following (letters refer to text):

    a. The Dream, op. cit., p. 375 f.; Mr. Britling, op. cit., p. 84; Socialism and the Family, Works, Atlantic Edition, vol. XVI. London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1926 (1906), p. 505; The World of William Clissold, op. cit., passim.

    b. The Dream, p. 375 f.

    c. Men Like Gods. Works, Atlantic Edition, vol. XXVIII. London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1927 (1923), p. 72, and The Wheels of Chance, passim.

    d. Kipps, Works, Atlantic Edition, vol. VIII. London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1925 (1905); Love and Mr. Lewisham, Works, Atlantic Edition, vol. VII. London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1925, passim.

    e. Joan and Peter, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 67; God the Invisible King, Works, Atlantic Edition, vol. XI. London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1925 (1917).

f. The Dream, op. cit., p. 596; The Passionate Friends, Works, Atlantic Edition, vol. XVIII. London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1926 (1913) passim; The Wife of Sir Isaac Harman, Works, Atlantic Edition, vol. XVI. London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1926 (1914). Preface, et pass.

g. A Modern Utopia and Other Discussions, Works, Atlantic Edition, vol. IX. London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1925 (1904), p. 92; World Brain, London, Methuen, 1938, p. ix.

h. See note 6 above.

i. This is a universal theme in Wells' work, but see particularly his striking Platonic metaphor in The Dream (p. 138) where the miserable, hunted, unheroic, crowded and dangerous life of the U-boatmen is likened to mankind's lot - and it is the teacher's task to rescue the "crew".

23. Apart from his scientific texts and histories Wells' use of the language of race evolution is sparing - but vivid when it occurs - e.g., a splendid Darwinian gloss on Hegel in First and Last Things, Works, Atlantic Edition, vol. XI. London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1925 (1917): "our individualities, our nations and states and races are but bubbles and clusters of foam upon the great stream of blood of the species, incidental experiments in the growing knowledge and consciousness of the race" (p. 250). Shaw's fullest exposition of his Lamarckian and Bergsonian beliefs in creative evolution (significant change depends on a will to create) is in his Preface to Back to Methuselah; it is also featured in "The Revolutionist's handbook and pocket companion" in Man and Superman, and in the Preface to Saint Joan. Both St. Joan and Napoleon (in The Man of Destiny) are portrayed, as, in part, figures of the future. Shaw's belief in the need for an "evolutionary" change greatly reduces his interest as an educational reconstructionist. Despite his Fabianism, he had little confidence that much could be done through education to effect social change.

24. Wells expressed this spark as a sense of hope, or God-in-man, in The Undying Fire, Works, Atlantic Edition, vol. XI. London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1925 (1917), p. 140 f.

25. Russell, B. Portraits from Memory and Other Essays. London, Allen and Unwin, 1956, pp. 76-80. Wells distinguished the future-directed mind (constructive, legislative, organizing, masterful) from the predominant type of mind, which regards the future, if at all, "as a sort of blank non-existence upon which the advancing present will presently write events". The Discovery of the Future, Works, Atlantic Edition, vol. IV, London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1924 (1902), p. 357.

26. But it was a science which closely harmonized with the arts. Thus, in Men Like Gods, Mr. Barnstable reflects that utopian lives are like

those of successful scientists and artists: "a continual refreshing discovery of new things, a constant adventure with the unknown and the untried", p. 171.

27. Harrison, op. cit., p. 92 f. The illustrations in this book show very clearly how the Owenites conceived small urban communities in park-like landscapes. Wells, in the character of William Clissold, compared Owenism favorably with "political" socialism (Fabianism, Marxism): "It was by turning towards politics and deserting the vigorous initiatives of that inspired industralist, Robert Owen, that Socialism went astray, and it is to the political delusion that we owe now, [1925-1926] in nearly every country under the sun, the spectacle of a large futile Labour-Socialist party which clamours while it is in opposition for the nationalization and socialization of everything, and gives way to a helpless terror of administration so soon as it finds itself in office." The World of William Clissold, vol. 3, p. 637.

28. A Modern Utopia, p. 92. In this book, Wells briefly alluded to the ideal of a "world-wide house of Salomon" (p. 245). He gave a thoroughly Baconian appraisal of the modern scientific and industrial quest for control of the physical environment in the first fifty pages of The World Set Free, Works, Atlantic Edition, vol. XXI. London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1926 (1914).

29. He discussed this point in First and Last Things, criticizing the "cocksure" and over-precise approach to science of Comte and Spencer. p. 209.

30. ib., p. 219; Men Like Gods, p. 72.

31. Low-Beer, Ann (ed.). Herbert Spencer. London, Collier-Macmillan, 1969. "Introduction", pp. 20-21.

32. "Education must precede the Socialist State ... Socialism ... presupposes intelligence, and demands as fundamental necessities schools, organized science, literature, and a sense of the State." New Worlds for Old, p. 116; "Socialism is still essentially education, is study, is a renewal, a profound change in the circle of human thought and motive", Socialism and the Family, p. 506. Acting on a similar belief, Sidney Webb felt his conscience to be clear in using Hutchinson's legacy, intended to advance the socialist cause, to found the London School of Economics. Fremantle, op. cit., p. 127.

33. Wells veered between praising Marx as a great social analyst and critic, and attacking him for "preaching predestination and salvation without works", New Worlds for Old, p. 245. In The World of William Clissold Marx was castigated for introducing an "ugly ungraciousness" into socialist discussion: "the maggot, so to speak, at the core of my decayed Socialism", (vol. 1, pp. 178-179).

34. Wells attributed the managerial strain in his thought, e.g., in A Modern Utopia, to this transient influence of the Webbs. Anticipations. Works, Atlantic Edition, vol. IV. London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1924 (1901).

35. Nevertheless, these writings provide a powerful imaginative stimulus, comparable in this respect to Mill's On Liberty. Indeed, the writings of Morris and Wells on fraternity, and of the Christian Fabian Tawney on Equality, may be linked with Mill's Essay as completing, for the English-speaking world, the literary exploration of the French revolutionary slogan of liberty, equality and fraternity.

36. Experiment in Autobiography, op. cit., vol. 2, ch. 9. Like most of Wells' ideas, his misgivings about existing and projected international institutions may be traced to his earlier writings. See his satire of a world conference of authors in Boon, Works, Atlantic Edition, vol. XIII. London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1925 (1911), p. 475.

37. Gabriel, R.H. The Course of American Democratic Thought: an Intellectual History Since 1815. N.Y., Ronald Press, 1946 (reprint).

38. "The pseudoeducated man of the older order couldn't teach, couldn't write, couldn't explain. He was pompous and patronising and prosy; timid and indistinct in statement with no sense of the common need or the common quality". The Dream, p. 535.

39. Anticipations, op. cit., V, "The life history of democracy".

40. See note 34.

41. See note 23.

42. Kagarlitski, J. The Life and Thought of H.G. Wells. London, Sidgwick and Jackson, 1966, p. 105.

43. First and Last Things, pp. 218-219.

44. Joan and Peter, ch. 7 "The School of St. George and the Venerable Bede".

45. Mr. Britling, p. 140 (authorial intrusion). In The World Set Free Wells contrasted man's suspicion, jealousy, bellicosity and particularism with the monstrous destructive power released by science, p. 168.

46. The theme of the "new man" pervades Wells' writings. He appears in various forms: as a modern imperialist (Joan and Peter); freed of his ape-ancestry (Joan and Peter); possessed of a new level of consciousness (The World Set Free); flexible in the face of change (The World of William Clissold); tough-minded and intellectually trained (The New Machiavelli); free of jealousy (The Wife of Isaac Harman); as an emancipated woman (ib. and Ann Veronica); and as god-like and perfected in his rationality and communality in utopia (Men Like Gods).

47. Fichte, J.G., op. cit.

48. von Herder, J.G. Reflections on the Philosophy of the History of Mankind (abridged and intro. by F.E. Manuel). University of Chicago

Press, 1968. Cp. Passmore's analysis, which emphasizes a tension between relativist and absolutist strands in Herder's thought: op. cit., pp. 221-228.

49. Blake, W. "There is No Natural Religion" (Second Series) in Poetry and Prose of William Blake (ed. G. Keynes). London, Nonesuch Press, 1948, p. 148.

50. Blake, W. "The Marriage of Heaven and Hell", ib., p. 181.

51. Blake, W. "The First Book of Urizen", ib., pp. 221-222. The explosive potential of the attempt to assimilate all experience to "one law" - the essence of reductionism - is explored in Thomas Mann's The Magic Mountain (trans. from the German by H.T. Lowe-Porter). N.Y., A.A. Knopf, 1927.

52. See Chapters VI, VII, and VIII of the present work.

53. The mediaeval element in the enlightenment quest for order was the subject of Becker's controversial The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Philosophers. In later chapters, especially VII and IX, I return to the very powerful influence exercised upon many reconstructionists by the sense of a breakdown in cultural order.

54. Reich, C.A. The Greening of America. New York, Random House, 1970; Roszak, T. The Making of a Counter Culture. New York, Doubleday, 1969. Both authors reject the equation of technological advance with human well-being and consider utopian alternatives.

55. Russell, B. "Some prospects: cheerful and otherwise", Sceptical Essays, op. cit., p. 234.

56. See Chapter III above. Sklair has argued that sociology should be treated as a theory of progress, op. cit., part two.

57. Wells, H.G. The Discovery of the Future, op. cit., pp. 373-374.

58. Russell, B. Education and the Social Order. London, Allen and Unwin, 1932, ch. 1.

59. Passmore, op. cit., makes no mention of Russell as a "perfectibilist", presumably because of the pronounced scepticism of his thought and his pessimism about the future. But this is surely an oversight, and not a considered judgment, in view of Russell's role as a popular moralist and social reformer who believed it both possible anddesirable to attempt to reform society and modify individual character.

60. Russell, B. The Impact of Science on Society. London, Allen and Unwin, 1952.

61. Russell, B. Principles of Social Reconstruction. London, Allen and Unwin, 1916, chs. II and IV. I discussed some aspects of this difficulty of reconciliation in my review of the Kothari Report in ch. II.

62. Russell, B. "An outline of intellectual rubbish" in Unpopular Essays. London, Allen and Unwin, 1950, p. 121. The "rubbish" included the belief that human nature cannot be changed. However, for the most part, Russell himself separated "nature", embedded in the impulsive life, from "behavior", and argued that it was the latter that through habit and institutional pressures might be modified.

63. However, Russell argued that Lockeian liberalism, because of its emphasis on tentativeness of belief and uncertainty of knowledge, is the antithesis of ideology, which he equated with theology: "Philosophy and politics" in Unpopular Essays, p. 25. I discussed this issue in my Introduction to the present work. It should also be noted that Russell's enthusiasm for the public realm of scientific thought was not as straight-forward as this essay suggests. Thus in "Mysticism and logic" (Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays. London, Longmans, Green, 1918),he made a definite place in his epistemology for intuition, mystical insights and illumination: "There is an element of wisdom to be learned from the mystical way of feeling, which does not seem to be attainable in any other manner", p. 11.

64. Freud, S. Totem and Taboo. Works, Standard Edition, London, Hogarth Press, 1955 (1913); Civilization and its Discontents. Works, Standard Edition. London, Hogarth Press, 1961 (1929). For a recent psychoanalytic review of Freud's arguments, see Muensterberger, W. (ed.) Man and His Culture: Psychoanalytic Anthropology After "Totem and Taboo". London, Rap and Whiting, 1969. Russell's neglect of problems of inhibition in personal life may be contrasted with his determination to find social institutions in which aggressive impulses could be sublimated.

65. Russell, B. Principles of Social Reconstruction, p. 6.

66. Russell, B. "The recrudescence of puritanism" in Sceptical Essays. On the role of the passions as springs of action, see Human Society in Ethics and Politics. London, Allen and Unwin, 1954, pp. 175-176.

67. Russell, B. Portraits from Memory, p. 96.

68. Russell, B. Principles of Social Reconstruction, p. 12.

69. Russell, B. Human Society in Ethics and Politics, p. 114.

70. Cassirer, E. The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, op. cit., ch. 1.

71. Blake, W. "A Descriptive Catalogue &c., no. 3, Sir Jeffrey Chaucer and the nine and twenty Pilgrims on their journey to Canterbury" in Poetry and Prose of William Blake, op. cit., pp. 595-606.

Chapter VI

1. Bowers, C.A., op. cit., ch. 1; Cremin, L.A., op. cit., chs. 6-8; Graham, Patricia. A. op. cit., chs. 1, 2, 4; Karier, C.J. Man, Society, and Education. Glenview (Ill.) Scott Foresman, 1967, pp. 235-251.

2. Dewey, J. Individualism, Old and New. New York, Minton Balch and Co., 1930, p. 169. See also Childs, J.L. Ten Theses on Education and American Culture. Greenwich, (Conn), Edgewood School Press, 1935: "1. It is through the nurture of the culture that human beings are developed." These theses are extensively developed by Dewey, Childs, Kilpatrick and other experimentalists in a general model of human growth as culturally-interactive. Dewey frequently criticized the abstraction and isolation of "individual" from "society" and "culture" and the analysis of them outside specific contexts. See Democracy and Education, ch. VII: "The democratic conception in education", for a typical illustration of his own historical method of treatment. His theory of experience, however, is less obviously culturally orientated.

3. Dewey's affinities with Mead are very close on this point. See Mead, G.H. Mind, Self and Society (intro. C.W. Morris). University of Chicago Press, 1934, and Childs, J.L. American Pragmatism and Education. New York, H. Holt, ch. 4.

4. At any rate, one major task of philosophy was to examine ordinary life problems. See Experience and Nature. New York, W.W. Norton & Co., 1929, pp. 7-8 and The Quest for Certainty. New York, Minton, Balch & Co., 1929, ch. I et pass. Dewey did not suppose all problems capable of solution; many of them, in any case, simply faded away, or ceased to agitate attention as circumstances and thinking changed. See Randall, J.H. jr., "Dewey's interpretation of the history of philosophy" in Schilpp, P.A. (ed.). The ramifications of philosophic inquiry were greater in Dewey's theory than in those of most modern philosophers of the empirical school. Thus he was interested in the interactions and relationships between logic, modes of experience, and the socio-cultural world. The ultimate source of all these topics, however, was "common experience". See Ratner, J. "Dewey's conception of philosophy" in Schilpp, P.A. (ed.), op. cit., p. 55. Dewey anticipated those contemporary social and moral philosophers who are interested in "fact/value" distinctions, who seek more "real" and "significant" problems for philosophical investigation, and demand a closer relationship between analytic, speculative and empirical inquiries. See Human Nature and Conduct. New York, H. Holt, 1922 (reprinted with new introduction: New York, Modern Library, 1930), pp. 11-12. (For a discussion of the use of the term experimentalism in relation to this way of thinking, see Childs, J.L. Education and the Philosophy of Experimentalism. New York, Appleton, Century, 1931, ch. 1.

5. For an appreciative comment on this contribution, see Rugg, H. and Withers, W. Social Foundations of Education. New York, Prentice-Hall,

1955, p. 514 f. The work of the experimentalists in this respect is severely criticized in Brauner, C.J., American Educational Theory. Englewood Cliffs (N.J.), Prentice-Hall, 1964, p. 202 f.

6. Childs, J.L. American Pragmatism and Education, ch. 5. A characteristic discussion of the interaction of individual and cultural factors in experience is: Dewey's Freedom and Culture. London, Allen and Unwin, 1940, ch. 5 "Democracy and human nature".

7. Dewey, J. Human Nature and Conduct, passim.

8. These were interests the experimentalists shared with Durkheim, although Durkheim appears to have had little direct influence on them. Durkheim's own attitude towards James' Pragmatism was hostile. See his Pragmatism and Sociology, reprinted in Wolff, K.H. (ed.), op. cit. Significantly, Durkheim attacked the relativism of James' theory of truth, and espoused doctrines resembling Platonic absolutism.

9. I give a brief overview of his career and thought in my Introduction to Dewey. London, Collier-Macmillan, 1970.

10. Dewey's writings are notoriously extensive. In the following account, I draw principally upon: How We Think. Boston, D.C. Heath, 1910 (rev. ed. 1932); Essays in Experimental Logic. University of Chicago Press, 1916; Reconstruction in Philosophy. New York, H. Holt, 1920 (rev. ed. Boston, Beacon Press, 1948); Human Nature and Conduct; Experience and Nature; The Quest for Certainty; Individualism Old and New; Logic: the Theory of Inquiry. New York, H. Holt, 1938; Problems of Men. New York, Philosophical Library, 1946.

11. Dewey, J. Experience and Nature, p. 42; "Conflict and uncertainty are ultimate traits" Human Nature and Conduct, p. 12. For the role of thought in creating order out of uncertainty and doubt, see How We Think, passim., and Essays in Experimental Logic, chs. 2 and 6. Cp. Whitehead's not dissimilar treatment in Adventures of Ideas, op. cit., p. 14 f. and Part II.

12. Dewey discussed the educational implications of the transition from a farm- and township-based society to an urban society in The School and Society, op. cit. He explored the wider social and political implications in, e.g., Individualism, Old and New; Freedom and Culture; and Problems of Men. There is frequently more than a note of nostalgia in his references to the virtues of a shared communal life on the "old farm". The "old farm" recurs in experimentalist writings as a source of homely democratic virtues of self-sufficiency, hard work, property rights, and skills of self-government which almost seem to make large-scale government unnecessary: see Childs, J.L. Education and Morals. New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1950, ch. X. The marked individualism of these virtues contrasts with the experimental enthusiasm for shared experience, collective action, and intelligent social planning. References to a departed rural glory are reminiscent of Cobbett, who lamented the change from the old farm house in which the farmer's family and his servants lived together as a unit, to the new style in which middle class notions of gentility set the

farmer and his family apart from their employees: Cobbett, W. Rural Rides, entry for 20th October 1825. London, Dent, n.d. (1853 ed.), 2 vols. Cobbett, like Dewey, attributed the change to the impact of industrialization on the values of the traditional rural culture.

13. Dewey, J. Human Nature and Conduct. See especially Part II, section III, "Changing human nature" and section IV "Impulse and conflict of habits". But being "built into" human nature did not prevent habits and customs from being modified. Thus it was not so much the instinctive and impulsive element in human nature that resisted change as the inertia of custom and "the resistance that acquired habits offer to change after they are once acquired": Dewey, J. "Does human nature change?" The Rotarian Magazine, 52, 2, Feb. 1946 (reprinted in Nordskog, J.E. (ed.) Social Change. New York, McGraw Hill, 1960, pp. 95-99.) These points underline Dewey's conviction that, through education, right habits should be formed.

14. Dewey, J. "The teacher and his world" in Problems of Men.

15. Rugg, H. Culture and Education in America. New York, Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1931, Part V; and The Great Technology. New York, John Day Co., 1933, passim.

16. The work of the Laboratory School has been extensively documented: Dewey, J. (ed.) The Elementary School Record (9 monographs). University of Chicago Press, 1900 (reprinted in Findlay, J.J. (ed.) The School and the Child. London, Blackie, (n.d.)) and Dewey, J. The School and Society; Mayhew, Katherine C. and Edwards, Anna C. The Dewey School. New York, D. Appleton Century Co., 1936; Lepencier, Ida B. The History of the Laboratory School. University of Chicago Press, 1960; Wirth, A.G. "John Dewey's design for American education: an analysis of his work at the University of Chicago". History of Education Quarterly, IV, 2, June 1964, pp. 83-105. I discuss the Laboratory School in Chapter XI, section 2.3.2.

17. Kilpatrick, W.H. Education for a Changing Civilization. New York, Macmillan, 1926.

18. ib., p. 41. But Kilpatrick vacillated between a position which commended adjustment to contemporary culture and a more critical stance. In 1942, he criticized the political system of industrial capitalism on the grounds that it interfered with or inhibited the realization of the "American dream" of abundance for all; also, it had failed to establish equality of opportunity: "Philosophy of education from the experimental outlook" in National Society for the Study of Education, forty-first yearbook, part 1, Philosophies of Education. Bloomington (Ill.), Public School Publishing Co., 1942, p. 41.

19. Kilpatrick, W.H. (ed.). The Educational Frontier. New York, The Century Co., 1933, especially essay 2 (prepared by Dewey and Childs) "The social-economic situation and education".

20. The most revealing source of Rugg's earlier optimism is his massive

school and junior college social-studies textbook series. There are occasional criticisms of industrial civilization in these volumes but in general they present an optimistic and cheerful picture of a world steadily progressing through the application of science and technology. Rugg, H. and Krueger, Louise Man and His Changing Society. Boston, Ginn, 1929-1940.

21. The Great Technology, ch. X "Axioms for the great technology".

22. As with the post-war experimentalists, the emphasis Bode gave to objectives was on the processes of formation, with government cast into the role of facilitator: "providing the conditions for widening the area of common purposes among men". Bode, B.H. Democracy as a Way of Life. New York, Macmillan, 1937, p. 50.

23. The class bias of education was documented in pioneering sociological monographs: Counts, G.S. "The selective character of American secondary education" School Review and Elementary School Journal, Supplementary Educational Monographs, no. 19, 1922, and "The social composition of Boards of Education", ibid., no. 33, 1927. Counts' transition from enthusiasm to disenchantment with the Soviet system may be observed in (a) his Introduction to Pinkevitch, P. The New Education in the Soviet Republic and in his A Ford Crosses Soviet Russia. Boston, The Stratford Co., 1930 (a travel book, eulogizing the new order); and (b) The Country of the Blind (with Nucia Lodge and revealingly subtitled "The Soviet system of mind control") Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1949, and The Challenge of Soviet Education. New York, McGraw Hill, 1957 (a strong condemnation and warning of the power of totalitarian trends in Soviet education).

24. Dewey, J. The Problems of Men, p. 109.

25. Rugg, H. Foundations for American Education, op. cit., p. 249. Although he assented that machine technology and capitalist production are the prime movers, Rugg did not restrict his wide-ranging analysis of cultural trends in America to such a limited framework. He ascribed to the ideas of individuals and groups of thinkers - philosophers, artists, sociologists, jurists, psychologists and others - a power which went far beyond the development of their own particular spheres of interest. These were the "new frontiersmen", the creators of a new "cultural synthesis" which was transforming American consciousness and social institutions. ib., "Foreword".

26. Shapovalenko, S.G. (ed.), op. cit.

27. See Chapter XI, section 2.3.2, and Chapter XII, sections 1-4.

28. In this necessarily abbreviated assessment of the "lag" theory, I have drawn principally upon the following essays in Duncan, O.D. (ed.) Ogburn on Culture and Social Change. University of Chicago Press, 1964: "Stationary and changing societies" (1936); "Technology and governmental change" (1936); "Culture" (1937); "Cultural lag as theory" (1957).

29. Drawn principally from Dewey, J. Problems of Men, ch. 1. "The

democratic faith and education", and Rugg, H. Foundations for American Education, p. 249 f.

30. Rugg, H. and Withers, W. Social Foundations of Education, p. 523 f.

31. Dewey, J. Creative Democracy - the Task Before Us. (Eightieth birthday address, delivered before the National John Dewey Conference, New York City, Oct. 20, 1939) Washington, National Education Association, n.d., pp. 9-10. Dewey's confidence in rational, empirical, essentially educational, methods of change led him to quarrel with Marxism, which he described as an anti-scientific absolutism: Freedom and Culture, ch. 4 "Totalitarian economics and democracy".

32. Problems of Men, p. 161. The idea of a close affinity between science and democracy was accepted by all the experimentalists, so much so that science and democracy (both heavily interpreted) may be regarded as the twin foundation stones of the movement. At times the affinity was translated into an identity: "Democracy requires the same open-mindedness toward values or interests as science requires toward evidence. In this respect the spirit of science is the same as the spirit of democracy". Bode, B.H. Modern Educational Theories. New York, Macmillan, 1927, p. 257.

33. Childs' equivocal attitude toward indoctrination in the thirties is discussed in Bowers, op. cit., pp. 121-122. Counts supported indoctrination in the values of militant democracy: Dare the School Build a New Social Order? New York, John Day, 1932, p. 10 f. and The Prospects of American Democracy. New York, John Day, 1938, p. 294 f. It should be noted that Counts was reacting against the extreme individualism of the independent progressive schools of his time, and that he was alarmed by the prospect of anti-democratic forces capturing the allegiance of children in public schools.

34. This is a composite picture, drawn from several of the principal works of experimentalist social criticism in the thirties: Dewey, J: Freedom and Culture; Individualism, Old and New; Liberalism and Social Action (New York, G.P. Putnam, 1935); Problems of Men; Bode, B.H. Democracy as a Way of Life; Counts, G.S.: Dare the School Build a New Social Order? and The Prospects of American Democracy; Kilpatrick, W.H. (ed.) The Educational Frontier; Rugg, H. The Great Technology; Rugg, H. (ed.) Democracy and the Curriculum. New York, D. Appleton-Century, 1939 (third yearbook of the John Dewey Society).

35. Rugg, H. Foreword to Rugg, H. (ed.) Democracy and the Curriculum; Dewey, J. "The future of liberalism" (1935) in Problems of Men.

36. Rugg was most confident about what education could achieve. Dewey always maintained that the school's contribution of necessity would be indirect. But it is interesting to see how far, by 1938, Dewey had advanced beyond the extremely cautious approach he adopted in 1916. Cp: Democracy and Education, ch. 1 (1916); "Can education share in social reconstruction?" The Social Frontier, 1, Oct. 1934, pp. 11-12; and Problems of Men ("Democracy and education in the world of today", 1938).

37. I discuss the practical form Dewey expected science to take in education in Chapter XI, section 2.3.2.

38. Rugg, H. Culture and Education in America, Preface and Part III. (Although not published until 1931, this book was written by about 1926).

39. See, for example, the "four foundations" for education in Foundations for American Education. Actually, Rugg calls them frontiers - the human, social, aesthetic, and moral-ethical frontier - which he combines into a single "educational frontier" in the last part of the book.

40. Rugg, H. and Withers, W., op. cit. See note 30. Although Rugg's own theory of social change,as he explicitly expounded it in this book, was eclectic, a combination of culture lag and social conflict, the emphasis he constantly gave to the actual and potential impact of the ideas of selected leaders of thought suggests that he was at heart an ideational theorist, with a leaning towards the theory of the "great man's ideas", an intellectualist version of Carlyle's heroes.

41. Rugg, H. The Great Technology, p. 180.

42. Rugg's views fluctuated. By 1939, he had far less confidence in the capacity of a revised capitalist system to manage either domestic reform or to ward off the growing threat of totalitarianism in Europe. After the war, his optimism in reformed capitalism was restored. (Foundations for American Education, pp. 286, 319 f., 365.)

43. Chapter VIII, section 2.

44. Rugg, H. The Great Technology, p. 185.

45. He gave greater emphasis to social tension as a fruitful source of change in Social Foundations of Education.

46. Rugg, H. The Great Technology, p. 189 f.

47. ib., p. 201 f.

48. Rugg, H. Culture and Education in America, p. 142. See also Imagination (New York, Harper and Row, 1963), ch. 15, for Rugg's argument that within the person, impulse and fantasy, as well as rational analysis and contemplation, are required for higher order conceptualizing.

49. Rugg, H. Culture and Education in America, p. 211.

50. Counts, G.S. "To vitalize American tradition" Progressive Education, Feb. 1932 (cited in Kandel, I. "American philosophy of education" in Clarke, F. (ed.) Review of Educational Thought. London, University of London Institute of Education and Evans Bros., n.d. (c. 1936). See also the passage I quote from Dewey's Democracy and Education: note 62.

51. Bode, B.H. Democracy as a Way of Life, pp. 48 and 58-59, and "The new education ten years after. 1. Apprenticeship or freedom?" The New Republic, LXIII, 809, June 4, 1930, pp. 61-64. Bode's concepts of democracy as the free play of intelligence and as sharing are very similar to Dewey's. Bode himself thought that he was laying more stress on the defining of objectives than did Dewey. He claimed that "there is considerable ground for the suspicion that our concern for the common man will evaporate into idle words and sentiments, unless we gain some perception of what is required to give the common man his proper share in our social and cultural heritage" (Progressive Education at the Crossroads. New York, Newson and Co., 1938, p. 13.) However, he gave no more definite content to objectives nor did he provide any sharper perception of democratic requirements than did Dewey.

52. Counts, G.S. Dare the School Build a New Social Order?, p. 46 f.

53. Lilge, F., art. cit. Childs had undoubtedly moved, as did Kilpatrick and Counts, from the position of radical hostility to American civilization in the 1930s to a firm belief that the American "way of life", by contrast with the Soviet system, had a great deal to commend it. In view of this, the criticism that some experimentalists had come to advocate an education which encourages children to adapt to their society as it was rather than to learn to think about ways of reforming it, is apposite.

54. Counts, G.S. Dare the School Build a New Social Order?, p. 10 f. Childs' position was, on the whole, more guarded. He clearly recognized "that the development of the program of the school inescapably involves an evaluation and interpretation of the ways of life and thought of its society". (Education and Morals, p. 104.) This, indeed, is one of the basic tenets of reconstructionism, which was less clearly perceived during the 1950s than in the 1930s. In periods of crisis, the evaluation was sharper and more exclusive of alternative possibilities. Hence, in the thirties, when democracy appeared to be threatened from within, the school could not afford to miss opportunities of actively commending democracy against its critics. In the post war period, when the external enemy appeared more serious, it was the American qualities of democracy that were to be strongly impressed upon children and teachers.

55. Kilpatrick, W.H. Philosophy of Education. New York, Macmillan, 1951, pp. 405-406.

56. Counts, G.S. Dare the School Build a New Social Order?, pp. 19-20; Bode, B.H. Progressive Education at the Crossroads, chs. 5 and 7.

57. Dewey, J. Democracy and Education, ch. VIII; and Experience and Education. New York, Macmillan, 1938, passim. For the distinction between aims and procedural principles in education, see also Peters, R.S. Education as Initiation. University of London and Evans Bros., 1964.

58. Dewey, J. Creative Democracy - the Task Before Us, pp. 15-16. See also Democracy and Education, ch. VII "The democratic conception in education".

59. Individualism, Old and New, passim.

60. Problems of Men, ch. 2, "Democracy and education in the world of today".

61. See Dewey, J. The Public and its Problems. New York, H. Holt, 1927 (reissued with a new introduction, Gateway Books, 1946) and Dewey, J. and Tufts, J.H. Ethics. New York, H. Holt, 1910 (rev. ed. 1933), ch. XX "Social organization and the individual".

62. Democracy and Education, Preface, p. x.

63. For Weber's views on democracy I have principally used: Weber, M. From Max Weber (trans. and ed. Gerth, H.H. and Mills, C.W.) London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1948; Bendix, R. Max Weber: an Intellectual Portrait. London, Heinemann, 1960; and Parsons, T., Shils, E., Naegele, K.D., and Pitts, J.R. Theories of Society. New York, Free Press of Glencoe, 1961.

64. From Max Weber "Politics as a vocation".

65. ib., "Bureaucracy".

66. ib., "The sociology of charismatic authority" and "The meaning of discipline".

67. Rugg, H. Culture and Education in America, Preface.

68. Rugg, H. Foundations for American Education, p. 339.

69. Bode, B. Modern Educational Theories, p. 7.

70. For antecedents of this in American society, see Gabriel, R.H. The Course of American Democratic Thought: an Intellectual History Since 1815. passim.

71. Human Nature and Conduct, p. 21. This passage and many others where Dewey discusses the culture of the norms and mores of his society and draws extensively upon the American heritage and the Western tradition of philosophical, political, social and educational thought, make it very difficult to understand what could be meant by the charge that "his ideal society is, in fact, a rootless one": G.H. Bantock Education in an Industrial Society, op. cit., p. 31. The "roots" are indeed different from those selected for preservation and development by Bantock but he evades this issue under the blanket charge of "rootlessness". For Dewey's account of some of his "roots", see "The development of American pragmatism" in his Philosophy and Civilization. New York, G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1931, pp. 13-35.

Chapter VII

1. Kecskemeti, P. "Introduction" to Mannheim's Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952.

2. "We saw that direct experience itself contains many elements of theoretical meaning, that pre-theoretical perception is charged with incipient reflection which, however, need not blur the directly given Gestalt in any way. Certain details may even stand out more vividly, when illuminated by theory; a theory may help us to see as enduring 'facts' certain things which would otherwise fade away after the intuitive flash is over. This, then, is the one thing scientific analysis can do for cultural products; it can stabilize them, make them endure, give them a firm profile." And: "historical theory fulfils its own essence only by managing to derive an ordering principle from this seeming anarchy of change - only by managing to penetrate the innermost structure of this all pervading change". Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, p. 72 and p. 86. It is very characteristic of Mannheim that he should treat this reconstructive role of theory as basically stabilizing. This, too, is how Dewey perceived problem-solving, and how the later experimentalists (under the influence of both Dewey and Mannheim) perceived the tasks of establishing in the community the method of consensus together with a stable core of shared values.

3. Ideology and Utopia (trans. L. Wirth and E. Shils). London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952 (First English ed., 1936); Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge; Essays on the Sociology of Culture. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1956. (The latter two are collections of essays, published posthumously in book form.)

4. Cp. Aron, R. German Sociology. New York, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964, pp. 55-65.

5. Ideology and Utopia, p. 28.

6. Mannheim's most systematic treatment of this topic occurs in his early essay, "On the interpretation of weltanschauung" (1921-1922), reprinted in Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge.

7. The difference between Mannheim's position and one well-known form of methodological individualism can be exaggerated. The two approaches have in common a confidence that by altering social situations, behavior can be substantially modified: "methodological individualism, by imputing unwanted social phenomena to individuals' responses to their situations, in the light of their dispositions and beliefs, suggests that we may be able to make the phenomena disappear, not by recruiting good men to fill the posts hitherto occupied by bad men, nor by trying to destroy men's socially unfortunate dispositions while fostering their socially benevolent dispositions, but simply by altering the situation they confront". Watkins, J.W.N. "Methodological individualism and social tendencies"

in Brodbeck, May (ed.) Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences. op. cit., pp. 269-280.

8. Like Mannheim, Scheler was perturbed by the dis-unity of culture and rested his hopes in an elite to create a new organic culture. His religious interests were strong and, as Mannheim was to do, he vested final cultural authority not in scientists but in sages and saints. Staude, J. Max Scheler 1874-1928: an Intellectual Portrait. London, Collier-Macmillan, 1967.

9. Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, p. 53.

10. ib., p. 42.

11. ib., p. 45.

12. Ideology and Utopia, p. 132.

13. ib., p. 3.

14. Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1940, p. 26. The link between empiricism and "reconstruction" was forged in Mannheim's early writings; for example, this typically Hegelian passage in his 1924 essay, "Historicism": He argued that culture analysis will disclose that motifs are "organically bound up with one another. The stream of ideas does not, then, flow and swell in separate channels (represented by the various spheres of life and culture). The separate motifs are, rather, mutually conditioning at the successive stages of evolution and are components and functions of an ultimate basic process which is the real "subject" undergoing change. To work out the structure or configuration of this total process on the basis of a thorough examination of its separate elements is the final aim of historicism - a universal metaphysical and methodological principle which comes more and more to dominate the cultural sciences". Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, p. 87.

15. Ideology and Utopia, p. 91. This claim forms the gist of his essay, "Historicism".

16. ib., p. 25.

17. ib., pp. 42-47 and 55. Sir Fred Clarke, formerly Director of the London Institute of Education, greatly admired and was much influenced by Mannheim. In his personal copy of Ideology and Utopia (now in the Clarke collection of the London Institute library), he underlined Mannheim's statement that "the extension of our knowledge of the world is closely related to increasing personal self-knowledge and self-control of the knowing personality", (p. 43) and made the marginal note "Education". For Clarke's views on Mannheim, see his essay "Karl Mannheim and the Institute of Education" published for the first time in Mitchell, F.W. Sir Fred Clarke: Master Teacher. London, Longmans, Green, 1967.

18. Ideology and Utopia, p. 95.

19. ib., p. 26.

20. Popper, K. The Open Society and its Enemies, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 217 f.

21. Ideology and Utopia, p. 186.

22. ib., p. 3.

23. ib., p. 186.

24. ib., p. 71.

25. Mannheim himself recognized certain affinities between Thomism and the unified world devised by the intellectual clerisy and "put at the disposal of those who crave for a consistent way of life". Diagnosis of Our Time. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1943, p. 111.

26. Ideology and Utopia, p. 83.

27. Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, p. 107 f.

28. Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning (ed. H. Gerth and E. Bramstedt). London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1951, ch. 13 "Thought, philosophy, religion, and the integration of the social order"; Diagnosis of Our Time, ch. VII, "Towards a new social philosophy". This chapter, subtitled "A challenge to Christian thinkers by a sociologist" was first presented as a paper to the Moot, a group of Christians, including John Bailey, Fred Clarke, T.S. Eliot, Donald MacKinnon, J. Middleton Murray and J.H. Oldham, who met several times a year for a number of years from early in 1939. Clarke's Education and Social Change, first published as a Christian News Letter, was written as a commentary on and development of some of the ideas Mannheim had discussed.

29. Ideology and Utopia, p. 192 f. See, too, p. 82, where Mannheim refers to the unchanging, essential elements in human nature, together with freedom of the will, and ecstatic experience, which he developed more fully in Diagnosis of Our Time. There is also a lengthy discussion of ecstacy as a valid and important part of awareness in Essays on the Sociology of Culture, p. 240 f.

30. Man and Society, p. 216.

31. ib., p. 203.

32. Essays on the Sociology of Culture, p. 109. But this was in an essay, "The problem of the intelligentsia", in which he gave more emphasis than in most other of his writings to the creative role of individuals. Significantly, it is the intellectual who "has the characteristics of a Proteus who perennially transcends and reconstitutes himself, and whose foremost motives are renovation and reformation", ib., p. 92. This is an apt description of Mannheim himself.

33. ibid; see also Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning, ch. 13.

34. Ideology and Utopia, p. 186.

35. Essays on the Sociology of Culture, p. 190. The essay from which this is taken, "The democratization of culture", is an uneasy blend of Christian and Kantian views on the autonomy of the self, on the one hand and, on the other, survivals of Hegel's doctrine of individual consciousness as a vehicle for Absolute Spirit.

36. ib., p. 55 and p. 71.

37. Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning, p. 180.

38. "Ideological" in this sense is conservative, and "utopian" is radical thought. Ideology and Utopia, p. 36.

39. Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning, p. 189.

40. Popper, K. The Poverty of Historicism. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961 (1957) "Introduction" et pass. The difference in perspective and method between Mannheim and Hayek is very apparent in this comment on the position Hayek adopts in Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967: "For Hayek functionalism is an extension of Hume and Adam Smith: society is a dense, opaque, partly impenetrable web informed by the recondite harmonies of the invisible hand. It is a system beyond the intentions of individuals lit only by highly specialized enclaves of scientific uhderstanding. These are not total explanations of the system leading to comprehensive predictions about its course, so much as angled shafts of light, often highly general in form, which illuminate the limits of our knowledge. The self-conscious direction of society, where all is understood, either intimately in the phenomenological manner or typically in laws, is not only totalitarian in its proposed harmonization of essentially disparate individual ends, but also scientifically impossible", pp. 341-342; Martin, D. Review article, British Journal of Sociology, 19, 1968, pp. 334-342.

41. Mannheim's contribution to the sociology of generation tension is particularly significant; n.b. his conception of youth as a vitalizing agency in society, whose potential contribution is frequently overlooked: "Youth in modern society" in Diagnosis of Our Time. See also "The problem of generations" in Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge.

42. Mannheim's juxtaposition (in his essay "The nature of economic ambition" in Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge) of these two types illustrates his reluctance to adopt a model of social action which minimized the religious and contemplative elements of experience. Thus his thought has marked affinities with Platonism and Christianity (and other religions, e.g., Hinduism whose "karmas" include both action and renunciation).

43. In Essays on the Sociology of Culture, p. 55 f., Mannheim develops

an interactive thesis which treats "individual" and "society" as dimensions rather than as separate entities.

44. ib., p. 47.

45. For his criticisms see ib., p. 109 f. I discuss the educational difficulties in ch. X, section 5.5, and ch. XII, section 2.

46. Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning, p. 188.

47. Man and Society, p. 11. This outlook is more common in literature than in social science. For example, in Moravia's Two Women the mother in wartime Italy is likewise "haunted by a sense of crisis" as, after long and successful protection, she sees her daughter transformed by the brutality of war: there is no protection against violence, and saintliness and even survival are to be won only through struggle.

48. The crisis concept is most fully explored in Man and Society; tasks of renewal are discussed there and in Diagnosis of Our Time, and Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning. These three works complete Mannheim's major output. See note 3.

49. Man and Society, ch. 1.

50. I have drawn these factors and determinants of crisis mainly from the three books listed in note 48; Mannheim enumerated factors in Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning, ch. 1. "Main symptoms of the crisis".

51. Disagreement with the concept of crisis was expressed, for example, by M. Ginsberg: "Moral bewilderment" (1944), reprinted in his On the Diversity of Morals. London, Heinemann, 1956. Ginsberg rightly argued that crisis theories give prominence to certain tendencies while ignoring others, that they assume causal links between movements, and that they attach undue importance to the analysis of documents. However, these are all matters of judgment or, as Mannheim might say, of interpretation, and their significance lies not only in the factual claims made about them but in the use of the interpretations rendered for purposes of directed social reform. That is, the concept of crisis is itself ideological. This does not mean, of course, that there was no objective basis for it, and Mannheim made very effective use of the undeniably serious domestic and international problems of Europe in the thirties and forties, in supporting his argument for large-scale planning.

52. Diagnosis of Our Time, p. 104.

53. Man and Society, p. 114.

54. ib., p. 292.

55. Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning, p. 102. Mannheim's thinking on this subject was very much in tune with the tenor of the recommendations for the revitalization of the Public Schools in the Fleming

Report: The Committee on Public schools. The Public Schools and the General Educational System. London, H.M.S.O., 1944.

56. On Dewey, see ch. X, section 1.2. Cassirer inextricably links continuity and recreation in the processes of transmission. Of the great works of culture he very perceptively remarked that "their content has being for us only by virtue of the fact that they must be continually possessed anew and hence continually recreated". His comments on language point to the inadequacies of a great deal of conventional thought on the processes of transmitting a heritage: "language exists only by virtue of the fact that it is passed on from one generation to the next ... The receiver does not take the gift as one accepts a stamped coin. For he cannot receive it except by using it, and to make use of it is to give it a new stamp. So, too, teacher and pupil, parent and child, never speak precisely 'the same' language". Cassirer, E. "The tragedy of culture" in The Logic of the Humanities, op. cit., pp. 197-198.

57. The principal sources for Mannheim's elite theory are Man and Society, parts I and II and p. 224 f.; Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning, chs. 3, 4, 13; Essays on the Sociology of Culture, part II and p. 200 f.

58. Man and Society, p. 82 f.

59. Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning, p. 93.

60. Man and Society, p. 92 f.; Essays on the Sociology of Culture, p. 200 f.

61. Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning, p. 96 f.

62. Essays on the Sociology of Culture, p. 240 f. Mannheim argued that, while an efficiency-minded democracy can all too easily discourage such experience, the attack upon social distance which democracy typically mounts, if successful, creates "a basis for purely existential relationships". This he believed to be democracy's "greatest potential achievement" (ib., p. 242). There are close similarities between Mannheim's criticism of social distance and Dewey's ideas on shared experience. A similarity is also apparent in Mannheim's ideas on existential space and Dewey's theory of primary experience. See ch. X, section 1, and my Introduction to Dewey, op. cit., pp. 13-16.

63. Diagnosis of Our Time, p. 119.

64. Williams, R. Culture and Society, op. cit., and The Long Revolution, op. cit.

65. Mahnheim's views on consensus exercised a powerful influence on the later American experimentalists, as we shall see in ch. VIII. He recognized that in a modern society social solidarity must be realized through conflict and stress. (Essays on the Sociology of Culture, p. 194 f.) He called for a "dynamic consensus" (Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning, p.107) but beyond pointing to the need for a critical surveillance of norms, for planning mechanisms dominated by elites, for receptiveness to "impulses coming from below", and for the systematic use of communication media, he had surprisingly little

to say about the most important question for a democracy in a period of change, namely procedures for achieving widespread agreement over worthwhile objectives. What seems to have appealed most to the later experimentalists is Mannheim's plea for a redefined set of basic norms and values (ib., p. 141 f.).

66. Mannheim did envisage the retention of a two-party parliamentary system and would retain private ownership of farms, small businesses and innovative enterprises. (Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning, p. 112 f.) However, he gave far more prominence to the permanent, elite-dominated, and centralized institutions engaged in long-term planning and "co-ordination", thus insuring effective control by what he hoped would be a culturally unified, if institutionally diverse, managerial bureaucracy. Having thus centralized social control in powerful institutions, he gave education an impossible task when he said that it was "through education" that the public should learn to express its wishes and aspirations and to insure popular control over planning objectives. (ib., p. 149).

67. As with Mannheim's views on parliamentary democracy and central planning by elites, this too is a matter of emphasis. He outlined "principles of democracy" and the anticipated behavior patterns of the "new democratic man", respectively in Essays on the Sociology of Culture, p. 176 f. and Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning, ch. 8 "The pattern of democratic behaviour".

68. The functional-substantive distinction is discussed in Man and Society, p. 58 f.; for the concept of youth as marginal outsiders, capable, if properly organized, of revitalizing society, see Diagnosis of Our Time, 3, "The problem of youth in modern society".

69. Popper, K. The Poverty of Historicism. "Introduction".

70. Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, p. 172.

Chapter VIII

1. Confusion over the nature of actual and desirable relationships between politics and education in different situations can easily lead to exaggerated generalization, e.g., "It is an accepted fact that education is a creature of polity, and in a sense, a political phenomenon". El-Ghannam, Mohammed A. Politics in Educational Planning. Paris, Unesco, International Institute for Educational Planning, 1970. Occasional paper, no. 19, p. 18. The authority of Aristotle notwithstanding, it is not an accepted fact that education is a "creature of polity"; rather, the facts of the relationship of education to politics are extremely complex and various. In any case, to slide from the so-called facts, as El-Ghannam does, into the argument that it is the function of the educational planner to translate the politician's vision of an ideal future into reality is to beg the question of the role of education as a clarifier and critic of "visions". This question is begged as a matter of course in authoritarian and totalitarian systems. It is a condition of the survival of freedom of thought and discussion in democracies that the question is kept open, through at least some schools and other educational institutions sustaining a critical stance towards political ends, whatever their source. This argument, no less than El-Ghannam's, recognizes that education is a political phenomenon, but it refuses to acknowledge that a socio-cultural system should be conceived as an Aristotelian pyramid, with the polity at the apex, and determining the ends of all other spheres of thought and action. One consequence of this latter model of political dominance is Lynsenko's biology.

2. Brameld, T. Education for the Emerging Age. New York, Harper and Row,1965, p. 15.

3. Brameld, T. Cultural Foundations of Education - an Interdisciplinary Exploration, op. cit. Brameld's substantive studies of culture include The Remaking of a Culture - Life and Education in Puerto Rico. New York, Harper, 1959, and Japan: Culture, Education and Change in Two Communities. New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968. Brameld does make some use, particularly in his study of Puerto Rico, of the analytic framework he outlined in Cultural Foundations of Education.

4. Brameld, T. Education for the Emerging Age, pp. xi., 33-34. Brameld postulated universal change: "Change is a ubiquitous fact of any and all culture." Cultural Foundations of Education, p. 125. In Ch. VIII I discussed Brameld's analysis of the concepts of cultural process - including "crisis" which he alleges experts agree about, although he was not able to cite much evidence of their agreement.

5. Brameld, T. Patterns of Educational Philosophy. New York, World Book Co., 1950, p. 59.

6. ib., chs. 3 and 4.

7. Education for the Emerging Age, p. 1.

8. ib., Prelude and ch. 17. Brameld recognized the strength of likely conservative opposition from within the education profession (chs. 5 and 6). But he tended to dismiss the arguments of "conservatives" like Conant and others, instead of assessing them.

9. See Roszak, T. (ed.). The Dissenting Academy, op. cit., for a set of proposals on each of these topics, and Brameld, T. The Climactic Decades. Mandate to Education. New York, Praeger, 1970, for Brameld's sympathy with the increase in student radicalism.

10. Education for the Emerging Age, pp. 11-12.

11. ib., p. 80 f. The "buttresses" included, in addition to an "adequate theory of social forces" theories of human nature, the state and government, and normative commitment. Brameld's own views on these topics were very sketchy; what emerges is essentially the democratic ideology of the thirties, but with a more internationalist flavor.

12. To illustrate the difference between appeals for "buttresses" and the systematic deployment of a theory of resistance to change, see Gross, N., Giacquinta, J.B. and Bernstein, M. An Attempt to Implement a Major Educational Innovation: a Sociological Inquiry. Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard University, 1968 (mimeo). Gross and his associates noted the paucity of sound theoretical constructs for analysing the ineffectiveness of institutional change in education, but in the course of their study built up a model to account for this ineffectiveness.

13. I touch upon some of these in their relation to curriculum change in "Changing the curriculum: forces and strategies" in Walton, J. (ed.) Innovation in Education. Oxford, Pergamon (forthcoming). On achievement motivation, see McClelland, D.C. "Changing values for progress" in Burns, W.H. (ed.) Education and the Development of Nations. Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1963; and McClelland, D.C. and Winter, D.G. Motivating Economic Achievement. New York, The Free Press, 1969.

14. Frank, L. "Culture and personality - the psycho-cultural approach to a democratic social order" in Hook, S. (ed.). John Dewey, Philosopher of Science and Freedom. New York, The Dial Press, 1950.

15. Rickman, H.P. (ed.). Pattern and Meaning in History: W. Dilthey's Thoughts on History and Society. London, Allen and Unwin, 1961. This comparison is particularly apt in view of Dilthey's analysis of volition and feeling in the culture sciences. See also Frank's Feelings and Emotions. New York, Doubleday, 1954, a brief but important counterbalance to the rationalistic excesses of most of the American experimentalists.

16. Raup, R.B., Axtelle, G.E., Benne, K., and Smith, B.O. The Improvement of Practical Intelligence. New York, Harper, 1949 (1943); Stanley, W.O. Education and Social Integration. New York, Teachers College,

Columbia University, Bureau of Publications, 1953; Smith, B.O., Stanley, W.O. and Shores, J.H. Fundamentals of Curriculum Development. New York, Harcourt, Brace and World, 1957 rev. ed., (1950).

17. Raup, R.B., et al, op. cit., pp. 100-101.

18. Stanley, W.O., op. cit., p. 31.

19. ib. and ch. 3 "Evidence of cultural crisis".

20. Like Mannheim and the later experimentalists, Leavis and Thompson were deeply perturbed by the disappearance of an "organic community". The disappearance signified "a vast and terrifying disintegration". Leavis, F.R. and Thompson, D. Culture and Environment. London, Chatto and Windus, 1950 (1933), p. 87. Furthermore, the complete disappearance of the past meant an irretrievable loss, a point with which the reconstructionists agreed, even if they did not attach quite so much importance as did Leavis and Thompson to memory: "the memory of the old order must be the chief incitement towards a new, if ever we are to have one. If we forget the old order we shall not know what kind of thing [standard?] to strive towards, and in the end there will be no striving, but a surrender to the 'progress' of the machine". ib., p. 97.

21. Stanley, W.O. Education and Social Integration, p. 58 f.

22. ib., p. 117. Stanley did not want a complete integration of society in the sense of an all pervading uniformity of norms and aspirations. He followed Linton in separating a common core of values from other types of social activity in which variability and diversity would be practised.

23. Smith, B.O., et al. Fundamentals of Curriculum Development, p. 4.

24. Adams, J. The Herbartian Psychology Applied to Education... Boston, D.C. Heath, 1897, ch. III "The Herbartian psychology"; Morrison, H.C. The Curriculum of the Common School. University of Chicago Press, 1940.

25. Smith, B.O., et al., op. cit., p. 578.

26. ib., p. 58. For Parsons' view that "a change in the structure of a social system is a change in its normative culture" see "An outline of the social system" in Parsons, T., et al., Theories of Society, op. cit., p. 73.

27. Smith, B.O., et al., p. 88.

28. Brameld, T. "Philosophical anthropology: the educational significance of Ernst Cassirer". Harvard Educational Review, 26, 1956, pp. 207-232, reprinted as an appendix in Cultural Foundations of Education, op. cit. See also Patterns of Educational Philosophy where, in discussing Mannheim's distinction between ideology and utopia, Brameld affirmed the "twofold obligation" of reconstructionists to analyse the methods

and meanings of ideology as "a major device for retarding and blocking our utopian propensities", and to "build future-looking attitudes and cultural objectives together with effective strategies for reaching them", (p. 454).

29. These issues are discussed in relation to the Illinois curriculum programme of the fifties, which involved considerable public participation, in Smith, B.O., et al., op. cit., p. 426 f. Use of the charette technique is much more recent. A case study report of its use in a poor area in Baltimore has been prepared by Educational Facilities Laboratories, New York: Kohn, S.D. Experiment in Planning an Urban High School. The Baltimore Charette. New York, Educational Facilities Laboratories, 1969. Information on other charette activities is available from the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Facilities Department.

30. Brameld, T. Patterns of Educational Philosophy, p. 456 f. and p. 538 f.

31. Coulton, G.G. Medieval Panorama, vol. 1. London, Collins, 1961 (1938), p. 38. (Coulton is paraphrasing Tacitus on "the old Germanic principle ... of compulsory unanimity").

32. Raup, R.B., et al., op. cit., p. 40.

33. ib., ch. 6. "The roles of character and community in judgments of practice".

34. Practical judgment was not unreservedly welcomed by all of the older experimentalists. See Childs' searching critique in American Pragmatism and Education, op. cit., p. 298 f. The engineering aspects of the doctrine have been very interestingly developed, in terms of curriculum change and organizational theory, by Benne: Benne, K.D. and Muntyan, B. (eds.). Human Relations and Curriculum Change ... New York, Dryden Press, 1951, and Bennis, W.G., Benne, K.D. and Chin, R. (eds.) The Planning of Change. New York, Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1961. The latter is in effect the second edition of the former. It is significant that in the third edition of this work, (1969), decreased emphasis is given to the democratic ideology, with a corresponding increase in supposed value free, behavioristic, organizational theory. It is just this emphasis which reveals the danger, that important areas of public decision taking will be reduced to matters of technical efficiency. Concession is made to normative issues by categorizing them as "qualitative inputs".

35. "The great conflict facing the world today is between those who believe change must be imposed by force and coercion - the authoritarian program - and those who believe that a free social order can change through education and persuasion, exhibiting the capacity for self-repair and self-regulation which is the basic conviction of a democratic society." "Fragmentation in the helping professions" Bennis, W.G., et al., op. cit. (1962 ed.), p. 46. See also Feelings and Emotions, op. cit., pp. 37-38.

36. Frank, L.K. The School as Agent for Cultural Renewal. Cambridge

(Mass.), Harvard University Press, 1959. However, in Feelings and Emotions, the tensions which Frank perceives to be the most serious for society are ultimately those within the human personality.

37. Brameld, T. Patterns of Educational Philosophy, pp. 426-427.

38. Brameld, T. Education for the Emerging Age, p. 83.

39. Mead, M. "The future as a basis for establishing a shared culture". Daedalus, 94, 1. Reprinted in Bennis, W.G., Benne, K.D. and Chin, R. (eds.). The Planning of Change. New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969. See also Mead, M. Growing Up in New Guinea. Harmondsworth (Middlesex), Penguin Books, 1942, ch. XVI "The child's dependence upon tradition".

40. Stanley, W.O. Education and Social Integration, p. 34.

41. Stanley, W.O. Education and Social Integration, p. 138 f. For recent evidence of the impact of Mannheim on Stanley's thought, see Stanley, W.O. and Holtzmann, R.H. "Perspectivism and unity: Karl Mannheim". Educational Theory, 19, 3, Summer 1969.

42. Stanley, W.O. Education and Social Integration, p. 35. See also the defence of the reconstructionist approach in education in Smith, B.O., et al., op. cit. "The reconstruction theory represents the only definition of the social function of education which, in a period of social crisis and transition such as the present, offers any hope whatever that education may play a significant role in the uncoerced resolution of social conflicts and problems. And if it is true, ... that education is the only alternative to force, then it would appear that the public must espouse the educational adventure implied by this position - or else abandon the attempt to re-establish consensus through reasoned discussion and consent rather than through civil strife and dictatorship", (p. 575).

Chapter IX

1. Ausubel has recently brought the two approaches together: "one cannot simply soak up one's culture like a piece of blotting paper and expect it to be meaningful. But who advocates doing anything of the kind? The very processes of perception and cognition necessarily require that the cultural stimulus world must first be filtered through each individual's personal sensory apparatus and cognitive structure before it can have any meaning. Meaning can never be anything more than a personal phenomenological product that emerges when potentially meaningful ideas are integrated within an individually unique cognitive structure. Invariably, therefore, the achievement of meaning requires translation into a personal frame of reference, and reconciliation with established concepts and propositions." Ausubel, D.P. Educational Psychology, a Cognitive View. New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968, p. 475.

2. "On surveying the sum total of Socialist and Communist literature ... and comparing the infinitely slight results of the last period with the earlier days, one can hardly mistake the fact that as theories Socialism and Communism have already run their course ... One is no longer wrong in regarding the Socialist and Communist theories as a closed chapter ... the age ... of theoretical elaboration ... having come to an end." (Lorenz von Stein, in 1847. Quoted by Talmon, J.L. Political Messianism. The Romantic Phase. London, Secker and Warburg, 1960, p. 506.)

3. Aron, R. "On totalitarianism" in Democracy and Totalitarianism. London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968 (1965), pp. 193-194.

4. Hoggart, R. Speaking to Each Other, op. cit., vol. 1, "Culture dead and alive" (1961).

5. The classical and Christian forms of change theory are examined by: Baker, H. The Image of Man. New York, Harper, 1961 (1947); Bury, J.B., The Idea of Progress; Finley, M.I. "Myth, memory and history". History and Theory, 4, 1964-1965, pp. 279-303; and Nisbet, R., Social Change and History. (Cp. Finley's argument that the Greeks were hostile to notions of change with Nisbet's and Bury's claim that the theory of development originates in classical thought.) On modern approaches to the concept of universal social change, see Moore, W.E. and Cook, R.M. (eds.) Readings on Social Change. Englewood Cliffs (N.J.), Prentice-Hall, 1967, and Nisbet, R.A., op. cit. Recent arguments about the rate and extent of change and the degree of inter-relationship between science and technology may be contrasted with the too confident affirmations of the earlier reconstructionists. See: Dovring, F. "The principle of acceleration: a non-dialectical theory of progress." Comparative Studies in Society and History, XI, 1969, pp. 413-425 (accelerating change is a principle at work since man's first conquest of fire; population increases account for increased rates of change); Kuhn, T.S. "Comment" (on Dovring), ib., p. 428 (factors promoting

the development of science don't necessarily promote the development of technology); Weinberg, I. "The problem of the convergence of industrial societies: a critical look at the state of a theory", ib., pp. 1-15 (challenges Marxist technological determinism and uncritical acceptance of "total transformation"; queries convergence theory).

6. The successive elimination, from the time of Locke onwards, of theoretical obstacles to perfectibilism are discussed by Passmore, op. cit., p. 169 f., p. 192 f., p. 202 f. See also Talmon, J.L., op. cit., pp. 15-31, 505-518 and his earlier volume, The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy. London, Secker and Warburg, 1952, pp. 1-13, 249-255, for an overview of the ideological treatment of scientific-democratic themes in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Reconstructionism, partly through the influence of Comte on Dewey, was considerably influenced by this background. The contrast between (a reconstructionist) belief in the possibility of progress and belief in the inevitability of decay is brought out in the following passages:

1. "Perfectibility as applied to human nature means potentiality for cultural development under adequate historical conditions. Cultural evolution may be understood as the unfolding or activating of the potentialities of human nature through a process of self-conditioning and education in relation to a given environment. Cultural evolution is possible because man is capable of acquiring in time new actual psychocultural powers and abilities by means of the processes of education, social conditioning, and individual creative efforts. This unique type of cultural perfectibility also explains the possibility of cultural continuity and discontinuity, and, hence, of progress. Cultural patterns are not only repeated but improved upon and surpassed by later generations ... cultural evolution and cultural progress are direct consequences of human efforts in self-cultivation of the natural environment." Bidney, D., Theoretical Anthropology, op. cit., p. 82.

2. "Is it surprising that the people could see their fate and that of the world only as an endless succession of evils? Bad government, exactions, the cupidity and violence of the great, wars and brigandage, scarcity, misery, and pestilence - to this is contemporary history nearly reduced in the eyes of the people. The feeling of general insecurity which was caused by the chronic form wars were apt to take, by the constant menace of the dangerous classes, by the mistrust of justice, was further aggravated by the obsession of the coming end of the world, and by the fear of hell, of sorcerers, and of devils." Huizinga, J. The Waning of the Middle Ages. (A study of the forms of life, thought and art in France and the Netherlands in the XIVth and XVth centuries.) London, Arnold, 1924, p. 21 (see also ch. II "Pessimism and the ideal of the sublime life" for evidence of the effect of Christian renunciation doctrines on reformist thought.)

The portent of impending cultural disorder, in the writings of Wells, Mannheim, and Brameld, may be seen as an infusion of the

spirit of mediaeval pessimism into the cultural theory whose outlines Bidney sketched.

7. On technological and other change theories see: Cohen, P.S., Modern Social Theory, op. cit., ch. 7 "Explaining social change"; Eisenstadt, S.N. (ed.) Readings in Social Evolution and Development. Oxford, Pergamon, 1970 (especially papers by Ginsberg, Schaff, Moore, Bocke and Eisenstadt); Krausz, E. Sociology in Britain, a Survey of Research. London, Batsford, 1969, p. 176 f.

8. See Aron, R. The Industrial Society, op. cit., part I; Ginzberg, E. (ed.) Technology and Social Change. New York, Columbia University Press, 1964, (especially papers by Bell, Baker and Fabricant); Hoselitz, B.F. and Moore, W.E. (eds.) Industrialization and Society. Paris, Unesco, 1963 (especially concluding summary).

9. Carritt, E.F., op. cit., p. 159.

10. The Puritan notion of "Christian Calling" illustrates the combination of divine control of history and human action in the world. See John Cotton's essay of that title in Miller, P. (ed.) The American Puritans. Garden City, New York, Doubleday, 1956, pp. 172-182; also, Miller's discussion of the covenants of works and grace: The New England Mind. The Seventeenth Century. New York, Macmillan, 1939, p. 366 f.

11. Pasternak, B. Dr. Zhivago (trans. M. Hayward and M. Harari). London, Collins-Fontana, 1961, p. 332. Compare the "new man" ideology of the film, "The Legend of Maxim Gorki's Youth", based on the autobiography of the early hero of the Soviet revolution. Erikson comments on this film: "It is clear that what we are watching in this picture is the emergence of a new frame of mind, a frame of mind which to us is primarily characterized by its omissions. What is omitted, again and again, is action based on a sense of guilt. Thus neither remorse nor reform seems to count in this new frame of mind. What counts is critical patience, incorruptible avoidance, and absolute intolerance of wrong action, clear inner direction, and then - action." Erikson, E.H. Childhood and Society. New York, W.W. Norton, 1950, pp. 338.

In this reading of the character of Alyosha (Gorki) Erikson identifies one of the basic motifs of the film, but there is also the character of the grandmother - mother Russia in symbolic terms - whom Alyosha is admonished by the anarchist lodger to heed, with the advice "Evil commands he would not heed: behind another's conscience he would not hide". Old Russia, and her conscience, are not entirely supplanted by the new, remorseless hero. The latter point, which Erikson touches on but does not develop, suggests a more complex "new man" than the revolutionary man of steel that Erikson depicts. The new is a mixture, of the traditional and the modern, an interpretation which is borne out by the Autobiography itself. Mead argues that guilt does play a part in the "new Soviet man", in a paper that draws attention to Marxian failure to develop a theory relating character structure to political institutions: Mead, Margaret, and Callas, Elena "Child-training ideals in a post-

revolutionary context: Soviet Russia" in Mead, Margaret, and Wolfenstein, Martha (eds.) Childhood in Contemporary Culture. University of Chicago Press, 1955. But how important are these kinds of ideals in modifying character? Following his review of a wide range of publications on the Israeli kibbutzim, I. Kraft doubted whether any contemporary society is producing a "new man". He argued, like Wells, that new human types will emerge, if at all, only slowly, and more in the course of sustained attacks by societies on their larger problems than as a consequence of specific child-rearing practices. Kraft, I. "A new man in the kibbutz?" Teachers College Record, 68, 7, April 1967, pp. 588-595. This may be so, but such attacks have to be directed by purposes and the importance of works like "The Legend of Maxim Gorki's Youth" is, in this respect, to suggest possibilities. For more recent evidence than Kraft's on the attitudes of second generation kibbutzniks, see Group of Young Kibbutz Members. The Seventh Day. Soldiers' Talk About the Six Day War. (English ed. H. Near). London, André Deutsch, 1970; and Cohen, E. and Rosner, M. "Relations between the generations in the Israeli kibbutz" in The Midrasha, College of Jewish Studies: The Kibbutz as a Way of Life in Modern Society. Southfield (Mich.), 1970.

12. Freud, S. The Future of an Illusion. Complete Works, ed. J. Strachey, XXI. London, Hogarth Press, 1961 (1927), pp. 54-56.

13. Maritain, J. Education at the Crossroads. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1943, ch. IV "The trials of present-day education".

14. Oakeshott, M. "The tower of Babel" in Rationalism and Politics, op. cit. "The pursuit of perfection as the crow flies" is an enterprise, Oakeshott asserts, that is appropriate to individuals, not to societies, because its reward lies not in the achievement but in the attempt. For society, the penalty of this approach is "a chaos of conflicting ideals, the disruption of a common life", (p. 59). It is not at all clear that,because the reward lies in the attempt, only individuals and not societies should seek amelioration. Oakeshott's reference to the disruption of the common life overlooks the fact that disruption has occurred and the argument that to restore a common life concerted action is required.

15. Parsons, T. The Structure of Social Action, op. cit., vol, 1, p. 463.

16. Durkheim, E. The Rules of Sociological Method, op. cit., p. 5.

17. For Marx's thought I have used Feuer, L.S. (ed.) Marx and Engels: Basic Writings, and the following commentaries: Addis, L. "The individual and the Marxist philosophy of history", Philosophy of Science, 33, 1966, pp. 101-117, reprinted in Brodbeck, May (ed.) op. cit., pp. 317-335; Aiken, H.D. (intro. and ed.) The Age of Ideology. New York, Mentor, 1956; Berlin, I. Karl Marx. London, Oxford University Press, 1963 (3rd ed.); Delfgaauw, B. The Young Marx. London, Sheed and Ward, 1967; Lichtheim, G. Marxism. An Historical and Critical Study. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961; Popper, K. The Open Society and its Enemies, op. cit., vol. II. For recent revisions

of Marxist determinism in the direction of ideational initiatives for change, see Schaff, A. "The Marxist theory of social development" in Eisenstadt, S.N. (ed.), Readings in Social Evolution and Development; and Marek, F. Philosophy of World Revolution.

18. Inconsistences in and developments of Marx's thought provide sympathetic interpreters with sufficient material for other readings. For example, Addis' attempt to convert sub-structural determinism into "total social interactionism", art. cit., p. 332, and Marek's use of Marx's famous argument (Preface, vol. I of Capital) that we may shorten the birth pangs of the new society by getting into line with the laws of motion of history. However, Marek found it necessary to revise Marxism to the extent of affirming that the laws of history and the development of society are the result of human wills, consciousness, and activity, op. cit., pp. 43-44. This modification so far "reconstructs" Marxism as to make some of its major claims indistinguishable from the socialist reformism Marx and Engels denounced.

19. See ch. XI, section 2.3.2.

20. Berlin, I., op. cit.

21. See Benne, K.D. and Muntyan, B. (eds.), Human Relations and Curriculum Change; and Bennis, W.G., et al, (eds.), The Planning of Change.

22. Jones, G.N. Planned Organizational Change. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968. See also my paper in Walton, J. (ed.), Innovation in Education. I discuss the theory of practical judgment below, in chs. X, section 5.6, and XII, section 4.

23. Rogers, E.M. The Diffusion of Innovations. New York, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962. See also Sklair, L., op. cit., p. 94 f.

Chapter X

1. Kilpatrick, W.H. Philosophy of Education, op. cit., p. 120.

2. This is the implicit theme of the four chapters in Democracy and Education in which Dewey outlines the reconstructionist theory (chs. VI-IX). See also his papers "Education for a changing social order" in National Education Association. Addresses and Proceedings, Washington, D.C., 1934, pp. 744-752, and "Education and social change". The Social Frontier, III, May 1937, pp. 235-238. On embryonic communities see Dewey, J. and Dewey, Evelyn. Schools of To-morrow. New York, Dutton, 1915, passim.

3. See my Introduction to Dewey, op. cit., sections 4 and 5, and chapter VI, sections 1.1 and 2.3 of the present work. I shall not repeat the references to Dewey's theory of experience that I used in those sections.

4. Dewey argued for the educational importance of pre-defined subject matter in his early essay, The Child and the Curriculum. University of Chicago Press, 1902. He was frequently misunderstood or misinterpreted on this point, even by his disciple Kilpatrick, whose The Foundations of Method (New York, Macmillan, 1929) and "The project method" (Teachers College Record, XIX, 1918, reissued by Teachers College Press, 1921), minimize the significance of subject matter prepared in advance of teaching. For Dewey's later comments on the abandonment of pre-arranged learning structures, see his Progressive Education and the Science of Education. Washington (D.C.), Progressive Education Association, 1928, and Experience and Education. New York, Macmillan, 1938.

5. The Elementary School Record, op. cit., and Democracy and Education, op. cit., chs. V and IX.

6. ib., ch. IV; The School and Society, op. cit., ch. V.

7. Bode, B.H. Progressive Education at the Crossroads, op. cit., ch. V "Education as growth". See also Archambault, R.D. (ed.) Dewey on Education: Appraisals. New York, Random House, 1966, especially essays by Archambault, Hook and Scheffler.

8. For his Herbartian phase, see Dewey's early papers to the National Herbart Society (forerunner of the National Society for the Study of Education): "Interest as related to the training of the will". Second Supplement to the Herbart Yearbook for 1895. Bloomington, (Ill.), 1896 (revised and republished, 1899); and "Ethical principles underlying education". National Herbart Society. Third Yearbook. Chicago, 1897 (revised and reissued as Moral Principles in Education. Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1909); also, "The reflex arc concept in psychology". Contributions to Philosophy, 1, 1, 1896. University of Chicago.

9. Critics who have made this point include Broudy, H.S. ("Dewey's analysis

of the act of thought" in Clayton, A.S. (ed.) John Dewey in Perspective. Bulletin of the School of Education, University of Indiana, 36, 1, Jan. 1960. Bloomington, Indiana); Bruner, J.S. "After John Dewey, what?" in Archambault, R.D. (ed.), op. cit.; and Hirst, P.H. "The logical and psychological aspects of teaching a subject" in Peters, R.S. (ed.), op. cit.

10. These and other patterns of subject-matter organization are examined in Smith, B.O., Stanley, W.O., and Shores, J.H., Fundamentals of Curriculum Development, op. cit., pt. 3, "Patterns of curriculum organization".

11. Two prominent English educational critics are Bantock, G.H. (Education in an Industrial Society, op. cit., ch. 2 "John Dewey on education") and Walsh, W. The Use of Imagination. London, Chatto and Windus, 1959, p. 192. These critics have been considerably influenced by the views of Santayana (Santayana, G. "Dewey's naturalistic metaphysics" in Schilpp. P.A. (ed.). The Philosophy of John Dewey, op. cit., pp. 245-261). For a more sympathetic appraisal of this and other issues, together with a systematic attempt to reconstruct experimentalism, see Berkson, I.B. The Ideal and the Community. New York, Harper, 1958, passim.

12. Experience and Nature, op. cit., p. 78 f; 232 f: Reconstruction in Philosophy, ch. 4 "Changed conceptions of experience and reason".

13. Stanley, W.O. Education and Social Integration, p. 21.

14. In experimentalist thought, the confusion of education with enculturation stems from the first two chapters of Democracy and Education where Dewey fails to distinguish adequately between socially functional processes of individual formation and the qualitative criteria of education. In his later writings, and indeed in subsequent chapters of Democracy and Education, he made a clearer distinction between these two. See, for example, "Democracy and education in the world today" (1935) in Problems of Men, op. cit.

15. Brameld, T. Education for the Emerging Age, op. cit., p. 7.

16. ib., p. 64.

17. ib., p. 107.

18. ib., p. 115.

19. Smith, B.O., Stanley, W.O. and Shores, J.H., op. cit., p. 1; Stanley, W.O., op. cit., p. 22.

20. Note the warmth of Sidney Webb's hostility to those class distinctions which are expressed in occupational differences of status and privilege: "I want no class of hewers of wood and drawers of water; no class destined to remain there and forbidden from rising ... because we do not provide for it. I cannot believe that we are only to provide the means of instruction for a certain limited number of people who we think will rise, while the rest are to toil for our convenience.

For our convenience! Who is to hew? Who is to deliver our bread? Our convenience! Our comfort. Our comfort is to stand in the way of enabling these people, our fellow citizens, to attain anything better than being mere hewers of wood and drawers of water." Quoted in Cole, Margaret, Beatrice Webb, 1858-1943. London, Longmans, Green, 1945, p. 46 fn. (According to Mary Hamilton, Sidney and Beatrice Webb, op. cit., p. 120, these remarks are from an address to the Association of Technical Institutes, 1909.)

21. Counts, G.S. Dare the School Build a New Social Order?, p. 20. Counts vacillated between demanding that the schools firmly commit themselves to a modernized version of the "American dream" and posing a more critical role for them. However, he was in no doubt that even the criticism should be directed by definite criteria and these criteria, as he outlined them, form the basis of a socialist programme of socio-political action. The controversy in the columns of The Social Frontier is discussed by Bowers, C.A., op. cit., chs. 3 and 4.

22. Bode, B.H. Progressive Education at the Crossroads, op. cit., ch. 7; Democracy as a Way of Life, op. cit., p. 77 f. Bode, however, opposed the editorial policy of The Social Frontier; Bowers, C.A., op. cit., chs. 3 and 4. He was dissatisfied with the lack of direction and of concreteness in Dewey's proposals, but no more satisfied when Counts proposed a more definite reconstructionist role for the school. Bode, in fact, was less precise in his treatment of the problem of defining objectives than any other experimentalist. The following is typical: "With regard to curriculum construction [democracy] requires, first of all, a type of education that enables the individual not only to adapt himself to the existing social order, but to take part in its remaking in the interests of a greater freedom." (Modern Educational Theories, op. cit., pp. 19-20.) However, this passage, and similar ones in the writings of Counts, Rugg, Kilpatrick and Dewey are a sufficient rebuttal of the claim that the reconstructionist thinking of the thirties had no significant antecedents in the twenties; cp. Graham, Patricia, A., Progressive Education from Arcady to Academe, op. cit., pp. 65-66.

23. Not only the militant democrats held this view. Both Dewey and Kilpatrick shared it. Kilpatrick's argument, that the "concomitant" or unintended "atmospheric" learnings are more significant than many of the formal learnings of the curriculum, is one example; Dewey's argument, that the practice of the principles of progressive education in teacher education would carry more conviction than courses of study taught by formal means, is another: Kilpatrick, W.H. The Foundations of Method, op. cit., ch. VIII, "The wider problem of method"; Dewey, J. "Introduction" to Clapp, Elsie R. The Use of Resources in Education. New York, Harper, 1952.

24. For recent analyses of stronger and weaker forms of indoctrination in education, see White, J.P. "Indoctrination" in Peters, R.S. (ed.) The Concept of Education, op. cit., pp. 177-191; Gregory, I.M.M. and Woods, R.G. "Indoctrination" and White, S. "Reply" in The Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain. Proceedings of the Annual Conference, Jan. 1970, pp. 77-120.

25. Whether Dewey committed the "naturalistic fallacy" is difficult to ascertain from his ambiguous statements on the role of knowledge in moral judgments; but cp. Human Nature and Conduct, op. cit., pp. 11-12; and "Theory of valuation". International Encyclopaedia of Unified Science, II, 4, University of Chicago Press, 1939, and "Logical conditions of a scientific treatment of morality" in Problems of Men, pp. 214-215. He would agree with Nowell-Smith about the practical usefulness of empirical knowledge in making moral choices: Nowell-Smith, P.H. Ethics. Harmondsworth (Middlesex), Penguin Books, 1954, pp. 181-182.

26. But cp. note 12.

27. See chs. XI, section 2.2, and XII, section 3.

28. Sources of the Webb concept of education are scattered: Webb, Beatrice, Our Partnership; Webb, S. The Education Muddle and the Way Out; London Education; "Twentieth century politics" in The Basis and Policy of Socialism; Webb, S. and B. The Prevention of Destitution; A Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain; The Decay of Capitalist Civilization; Webb, S. and Freeman, A. Great Britain After the War. London, Allen and Unwin, 1916. The following Fabian Tracts, together with the previous references, provide a comprehensive overview of the Fabian position (to 1940): Webb, S. Questions for School Board Candidates, Tract 25, 1891; Webb, S. A Labour Policy for Public Authorities, Tract 37, 1891; Martin, J.W. State Education at Home and Abroad, Tract 52, 1894; Shaw, G.B. Report on Fabian Policy, Tract 70, 1896; Shaw, G.B. Socialism for Millionaires, Tract 107, 1901; Webb, S. The Education Act, 1902: How to Make the Best of It, Tract 114, 1903; Webb, S. The London Education Act, 1903: How to Make the Best of It, Tract 117, 1904; Bland, H. Socialism and Labour Policy, Tract 127, 1906; Dale, Mrs. Hylton. Child Labour Under Capitalism, Tract 140, 1908; Mrs. Townsend The Case for School Nurseries, Tract 145, 1909; Hutchins, Miss B.L. What a Health Committee Can Do, Tract 148, 1909; Guest, L.H. The Case for School Clinics, Tract 154, 1911; The Education Group. What an Education Committee Can Do (Elementary Schools), Tract 156, 1911; Webb, S. The Teacher in Politics, Tract 187, 1919; Drake, Barbara. Some Problems of Education, Tract 198, 1922; Dawson, Lilian A. Co-operative Education, Tract 205, 1923; Samuels, H. Education Committees, Tract 225, 1928; Drake, Barbara. Starvation in the Midst of Plenty, Tract 240, 1933.

29. Wells wrote several books and articles specifically on education, but this review of his ideas on educational processes is based on the whole body of his work, to which I referred in detail in ch. V.

30. Scientific humanism, for Wells, involved an intermixture of literary, aesthetic and historical thought with the natural sciences. World Brain, p. x.

31. Wells, H.G. First and Last Things, p. 291. Wells saw education as a necessary prior condition of socialism: New Worlds for Old, p. 116. It is obvious that Wells was thinking of socialism as itself a form of the educated life, a very different concept from political and

administrative socialism.

32. As with Wells, in this discussion of Russell's educational views, I have used the whole range of those of his works which I drew upon in ch. V, with the addition of his volume, On Education. London, Allen and Unwin, 1926.

33. Peters, R.S. "What is an educational process?", art. cit., p. 20.

34. ib., p. 22.

35. His reservations rested on a definition of education which demanded high standards of cognitive performance, or at least a progression towards them in the management of educational processes. More recently, he has accepted wider uses of the term "education": "Education and the educated man" in The Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain. Proceedings of the Annual Conference, January 1970, pp. 5-20.

36. Peters, R.S. "What is an educational process?", art. cit., pp. 21-22; Oakeshott, M. "The voice of poetry in the conversation of mankind" in Rationalism and Politics, op. cit. See especially pp. 197-202.

37. There are many similarities on these points between Dewey's criticism of child-centred progressivism and Peters' criticism of the Plowden report: Dewey, J. Experience and Education; Peters, R.S. "'A recognizable philosophy of education': a constructive critique" in Peters, R.S. (ed.) Perspectives on Plowden. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969.

38. Rugg, H. Culture and Education in America (1931), op. cit., p. 230. Similar aspirations were expressed in Foundations for American Education (1947), op. cit., and Social Foundations of Education (1955), op. cit.

39. These culture heroes, the builders of the "American philosophy of experience" are (to take only the first rank): Peirce, William James, Dewey, Veblen, Whitman, and Oliver Wendell Holmes, jr.

40. Clarke's published output was relatively slight but highly influential. In addition to the items I referred to in ch. VII, see "The conflict of philosophies" in Clarke, F. (ed.) A Review of Educational Thought, University of London Press and Evans Bros., 1936; "The search for a philosophy of education". Journal of Education, 77, 919, Dec. 1945, pp. 574-576; Essays in the Politics of Education. Cape Town, Juta and Co., 1923; and Freedom in The Educative Society, University of London Press, 1948. Unfortunately these essays do scant justice to one of the most thoughtful and influential of twentieth century English educationists. Mitchell's appreciative biography shows the relative insignificance of Clarke's published work in his overall contribution to education. His shrewdness is revealed in the (unpublished) marginal comments in several of the books now in the Clarke collection of the London Institute. For example, in W. Hocking's Human Nature and its Remaking. (New Haven [Conn.], Yale University Press, 1923), a book which greatly stimulated Clarke, there is the following passage:

"society needs always to be saved from the besetting vice of its Recommenders, that of abstraction" (p. 218). Clarke's terse marginal comment is: "Parsons and Professors". Clarke's concluding note on Hocking's chapter "Ideals and their Recommenders" is: "Recommenders to guard against 'interested' ideals and standards, and in their turn to be guarded against as source of abstractions. Rough, tumble of the conflict of institutions forcing us to a concrete synthesis is the best safeguard here" (p. 222).

41. Clarke, F. Education and Social Change, p. vi.

42. Clarke, F. Freedom in the Educative Society, Conclusion, et pass. Clarke always conceived the educative society in terms of a Christian consensus, and his thought was strongly influenced by Idealism, not only that of Hocking but also Bosanquet's. See Essays in the Politics of Education, p. 7 f. This book is significant for its very strong social emphasis, which it is sometimes mistakenly assumed Clarke did not develop until he read Mannheim. The principal influences in Clarke's thought in this respect appear to have been Plato, Bosanquet, Durkheim, and Dewey, ib., chs. 1 and 11. It is interesting that this social emphasis should continue to be expressed in the writings of the present director of the London Institute: Elvin, L. "The positive roles of society and the teacher" in Peters, R.S. (ed.) Perspectives on Plowden. Elvin was also a signatory of the Kothari Report.

43. Mannheim, K. Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning, op. cit., p. 114.

44. Frank, L.K. The School as Agent for Cultural Renewal, op. cit.

45. ib., p. 3.

46. ib., p. 18 f.

47. Stanley, W.O. Education and Social Integration, op. cit., pp. 172-173.

48. Raup, R.B., Axtelle, G.E., Benne, K.D. and Smith, B.O., op. cit.; Benne, K.D. "Democratic ethics and human engineering". Progressive Education, 26, 7, May, 1949, reprinted in Bennis, W.G., Benne, K.D. and Chin, R. (eds.), op. cit. (1961).

49. Brameld, T. Patterns of Educational Philosophy, op. cit., pp. 523-524.

50. Stanley, W.O., op. cit., p. 173.

51. Brameld, T. The Climactic Decades, op. cit., pp. 183-184.

52. Cassirer, E. The Philosophy of the Englightenment, op. cit., p. 6 f.

Chapter XI

1. Note Rugg's editorship of and contributions to the National Society for the Study of Education. The Foundations and Techniques of Curriculum Construction. Twenty-sixth yearbook, part 1. Bloomington (Ill.), Public School Publishing Co., 1926; Smith, B.O., Stanley, W.O. and Shores, J.H.. Fundamentals of Curriculum Development; Broudy, H.S., Smith, B.O. and Burnett, J.R. Democracy and Excellence in American Secondary Education. Chicago, Rand McNally, 1964.

2. For examples of this approach, see Hirst, P. "Liberal education and the nature of knowledge" in Archambault, R. (ed.) Philosophical Analysis and Education; and Hirst, P. and Peters, R.S. The Logic of Education. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970. The most influential modern study of strategies of subject development in the school curriculum is Bruner, J.S. The Process of Education. Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard University Press, 1960.

3. For example, Dewey, J. Experience and Education, op. cit.; Dearden, R. The Philosophy of Primary Education. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968; Hirst, P. and Peters, R.S., op. cit., p. 32 f.

4. Phenix, P. Realms of Meaning, op. cit.; Broudy, H.S. et al., op. cit.

5. Shapovalenko, S.G. (ed.) Polytechnical Education in the U.S.S.R., op. cit., p. 11.

6. Clayton, A.S. Religion and Schooling. A Comparative Study. Waltham (Mass.), Blaisdell, 1969, pp. 59-60. The task of a Christian education, according to Leeson, is, in the Pauline phrase, "to clothe the children with Christ": Leeson, S. Christian Education. London, Longmans, Green, 1947, p. 118.

7. Low-Beer, Ann (ed.) Herbert Spencer, op. cit., "Introduction"; Bibby, C. T.H. Huxley. Scientist, Humanist and Educator. London, Watts, 1959, ch. 2 "A culture adequate to the age".

8. Webb, S. and Freeman, A. Great Britain After the War, op. cit., p. 10.

9. ib., p. 74. Webb and Freeman referred approvingly to the radical educational outlook of the former Chief Inspector of the Board of Education, Edmond Holmes - What is and What Might Be. This book may be contrasted with Webb's plan for the organization of educational facilities in London; together they comprise a substantial qualitative and quantitative reorientation of educational thinking in the early twentieth century.

10. Webb, S. The Teacher in Politics, op. cit., pp. 10-11.

11. Webb, S. London Education, op. cit., p. 53.

12. ib.

13. Webb, S. and Freeman, A., op. cit., ch. XI "Can we obtain a revolution in education?"; and Webb, S. and B. The Prevention of Destitution, op. cit., ch. 2 "How to prevent the destitution that arises from sickness"; ch. 4 "How to prevent the destitution arising from child neglect". The Webbs were no less percipient in analysing the relationship between destitution and education than they were in forecasting trends in higher education: "It is clear, though the Socialist does not always remember it, that any such reconstruction as he desires involves, as a condition, that we should first have put an end to the degradation and demoralization in which so large a proportion of the wage-earners are, by their destitution, enslaved; and that the best hope lies in securing, for the children of the whole population, such a standard of health, intelligence, and education as will enable them to take their place in the Co-operative Commonwealth", The Prevention of Destitution, p. 329. The main obstacle, they felt, was not so much lack of money as lack of administrative science - hence their interest in developing means for social research in tertiary institutions.

14. Webb, S. London Education, op. cit., ch. III "The organization of commercial education", ch. IV "The organization of the polytechnics".

15. The Webbs' devotion to administrative reform and their generally off-hand treatment of the arts and the humanistic studies have perhaps contributed to a conception of the role of local and, indeed, national government which has identified utilitarian provision as the principal function of public authority. The neglect of the arts by the municipalities was severely criticized by W.A. Robson (The Development of Local Government. London, Allen and Unwin, 1932, 2nd edn., pp. 221-235.) Robson attributed this neglect to "the traditional legal inability of municipal bodies to foster the cultural services in the past century" (p. 232). Allowing for marked improvements since 1932, this criticism is a reminder that considerably more than a combination of a national minimum and utilitarian studies are required in education to procure that enrichment of experience from which high aspirations proceed.

16. Principal sources of Wells' curriculum thinking are (chronologically): Mankind in the Making; New Worlds for Old; The New Machiavelli; The World Set Free; The Undying Fire; Joan and Peter; The Salvaging of Civilization; Experiment in Autobiography; World Brain.

17. World Brain, pp. 72-73. This scheme has much in common with the informational programme of general education prepared in detail by Rugg and sketched by Brameld.

18. The Story of a Great Schoolmaster. Works, Atlantic Edition, vol. XXIV. London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1927 (1924) "Oundle was not so much a public school as a happy and all too brief lapse of a public school into education" (1927 Preface).

19. ib., p. 54.

20. Bantock, G.H. "Towards a theory of popular education". Times Educational Supplement, 2912, March 12, 1971, p. 4; 2913, March 19, 1971, p4.

21. Seguel, Mary L. The Curriculum Field. Its Formative Years. New York, Teachers College, Columbia University, Teachers College Press, 1966.

22. It is instructive to contrast Bobbitt's job analysis approach to defining a socially relevant content in the U.S.A. in the 1920s with Pestalozzi's atomistic analysis of sense perception and his deductions of learning experiences therefrom. Seguel, M.L., op. cit., p. 67 f; Pestalozzi, H. How Gertrude Teaches Her Children ... An Account of the Method (trans. Lucy E. Holland and Frances C. Turner, ed. E. Cooke). London, Swan Sonnenschein, 1900. "The most important means of preventing confusion, inconsequence, and superficiality in human education, rests principally on care in making the first sense impression of things most essential for us to know, as clear, correct, and comprehensive as possible" (p. 159).

23. "I believe it is not possible for common popular instruction to advance a step, so long as formulas of instruction are not found which make the teacher at least in the elementary stages of knowledge, merely the mechanical tool of a method, the result of which springs from the nature of the formulas and not from the skill of the man who uses it. I assert definitely, that a school book is only good when an uninstructed schoolmaster can use it at need" (ib., p. 41). There was another side to Pestalozzi's educational thinking - his concern for what he called "thinking love" in adult child relationships: nb. his Letters on Early Education (Pestalozzi to J.P. Greaves). London, Sherward, Gilbert Piper, 1827.

24. Ratich, unfortunately, failed to satisfy his patrons and was at one point imprisoned by Prince Ludwig and only released on signing a declaration that he "had claimed and promised more than he knew or could bring to pass" - a salutary reminder of the proneness of educational reformers to overreach themselves! Barnard, H.C. (ed.) Memoirs of Eminent Teachers and Educators ... in Germany. Hartford (Conn.), Brown and Gross, 1878, p. 322.

25. Bruner, J.S. The Process of Education, op. cit. It should be added that in his later book, Toward a Theory of Instruction. Cambridge (Mass.), The Belknap Press, 1967, Bruner accepted a more responsible and creative role for classroom teachers.

26. Maclure, J.S. Curriculum Innovation in Practice. London, H.M.S.O., 1968, p. 10.

27. These criticisms are to be found in many of Dewey's works. See, particularly, "Ethical principles underlying education", National Herbart Society, Third Yearbook. Chicago, 1897 (revised and reissued as Moral Principles in Education. Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1909); The School and Society; Progressive Education and the Science of Education, and Experience and Education.

28. See the assessment by his disciples: Childs, J.L. American Pragmatism and Education, op. cit., chs. 6-9, and Kilpatrick, W.H. "The contribution of John Dewey to education" in Schilpp, P.A. (ed.) The Philosophy

of John Dewey, op. cit.; and Handlin, O. John Dewey's Challenge to Education. New York, Harper, 1959.

29. Smith, B.O., Stanley, W.O. and Shores, H.J., op. cit., p. 477 f. Note also Dewey's criticism that one of the practical consequences of public involvement in curriculum making is the tendency for local communities to "keep up with the Jones's" by adopting the latest fad: Callahan, R.E. Education and the Cult of Efficiency. Chicago University Press, 1962, p. 53 fn.

30. Cited from Tyler's address to the Third International Curriculum Conference, Oxford, 1968, by Maclure, S., op. cit., p. 37. See also Tyler, R.W. Basic Principles of Curriculum and Instruction. University of Chicago Press, 1949, chs. 1-4. On "organizing centres" in curriculum design, see Herrick, V.E. "The concept of curriculum design" in Herrick, V.E. and Tyler, R.W. (eds.) Toward Improved Curriculum Theory. University of Chicago Press, 1950, Supplementary Edl. Monographs, no. 71.

31. I develop this point in discussing curriculum objectives in my paper, "Objectives in general studies". The Vocational Aspect, 23, 54, April 1971, pp. 1-7. See also, Broudy, H.S. "Can we define good teaching?" Teachers College Record, 70, 7, April 1969, pp. 583-592, for a distinction between teaching which is directed by objectives and "encounter teaching", which emphasizes personal interactions between teacher and taught.

32. Dewey, J. Sources of a Science of Education. New York, Liveright, 1929.

33. Rousseau used social materials for the education of Emile, in the form of history, literature and so forth, but the social relationship patterns he imposed were, if not exactly arbitrary, highly artificial and restrictive.

34. Mayhew, Katherine C. and Edwards, Anna C., op. cit.; Dewey, J. (ed.) The Elementary School Record; The School and Society. Dewey brings out the psychological significance of these studies, by a dual use of the word "occupation" (to refer both to the history of work, and to children's activity) in Democracy and Education, p. 228 f.

35. Dewey, J. "Challenge to liberal thought" in Problems of Men, op. cit. See also Childs' attack on the classical humanism of R.M. Hutchins, in his Education and Morals, op. cit., ch. V.

36. "The modern trend toward vocational education in its effect upon the professional and non-professional studies of the university". Journal of Proceedings and Addresses, Association of American Universities, Nov. 1917.

37. Childs, J.L. "Experimentalism and educational values" (p. 220). Harvard Educational Review, XXII, 4, Fall 1952, pp. 219-228. Childs' attacks in this paper on Soviet communism and on "romantic" aspirations to create a world state in the near future may be contrasted with his more militant and utopian outlook in the thirties.

38. Dewey, J. Democracy and Education, p. 225.

39. ib., ch. X "Interest and discipline", and XIV "The nature of subject matter".

40. Dewey, J. How We Think, ch. VII "Analysis of reflective thinking" (1932 ed.).

41. Kilpatrick, W.H. The Project Method, op. cit., p. 4.

42. Kilpatrick, W.H. The Foundations of Method, op. cit., p. 148.

43. ib., p. 157.

44. Kilpatrick, W.H. Education for a Changing Civilization, op. cit., p. 136.

45. Kilpatrick had not modified his preference for the expansive concept of education as "total living" in 1951, when he contrasted the old curriculum ("the requisite content of knowledge arranged systematically [logically] for progressive acquisition") with the new ("the new curriculum becomes the total living of the child so far as the school can influence it or should take responsibility for developing it"). Philosophy of Education, op. cit., pp. 313-314.

46. Dewey, J. Democracy and Education, op. cit., pp. 269-270.

Chapter XII

1. Rugg, H. and Withers, W., Social Foundations of Education, pp. 144-145.

2. Rugg, H. Culture and Education in America, op. cit., p. 230 f.

3. ib.

4. But when Rugg, as editor of the 1926 Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education (The Foundation and Techniques of Curriculum Construction), had the opportunity, or so one might think, to assemble such a design team, he passed it over. The Yearbook contributions are substantially by Rugg himself and by professional educationists, and no new "synthesis" emerged.

5. Rugg, H. Culture and Education in America, p. 59 (italics).

6. ib., p. 71.

7. ib., p. 74.

8. Rugg, H. and Counts, G.S. "A critical appraisal of current methods of curriculum-making" in Rugg, H. (ed.), op. cit., pp. 425-427.

9. Bruner, J.S. The Process of Education, op. cit.

10. Rugg, H. and Krueger, Louise. Man and His Changing Society, op. cit. Rugg was bitterly attacked by factions within the American Legion and business organizations (Rugg, H. That Men May Understand. New York, Doubleday, 1941) for reasons not difficult to appreciate: [Man and His Changing Society represents] "the clearest and most concrete attempt on the part of any reconstructionist in the twentieth century to change the curriculum of the schools directly along reconstructionist lines". Karier, C.J. Man, Society, and Education., op. cit., p. 241 fn.

11. Rugg, H. Culture and Education in America, p. 142. A similar point is made in his study of progressive schools. Rugg, H. and Shumaker, Ann. The Child-Centered School. An Appraisal of the New Education. Yonkers-on-Hudson, New York, World Book Co., 1928.

12. But see his posthumously published study, Imagination.

13. Rugg, H. Foundations for American Education, op. cit., p. xiv.

14. See my discussion of perspectivism, ch. VII, section 1.4.

15. Rugg, H. and Withers, W., op. cit., p. 662 f.

16. The main sources of Mannheim's thought on the content of school education are: Diagnosis of Our Time, chs. IV "Education, sociology and the problem of group awareness", and VII "Towards a new social philosophy"; and Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning, pt. III,

"New men and new values".

17. ib., ch. 10 "Education as groundwork". On the need for sociological integration in education see Diagnosis of Our Time, p. 57 f.

18. Central Advisory Council for Education (chairman, Sir G. Crowther) 15 to 18. London, H.M.S.O., 1959; see especially part five,"The sixth form"; Central Advisory Council for Education (chairman, J.H. Newsom), Half Our Future, op. cit., part two, "The teaching situation".

19. For American and international data on this question, see: Greenstein, F.L. Children and Politics. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1965; Hyman, H.H. Political Socialization. Glencoe (Ill.), The Free Press, 1959; Massialas, B.G. Education and the Political System. Reading (Mass.), Addison-Wesley, 1969.

20. Essays on the Sociology of Culture, p. 116. In Ideology and Utopia, Mannheim noted the conflict in education between the intellectualistic system (symbolized by the lecture, with the communication of knowledge as its motif) and the "Romantic" system (symbolized by the workshop, and creative collaboration): "But the Romantic treatment reaches its limit whenever systematic knowledge is an indispensable prerequisite of modern life", op. cit., p. 161. In education, as in politics, he saw a need to steer a middle course between contemplation, theoretical approaches, and what he called "historical immediacy" (ib., p. 156). I have tried to show that frequently, instead of finding a middle course, Mannheim veered towards one or other of the extremes.

21. Brameld, T. "The meeting of educational and anthropological theory" in Spindler, G. (ed.) Education and Anthropology. Stanford University Press, 1955, reprinted in Spindler, G. (ed.) Education and Culture. Anthropological Approaches. New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963, p. 91.

22. Education for the Emerging Age, op. cit., p. 184 (italics). See also Patterns of Educational Philosophy, op. cit., ch. 19 "A curriculum design for schools of the people".

23. Education for the Emerging Age, p. 153 f. "Defensible partiality" or the commitment by a group of inquirers to a programme of action did not in Brameld's judgment exclude the use of propaganda, a view he shared with Mannheim. Brameld, T. Patterns of Educational Philosophy, pp. 567-568.

24. Smith, B.O., Stanley, W.O. and Shores, J.H. Fundamentals of Curriculum Development, op. cit., chs. 14-16.

25. Frank, L.K. The School as Agent for Cultural Renewal, op. cit., p. 11.

26. Dewey, J. and Bentley, A.F. Knowing and the Known. Boston, Beacon, 1949.

27. The relationship is evident in Bruner's essay "After John Dewey, what?" in Archambault, R.D. (ed.) Dewey on Education: Appraisals, op. cit.,

and in Toward a Theory of Instruction, op. cit. The distinction that Bruner draws between learning and instruction parallels Dewey's demarcation of his thought from mainstream progressivism.

28. This is true of Dewey, even though in his account of the curriculum of the Laboratory School he grouped subject matter into occupations, studies of the background of social life, and communication skills in reading, grammar and arithmetic. He argued that the latter were given too much attention and he made them subsidiary to the first two, whose character is very definitely social.

29. Remmers, H.H. (ed.) Anti-Democratic Attitudes in American Schools. Evanston (Ill.), Northwestern University Press, 1963, p. 54.

30. Fantini, M. and Weinstein, G. The Disadvantaged: Challenge to Education. New York, Harper and Row, 1968.

31. Greenstein, F.L., op. cit., ch. 3 "Children's feelings about political authority".

32. Remmers, H.H. (ed.), op. cit. On relative rates of saturation in political teaching, see Bereday, G.Z.F. and Stretch, Bonnie B. "Political education in the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.". Comparative Education Review, 7, June 1963, pp. 9-16; Kazamias, A.M. and Massialas, B.G.. Tradition and Change in Education. New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1965, chs. 8 and 9; and Massialas, B.G., op. cit.

Chapter XIII

1. Webb, S. London Education, op. cit., p. 4.

2. ib., p. vii.

3. ib. passim. See also Webb, S. and Freeman, A. Great Britain After the War, ch. XI.

4. The 1870 Education Act. State involvement in some form or other goes back considerably further than this. Armytage, W.H.G. Four Hundred Years of English Education. Cambridge University Press, 1964, chs. I-VII.

5. Behind this programme lay the Fabian faith in education as the foundation of a socialist society. This is well summarized by J.W. Martin: "It is of little use getting every man and woman a vote, securing Labour candidates and Payment of Members, abolishing the House of Lords, or even nationalizing the land and all the means of production, unless we at the same time take care that each generation of children gets the best schooling that we know how to provide, and can possibly afford. Universal suffrage can prosper only through Universal Education. Without a well-taught electorate, Socialism is impossible." "State education at home and abroad", State Education at Home and Abroad, op. cit., p. 2. The issue of the common secondary school illustrates the diverse forms that the faith has taken at different periods. In London Education, Sidney Webb opposed the common school, and did so again in 1918 (Great Britain After the War). The Christian egalitarian socialist, R.H. Tawney, was still, in 1922, supporting different types of secondary school as an alternative to the common school: "a pedantic State-imposed uniformity" and mere "utilitarian efficiency". (Secondary Education for All ... London, The Labour Party and Allen and Unwin, 1922, p. 30.)

6. Nunn, T.P. Education: its Data and First Principles. London, Arnold, 1920. Webb envisaged a form of teacher engagement in political decision-taking, which is still in many respects remote from the realities of policy-making: "we nowadays look, for the most perfect democracy, to a higher degree of complication than either James Mill or Karl Marx ever contemplated - to a perpetual interaction, in council and in administration, between the representatives of the community of citizens or consumers, on the one hand, and on the other, the representatives of each vocation or profession, organized as producers of commodities or services". The Teacher in Politics, op. cit., p. 7.

7. Wells, H.G. The New Machiavelli, p. 76 f.

8. Wells, H.G. World Brain, p. 45.

9. For the history of the interlocking of publicly provided and denominational institutions, see Cruickshank, Marjorie. Church and State

in English Education, 1870 to the Present Day ... London, Macmillan, 1963. The Webbs had a far better appreciation of the problems of changing this structure of interlocking institutions than had Wells.

10. Wells, H.G. Works, vol. XXIV, 1927. "Preface".

11. Wells, H.G. World Brain, p. 49.

12. Rugg, H. The Great Technology, op. cit., p. 181 f.; Brameld, T. Patterns of Educational Philosophy, p. 616 f.

13. Dewey, J. The School and Society, op. cit. See especially ch. II "The school and the life of the child".

14. Kilpatrick, W.H. Education for a Changing Civilization, op. cit., pp. 76-77; 125 f.; Philosophy of Education, pp. 347-348 and ch. XXIII "Curriculum making".

15. Bode examined the problem of relating a democratic school to the only partially democratic society in Democracy as a Way of Life, op. cit., p. 82 f.

16. Dewey's most incisive assessment of these points is The School and Society. But the changes in society that made the redefinition of the role of the school imperative did not reduce the educative role of other institutions than the schools. He saw schools as "the formal agencies for producing those mental attitudes, those modes of feeling and thinking, which are the essence of a distinctive culture. But they are not the ultimate formative force. Social institutions, the trend of occupations, the pattern of social arrangements, are the finally controlling influence in shaping minds": Individualism Old and New, op. cit., p. 119. For a detailed analysis of how economic development and formal education interacted in a nineteenth century rural community, see Thabault, R. Education and Change in a Village Community (trans. P. Tregear). London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1971.

17. Dewey, J. "Education and social change", art. cit.; Kilpatrick, W.H. (ed.) The Educational Frontier, chs. 1, 2, 4 and 8; Childs, J.L. Education and Morals, op. cit., p. 26 f.

18. Hardie, C.D. Truth and Fallacy in Educational Theory, op. cit., pp. 55 and 63.

19. Counts, G.S. The Selective Character of American Secondary Education, op. cit.; The Social Composition of Boards of Education, op. cit.; Dare the School Build a New Social Order?, op. cit. T. Veblen's critique of the influence of business on higher education is to be found in his Higher Learning in America. A Memorandum on the Conduct of Universities by Business Men. New York, Huebsch, 1918. For the impact of Veblen on Rugg, see the latter's Foundations for American Education, op. cit., p. 264 f.

20. "The school is but one formative agency among many, and certainly not the strongest", Dare the School Build a New Social Order?, op. cit.,

p. 24.

21. The divisions this provoked amongst the experimentalists, including Dewey, are discussed by Bowers, C.A. The Progressive Educator and the Depression, op. cit., p. 139 f.

22. For an appraisal of the efficiency movement and of Dewey's opposition to it, see Callahan, R.E. Education and the Cult of Efficiency. I criticized more recent developments of efficiency thinking in educational administration in reviewing the 63rd yearbook, pt. 2, of the National Society for the Study of Education, Behavioral Science and Educational Administration. Illinois, Chicago University Press, 1964: International Review of Education, XII, 1, 1966, pp. 112-115.

23. See Dewey, J. and Dewey, Evelyn. Schools of Tomorrow; Rugg, H. and Shumaker, Ann. The Child-Centered School. An Appraisal of the New Education. In the latter, particular emphasis is given to creativity and the place of the arts in education: chs. XI-XX. Cremin, L.A. The Transformation of the School, op. cit., ch. 8 "The changing pedagogical mainstream"; and Collings, E. An Experiment With a Project Curriculum. New York, Macmillan, 1923.

24. Bode, B. Modern Educational Theories, op. cit., p. 262.

25. The ambition to re-create communities through schooling continues to attract reformers. For a recent proposal to reinstate the "missing community" in schools, see Oliver, D.W. and Newmann, F.M. "Education and community". Harvard Educational Review, 37, 1, 1967, pp. 61-106. In Britain, J.B. Mays has been, amongst sociologists, the most active supporter of the view that, in poorer areas in cities, the school should perceive its task as including substantial efforts to improve the quality of community life: The School in its Social Setting. London, Longmans, 1967.

26. Brauner, C.J. American Educational Theory, op. cit., p. 202 f.

27. See the vigorous criticisms of educational policy in Dumont, R. False Start in Africa. London, Deutsch, 1966.

28. Mannheim, K. Diagnosis of Our Time, op. cit., p. 75.

29. ib., ch. III "The problem of youth in modern society"; ch. IV "Education, sociology and the problem of social awareness".

30. Mannheim, K. Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning, op. cit., ch. 10 "Education as groundwork"; Clarke, F. Essays in the Politics of Education, p. 44 f.

31. This is especially the concern of Clarke's Freedom in the Educative Society, where education is set the practical task of determining "the forms of instruction and discipline which are possible and appropriate in the given state of the culture" (p. 51).

32. Clarke, F. Education and Social Change, op. cit., p. 47 f.

33. Mannheim, K. Diagnosis of Our Time, p. 24.

34. Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning, p. 95 f.

35. ib., p. 247.

36. Essays in the Politics of Education, p. 27.

37. ib., ch. V "What is secondary education?".

38. Freedom in the Educative Society, ch. IV "The English tradition". Clarke's pluralism is evident in the distinctions he drew in this book, between culture and society, and man and citizen.

39. Clarke, F. Education and Social Change, p. 48. See also Essays in the Politics of Education, where Clarke tried to keep the supporting and controlling roles of the state apart, while at the same time criticizing Nunn's individualism.

40. On the abuses of "shaping" metaphors in education, see Hirst, P.H. and Peters, R.S. The Logic of Education, op. cit., p. 29, and ch. 5 "Teaching".

41. Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning, p. 250. In this same chapter, Mannheim wrote approvingly of Counts' attempt, through education, to recreate the social order.

42. Brameld, however, has been a consistent advocate of new and experimental institutions; hence his welcome in The Climactic Decades of the "counter-culture" proposals for schools and colleges radically different in character from conventional institutions.

43. Raup, R.B. et al. The Improvement of Practical Intelligence, p. 40 (italics).

44. See chapter VIII, note 29.

45. Brameld, T. Patterns of Educational Philosophy, p. 698; ch. 22 "Education for democratic power".

46. Neill, A.S. Summerhill, op. cit., p. 45 f.

Chapter XIV

1. The difference may be illustrated by contrasting Dewey's thought with the progressivism of Margaret Naumburg. Naumburg, director of the Walden School, was one of Dewey's severest critics, finding in his thought a pervasive tendency to submerge the individual in "group consciousness", and to suppress originality: "Much of the present social philosophy that wishes to sacrifice the individual to the good of the group is nothing but instinctive herd philosophy, translated into modern terms..." The Child and the World. New York, Harcourt Brace, 1928, p. 59. I discuss this criticism in Criticisms of Progressive Education, 1916-1930, unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of Illinois, 1958, p. 253 f. The unfoldment theory of growth derives principally from Rousseau and Froebel. Dewey's assessment of Froebel reveals both his debt and his rejection of the latency theory. See The School and Society, ch. V, and Democracy and Education, chs. V and IX.

2. Rugg, H. and Withers, W. Social Foundations of Education, op. cit., p. 691.

3. Peters, R.S. (ed.) Perspectives on Plowden, op. cit., pp. 16-17, 79 f. and ch. V. Childs' summary of the thinking of the experimentalists on this matter is instructive: "they have never endorsed the movement to turn the school into a "child-centred" institution. They have been critical of those groups in the new education who have assumed that to make the growth of the child the compelling moral aim of the school necessarily implies that the child is competent to take over the responsibility for his own education ... For them, freedom is an achievement, not an original possession, and they believe that the child becomes 'free' as he becomes intelligent ...", etc. American Pragmatism and Education, op. cit., pp. 344-345.

4. The suggestions will be brief and they must perforce be made without reference to some of the more interesting developments in our understanding of the teacher's task; for example, The Eight-Year Study in the U.S.A. and the Peckham Experiment in England. See Aikin, W.M. The Story of the Eight-Year Study. New York, Harper, 1942; Pearse, Innes H. and Crocker, Lucy H. The Peckham Experiment. London, Allen and Unwin, 1943; Williamson, G.S. and Pearse, Innes H. Science, Synthesis and Sanity. London, Collins, 1965. See also Oeser, O. (ed.) Teacher, Pupil, and Task: Elements of Social Psychology Applied to Education. London, Tavistock, 1955, chs. I-VI; and Rugg, H. Foundations for American Education, part VI "The educational frontier".

5. Kelsall, R.K. and Kelsall, Helen M. The School Teacher in England and Wales. The Findings of Empirical Research. Oxford, Pergamon, 1969; Taylor, W. (ed.) Towards a Policy for the Education of Teachers, Proceedings of the 20th Symposium of the Colston Research Society ... 1968. London, Butterworth, 1969.

6. Nash, P. "The strange death of progressive education". Educational Theory, XIV, 2, April 1964, pp. 65-75, 82 (p. 69).

7. Increasing teacher militancy, and organized power in the sixties, were regarded by J.R. Burnett as grounds for hope that American teachers might themselves assume a socially reconstructive role: "Changing the social order: the role of schooling". Educational Theory, XIX, 4, Fall 1969, pp. 327-336. See also Brubacher, J. "Why teacher militancy?". Educational Leadership, 27, 1, Oct. 1969, pp. 30-33. However, some research studies of teacher attitude and political behavior suggest that authoritarianism is still widespread and that teachers tend to remain "quiet" on controversial issues: Gubser, M.M. "Anti-democratic attitudes of American educators". School and Community, 54, 4, Dec. 1967, pp. 14-16; Massialas, B.G. Education and the Political System. But, as W. Taylor (Society and the Education of Teachers. London, Faber and Faber, 1969) points out, evidence on teacher personality, at least in England, is still very inadequate and insufficient for any generalizations to be made (p. 171 f.).

8. Cp. Brauner, C.J. American Educational Theory, op. cit., p. 202 f. Brauner in fact makes this inference, but his argument is speculative.

9. Cited in Callahan, R.E. Education and the Cult of Efficiency, op. cit., p. 121.

10. "Introduction" to Clapp, Elsie R. The Use of Resources in Education.

11. Impressions of Soviet Russia and the Revolutionary World, Mexico, China, Turkey. New York, New Republic Inc., 1929 (extract in Skilbeck, M. Dewey, op. cit., pp. 125-135).

12. Childs, J.L. Education and Morals, op. cit., p. 185 f.; Kilpatrick, W.H. Education for a Changing Civilization, op. cit., p. 76 f., and 128; and Philosophy of Education, op. cit., pp. 347-348.

13. McClelland, D. "Changing values for progress" in Burns, H.W. (ed.) Education and the Development of Nations. Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1963, p. 73. I discuss the concept of teacher as change agent in "Strategies of curriculum change" in Walton, J. (ed.) Curriculum Organization and Design. London, Ward Lock (forthcoming), and "The teacher as agent of cultural change". Educational Theory (forthcoming).

14. See Kelsall, R.K. and Kelsall, Helen M., op. cit.

15. Clarke, F. Freedom in the Educative Society, p. 51 f. However, Clarke's position is not altogether consistent, as he treated the teacher both as a free agent of culture and as an instrument of political decisions. The inconsistency reflects Clarke's recognition of the formative influence and power of organized institutions and his Idealistic belief in a higher realm of ideas which are expressed in culture. Both the political and the cultural roles should be performed, but difficulties arise in attempting to reconcile them and Clarke paid too little attention to these difficulties.

16. World Brain, op. cit., p. 81. See also The World of William Clissold, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 178; vol. 3, pp. 704, 716.

17. The Undying Fire, p. 47.

18. Wells, H.G. New Worlds for Old, op. cit., p. 282.

19. Croce, B. "Introduction" to G. Gentile The Reform of Education. London, Benn, 1923, p. xi.

20. Lucas, F.L. The Decline and Fall of the Romantic Ideal. Cambridge University Press, 1936; Berlin, I. B.B.C. Third Programme broadcasts, October-November 1967, "Romanticism".

21. See note 7.

22. See ch. XIII, section 3.1.

23. Patterns of Educational Philosophy, op. cit., pp. 631-632, 748 f.

24. Problems of Men, op. cit., pp. 78-79.

25. Bennis, W.G., Benne, K.D. and Chin, R. (eds.) The Planning of Change, op. cit. See also note 13 above.

26. Brameld defends this position in the light of cross-cultural studies of value preferences in Cultural Foundations of Education, ch. 12 "Human freedom as a cultural goal".

27. Patterns of Educational Philosophy, p. 563 f.

28. Russell, B. Unpopular Essays, p. 153.

29. The difference between Russell and Dewey on this matter reflects different cultural situations and different traditions of community engagement in education. J.B. Mays continues the Russell tradition, although in a modified form, when he recommends teachers who are confronted by "bad" situations to find ways of preventing the major formative influences of peer group and family from allying with one another: The School in its Social Setting, op. cit., p. 3 f.

30. Education for a Changing Civilization, p. 76.

31. Childs, J.L. Education and Morals, p. 185.

32. See ch. XI, section 2.3.2.

33. For example, the Department of Education and Science teaching practice survey at the Bristol University School of Education. See Cope, Edith. "Teachers and training, 1, School practice, the concept of role". Trends in Education, 16, Oct. 1969, pp. 34-38.

34. Rugg, H. and Withers, W. Social Foundations of Education, p. 557.

35. Schilpp. P.A. (ed.) The Philosophy of John Dewey, op. cit., p. 138f, p.544f.

36. See The Logic of the Humanities, op. cit., p. 194 f.

37. Dearden, R.F. "Instruction and learning by discovery" in Peters, R.S. (ed.) The Concept of Education, op. cit.

38. Rugg, H. and Withers, W. Social Foundations of Education, p. 515 f. Rugg elaborated his ideas on integrated cultural studies in the concluding section of this book. See also above, ch. VIII, section 1.3.

39. Brauner, C.J. American Educational Theory, p. 202 f.

40. Rugg, H. and Withers, W., op. cit., p. 624.

41. Clarke, F. Essays in the Politics of Education, op. cit., p. 142 f. See also Clarke's mature views on the subject in "The widening scope of the study of education" in The Advancement of Science, VI, 23, Oct. 1949. There are very interesting similarities between Clarke's views (Essays in the Politics of Education, ch. VIII "The study of education") and Bode's (Modern Educational Theories, ch. XV "Scientific method and educational theory"). Both argued for the development of relationships between educational science and a general philosophy or theory, through the study of the processes and objectives of education - a task for which they felt the university department was peculiarly well suited. I explore this relationship, in the context of curriculum development in "Graduate training, curriculum development and the U.D.E.s" Education for Teaching, No. 82, Summer 1970.

42. Childs, J.L. Education and Morals, p. 175.

43. The principal sources of this eclectic model are Rugg, Kilpatrick and Brameld.

44. Philosophy of Education, p. 232 f.

45. Education for the Emerging Age, ch. 19 "The coming breakthrough in teacher education". See also Cultural Foundations of Education, p. 257 f. Cp. Brameld's more modest proposals for Puerto Rican teacher education: The Remaking of a Culture, p. 595 f.

46. See Brameld's criticisms of Hutchins and the St. John's College 100 books curriculum in Patterns of Educational Philosophy, ch. 11 "The perennialist pattern of educational beliefs".

47. Rugg, H. Foundations for American Education, ch. XVIII "Society centred foundations ..."; Rugg, H. and Withers, W. Social Foundations of Education, p. 523 f.

48. Phenix, P.H. "Teacher education and the unity of culture". Teachers College Record, 60, 6, March 1959, pp. 337-343.

49. Brauner, C.J., op. cit., p. 221.

50. Peters, R.S. "A recognizable philosophy of education: a constructive critique" in Perspectives on Plowden, op. cit., p. 17.

Chapter XV

1. The treatment of education as a "dependent variable" performing roles like occupational selection and preparation illustrates this approach: Clark , B.R. Educating the Expert Society. San Francisco, Chandler, 1962.

2. See ch. XII, section 1. Several of the major features of the movement are reviewed in Richmond, W.K. The School Curriculum. London, Methuen, 1971, Introduction and Part I.

3. The rational model of behavior, which sees man in terms of his deliberations, choices, adoption of rules, planning, etc., does not deny the values to which I have alluded, but, insofar as it acknowledges them at all, treats them as constituents of rationality itself. To assimilate them in this way is to create a hierarchy which itself answers the question the rationalist claims to be asking; viz. "what sort of life is worth living?": Peters, R.S. "Mental health as an aim". Studies in Philosophy and Education, III, 2, Spring 1964, pp. 185-200.

4. Lack of design models in the "child-centred" schools was one of their principal weaknesses, according to Dewey, Rugg and other reconstructionists: "In none of these schools has the staff, working as a team, designed a really integrated program of work". Rugg, H. and Shumaker, Ann. The Child-Centered School, op. cit., p. 113.

5. Britton, J. Language and Learning. London, Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 1970.

6. I discuss an example of partial integration in primary school social studies in "Man - a broadcast series". Trends in Education, 19, July 1970, pp. 9-15.

7. The schemes were by no means always unworkable, as I pointed out in chs. X and XI in discussing Dewey's pioneering reforms at the Laboratory School.

8. Fantini, M. and Weinstein, G. The Disadvantaged: Challenge to Education. New York, Harper and Row, 1968.

9. As in the Newsom Report, Half Our Future.

10. Benne, K.D. and Muntyan, B. (eds.) Human Relations in Curriculum Change, op. cit., Part One, "Human relations - a neglected factor in curriculum change".

11. This argument is underlined in Gross, N., et al. An Attempt to Implement a Major Educational Innovation.

12. Laski, H. The American Democracy. London, Allen and Unwin, 1949, pp. 390-391.

13. I discuss this more limited form of institutional innovation in my paper "Graduate training, curriculum development and the U.D.E.s", art. cit.

14. Scheffler, I. (Chairman) Harvard Committee The Graduate Study of Education. Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard University Press, 1966, p. 19. This passage echoes Whitehead's conception of the task of the whole university: "Harvard, the future" in Essays in Science and Philosophy. London, Rider, 1948.

15. Bruner, J.S. Toward a Theory of Instruction, op. cit.

16. For critiques, see Ausubel, D.P. Educational Psychology. A Cognitive View, op. cit.; Bruner, J.S. Toward a Theory of Instruction, op. cit.; and Dearden, R.F. "Instruction and learning by discovery", art. cit.

17. Discussed in Bennis, W.G., Benne, K.D. and Chin, R. (eds.) The Planning of Change, op. cit., passim.

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